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ABSTRACT

Volume I, "Development Prospects and Problems," is part of a 2-volume compendium of study papers intended to serve as a resource document for members of the Joint Economic Committee, other members of Congress, and those who are concerned with formulating and executing effective policies of economic development for American Indian and Alaskan native communities. "The study addresses itself to the serious problems of poverty and economic insecurity found in native American communities and to the apparent inability of the Federal Government to provide effective assistance in improving the economic situations of American Indian and Alaskan native groups. The compendium contains papers by invited individual experts, statements by Federal agencies, and statements by native organizations." This document, Part I of the study, contains a discussion of deficiencies of current statistical data on the American Indian, along with 16 studies which summarize economic conditions among the Indians, the frustrations and failures of assistance efforts, the mixed results of initiatives undertaken since 1963, and the history of Indian attitudes toward Federal assistance. Also included in Part I are recommendations for the future direction of Federal policy. A related document is RC 005 588. (LS)

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TOWARD ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FOR NATIVE AMERICAN COMMUNITIES

A COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS

SUBMITTED TO THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT

OF THE

JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

Volume 1

Part I: DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS

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LETTERS OF TRANSMITTAL

DECEMBER 18, 1969.

To the Members of the Joint Economic Committee:

Transmitted herewith for the use of the members of the Joint Economic Committee and other Members of Congress is a two-volume study entitled "Toward Economic Development for Native American Communities," prepared for the Subcommittee on Economy in Government.

The views expressed in this document do not necessarily represent the views of the members of the committee or the committee staff, but are statements of issues and alternatives intended to enlarge public knowledge of the subject and to provide a focus for further discussion.

WRIGHT PATMAN,
Chairman, Joint Economic Committee.

DECEMBER 17, 1969.

Hon. WRIGHT PATMAN,
Chairman, Joint Economic Committee,
Congress of the United States,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Transmitted herewith is a two-volume compendium of study papers entitled "Toward Economic Development for Native American Communities." The compendium is intended to serve as a resource document for members of the Joint Economic Committee, other Members of Congress, and others who are concerned with formulating and executing effective policies of economic development for American Indian and Alaskan native communities.

The papers in this compendium document the fact that, despite greatly increased levels of Federal assistance, the vast majority of native Americans continue to live in extreme poverty and deprivation. The need for a searching evaluation of Federal Indian policies is apparent. Many new types of economic assistance programs have been instituted by the Federal Government in the past 5 or 6 years. Some of these appear to hold considerable promise for the future, but the lack of adequate evaluation has made it difficult to know which policies are working and which are not. This compendium is intended to help put current policies in perspective and to suggest appropriate directions for the future.

The compendium contains contributions by a number of invited individual experts, statements by Federal agencies having responsibility for various programs to assist native Americans, and statements by organizations representing native groups. The subcommittee is indebted to the authors for their excellent contributions and to the various Federal agencies for their cooperation in this endeavor.

As the Executive Director's letter indicates, the compendium should not be interpreted as an expression of views or conclusions by the subcommittee, its individual members, or the committee staff.

WILLIAM PROXMIRE,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Economy in Government.

DECEMBER 16, 1969.

Hon. WILLIAM PROXMIRE,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Economy in Government, Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR PROXMIRE: Transmitted herewith is a two-volume study entitled "Toward Economic Development for Native American Communities." The study addresses itself to the serious problems of poverty and economic insecurity found in native American communities and to the apparent inability of the Federal Government to provide effective assistance in improving the economic situations of American Indian and Alaskan native groups.

The compendium contains papers by invited individual experts, statements by Federal agencies, and statements by native organizations. It is intended as a resource document for Members of Congress and others concerned with achieving an effective Federal policy in this area. By providing historical background, descriptions of new programs instituted in the 1960's, assessment of current economic and social conditions, and suggestions for future policy directions, the study can form a basis for informed discussion and necessary action.

Frazier Kellogg had staff responsibility for compiling and editing the compendium. He was assisted in the earlier stages by Michael J. Duberstein, and throughout the study he had the administrative and secretarial assistance of Mrs. Anne McAfee. The papers in the compendium represent the views of their authors, and should not be interpreted as reflecting the opinions of members of the Joint Economic Committee or the committee staff.

JOHN R. STARK,
Executive Director, Joint Economic Committee.

CONTENTS

Volume 1

Page

Letters of transmittal III

Introduction VII

Part I: DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS

A Statistical Profile of the Indian: The Lack of Numbers
STEPHEN A. LANGONE 1

American Indians in Rural Poverty
HELEN W. JOHNSON 19

The American Indian: Needs and Problems
ALBERT JENNY II 46

Barriers to Economic Development
GORDON MACGREGOR 61

Some Thoughts on Reservation Economic Development
BILL KING 66

Indian Identity and Economic Development
SOL TAX and SAM STANLEY 75

Readjustment with Security for the American Indian
GLENN L. EMMONS 97

Economic Development as a Means of Overcoming Poverty
ROBERT L. BENNETT 102

Trends in Employment and Earnings of American Indians
ALAN L. SORKIN 107

Role of Manpower Programs in Assisting the American Indians
U.S. Department of Labor 119

An Economic Evaluation of On-the-Job Training Conducted Under the Auspices of the Bureau of Indian Affairs: Concepts and Preliminary Findings
LOREN C. SCOTT and DAVID W. STEVENS 171

Lawyers on the Reservation: Some Implications for the Legal Profession
MONROE E. PRICE 191

A Plan for Navajo Economic Development
DAVID F. ABERLE 223

The Lumbee Indians: Patterns of Adjustment
MOHAMMOD AMANULLAH 277

Tax Incentives for Industrial Development
E. Y. BERRY 299

The Role of the Federal Government in Present-Day Indian Industrial and Commercial Development: A Discussion
MAURICE SONNENBERG 302

Economic Development and Alaskan Natives
ARLON R. TUSSING and DOUGLAS N. JONES 313

Volume 2

Part II: DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS AND PLANS

Economic Development of Indian Communities
BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 381
Indian Development Program
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 356
The Role of Indian Tribes in Economic Development and the Efforts of the Indian Division of the Community Action Program of the Office of Economic Opportunity To Assist in Indian Reservation Economic Development
JAMES J. WILSON 370
People and Programs: The Indian Effort in the Development of Health, Education, and Welfare 375
Exhibit I: Improving the Quality of Life Among Indians 381
Exhibit II: State Letter No. 1031; Subject: Eligibility of Indians, Including Those Living on Reservations, for Medical Care and Servives Under Provisions of Social Security Act 387
Exhibit III: State Letter No. 1062; Subject: Eligibility of Indians, Including Those Living on Reservations, for Assistance and Services Under Provisions of the Social Security Act 387
Manpower Programs for Indians Administered by the Department of Labor 389
USDA Programs Directed to the Indian Community with Attention to the Relationships Among USDA Programs and the Human and Economic Development Efforts of Other Federal Agencies 395
Economic Development in the American Indian Community: Role of the Small Business Administration 398
Appendix I: Correspondence Between the Commissioner of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Small Business Administration 405
Appendix II: Excerpts From Recent Reports by SBA Field Offices Concerning the Involvement in Economic Development in the American Indian Community 405
Economic Development of the American Indian and His Lands
POSITION PAPER OF THE NATIONAL CONGRESS OF AMERICAN INDIANS 410
Oklahomans for Indian Opportunity, Incorporated and Economic Development for Non-Reservation Indian People
WILLIAM G. HAYDEN 418
Position With Respect to the Native Land Claims Issue
EMIL NOTTI 442

Part III: THE RESOURCE BASE

Indian Trust Funds
ALAN L. SORKIN 449
Federal Encroachment on Indian Water Rights and the Impairment of Reservation Development
WILLIAM H. VEEDER 460
The Heirship Land Problem and Its Effect on the Indian, the Tribe, and Effective Utilization
STEPHEN A. LANGONE 519
Framework for Decision
ESTER C. WUNNICKE, ROBERT D. ARNOLD, and DAVID M. HICKOK 549

INTRODUCTION

The Subcommittee on Economy in Government has devoted much of its activity in the past year to public expenditure policy, both in respect to (a) determination of priorities, and (b) assuring greater effectiveness of program. Examination of the effectiveness of Federal programs concentrated for the most part on defense spending and to a lesser extent on the question of public works evaluation. Obviously, there are many other public programs that warrant attention from the point of view of program effectiveness. Our Indian programs are an obvious candidate for such attention. While expenditures for this purpose constitute but a small part of the total budget, past failure to apply necessary funds effectively have incurred large costs in human terms. Now, with the renewed emphasis on economic rehabilitation that characterizes our efforts to improve the impoverished sectors of the U.S. economy, it seemed an appropriate time for the subcommittee to undertake this review of our Indian policy objectives and our programs to achieve them. This compendium is intended to aid the Congress in its consideration of means to improve the presently intolerable situation of the Indian population in the United States.

The need to preserve economic and social opportunities for native Americans—the American Indians and the Alaskan native groups—has troubled thoughtful citizens virtually ever since the arrival of the first white settlers on the American Continent. The Federal Government has now had official trust responsibilities for the American Indians for well over 100 years. A variety of different Indian policies have been tried out, ranging from efforts to completely assimilate the Indians into the dominant white culture and economy, thus causing them to disappear as a separate group, to efforts to preserve traditional Indian societies totally intact and totally divorced from the rest of the American economy. These various policy efforts would seem to have had only one thing in common: none of them worked. The American Indians continue to be the most poverty-stricken group in American society. Perhaps three-quarters of reservation Indian families have incomes below the poverty level, unemployment exceeds one-third of the reservation labor force, educational opportunity and attainment are substantially below the national average, and many Indian communities would appear to have developed attitudes of total discouragement and hopelessness.

Certainly predominant public attitudes toward the American Indians have not always been ones of concern and good intentions. But even where intentions have been of the best, remarkably little appears to have been achieved in the way of actually improving Indian living conditions. Recently there has emerged a great deal of public concern for the impoverished and disadvantaged groups in our society, and this concern has been reflected in substantially increased Federal expenditure on Indian programs. Total Federal expenditure on programs to assist the Indians and the Alaskan natives is now in the neighborhood of $500 million per year. Many new programs of economic development assistance have been introduced in the last 5 or 6 years, and a number of Government agencies have become involved in these programs. In addition, there seems to be an increased awareness of the need to have the Indians participate fully in planning their own future.

All these are hopeful signs. Good intentions, a willingness to make the necessary financial investments, and respect for the Indian's right to self-determination are fundamental to any successful program to improve economic conditions, but they are only the beginning. In order to plan and implement a successful economic development effort, it is necessary to know which specific programs will work and under what circumstances. Among the questions which need answering are:

- What are the potentials of the natural resource base found on the Indian reservations?
- How can this potential be utilized?
- What types of industry can operate with economic efficiency on the reservations?
- How can these industries be encouraged to locate there?
- How much and what kind of job training is required?
- How will development on the reservation affect the surrounding region and vice versa?
- What is the appropriate role of the Federal Government in Indian economic development and which agencies should be given which responsibilities?

These questions and many others require answers. If they are not answered, current efforts to assist the Indians will be no more successful than past efforts. Some of the answers can be found through a thorough evaluation of past and current programs, particularly the proliferation of new programs which have been instituted since about 1963. The Joint Economic Committee's compendium is addressed to the specifics of economic development, and it includes descriptions and evaluations of the new efforts of the 1960's. The compendium is thus intended to make a contribution not only to the stimulation of public concern regarding the plight of the American Indians, but also to the knowledge and understanding required to translate this concern into successful action.

The publication of this compendium follows closely upon the release of the report of the U.S. Senate's Special Subcommittee on Indian Education, a report which makes recommendations for improving not only the education but the total social and economic environment of the American Indians.[1] Education and economic development are obviously too closely interrelated to be considered in isolation from each other. Material in the Joint Economic Committee's compendium should form a useful part of the background information needed to evaluate and carry out the recommendations of the Special Subcommittee on Indian Education.

Part I of the compendium contains 16 studies by outstanding experts. These studies summarize current economic conditions among the American Indians, the frustrations and failures of earlier assistance efforts, the mixed results of the new initiatives undertaken since 1963, and the history of Indians' own attitudes toward Federal assistance programs. They also contain a number of recommendations for the future direction of Federal policy. The first article in Part I describes the serious deficiencies of current statistical information. The lack of sufficient statistical data makes adequate evaluation of present Federal Indian policies almost impossible. New policy planning cannot proceed rationally until it can be learned which current policies are producing results and which are not.

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[1] U.S. Senate, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Special Subcommittee on Indian Education, *Indian Education: A National Tragedy—A National Challenge*, Nov. 3, 1969.

8

Several subsequent articles describe the social and economic conditions in which Indian families now live. On many reservations, extreme poverty and high unemployment are coupled with dependency on Federal welfare programs and a sense of despair born out of the failure of past efforts to improve living conditions. Because long-endured poverty has led to this sense of frustration and despair as well as to serious health problems, economic development efforts will succeed only if they are accompanied by the necessary programs of social rehabilitation, including improved education and health care and the provision of adequate housing.

If economic development among the Indians is to succeed, it must be compatible with the Indians' own sense of values. It is now widely recognized, as unfortunately it often was not in the past, that the Indian does not wish to abandon his identity and his traditional cultural and social values and to become completely assimilated into an acquisitive, capitalistic society. Indian cultures place high value on preservation of the natural environment, on sharing of material goods among the extended family and the tribe, and on maintaining a life style which allows time for quiet leisure and contemplation. The Indians have no wish to abandon these values in favor of industrial society's emphasis on individual competitive achievement and frenetic activity. The problem the Indians face is to come to terms with the surrounding industrial society in a way which permits them to maintain a decent standard of living while still remaining true to their own culture. Achieving compatability between these two somewhat conflicting objectives is obviously not easily done. Failure to recognize and solve this conflict is undoubtedly a large factor in explaining the overall failure of past Federal efforts to assist the Indians.

Part I of the compendium also contains discussions of job training and industrialization efforts sponsored by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Labor Department, and other Federal agencies. These articles emphasize the great variety of situations found among different Indian groups. Among the specific situations discussed are the economic status of the large Navajo reservation, the adjustment problems faced by Indians who migrate to an urban environment, and the special problems faced by rural Indians who do not live on reservations.

Part II of the compendium contains statements by Federal agencies which have responsibility for programs affecting the American Indian and by native organizations. These statements not only describe present programs, but provide various views of currently unmet needs and the manner in which programs should go forward in the future. The Bureau of Indian Affairs has, of course, long been the agency primarily concerned with programs of Indian economic development. While this agency still has a major share of the responsibility for economic development programs, several other agencies have, in recent years, become involved in important ways. The Economic Development Administration and the Office of Economic Opportunity are cooperating in a program of industrial and community development on a selected group of reservations judged to have the greatest development potential. The manpower and job placement services of the Department of Labor, the rural development programs of the Department of Agriculture, and the loan and management assistance programs of the Small Business Administration are available to Indians, and these agencies are undertaking special efforts to assure that Indians have full access to these programs. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare administers an extensive Indian health services program and has established an Office of Indian Affairs to assure that Indians are aware of and full participants in other HEW programs.

Although the situation of the reservation Indian is often described as one of frustration and despair, it would be a serious mistake to think that the Indians are making no organized effort to improve their own economic situation. A statement prepared for this compendium by the National Congress of American Indians, an organization representing over 100 tribes, outlines extensive plans for assisting Indian tribes in development planning and in making maximum use of available Federal programs. A statement by the Oklahomans for Indian Opportunity describes this relatively new organization and indicates the substantial progress which can be made when local concern and desire for self-improvement are effectively mobilized. A statement by the Alaska Federation of Natives describes their position with respect to disposition of the extensive and valuable Alaskan land areas currently under dispute. The particular problems of Alaskan natives and the importance to them of an equitable settlement to this land dispute are also discussed elsewhere in the compendium in two excerpts from the report of the Federal Field Committee for Development Planning in Alaska.

Part III of the compendium discusses the resource base available to the American Indians. The total land area set aside as Indian reservations is, of course, no longer adequate to support a traditional Indian economy based on hunting and grazing. Nor do agricultural pursuits offer much opportunity for improvement in economic conditions. For some Indian tribes, agriculture is simply not a traditional pursuit. Other tribes once had economies based on agriculture, but, like other small and poorly financed farmers, now find themselves with no place in a modern mechanized agricultural industry.

Indian lands do contain valuable forest and mineral resources. One problem which severely complicates advantageous exploitation of these resources is the complicated land ownership situation. A substantial fraction of the Indian lands has at various times been awarded to individual Indians and held in trust for them by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Through the process of inheritance, many of these parcels of land have come into multiple ownership. The administrative problems connected with management of land held in trust for multiple owners prevent effective use of these lands. In some cases, they prevent any use whatsoever. Effective land management will require some sort of consolidation and simplification of land ownership. In the arid and semiarid areas of the Southwestern United States, adequate rights to the use of water resources are another crucial element in economic development. The protection of Indian water rights and planning for the best use of these valuable rights must be an integral part of any development program.

Perhaps one of the most encouraging aspects of the current Indian situation is that substantial funds are becoming available to many of the tribes through awards by the Indian Claims Commission and through leasing of mineral rights on Indian lands. In the past, some of these funds have been distributed on a per capita basis and the remainder have been held in trust by the Federal Government, earning, in general, below-market rates of return. Recently some of these funds have been put to use in tribal development programs, but their potential for financing development remains largely unrealized. More effective use of these funds could go a long way toward financing economic development for some tribes. It must be remembered, however, that such funds are very unevenly distributed among the tribes and can thus represent only one part of a total solution to the problem of the Indians' needs for financial resources.

Toward Economic Development for Native American Communities

Part I: DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS

A STATISTICAL PROFILE OF THE INDIAN: THE LACK OF NUMBERS

By Stephen A. Langone*

FOREWORD

Efficient planning and execution of development programs must be based on accurate information concerning current economic and social conditions and changes in these conditions over time. Stephen A. Langone points out that such data is simply not available with respect to the American Indians. Information compiled on a reservation basis was more adequate a hundred years ago than it is at present, despite the fact that over this period Federal expenditures for Indian programs have risen from $7 million to perhaps $500 million (no one knows the exact total), and the number of Indians under Federal jurisdiction has risen from 290,000 to nearly 400,000. After describing and analyzing this current lack of information, Langone presents a detailed outline for an informational handbook on the American Indians designed to provide the economic and social data which are essential to any rational development program.

Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to point out the absence of adequate statistical information on the American Indian and the need for such information by the Federal Government, the various States, the tribes themselves and the private organizations active in the field. In the Library of Congress Main Catalog there are—under the heading *Indians of North America*—12 drawers of cards. Twelve drawers contain approximately 18,000 cards and of this number only 16 cards are under the subheading *Statistics* and 11 cards under the subheading *Census*. Yet under the subheadings *Pottery* and *Legends* there are 103 for the former and 314 for the latter. Under the subheadings *Population* and *Income* there are no cards at all. The only reason for this observation is to point out that a person with an interest in the American Indian can get much more information on subjects such as pottery and legends than he can on the income, educational attainment, land, etc., of the American Indian today.**

In any discussion concerning statistical information about the American Indian, his problems, and progress, one of the prime sources of information would seem to be the Annual Report of the Commissioner of

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*Analyst, American Indian Affairs, Government and General Research Division, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress.

**Much of the material available from the Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs on the American Indian is not available in public libraries because (1) there is no program to circulate such items to the libraries and (2) it is not combined in one publication that could be printed at the Government Printing Office and sent to depository libraries.

Indian Affairs. One hundred years ago—1869—the Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs,[1] E. S. Parker, was published in book form and contained 619 pages of information. The report included a 42-page statement by the Commissioner concerning general problems, policy decisions during the year, and a summary of the situation at various field jurisdictions, then identified as: Washington, Oregon, California, Nevada, Arizona, Utah, New Mexico, Colorado, Wyoming, Idaho, Montana, Dakota, the Northern Superintendency (Nebraska), the Central Superintendency (Kansas, Indian Territory), the Southern Superintendency (Indian country south of Kansas and west of Arkansas), Independent Agencies, and Indians Not Embraced in Any Agency. Following the Commissioner's statement are reports from each agency, some miscellaneous reports concerning Indians, and a section on statistics (in addition to local statistics given throughout the report) 54 pages long, containing detailed tables on population, education, agriculture, trust funds, trust land sales, and liabilities of the U.S. Government.

In contrast the latest available Annual Report of the Commissioner[2]—1967 at this writing—contains 15 pages (double spaced) including approximately six pages of pictures. Statistical tables (two-thirds of one page) include (1) Awards by Indian Claims Commission; (2) Budget, Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs; and (3) Income from Mineral and Surface Leasing of Indian Lands. Of course, the Bureau publishes separate reports that encompass other subjects, for example: *U.S. Indian Population and Land;*[3] *Statistics Concerning Indian Education,*[4] etc., but the population statistics are seven years old, those for land are six years old* and those for education are two years old.** The Bureau of Indian Affairs complies various statistical reports but they are either for administrative use only, or in some cases, not current enough for effective use. An example is the *Summary of Reservation Development Studies,*[5] a continuing study, begun "In response to a growing awareness of the need for more reliable human and natural resources data * * *." Other publications such as the *Annual Statistical Summary*[6] compiled by the Branch of Employment Assistance and the *Annual Report on Indian Lands*[7] would be of much more value to the entire Federal Government structure, the Indians and private organizations if they were (1) published together; (2) in a somewhat different from; and (3) covered the same period of time.

These observations are not intended as an indictment of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, but to illustrate that it is considerably easier for a researcher to study the conditions of the American Indian 100 years ago than it is to study conditions today. The information needed today is scattered, incomplete, and in some cases, unavailable, nonexistent, or contradictory. It is understandable that the Bureau of Indian Affairs statistical data is geared to the Bureau's own needs and limited by available funds and staff. But there is a real need for more complete and current information throughout the government.

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*There is a report with statistics up to June 30, 1968, but this is evidently for limited use since the older publication referred to is sent in answer to requests on Indian land.

**This report covers Indian students. It does not provide information on the education of the Indian labor force which would be very useful.

[1] U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs. Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs made to the Secretary of the Interior for the year 1869. Washington. 1870. 619 p.

[2] U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs. Indian Affairs 1967; a Progress Report from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. Washington, 1968. 15 p.

[3] BIA. *U.S. Indian Population (1962) and Land (1963)*. 35 p.
NOTE.—There is a later report published: *Annual Report on Indian Lands, June 30, 1968,* but evidently is only for Departmental use since the above is used for distribution.

[4] *Statistics Concerning Indian Education, Fiscal Year 1967* (latest available). 35 p.

[5] U.S. Department of the Interior. *Indians: Summary of Reservation Development Studies.* Fiscal Year 1970, September 24, 1968, 113 p.

[6] U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs. Branch of Employment Assistance. *Annual Statistical Summary, 1968.* 123 p.

[7] U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs, *Annual Report on Indian Lands:* June 30, 1968, 61 p.

In times past one of the finest sources of information was the annual report of each agency superintendent that appeared in the Bureau Annual Reports during the 1800's. Agency reports were a primary source providing a "bird's eye" view of the reservation, and any problems the Indians might have had, but the publication of such reports was discontinued early in this century. The absence of such reports today prevents the study of a given reservation—and the existing conditions—over a period of years. Whatever information is available, by agency, is generally found in congressional studies.

Keeping the comparative informational picture—1969 and 1869—in mind, we might point out that in 1869 the expenditure of the Bureau of Indian Affairs was $7,042,923, the agency had approximately 400 employees, and there were 289,778 Indians under the jurisdiction of the Federal Government. In fiscal year 1969, by contrast, the Bureau of Indian Affairs appropriation is approximately $250,000,000, the staff exceeds 16,000, and there are about 300,000 Indians living on trust land and 66,000 living nearby. In addition, the Department of Health Education, and Welfare spends about $150,000,000 per year and has a staff of over 6,000 people working on Indian programs. Other Government agencies such as the Office of Economic Opportunity, Economic Development Administration, Small Business Administration, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Farmers Home Administration, Rural Electrification Administration, Forest Service, Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, U.S. Geological Survey, and the Department of Labor (Manpower Development and Training Act) spend annually an additional $75,000,000 or more on Indian programs.

With all the millions spent—no one knows the total—and the thousands of Government employees working in the subject field it is literally impossible to obtain *up-to-date* and *accurate* information on such basic questions as employment and unemployment, average educational attainment, income, land ownership, reservation population, interest and vocational abilities. The Bureau of Indian Affairs does not have a research organization that can provide the Congress with such up-to-date information and Congress, as a result, has been forced to undertake much of the basic research necessary to legislative action in the field of Indian affairs. The only alternative for the Congress is to content itself with statistics that are, in many cases, five, ten, twenty, or more years old, and often incomplete and inaccurate. The result of this problem is a lack of continuity of statistical information on the conditions of the American Indian. Therefore there is no sound basis for comparison to determine the increase or decrease of given problems or indeed the improvement or lack of improvement in the economy of Indian tribes.

The Bureau of the Census publishes rather detailed information on Indians every decade, but as the Bureau of Indian Affairs points out [3]—

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[3] **BIA. *U.S. Indian Population and Land.* p. 1.**

> Because the enumeration districts for the Decennial Census do not generally match reservation boundaries, and trust land may be scattered in some areas, the Bureau cannot use Census data for estimating and planning for potential service requirements.

In discussing the general Census, the Bureau of Indian Affairs stated that:

> The count of Indians in the 1960 Decennial Census was the most accurate since 1930, when all persons were asked if they were Indian and additional questions were asked of those who said they were Indian. In 1940 and 1950 enumerators did not ask questions about race and used their own judgment. This resulted in many undercounts, especially in large cities, and in counties and states without Federal Reservations, where the scattered Indian population was not generally recognized and recorded.
>
> In 1960 people in postal areas received enumeration sheets by mail on which they recorded the basic information about themselves, including race. In non-postal areas enumerators were instructed to ask questions about race. The result was a higher count of Indians than ever before.

The major problem encountered in using Census Bureau statistics is that the Federal Government Indian program does not extend to all persons of Indian ancestry but only to those under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Another related problem that has been a question for generations is "Who or what is an Indian?" Neither the Congress nor the Executive Branch has defined Indian other than for the purpose of a specific piece of legislation. An "Indian" can be a person with anywhere from a drop of Indian blood to a full-blood in the present confusion over definition. For example, there are people recognized by the Federal Government as Indians, others recognized by the various States, and others by the Census Bureau. As another example of the confusion, the Bureau of Indian Affairs publication on Indian land and population carried a covering memo stating:

> Because of differences in definitions and in the wording and timing of requests for population data, there has been wide variation in statements about Indian population. This has sometimes led to misunderstandings. To prevent such misunderstanding, the data in this publication should be used throughout the Bureau for public statements and replies to information requests until later figures are available and officially distributed.

During the 85th Congress, the House Interior Committee published a study on the American Indian [9] and pointed out that during the study it had encountered the same problem of definition:

> Another aspect of the committee study included an analysis of expenditures by the various state governments for assistance to Indians. In drafting the questionnaire directed to state officials, the committee again encountered one of the most perplexing questions in this field: Who is an Indian? Various Federal laws define an Indian for the purpose of the legislation itself and Federal Government agencies are not in agreement concerning the recipients of services provided by them to variously defined

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[9] *Present Relations of the Federal Government to the American Indian.* Committee Print No. 38. 346 p.

> "Indians." [Discussion of the term "Indian" follows.] This is a general racial definition of the people known as "Indians"; however, the problem at the moment is, who are "Indians" for the purpose of supplying services to these people by the Federal and State Government?

The Committee then went on to point out that the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare—

> considers an individual to be an Indian "if he is regarded as an Indian by the community in which he lives as evidenced by such factors as membership in a tribe, residence on tax-exempt land, ownership of restricted property, and active participation in tribal affairs."

For the purpose of a State receiving financial assistance for Indian education, the Code of Federal Regulations required ¼ or more Indian blood. For the purpose of eligibility for cattle loans the requirement was membership in a tribe *and* ¼ or more Indian blood. However, under the regulations concerning law and order any person of Indian descent and a member of a recognized tribe was considered an Indian. The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (48 Stat. 984) authorizes the tribes themselves to define "Indian" for purposes of tribal membership. In contacting States with large Indian populations the Committee found that two States accepted the individual's opinion, four used the "recognition in the community" approach, Alaska required ¼ Indian blood, five accepted residence on a reservation, and one used the Census Bureau definition. The Committee concluded its discussion concerning the definition of Indian with a statement that is undoubtedly as accurate today as it was then:

> The definition of "Indian" presents one of the most difficult problems in the field of Indian affairs and no doubt accounts for many of the inconsistencies in various data supplied to the committee. Although all engaged in the field use the term "Indians," by applying the many and varied definitions we perceive a kaleidoscope of ever-changing groups. This accounts for many of the frustrations and difficulties in dealing with Indian legislation.

The research done over the years, by the Congress, to obtain adequate information on areas, within the field of Indian affairs, of legislative concern, has been carried on with the committee staffs available and the assistance of Library of Congress staff, as needed. As far back as 1904 when Charles J. Kappler—a Senate Indian Affairs Committee staff member—compiled the first two volumes of his four volume publication, *Indian Laws and Treaties*, the very same informational problem existed. The introduction to Kappler's Volume I states that—

> an accurate compilation of the treaties, laws, executive orders, and other matters relating to Indian affairs, from the organization of the Government to the present time, has been urgently needed for many years, and its desirability has been repeatedly emphasized by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in his annual reports to the Congress.[10]

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[10] Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties. 58th Congress, 2d session. Senate Document No. 319.

In the 81st Congress when the "compilation"[11] was published, the House Interior Committee pointed out that it had—

> long recognized the need for gathering into one compilation all available important statistical information relative to the Indians under the committee jurisdiction and the laws affecting such Indians.

In 1952 when the revised compilation[12] was published the Committee stated that—

> Congress wants information on the history of the special legislation affecting the several tribes, and statistical information regarding the effects of this legislation and the policies pursued under it, on the social and economic progress and welfare of the tribes themselves.

During the 85th Congress (1958) there was some concern about the diminishing Indian land base. The Senate Interior Committee found that "detailed statistics on the extent of Indian trust land disposals were not available in Washington" and undertook an extensive research project entitled *Indian Land Transactions*.[13] The problem was again pointed out in 1959 when the House Interior Committee published a study[14] on Government-Indian relations and stated that—

> In past years the Congress has been frequently handicapped by the lack of available up-to-date and accurate information relating to the various problems within the vast field of Indian Affairs.

Another extensive study was made in 1959 by the Senate Interior Committee on the Indian heirship land problem[15] and the Chairman stated that his—

> Intention was to make available to the members of this Committee a detailed analysis of the problem which could be used in drafting corrective legislation.

The Congress has relied heavily on its own staff, with some assistance from the Library of Congress staff, to carry out extensive studies on specific issues before the Congress. However, in each case, the staff starts from "scratch" and must contact pertinent Government agencies, tribes, individuals, Indian interest organizations, and, after collecting the basic data, proceed to the analysis. This has been mostly a "one-shot" approach since neither the congressional committees nor the Library of Congress has the staff necessary for continuous data collection, analysis, and publication. The following citations indicate the depth of research and the span of subject matter that the Congress has covered in the field of Indian affairs:

1904 58th Congress, 2d Session. Senate. Committee on Indian Affairs. Charles J. Kappler. *Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties.* Vol. I. (Laws, 1162 p.). Vol. II. (Treaties, 1099 p.). Senate Document 319.

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[11] House. 81st Congress, 2d session. Committee on Public Lands, Subcommittee on Indian Affairs. *Compilation of Material Relating to the Indians of the United States and the Territory of Alaska, Including Certain Laws and Treaties Affecting Such Indians.* June 13, 1950. Serial No. 30. 1110 p.

[12] House. 82d Congress, 2d Session. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Subcommittee on Indian Affairs. *Report with Respect to the House Resolution Authorizing the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs to Conduct an Investigation of the Bureau of Indian Affairs.* House Report No. 2503. 1594 p. (plus 157 maps and index).

[13] Senate. 85th Congress, 2d Session. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, *Indian Land Transactions.* December 1, 1958. Committee Print. 838 p.

[14] See footnote 9. p. 4.

[15] Senate. 86th Congress. 2d Session. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. *Indian Heirship Land Survey.* Committee Print. 2 vols. p. 1.

1913 62d Congress. 2d Session. Senate. Committee on Indian Affairs. Charles J. Kappler. *Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties.* Vol. III. (Laws). Senate Document No. 719. 798 p.

1929 70th Congress, 1st Session. Senate. Committee on Indian Affairs. Charles J. Kappler. *Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties.* (Laws). Senate Document No. 53. 1406 p.

1950 81st Congress, 2d Session. House. Committee on Public Lands. Subcommittee on Indian Affairs. *Compilation of Material Relating to the Indians of the United States and the Territory of Alaska, Including Certain Laws and Treaties Affecting Such Indians.* June 13, 1950. Serial No. 30. 1110 p.

1952 82d Congress, 2d Session. House. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. *Report with Respect to the House Resolution Authorizing the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs to Conduct an Investigation of the Bureau of Indian Affairs.* House Report No. 2503. 1594 p. (plus 157 maps and index).

1952 82d Congress, 2d Session. House. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. *Statistical Charts Regarding the Indians of the United States.* 45 p.

1954 83d Congress, 2d Session. House. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. *Report with Respect to the House Resolution Authorizing the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs to Conduct an Investigation of the Bureau of Indian Affairs.* House Report No. 2680. 576 p.

1958 85th Congress, 2d Session. Senate. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. *Indian Land Transactions: An Analysis of the Problems and Effects of Our Diminishing Indian Land Base, 1948–1957.* Committee Print. 838 p.

1959 85th Congress, 2d Session. House. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. *Present Relations of the Federal Government to the American Indian.* Committee Print No. 38. 346 p.

1959 86th Congress, 1st Session. House. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. *Indirect Services and Expenditures by the Federal Government for the American Indians.* Committee Print No. 14. 61 p.

1960 86th Congress, 2d Session. Senate. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. *Indian Heirship Land Survey.* Committee Print. 2 Vols. 1186 p.

1960 86th Congress, 2d Session. House. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. *Indian Heirship Land Study.* Committee Print No. 27. 2 Vols. (Vol. I, 555 p.; Vol. II, 1010 p.).

1962 87th Congress, 2d Session. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. *Federal Facilities for Indians.* 1955–1961. 209 p.

1963 88th Congress, 1st Session. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. *Federal Facilities for Indians.* 29 p.

1964 88th Congress, 2d Session. House. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. *List of Indian Treaties.* Committee Print No. 33. 45 p.

1964 88th Congress, 2d Session. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. *Federal Facilities for Indians.* 25 p.

1964 88th Congress, 2d Session. House. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. *Information on Removal of Restrictions on American Indians.* Committee Print No. 38. 90 p.

1965 89th Congress, 1st Session. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. *Federal Facilities for Indians.* 390 p.

1966 89th Congress, 2d Session. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. *Federal Facilities for Indians.* 856 p.

1967 90th Congress, 1st Session. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. *Federal Facilities for Indians.* 862 p.

The studies listed represent only a selection of congressional publications on the subject of Indian Affairs, but show the continuing congressional interest in the subject and the intent to pass effective legislation even though extensive research is required to establish the basic facts. While these studies have been most helpful at the time of publication, and—for lack of more recent information—still represent the latest "information" in some cases, they could be much more useful if they were current. However, with the Federal Government spending increased amounts on Indian programs and more and more agencies providing services to Indians, we seem to be in a position of having less information while programs, expenditures and staff are increasing.

Where does one go to find a complete list of all agencies and bureaus in the Federal Government operating Indian programs? How much does the Federal Government expend on Indian programs each year? Are all the programs using different definitions of "Indian"? How does an Indian or an Indian tribe find out about all the programs and how they can benefit from them? How can the Congress legislate effectively and how can the Executive Branch program effectively, if we do not have accurate and current statistics on unemployment, educational attainment, land interests, income, etc., for those Indians residing on reservations? These are some of the questions that have been brought up from time to time by the Congress and researchers in the field. There obviously is a real need for current information, published in usable form, and available throughout the country.

The experience of Representative William V. Roth in attempting to untangle the mass of all Federal assistance programs is instructive. Following an eight-month study in which some 1,091 distinct programs were identified, Representative Roth noted that "no one anywhere, knows how many programs there are; information on some programs is virtually impossible to obtain." The results of the Roth study of Federal assistance programs in general are an accurate reflection of the problem in the field of Indian programs, and there should be a similar concern to develop comprehensive and detailed information on Indian programs.

Fortunately, in this day and age, the problem could be approached through the use of computers and the centralization of source material. Once the information is fed into computers the basic task is correcting and up-dating statistics and program information. In an attempt to determine the types of information that would be most useful in such a publication careful attention was given to Congressional needs in the field of Indian affairs over the past few decades. The following outline will give the reader an indication of how valuable a "Handbook" could be.

Part I

INDIAN TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS

(This part would be based on Kappler's Laws and Treaties, Royce's Indian Land Cessions, and the National Archives' List of Documents Concerning the Negotiation of Ratified Indian Treaties. The organization could place the treaties, agreements, and executive orders in chronological order with the maps and lists of related documents with the pertinent treaty.)

Part II

HISTORY, LEGISLATION, AND CURRENT CONDITIONS ON INDIAN RESERVATIONS

Note.—The following would be a "form" report filled out by the Federal Officer in charge each year. It is based on a "questionnaire on a reservation profile" drafted by the Bureau of Indian Affaris a few years ago. Some changes have been made.

A. *Nomenclature.*
   1. *Proper name of tribes.* If unorganized the generally accepted name.

B. *Land.*
   1. *Location.* Describe the reservation's geographic location within a State or States and county or counties. Describe the proximity of trade centers, identifying the same and giving a general statement concerning size, population, and industry.
   2. *Climate.* State the length of the growing season, the length of the tourist or recreational season, and give average temperature ranges and average annual precipitation.
   3. *Historical.* Give the initial date of establishment of the reservation and groups and/or tribes for whom established, and citations to treaties, laws, and executive orders and original and present land area of the reservation.
   4. *Ownership.* (a) Tribal (trust and fee separately), trust allotted, Government-owned (totals as of June 30, last fiscal year). (b) Characteristics of ownership. Show the pattern of ownership, whether it is checkerboarded, scattered or contiguous. Make a brief comment on the possible improvement in the characteristics of ownership by unitization, syndication, etc.
   5. *Present Land Use.* Include the major categories of land use on the reservation with an average by percentage of each type, e.g. farming, grazing, commercial, etc. The percentage of Indian and non-Indian use of Indian land should also be given. The various categories of use should include a breakdown between individual Indian trust land and tribal lands.

6. *Heirship*. Number and percentage breakdown of allotted trust tracts belonging to a single owner, 2–10 owners, over 10 owners. Number of probate cases completed during the last fiscal year and the number pending. Total acreage in heirship status. Describe the heirship problem on the reservation.
7. *Potential*. Give a brief statement on reservation land potential. Describe tribal land acquisition program, if any. Indicate income from tribal land purchases made during the last year and the purchase price.
8. *Transportation*. Describe the major highways giving access to the reservation and the intra-reservation roads. How many miles of roads are there on the reservation? How many miles of roads are Bureau maintained? What jurisdiction(s) maintain the balance? Indicate commercial airports and railroads nearest to the reservation. List by percentage use of transportation, such as truck, car, horse, public, etc. Does the present adequacy or inadequacy of the road system hinder or help economic development of the reservation or the Indian's work opportunities?

C. *Population*.
   1. *Resident Total*. (a) Give the total number of Indian residents on the reservation, number of families, average number per family, average age, and other pertinent data. (b) Provide similar information for Indians residing adjacent to the reservation, i.e., service area population. (c) State briefly population trends. (d) Provide total number of adults (over 18), subdivided by sex, and the total number of minors. (e) Provide the total number of Indians residing on the reservation who are members of tribes other than those in residence.
   2. *Tribal Membership*. (a) Give total membership of tribe at present time. If an estimate, indicate, (b) Date of latest tribal roll.

D. *Tribal Administration and Government*.
   1. *Governing Body*. Give history of the tribal governing body, its functions, and membership.
   2. *Budget*. Give income and expenditures for the last fiscal year differentiating between tribal and other funds.
   3. *Member Civic Participation*. Describe the interest and activity of tribal members in tribal or social affairs and off-reservation, non-Indian affairs.

E. *Disposition of Judgment Awards*.
   1. *Past*. Describe and evaluate the use of any judgment awards in the past.
   2. *Current*. How does the tribe propose to use funds from the current award? (Attach any resolutions or program outlines.)

F. *Economic Activities and Potentials.*

1. *Reservation Development.* Indicate both resource development and industrial or commercial potential for the reservation.
2. *Labor Force.* (a) List the number of resident Indians employed on or near the reservation. (b) List the number of unemployed under the headings: temporary, seasonal, and permanent. A breakdown by sex should be included. Also distinguish between those residing on the reservation and those adjacent to.
3. *Employment Opportunities.* (a) Briefly state the livelihood source history of the Indian population. (b) Discuss the livelihood sources for non-Indians on the reservation and in adjacent areas.
4. *Income from Reservation Resources.* (a) List the total income from surface leases of all types, both to the Indians and non-Indians. If free use, or less than fair market value, is approved to Indian operators, calculate the rental rate on the average income from non-Indian use. (b) For grazing permits, use the same as above. (c) For timber, give the gross dollar income from stumpage sold; give estimated value of free-use forest products harvested. (d) For minerals include income from leases, bonuses, royalties, etc. (e) For commercial recreation, give the net profit from Indian and tribal recreational enterprises. (f) Under business enterprises, list the net profit from tribal enterprises other than recreation.
5. *Income from Employment for Reservation Residents.* (a) This should include a breakdown of those self-employed, and the Indian operator's income, less economic rent for land and operating expenses. (b) For those self-employed, other than in agricultural operations, calculate the disposable income from the business. (c) Other than self-employed should include all income from wages for Indians living on and working on, or living on and working near the reservation. This should include all types of employment (Federal Government, tribal, industrial, and private business). A breakdown of major employers by skilled, semiskilled, or unskilled workers should be included. (d) Estimate the value of services received from the Federal Government that a non-Indian in the surrounding area would have to pay for.
6. *Income from Resources and Employment.* For purposes of comparison, the total income from resources and employment should be divided by the number of families on the reservation to indicate the average amount per family that can be expected from these sources.
7. *Median Effective Family Buying Income in Surrounding Counties.* Include a comparison of on-reservation

income per family with the income of non-Indians living in counties surrounding the reservation. This appears to be the best measure of income that should be expected for Indian reservation residents. A national or state income level is too general and has less application to the program objectives.

G. *Health.*

1. *United States Public Health Service.* What facilities are provided by the United States Public Health Service?
2. *Adequacy.* Are these facilities adequate to meet the health needs of Indians?
3. *Use.* Are the facilities fully used by Indians?
4. *Needs.* What are the major health needs of the Reservation?
5. *Water and Sanitation.* Describe briefly the availability of water and sanitary facilities to meet normal needs for both family and community.
6. *Comparison.* How do each of these services compare with those of non-Indian families in the surrounding areas?

H. *Welfare.*

1. *General Assistance.* Give the BIA general assistance for the last fiscal year by number of cases, persons, and amount, and a breakdown of high and low months for such assistance.
2. *Other Financial Assistance.* Any Federal, State, or county assistance to Indians received through county Departments of Public Welfare. Include types of cases, total cases, and total number of persons involved.
3. *Commodity Program.* The numbers involved and the cost of any commodity program.
4. *Summary.* Give total of tribal members receiving assistance and indicate categories.
5. *Attitude.* What is the attitude of State and local officials regarding welfare to Indians?

I. *Education.*

1. *Level.* Give the average educational level for the following age groups in terms of the highest grade completed.

	Male	Female
18–25 years, inclusive		
26–45 years		
46 years and over		

2. *School Age Population.* Give the numbers of resident tribal members in the following age groups.

	Male	Female
1–5 years, inclusive		
6–13 years		
14–18 years		
19–21 years		

3. *School Facilities.* Give the following data regarding school facilities on the reservation (last fiscal year).

System	Number of schools	Capacity	Grades served	Indian enrollment	
				Elementary	Secondary
Public schools					
BIA schools					
Mission schools					
Other schools					

4. *Special.* (a) Describe briefly participation of Indian parents in school affairs. (b) What is the attitude of tribal members toward education? (c) Special problems related to school attendance, dropouts, etc. (d) Special services such as counseling, adult education, etc., available or needed in local schools and communities. (e) Scholarship aid (if any) provided by the tribe.

5. If available, provide the same for 1, 2, 4 (a) and (c) concerning the non-Indian population in surrounding area.

J. *Housing.*

1. *Existing Conditions.* (a) Briefly state the adequacy of existing housing. (b) Give the percent of Indian homes with electricity and telephones. (c) Briefly describe the availability of water and sanitary facilities. (d) Provide the same information for non-Indians of surrounding areas.
2. *Housing Authority.* Has the tribe established a housing authority?
3. What are current plans for (a) new homes, and (b) repair of homes?

K. *Relocation.*

1. *Employment Assistance.* List the number of units and people assisted in placement in direct employment through the employment assistance programs.
2. *Returnees.* Estimate by percentage those who have returned from relocation and the major reason for returning.

L. *Readiness of Indians to Manage Their Own Affairs.*

1. *Problem Areas.* Evaluate the capacity of the members of this particular tribe to manage their own affairs. Discuss any major problem areas.
2. *Cultural Isolation.* This entails an evaluation of participation by Indians on or off the reservation in what may be described as distinctly Indian culture (including language use, religious or secular ceremonies, social mores relating to an older Indian culture, etc.) The proportion of Indians (irregardless of degree of blood) contained in the "core" of cultural Indians constitutes a good measure of the degree of acculturation experiences by the tribe.
3. *Non-Indian Community.* Evaluate the relationship of this tribe or reservation to the non-Indian community,

i.e., local, county and State. This includes not only attitudes but abilities of these governmental units to carry any economic services necessary for future development.

4. *Bureau Appropriations.* Provide breakdown of appropriations, by activity, for three fiscal years: (a) Actual expenditures last fiscal year; (b) Funds programmed current fiscal year (or expended where applicable); (c) Funds programmed next fiscal year.

M. *Other Government Programs.*
  1. List all other Government programs in operation on the reservation or assisting the reservation population.
  2. Briefly describe each program, the number of participants, etc.

PART III

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INDIAN PROGRAMS, ALL AGENCIES*

This part would be based on a form annual report for all agencies, bureaus, and departments, in the Federal Government responsible for any aspect of Indian programs. The reports would contain—as indicated in the ouline below—specific information on the program and expenditures. Should the *Program Information Act* (H.R. 3860, Representative Roth) become law, Section 11 would prohibit all other compendiums of program information "in order to make the catalog the exclusive source of such program information both for the public and for the program officers." In developing a proposed catalog of Indian program information, every possible attempt could be made to incorporate the findings and recommendations of the Roth Study in determining the information to be included and the format as well. This could be expected to result in an efficiently organized and extremely useful compilation with a minimum of unnecessary duplication of effort. If H.R. 3860 is enacted, this part would simply be an extract of all Indian programs from the proposed *Catalog of Federal Assistance Programs.*

A. *Identification of Organization.*
  1. Full legal name of program.
  2. List each administrative level between the program and the highest agency or department.
  3. Enabling legislation.

B. *Funding.*
  1. Actual expenditures for the past fiscal year.
  2. Appropriations for the present fiscal year.

C. *Purposes.*
  1. Briefly outline the programs.

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*The idea for this part came from the Roth Study entitled *Listing of Operating Federal Assistance Programs as Compiled During the Roth Study* by the Honorable William V. Roth (Congressional Record, June 25, 1968. pp. H5441-5585; and House Document 399, 90th Congress, 2d session). This catalog has been an extremely useful reference tool and the writer has benefited not only from the information contained but the quick reference organization and indexing of the report itself.

2. Are there any plans for expanding or reducing the programs?
3. What has been the reaction of the Indians or Tribes?
4. Are there any other Government programs closely related to this one?
5. What are the eligiblity requirements for participation in the program?

D. *Offices.*
  1. List headquarters office, contact officer, and telephone number.
  2. List all field offices, contact officers, and telephone numbers.

E. *Personnel.*
  1. How many employees were there on the last day of the preceding fiscal year?
  2. Of this number how many were full time and how many part time?
  3. What were the total man-years expended in the previous fiscal year?
  4. What was the total administrative overhead of supplying, equipping, and servicing those man-years?

F. *Publications.*
  1. List all reports published during the past fiscal year by author, title, and pagination.
  2. Provide a brief summary for each publication.

PART IV

STATISTICAL COMPILATION ON INDIANS AND INDIAN RESOURCES

A. *Population.*
  1. Total Indian population in the United States (Bureau of the Census).
  2. Reservation population (Bureau of Indian Affairs).
    a. Living on Reservations.
    b. Living on trust lands (not on Reservations).
    c. Living near Reservations.
  3. Service population.
    a. Total "service" population and definition of same (Bureau of Indian Affairs).
    b. Total "service" population and definition of same (Division of Indian Health, Public Health Service).

B. *Health.*
  1. Infant death rate compared to non-Indian.
  2. Life expectancy for Indians as compared to non-Indians.
  3. General statement on the Indian's health today in comparison with the non-Indian.
  4. Programs.
    a. How many hospitals there are (location, number of beds, personnel service population, etc.).
    b. How many health centers (location, personnel, service population, etc.).

c. How many health stations (location, personnel, service population, etc.).
d. How many beds are available in community hospitals built through Public Law 85–151 (name of hospital and location).

C. *Employment and Unemployment.*
Total population.
1. Between the ages of 18 and 55 able to work.
   a. On the reservation, male, female.
   b. Near the reservation, male, female.
2. Working full time.
   a. On the reservation, male, female.
   b. Near the reservation, male, female.
3. Working part time.
   a. On the reservation, male, female.
   b. Near the reservation, male, female.
4. Between the ages of 18 and 55, physically able and wanting to work, now unemployed.
   a. Comparison with non-Indian labor force in area.

D. *Education.*
1. *Level.* Average educational level for the following age groups in terms of the highest grade completed:

	Male	Female
18–25 years, inclusive		
26–45 years		
46 years and over		

2. *School Age Population.* Number of resident tribal members in the following age groups:

	Male	Female
1–5 years, inclusive		
6–13 years		
14–18 years		
19–21 years		

3. *School Facilities.* On the reservation.

System	Number	Capacity	Enrollment Elementary	Enrollment Secondary
Public				
BIA				
Mission				
Other				

E. *Land.*
1. Total acreage of tribal land.
2. Total acreage of tribal *fee* land.
3. Total acreage of tribal *trust* land.
4. Total acreage of individual trust land.
5. Total acreage of individual trust land in heirship status.

        - a. Number of tracts.
        - b. Number with 2–10 owners.
        - c. Number with more than 10 owners.
    - 6. Total acreage of Federal lands on Indian reservations.
- F. *Law and Order.*
    - 1. Number of reservations under State law.
    - 2. Number of reservations having:
        - a. Traditional courts.
        - b. Courts of Indian Offenses.

Part V

STATE AGENCIES AND PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS IN THE FIELD OF INDIAN AFFAIRS

A. *State Agencies.*

Note.—General statement on each state agency, operation, staff, budget, programs, publications, etc.

B. *Private Organizations.*

Note.—General statement on each private organization, officers, operation, budget, publications, programs, etc.

Part VI

PUBLICATIONS AND REPORTS IN THE FIELD OF INDIAN AFFAIRS

Note.—Those published on a continuing basis by all levels of Government concerned with the Indian problem, the private organization publications, tribal newspapers, etc. The intent would be to annotate each publication indicating content and providing thereby a comprehensive list of publications containing current information from all over the United States.

Part VII

INDEX

A "handbook" as outlined above might well become a prime mover in the field of Indian affairs by providing a concentration of available information and by revealing the many deficiencies in our knowledge of the American Indian today. In addition, the inclusion of all programs—whether Federal, State, county or private—would, for the first time in the history of the subject, create a complete picture of the problem area and those organizations active in the field. Another positive aspect is that—with continued up-dating—the Federal Government would have a handy yardstick available to measure progress in terms of education, income, employment, and other factors.

In the author's opinion all the good intentions of the various governmental authorities—Congressional, Executive and State—are weakened by the fact that the problem itself has not been clearly delineated. An opportunity to determine rates of improvement—if any—in the American Indian's economic condition is a necessary foundation to any programs designed to solve the "Indian problem." The picture of the American Indian today is hazy and confusing and the statistical information available fails to clarify that picture. A central collection and publication point for the basic statistics necessary to adequate consideration of the subject matter and the Indian peoples concerned would, in the writer's opinion, result in more advantageous use of the monies appropriated and the creation of a specific yardstick with which to measure Indian progress.

The goal of the Federal Government, State governments, and private organizations active in the field of Indian affairs is to improve the economic conditions on Indian Reservations, and in that manner raise the Indian's standard of living to that of the non-Indian in this country. The attainment of the goal will require a vast improvement in our knowledge of Indians—and of ourselves.

AMERICAN INDIANS IN RURAL POVERTY

By Helen W. Johnson *

FOREWORD

It is widely recognized that poverty among American Indians continues to be severe and widespread. Making use of the findings of Department of Agriculture studies of rural poverty, Helen W. Johnson details the extent of this poverty in 16 counties in which the population contains a substantial proportion of Indians. In order to illustrate the effect of severe poverty on the quality of life, some actual family situations found among the Indians in Oklahoma are described. Also described are life on a reservation in North Dakota and rural off-reservation Indian life in various parts of the country. It is pointed out that the Indian has been the object of many decades of management and that this has engendered dependence on an alien culture. Thus the Indian does have special problems. Current needs include both the provision of essentially welfare assistance for much of the adult Indian population and the provision of the educational and other services needed to make Indian young people self-sufficient either on or off the reservation.

Introduction

The American Indian population is rural, poor, and essentially outside of the mainstream of the larger society. This states the basic framework of the analysis presented in the following pages.

The problems of American Indians are not new. They stem from many roots—historic, economic, social, and cultural. Contributing to the present alienation of the American Indian has been the ambivalent U.S. policy toward this minority ethnic group, along with the deliberate separation of Indians from the dominant white society. Acculturation of a minority is never an easy process, and advanced civilizations have not been too successful in their dealings with groups at lower levels of technological development. The American experience with the Indians is only one instance of a more general problem occurring when two different societies meet.

Anyone acquainted with Indian affairs has recognized that adjustment of the Indian in the dominant white society in America would take time and present many problems. The road has been long and difficult indeed, and acculturation is still far from accomplished. As long ago as 1926, a government survey directed by Lewis Meriam found the Indians to be "extremely poor, in bad health, without education and lacking adjustment to the dominant culture around them." [1]

The poverty of rural Indians is not of resources alone—it is also of the spirit. It is not enough to raise the level of living of a deprived people; it is also necessary to give them identity and purpose. As Peter Farb has written, worse than the educational, health, and housing deficits Indians suffer is the implication that Indians are "irrelevant to the American culture." He says further that, "A white education system has turned out imitation whites who succumb to the bleakness of reservation life and the prejudices around them." He quotes William Byler of the Association on American Indian Affairs on the seriousness of the current alienation: "The American Indian today is about to go over the brink—not only of poverty and prejudice, but of moral collapse." [2]

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[1] **Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1954 ed., vol. 12, p. 209.**

The issue of future direction to achieve a better life, *in* the white society or *out* of it, is particularly pressing for the young people who are on the threshold of making that choice. Torn between the Indian life and culture and the unfamiliar ways of the non-Indian world, they are confused and uncertain. Poised between two worlds, sociologically they are as much "cultural hybrids" as many second-generation immigrants of yesterday. They are in limbo, not really conditioned to be at home in either world. As one commentator put it recently, about these Indian youth, "They have one eye on the outside world, which means opportunity and fears; the other eye on the reservation, which means security and hopelessness." [3]

The Rural American Indian in the 1960's

Basic data in this report concerning the rural Indian are derived chiefly from the 1960 Census of Population, the most recent information available on a residence and county basis, supplemented by findings from a field survey conducted by the Economic Research Service, as well as selected other materials. Economic and social characteristics of the rural Indian population which are considered to be linked with poverty status will be discussed.

The 1960 Census of Population reported 524,000 in the Indian population, about 87 percent of them living in 23 States. Nine out of ten Indians in these States were on reservations. To the above number should be added 28,000 Eskimos and Aleuts in Alaska, who will be included in this analysis of rural Indians. More than fifty percent of the Indian population in each of 19 States was classified by the Census as living in rural areas.

The Indian population is very young, as evidenced by the fact that the median age of rural Indians in 1960 was 17.7 years, compared with 27.3 years for the rural population as a whole. Rural Indians are also in poverty—62 percent of the rural Indian families had incomes of less than $3,000 in 1959. This is of special significance in light of the large size of their families. Two out of three rural Indian families had four persons or more, over a fourth had seven persons or more.

Other social and economic characteristics indicate their disadvantaged position in 1960. Nearly half of the rural Indian males who were employed were in blue-collar occupations. The unemployment rate of 18.6 for rural Indian males was more than three times the rate of 5.1 for all rural males in 1960. Twelve percent of rural Indian males, and nearly 15 percent of the females 14 years old and over had no schooling, compared with 2.5 and about 2 percent for males and females in the total rural population. Infant mortality, maternal and other mortality rates, and morbidity rates from various causes were two to fifty times higher than U.S. rates in 1964. Life expectancy at birth for Indians was 63.5 years, whereas it was 70.2 for the United States as a whole.[4]

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[2] Farb, Peter, "The American Indian, A Portrait in Limbo," Saturday Review, Oct. 12, 1968, p. 26.

[3] Greider, William, "Wounded Knee Still Festers," Washington Post, Feb. 23, 1969, p. B4.

INDIANS IN SIXTEEN RURAL COUNTIES

In order to shed some further light on the status of the rural Indian, we have chosen for detailed examination sixteen counties in eight States, two counties in each State. These counties were selected because they were predominantly rural in 1960, Indians represented a substantial proportion of the total population of the county, and the incidence of poverty among all families in the county was high.[5] Analysis at the county level permits a closer look at areas in which rural Indians live.

To the extent that the status of the population in these rural counties represented the Indian population's position at that time, certain generalizations can be drawn about how they were faring. Rural Indians in the sixteen counties numbered 157,316, including Eskimos and Aleuts in Alaska. We will not know until 1970 Census data become available whether their situation has in fact bettered or worsened, nor even what the size of the Indian population is today.

The States and counties selected for analysis are the following: Alaska, Bethel and Wade Hampton (election districts); Arizona, Apache and Navajo; Montana, Big Horn and Glacier; New Mexico, McKinley and Sandoval; North Carolina, Hoke and Robeson; North Dakota, Rolette and Sioux; Oklahoma, Adair and McCurtain; and South Dakota, Shannon and Todd.

LOW INCOME

An important criterion in the selection of the sixteen counties was the level of family income in 1959. Poverty is obviously widespread in counties in which more than half of the families had incomes under $3,000, as was true in all of the sixteen counties. In one county in Oklahoma, the proportion was 85 percent. In all cases 80 and 90 percent of the families had less than $6,000, rising as high as 97 percent in Alaska and North Carolina. At the other end of the scale, fewer than 6 percent of the families had $10,000 income or more; in most counties, it was 4 percent or less. Even median family income reflects substantial rural poverty, ranging from a low of $955 in New Mexico to $2,778 in Montana. This analysis of family income was based on the 1959 income of some 30,000 nonwhite families.

EDUCATION

The educational level in the sixteen counties under consideration was well below the U.S. average of 10.6 in terms of median years of school completed by persons 25 years old and over in 1960. The range was from 0.9 years in Apache County, Arizona to a high of 8.8 years in Glacier

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[4] Indian Health Highlights, Public Health Service, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1966, pp. xvi and 7.

[5] Counties were 53 to 100 percent rural, Indians were 20 to 90 percent of the total county population, and 30 to 80 percent of all families had less than $3,000 income in 1959.

County, Montana. The range for the rest of the sixteen counties was from 1 to 8.5 years of school completed, close to minimum functional literacy standards.

HEALTH

One measure of health associated with poverty is available in a series of county data from the National Center for Health Statistics on infant mortality rates. These data reflect not only poverty and malnutrition, but a lack of prenatal and postnatal medical services more typical of underdeveloped than advanced industrial societies. Infant mortality rates in the sixteen selected counties in this report were, in 1961–65, in some cases two to nearly four times as high as the national average of 25.1.[6] The range was from 32.3 in Adair County, Oklahoma, to 94.2 in Bethel district in Alaska.

In some counties where the Maternal and Child Health Care project has been operative, or for other reasons, significant improvement has been achieved in lowering infant mortality rates since 1956–60. Of the sixteen counties considered here, all but three have achieved reduced rates since the 1956–60 period, some significantly. Still, the high rates in these counties of predominantly Indian population are an abysmal commentary on the availability of health and medical services as well as on the lack of dietary and child care information for this segment of our population. Infant mortality of this magnitude, not by any means restricted to the Indian population, is a matter for urgent national concern.

WELFARE

To measure objectively the welfare status of the Indian or any other population is precarious. In the broad sense of the term, welfare implies well-being, security, happiness, pride of person and race, and other intangible factors not susceptible of statistical or quantitative measurement. One might assume, however, that if substantial numbers of people in a given county are obliged to be public welfare recipients, at the least poverty conditions are also prevalent.

The level of welfare support cited here is the number of public assistance recipients in the total population of each county in 1964. This includes such programs as old age assistance, medical assistance for the aged, aid to dependent children, aid to the blind, and aid to the permanently and totally disabled, as well as some general assistance programs administered and financed by States or localities without Federal participation. Data are not available for Alaska except for the State as a whole, which reported 6,319 such recipients. Among the other 7 States, public assistance recipients in 1964 represented as high as 21 percent of the total county population in Adair and McCurtain counties in Oklahoma, 17 percent in Shannon, South Dakota, and 11 percent each in Apache County, Arizona, and Todd County, South Dakota.[7]

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[6] Infant and Perinatal Mortality Rates, HEW, Jan. 1968. Infant mortality rates are deaths under 1 year per 1,000 live births.

[7] County and City Data Book, 1967, Bureau of the Census, Table 2.

OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE

The occupational pattern in the sixteen counties exhibited clear relationships with poverty-related factors such as low levels of income and education in terms of the relatively low proportions of nonwhite males in white-collar and service occupations. The proportion in white-collar occupations in the Alaskan districts in 1960 was about 30 percent, but in all other counties except Sioux, North Dakota, it was about 20 percent or less. Service workers did not figure prominently in any of the counties—18 percent or less of the total nonwhite males. Blue-collar workers represented the predominant occupational category in all of the States except North Carolina where farmworkers accounted for more than half of the occupations. Overall, Indian males in these counties were clearly nonfarm workers.

INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE

Turning now to the industrial picture in these counties, the same general emphasis on nonagricultural work was found. Looking at 31,000 workers of both sexes in the nonwhite population of the sixteen counties, more than half were employed in nonagricultural industries. Six counties had 80 percent or more employed in such industries. Except in Oklahoma, the largest percentage of workers in nonagriculture were in business and other services; the lowest proportion was in finance, insurance, and real estate.

THE INDIAN SITUATION IN OKLAHOMA

We have chosen to describe the Oklahoma picture in some detail because the Economic Research Service conducted a survey in that area in 1966, which enables us to present reasonably current information on the status of some of the rural Indian families interviewed.

According to a recent Oklahoma publication, there are 67 Indian tribes in Oklahoma embracing a total population of about 65,000 or 12 percent of all U.S. Indians. Although some live and work in cities, they are mainly rural residents of little income and education and a great deal of unemployment and hardship. As the bulletin says about the Indian population, "To this day, many live in small isolated rural communities in abject poverty. A few * * * do not speak English and seem almost hopelessly alien to our society."[8] Living in a State that is 63 percent urban, 63 percent of the Indians are rural residents, more than one-half of them nonfarm. In Adair County, 23 percent of the total population was Indian in 1960, the largest proportion of any county in Oklahoma.

As in a number of States in which Indians represent a significant part of the rural population, including the seven other States previously discussed, certain poverty-related characteristics are in evidence in Oklahoma also. Nearly three-fourths of all Oklahoma Indian males had less than $3,000 income in 1959, and about 60 percent had less than $2,000 income. Limited education, both in quantity and quality, is also a factor contributing to the disadvantaged position of the Indian. For example, 6 percent of Oklahoma Indians in 1960 reported no schooling, and nearly three out of five had not gone beyond the eighth grade. In terms of median years of school completed for persons 25 years old and over, however, Oklahoma Indians were one year ahead of U.S. Indians as a whole—8.3 and 7.4 respectively. Only slightly more than one-third of all persons 14 years old and over in Oklahoma were attached to the civilian labor force, and the unemployment rate was three times that of the State as a whole.

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[8] **Indians in Oklahoma, Oklahoma Employment Security Commission, Oklahoma City, Okla., August 1968, p. 3.**

Case Studies[9]

The field research of the Economic Research Service mentioned above was directed to the discovery of rural poverty family characteristics and problems in several areas, not specifically those of the Indian population. While the number of rural Indian families surveyed in the Oklahoma counties of the Ozarks Region was too small to permit generalizations, a few case studies based on interviews will portray what may be typical rural Indian family situations in the two Oklahoma counties included in the sixteen discussed briefly above.

Certain common threads run through all these brief vignettes, even though all age groups are represented in the eight stories selected. To summarize some of the findings, in all cases education and job training were severely limited; income was low, mostly from public assistance; unemployment was almost universal for both male and female household heads; housing and plumbing facilities were both poor and inadequate; social participation went little beyond church attendance, visiting relatives and friends, listening to the radio or watching television. Most had some indebtedness outstanding, mainly for medical and dental services. Few carried either life or health insurance. While some had gardens, few produced any other food for home consumption. Attitudes concerning the present and future ran the gamut from mild optimism to deep pessimism.

Mrs. A

The youngest household head in this group of rural Indian families is a 22-year-old widow whom we shall call Mrs. A. Although she has only one child, a one-year-old son, she presides over an extended family which includes six other members—her mother, step-father, three sisters, and a brother. They share a rented two-story house, which is larger than most Indian families have (about 1,200 square feet of living space), and which has adequate plumbing facilities, also unusual—hot and cold running water, two baths, indoor toilet, public water supply and waste disposal. The house is heated with wood.

Mrs. A is not herself employed, but her mother and step-father are both working full-time and one of her sisters is employed part-time. Her brother and youngest sister are in school; the third sister is unemployed.

Mrs. A has had nine years of schooling; her mother and step-father have had none; two of her sisters have had eight and ten years. Mrs. A is interested in job training which would equip her to become a telephone switchboard operator.

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[9] The information on which these case studies are based was developed by O. Wendell Holmes, Economic Development Division, Economic Research Service.

To support this family of eight, income in 1965 was $4,512, $1,152 from Mrs. A's welfare assistance and $3,360 from the combined earnings of her parents. Rent payments are $35 per month.

Mr. and Mrs. B

Mr. and Mrs. B are 29 and 27 years old, respectively. They are the parents of seven children ranging in age from one through nine, living in a small, one-story house they rent for $30 a month. Living space of about 500 square feet is something less than adequate for a family of nine; there is no basement. The house construction is poor, with outside wall covering of tarpaper-composition material, and there are no inside plumbing facilities, no public sewage disposal system nor septic tank. Their water supply must be carried from a well. The house is heated with gas.

Mr. B has been unemployed since early 1966 when he sustained an injury while working in a lumber mill. The accident required surgery, during which time the mill replaced him. He feels that he has now recovered sufficiently to work full-time and would like training, if free, to become a machinist. Mrs. B is also interested in employment and would like to be trained for a factory sewing job. Both would be willing to commute to jobs or move to another community for employment. In either case, the pay level would have to be high enough to warrant such a change—$60 a week or more if commuting, $75 a week if it entailed a move to another location.

Mr. and Mrs. B both completed nine grades of school. Three of their children are in school; the other four are pre-schoolers. Mr. B has considerable faith in the value of education for his children, at least through high school.

The sole source of income for this family was $1,924 per year from Mr. B's unemployment compensation. He did slightly better in 1965 when he earned $2,374, but far below the poverty threshold for a family of this size.

Mr. and Mrs. C

The parents in this family are 47 and 36 years old, respectively. They have eight children whose ages range from three to nineteen. The family is housed in a one-story wood dwelling which allows only about 100 square feet of living space per family member. These rented quarters contain no indoor plumbing facilities, except spring-fed cold running water, and no sewage disposal system. The house is heated with wood.

Mr. C, partially disabled by inactive TB, works only part-time, as a laborer, for his landlord. This work pays the rent. He is not interested in job training as he feels he is unable to work full-time. Mrs. C, who has been a housewife since the age of fifteen, would like to learn to be a typist. She is willing to commute to a job, but does not want to leave the community to live elsewhere. The nineteen-year-old son, who completed eight years of school, is unemployed.

Mr. C has had no formal schooling, cannot read, and can write only his name. Except for two preschool-age children and the oldest child, the rest of the children are in school. The father hopes they will all achieve at least a high school education and encourages them to do so.

This family's income is derived from welfare payments, amounting to $1,950 in 1965, plus Mr. C's earnings from part-time work for his landlord. Of the $466 he gained from this source in 1965, $360 was allocated to rent payments. Total spendable income for this family of ten in that year was, therefore, about $2,000.

Mrs. D

The head of this household is a 43-year-old divorcee, the mother of eleven children, seven of whom are still at home with her. They range in age from four to fifteen years. One of the seven, a six-year-old son, was in an Indian TB hospital at the time of the survey, but was expected to return home soon, hopefully to stay. The four who have left are employed full-time, two of them in the military service. Mrs. D and her children live in a rented one-story frame house with no basement, which gives them about 1,000 square feet of living space. Indoor plumbing facilities, drinking water, and public sewage disposal system are available. Rent is $40 per month with no utilities furnished. The house is heated with gas.

Mrs. D is not presently employed, but expressed some interest in training to become a practical nurse. She has had virtually no work experience in the past and is partially disabled, limiting the kinds of employment she might seek. She completed only five years of school and has had no job training. The oldest five of her children at home are attending school, and two of the children who have left home completed high school; the other two had eleven years of school.

Mrs. D's income is derived from welfare checks amounting to $2,964 per year, out of which she pays $40 monthly for rent.

The E Family

The father in this family is 55 years old, his wife is 47. Their six children, all living at home, range in age from twelve through twenty-four. Although this is an eight-member household, their one-story dwelling affords them less than 800 square feet of living space. The monthly rent for this small house, which has no indoor plumbing except cold piped water, is $30. Drinking water comes from a well; there is no septic tank or public sewage disposal system. The house is heated with a wood-burning stove.

Mr. E owns and operates a garage, although he has had no formal training as a mechanic. His wife works part-time, making and selling beaded purses and other items, for which she recently had some instruction. Their oldest daughter, aged 24, works part-time doing ironing, and their 22-year-old son, who had just returned from Army service at the time of the survey, was beginning full-time employment. Both of the parents are interested in receiving training, Mr. E in mechanics and Mrs. E in learning to arrange artificial flowers in a florist shop. Both, however, consider themselves partially disabled with high blood pressure, and Mrs. E also has kidney trouble.

Although Mr. and Mrs. E had limited schooling, two and five years, respectively, they value education for their children and are keeping four of them in school, including an 18-year-old son in the tenth grade and a 20-year-old son in the eleventh grade. Their oldest daughter (24) completed eight years of school and their 22-year-old son had ten years.

Total income in 1965 for this family of eight was $2,980 from all sources. Mr. E earned $1,200 in his work as a garage mechanic, his wife received $180 from the sale of her handwork, the daughter earned $480 from ironing, and two sons together earned $1,120 in an aid program at school.

Mr. F

Mr. F is the only bachelor in our series of case studies presented here. He is 56 years old and has been living rent-free in a small house owned by his sister. The house has no plumbing facilities of any kind and no sewage disposal system. Water must be carried from a spring. The heating arrangement for this dwelling consists of a metal barrel in which logs are burned. About the time of the survey, Mr. F's sister sold this house, so her brother was obliged to look for other quarters.

This man has been a laborer in the past, but has been disabled with arthritis since late 1964. He is now able to do only occasional chores, such as cutting wood or building fences. From work of this kind, he received total income in 1965 of less than $500.

Mr. F had eight years in school and lives a very quiet life. He is a World War II veteran, but does not participate in veterans' activities because their meetings are held too far away from where he lives.

Mr. and Mrs. G

This family unit is in the concluding stage of the life cycle. Mr. and Mrs. G, aged 74 and 70 are now living alone, their ten children all having left home to make their own living. Their progeny range in age from 25 to 45. The aging parents own their single-story house of wood siding. Space is ample for the two of them, some 1,000 square feet, but there is no indoor plumbing, no public sewage system, and no septic tank. Drinking water supply is from a well. The house has no basement or garage, and is heated with wood.

In 1960, Mr. G retired from forty-two years of farming. He has had no other work experience.

Education has played little part in the lives of Mr. and Mrs. G and their children. Mr. G had only one year of schooling and his wife had none. Neither can read, and Mr. G can write only his name. Their oldest son graduated from high school, but he is the only one of their ten children who completed more than six years of school; the others dropped out after six years or less.

This couple lives on a monthly check of $105 from the Veterans' Administration. In 1965, Mrs. G earned $60 picking berries, making their total income for that year $1,320.

Mr. and Mrs. H

This is an elderly retired couple whose lives have been spent in farming. Mr. H is 81 years old, his wife is 72. They live in a small, one-story house which they own. They have indoor plumbing facilities and a septic tank; drinking water comes from a well. The house is heated with gas.

Mr. H has been retired from farming since 1950 and has had no other employment experience. Mrs. H has been a full-time housewife and was recently partially disabled by a stroke. Their 43-year-old daughter, a registered nurse, has returned home to care for her parents. Their three sons are living away from home, working full-time.

This family has had little schooling, except for the daughter who is a college graduate. The father had only six years of school, the mother completed eight grades, and the sons finished only elementary school.

Total income for this couple is $984 a year, from old-age assistance. Need for cash income is reduced somewhat by the fact that their house is debt-free, and they supply some of their food needs from a garden and keeping some poultry.

All of the above families lived in either Adair or McCurtain counties, in Oklahoma. They did not live on reservations. The initials used for the various families are simply alphabetical, with no relation to their real names.

Life on a Reservation in North Dakota

North Dakota is another State which has a large number of rural Indians. The following description of life on a reservation in one of our sample counties, Rolette, will yield some insight into the relatively recent situation there.

There are four Indian reservations in North Dakota which embrace, in one way or another, the full gamut of problems and issues arising from the special reservation status of the American Indian. Running through the fabric of all four North Dakota reservations are similar threads of concern about how to deal with the human problems which become special and complex because they are peculiarly Indian problems.

In a series of carefully researched articles appearing in the Fargo Forum in 1966, the writer quotes one Indian as saying that, "Being an Indian is a state of mind."[10] The Indian, who has been the object of many decades of management which has engendered dependence on an alien culture, *does* have special problems. Those who are concerned with administering reservation affairs are faced with the dual problems of essentially welfare assistance for the residual population now living on the reservation and preparing the young people through education and training, better health and employment opportunities to become self-sufficient on or off the reservation. None of the aspects of these twin problems will be solved easily or quickly.

TURTLE MOUNTAIN CHIPPEWA RESERVATION

In microcosm, the Turtle Mountain Reservation, wholly within the borders of Rolette County, offers an illustration of the ways in which these myriad problems and issues hamper efforts to alleviate poverty among rural Indians. This reservation is located in rolling hills just south of the Canadian border. Because of this geographical position, the Indians have acquired considerable French culture through intermarriage with French Canadians for many generations. Their surnames, speech, and customs evidence strong French influence.

Turtle Mountain is small in land area but large in population size compared with the other reservations in North Dakota. There are more than 7,000 Chippewa Indians on and adjacent to the reservation, in a total county population of 10,641. The principal center of activity is in Belcourt, where the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) headquarters is located, as well as the Turtle Mountain Community School, the Public Health Service hospital, and St. Ann's Catholic Mission.

But most of the Indians do not live in Belcourt. Their small cabins are out in the hills, close together, off the gravel roads. Constructed of logs, the cabins are stuccoed with a clay-water mixture as a protection against rugged North Dakota winters. The cabins are heated mostly with oil, although a few still use wood for heating. Many of the residents have electricity and television sets. They live on the land, but most do not farm it—fewer than seventy families make all or part of their living from farming, even though agriculture is what they know and other work is scarce.

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[10] Olson, Cal, "The Indian in North Dakota," The Fargo Forum and Moorhead News, January 16–20, 1966. (Five-part series)

Nearly sixty percent of the Turtle Mountain Indians have incomes of less than $3,000 a year from all sources—wages or salaries, land lease fees, welfare payments. This income level reflects in part the work scarcity, but it is also related to the skill level of the population. Aside from the relatively few Indians who are employed by BIA and the U.S. Public Health Service on the reservation, the principal sources of jobs are two small local industries. One is a Bulova Watch Company jewel bearing factory located in Rolla, in which 100 Indians earned an average of $70 weekly at the time this newspaper account was written. The other enterprise is a souvenir plant called Chippewayan Authentics which employed twelve people. While Indians, noted for their manual dexterity, have been successful in this kind of work, the total number represented on these payrolls is obviously insignificant in terms of employment needs, and efforts to induce other industries to locate in the area have been so far without success.

The Work Experience Program (WEP) of the Office of Economic Opportunity fills in some of the unemployment gap for adults. This program was said to be the first Indian-oriented WEP to be funded in the United States, as of June 1965. Because 157 of the 175 men in the program were receiving BIA general assistance, BIA continued its share of their financial welfare. About three-fifths of the WEP budget was earmarked for salaries of the participants so they could maintain their families while engaged in the program. The average worker received $180 monthly.

Although most of the men were anxious to learn a trade, especially the operation of heavy road construction equipment, the WEP budget did not permit renting such equipment. The jobs they performed, therefore, consisted of working as orderlies or janitors in nearby hospitals and schools, cutting roads and fire breaks into lakes and recreation areas on the reservation, cleaning up the litter of junk automobiles and burying the debris, and renovating submarginal housing where owners would pay for the materials. The participants spent two hours two evenings each week in classes studying elementary and junior high school subjects.

Other OEO programs on the reservation were CAP-sponsored education programs, including remedial education, Head-Start and kindergartens, and guidance counseling, plus a supervised recreation program. In 1965, there were 51 CAP employees on the reservation, 41 of them Indians, mostly serving as teacher aides and aides in guidance counseling.

Educational facilities on and near the reservation appear to be fairly ample. The Turtle Mountain Community School in Belcourt operates grades one through twelve and three other day schools have grades one through six. Indian students also attend four other day schools on the perimeter of the reservation, as well as three off-reservation boarding schools. Total enrollment in these schools accounts for about 1,800 students. In addition, some thirty-six high school graduates are in college, and sixty others are taking some form of post-high school vocational and technical training. Regular school attendance is said to be a problem, made difficult by the indifference of some of the parents. Dropouts are numerous, thought to be because the educational program may be too academic for the many students who are not college-bound.[11]

Although the health of the Indians on this reservation has greatly improved and the free PHS medical facilities and services are heavily used, there remain serious health problems. Turtle Mountain has a 46-bed PHS hospital in Belcourt in which nearly all of the Indian mothers have their babies, to which admissions increase 8 percent a year and outpatient visits nearly 11 percent yearly, at the rate of 70 outpatient visits for examination or treatment daily. The hospital has four PHS doctors, two dentists, and two pharmacists to handle this heavy caseload. The facilities of the hospital are so old that only emergency surgery is performed there. Hospital care at Federal expense may be authorized by PHS at other community hospitals, mainly at Rolette, North Dakota, and at the Air Force Base hospital in Minot.[12]

The health problems which plague this reservation, as is true of many others, probably call for education as much as medicine, since they grow out of the environment. Such ills as dysentery, skin diseases, respiratory illnesses, and malnutrition are caused by such elementary defects as lack of cleanliness, poor ventilation and improper heating, inadequate or improper diet. Preventive health measures, including better information on hygiene and nutrition, are needed. A further, major cause of poor health and other problems among these Indians is alcoholism. Here again, the answer is not primarily medicine, but rather in the environment—education, regulation, better social and economic conditions.

Turtle Mountain, on the plus side, has available schools and free medical care; it has a self-governing Tribal Council of nine men headed by an elected college graduate; the BIA Superintendent is also an Indian, employed by BIA for fifteen years; it has two small industries and some OEO activities; it has BIA and State welfare assistance.

On the other side of the coin, Turtle Mountain has low income and few occupational skills; it has poor land, and there has always been too little of it for each tribal member to receive an allotment there; the steadily growing population has made land scarcity an acute problem. As elsewhere, the land has been fragmented through years of inheritance since the time of allotment, and because of its low rental value, provides the tribe with little money income. The area lacks water for improved sanitation. The reservation is confronted with complicated jurisdictional relationships at Federal, State, county, and tribal levels in the administration of justice—crime, juvenile delinquency, and disputes of all kinds. Unemployment and underemployment are widespread. Perhaps most important of all, the thoughtful Indian is uncertain about the future and confused by conflicting advice as to where and how he should find it—on or off the reservation, "Americanized" or as an Indian. These social and psychological problems do not yield to easy solution, but they are very real.

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[11] Federal Facilities for Indians, Tribal Relations with the Federal Government, Report by Mamie L. Mizen for Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, 1965–66, p. 54.

[12] Ibid., p. 53.

Rural Nonreservation Indian Groups

It has been estimated in the Economic Research Service that there were scattered throughout the United States in 1960 more than 100,000 rural Indians who lived off the reservations.[13] They lived in the rural areas of some twenty States, the largest numbers in Oklahoma and North Carolina. These estimates include only those counties which had at least one hundred rural Indians. Every part of the country was represented by the twenty States, from Maine to California.

Information is limited about these Indian groups, which have no official connection with the Federal government and receive no services such as reservation Indians do. Their status and characteristics vary widely from Region to Region, and even from State to State. Four States each in the Northeast, North Central, and West Regions, and eight States in the South are included in this discussion of rural nonreservation Indian groups.

Northeast Region

In this Region, there were estimated to have been in 1960 nearly 7,000 Indians in rural communities in New York, about 1,400 in Maine, 425 in Massachusetts, and 300 in Rhode Island, a total for the Region of about 9,000.

New York State Indians are members of various Iroquois tribes located mainly in eight counties. Although they live on reservations, they receive so little Federal support that, for all practical purposes, they must be regarded as nonreservation Indians. Federal land trusteeship was terminated in 1948 and 1950. In Cattaraugus County, the tribes are composed of Senecas, who earn below-average income from a very poor land base. Senecas are also located in Chautauqua, Erie, and Genesee counties, pursuing a variety of occupations. A total of nearly 3,000 Senecas live in these four counties. About 1,700 rural Mohawks are found in Franklin County where they are mostly farmers and steel workers. In Niagara County, the Tuscarora Indians generally commute to Niagara Falls for employment, while Syracuse is the commuting center for Onondagas, Oneidas, and Cayugas in Onondaga County. There are only about two hundred rural Indians in Suffolk County, and they live on a small State reservation. The Indian population in this county is mixed, especially with the Negro population. Jobs are plentiful, but improvement of their housing by Farmers' Home Administration assistance has been hampered by their common ownership of land.

In Maine, rural nonreservation Indians were in three counties—Aroostook, Penobscot, and Washington. They were scattered in Aroostook County, the largest group being in Houlton Town, and no information is available on their situation. The Penobscot tribe in the county of that name lived mainly on a State reservation with no Federal support. They had a tribal government of their own, subject to the State of Maine, and were found principally on islands in the Penobscot River. Social and economic conditions of this tribe were poor. In Washington County, about three-fifths of the Passamaquoddy tribe lived on a State reservation similar to that in Penobscot and the remainder in two settlements in unorganized territory.

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[13] This portion of the report on nonreservation Indians is based almost entirely on an unpublished paper by Calvin L. Beale, entitled "Estimated Population in Rural Nonreservation Indian Groups in the United States, 1960," Economic Research Service, 1968.

In both Massachusetts counties in which rural Indians lived—Barnstable and Dukes—the Indian population is mixed, with white and Negro ancestry. In Barnstable, the Indians have customarily made their living from fishing, oystering, and cranberry picking, but with more general work in recent years, while in Dukes County, they depend on the summer resort trade on Martha's Vineyard Island. Only about three hundred Indians, mixed-blood descendants of the Narragansett tribe, live in Washington County, Rhode Island. They live in two towns—South Kingstown and Charlestown—under fairly good economic conditions.

NORTH CENTRAL REGION

This Region contains something over 5,000 rural nonreservation Indians in four States—Wisconsin, Michigan, Nebraska, and Ohio. Wisconsin has the largest number—2,400—all in Menominee County where they comprise 92 percent of the total population. This county was created in 1961 when Federal trusteeship of the Menominee tribe's land was terminated. The Menominees control the government of the county, which has the same boundaries as the former Menominee Reservation, and they are engaged in timber and sawmill operations. Farming is only a part-time, non-commercial enterprise for those classed as farmers. The area, which is wooded and has many lakes, provides good hunting and fishing for the residents. While the economic and social conditions of this tribe are better than many Indian communities, they fall far below U.S. standards. Median family income in 1959 was only $2,638, and more than two-thirds of the housing units were considered deteriorating or dilapidated.[14]

In Michigan, about four hundred Indians are scattered through the population of Allegan, Berrien, and Van Buren Counties, and something over 1,000 Ottawa and Chippewa Indians live along the northwestern coast of the Lower Peninsula in six counties, as well as in two counties in the Upper Peninsula. The largest single concentration in the Lower Peninsula is in Sutton's Bay Township of Leelanau County. Information is lacking on the current socioeconomic status of the rural Indians in Michigan.

There are about 1,000 rural Indians in northwestern Nebraska, presumably Sioux, who do not live on reservations, but are effectively adjacent to the large Pine Ridge Reservation in South Dakota. The small group of Indians in Highland County, Ohio, is not classified as Indian in the Census, but these 130 people consider themselves to be Cherokees, linked with Indian relatives in Oklahoma, and they carry on some Indian traditions. They are poor hill people who live in the hollows of the Appalachian border of Highland County, near the community of Carmel, and the settlement extends somewhat into Pike County. In the mid-1960's, they organized a development program and received an OEO grant as Indians. They are heavily dependent on welfare assistance.

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[14] Weidemann, Wayne H. and Fuguitt, Glenn V., "Menominee: Wisconsin's 72nd County," Dept. of Sociology, College of Agriculture, Univ. of Wisconsin, Madison, Population Note No. 3, April 1963, pp. 30–31.

THE WEST

In the West, which has about 17,000 rural nonreservation Indians, the great majority lives in California—about 14,000 in some thirty-four counties. The rest are in Oregon, Nevada, and Utah. The number of rural Indians per county in this Region ranges from only 100 to about 2,000.

The rural California Indians, who were given "rancherias" or residential homesites rather than being placed on reservations, have been excluded from most Federal programs for Indians, according to a recent report of the California State Advisory Commission on Indian Affairs. By and large, their socioeconomic status is superior to that of most Indian communities.

Oregon has approximately 3,000 nonreservation Indians in eight counties. Most of the Indian reservations and special Federal services for Indians in Oregon have been terminated during the last fifteen years. Many of these Indian groups live on or near what were formerly reservation lands. In at least two counties, Klamath and Lincoln, they are said to have better than average socioeconomic status, but in Wasco County, some 440 Indians of the former Umatilla Reservation have low average income. The status of Indians in the remaining counties is not known.

There are about 100 rural Indians in Churchill County, Nevada, and a like number in Washington County, Utah. The Nevada Indians are of the Shoshone tribe who formerly lived on the Austin Reservation. In Utah, they are of the Paiute tribe, also living on a former reservation.

THE SOUTH

This Region as a whole had nearly 75,000 nonreservation rural Indians located in eight States.[15] It is estimated that there were nearly 38,000 of them in Oklahoma in 1960. Determination of their precise number is complicated in this State by several factors, most importantly the fact that their ancestry is now so mixed with white and Negro populations that Indians are often indistinguishable as Indians, even though they can trace part of their heritage back to tribal rolls. In addition, all Indian reservations, except that of the Osage tribe, have been terminated—some many years ago, others since 1959. Indians are therefore dispersed throughout the population and retain a somewhat tenuous connection with the Bureau of Indian Affairs, which still maintains agency offices in the State and "assumes some responsibility" for Indians. It is not only difficult to determine the number and location of this fractionally mixed Indian population, but it is also difficult to know the extent of their need for additional assistance *as Indians*. This kind of knowledge depends on county-by-county, tribe-by-tribe information supplied by persons who are thoroughly familiar with local conditions.

Rural nonreservation Indians were living in fifty Oklahoma counties in 1960, the largest number in Adair County. Low family income and low educational levels were widespread in many of the counties. These were also counties in which there were relatively large concentrations of rural Indians.

In North Carolina, more than 31,000 rural nonreservation Indians were found in twelve counties. About 29,000 Lumbee were located in Cumberland, Harnett, Hoke, Robeson, Sampson, and Scotland counties, the largest numbers in Robeson and Hoke counties. The Lumbee are of tri-racial origin, but have been enumerated in the Census as Indian since 1890 and were officially so recognized by Act of Congress in 1953, although not granted Federal services by that Act. They were mostly poor and undereducated, and are engaged in agriculture as small-scale owners, tenants, and hired workers. They have one of the highest fertility rates of any ethnic group in the nation; their rate of natural increase is therefore very high. Some have recently migrated from North Carolina, going principally to Baltimore.

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[15] The eight States are: Oklahoma, North Carolina, Virginia, Alabama, Louisiana, Delaware, South Carolina, and Texas.

Other tri-racial groups of Indians live in back-country tobacco farming sections of North Carolina in Halifax, Nash, and Warren counties. They have been officially recognized as Indians only since 1950. A tri-racial group in Person County, also tobacco farmers, has been recognized by North Carolina as Indian since 1920.

Virginia had slightly over 1,000 rural Indians who lived in seven counties in 1960. In Halifax County, there were about 120 Indians who are a part of the tri-racial group in Person County, North Carolina, mentioned above, in which many of their children have gone to school. They are mostly tobacco farmers. As in North Carolina, the Indians of Virginia are of tri-racial origin. Most of them are not officially recognized as Indians by the State, and are living under very poor socioeconomic conditions.

Indians in Alabama, numbering about 750, were found in Escambia and Washington counties. In the former, they are mixed blood descendants of the Creek Indians who did not go to Oklahoma. Poor, part-time farmers, they receive no Federal support or services, but would like assistance to make a tourist attraction of Fort Mims. They have their own churches and a segregated elementary school, and have revived some Indian dancing and handicrafts. About 280 Census Indians in Washington County are part of a larger tri-racial group in the central and southern part of the county who are known colloquially as "Cajans." Some of their descent can be traced to the Creek Indians of Escambia County, but the Cajans are a separate population. Living in rather isolated piney woods country on dirt roads, they are in very poor straits economically and socially.

In the remainder of the South, the number of rural Indians per State is rather small, ranging from 370 in Texas to 2,470 in Louisiana. Delaware had only about 540 and South Carolina, 535. In Louisiana, 180 rural Indians of the Coushatta tribe lived in Allen Parish, still speak their native language, and carry on some handicraft work. Their children have attended public schools since 1949. Their economic and social status is fair. Houma Indians live in Lafourche Parish (140) and in Terrebonne Parish (1,900). Of mixed racial origin, they speak French and live mainly along the bayous, where many engage in fishing and trapping for a livelihood. Income levels and housing conditions are poor, and only recently has a public school been available to them. Most of these Indians are landless, and were characterized in an Interior Department report as severely exploited in their fishing and trapping operations. Some 250 Indians live in Plaquemines and Rapides parishes, in the latter county being of mixed blood but claiming Choctaw ancestry. Educational opportunity has been limited until recently to a segregated elementary school; none of the residents has gone to high school. Their dependence for employment in the past has been on a large timber company, but this work is no longer available.

Delaware had 130 Indians in Kent County, a tri-racial group claiming descent from the Nanticoke tribe. They have lived for many years as a separate population group with their own elementary school. In Sussex County, the 400 Indians are also Nanticokes, but live as a separate population also, principally in an area known as Indian Hundred. They have historically maintained separate schools and have tried to preserve their Indian tradition. Their social and economic condition is intermediate between local whites and Negroes.

Lumbee Indians in Dillon and Marlboro counties in South Carolina numbered about 110 in each county. They are part of the tribe mentioned earlier as residing in Robeson County, North Carolina. They are quite poor. There were some 315 Catawba Indians in York County, South Carolina, located on a former reservation southeast of Rock Hill. Federal trusteeship of their land terminated in 1962, and they are provided no Federal services. They are mainly employed in cotton mills and other industrial enterprises.

The only rural nonreservation Indians in Texas were living in Polk County. They were residents of the former Alabama-Coushatta Reservation near Livingston. Federal land trusteeship for this group was terminated in 1955, but tribal members are still eligible for Federal education and medical aid.

Considerably more information is needed about the estimated 100,000 people in rural nonreservation Indian groups. No person or agency at the present time has the requisite knowledge to report on their current social and economic situation with precision. It is believed that many groups are in poverty, in poor health, in poor housing. Educational levels are generally low, and either unemployment or underemployment is widespread. For these Indians, there is little or no Federal support as Indians, and for some there never has been. As American citizens, they are entitled to assistance where it is needed. Detailed local knowledge about them is absolutely required in order to ensure that such assistance is given intelligently and with understanding.

CONCLUSION

While the same symptoms of rural poverty have been repeated monotonously here as everywhere, the picture is not dark for all Indians or in all places. Some tribes have demonstrated that Indians can be enterprising and successful. They have converted some of their lands into profitable uses, lured industry to their areas, supplied a stable local labor force—and prospered. Some of the thousands who have gone to large cities have made satisfactory adjustments to urban life and living.[16] But this is not the usual pattern; the majority have not prospered, especially in the rural sector where most of them are.

Hopeful signs are appearing among Indian young people who are seeking higher education as the avenue to promising employment opportunities in a modern affluent society. Some have succeeded despite the pervasive, ambivalent feeling about leaving their reservations and families behind in their search for greater opportunity in the world outside. Also, there are now in existence at least five national Indian organizations to give voice to Indian needs and to help Indians help

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[16] Hoffman, James W., "A Comeback for the Vanishing American?" Presbyterian Life, Jan. 15, Feb. 1 and 15, and March 1, 1969.

each other to satisfy those needs. There are many outstanding Indian leaders in all segments of American society—business, politics, the arts, the entertainment world. The great diversity of special talents the American Indian has to offer—in industry, in government, in sports, in arts and crafts—is becoming better known to society at large.[17] All these are true accomplishments and promising signs.

Unfortunately, these forward strides leave many thousands of rural Indians still in the hinterland, still looking for the economic and social opportunities that are widely available to the society around them. The predicament of thousands of rural Indians is largely untouched and unbenefited by the continuously rising standards of living of much of the rest of the American population.

What the Indian today wants is what most American citizens not only want but demand. As a recent report of a Task Force of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States put it, "Indian spokesmen have stated Indian wants. They want to retain their culture. They want to be consulted and to have a real voice in decisions relating to themselves. They want to retain their reservation lands. And Indians want to enter modern economic life and enjoy its advantages. * * *"[18]

Like other minority groups, American Indians want to control their own destinies. The way to make this a realistic goal is not at all clear. The basic issue of separatism versus integration with the larger society is crucial in America today. How to join the mainstream of the society and yet retain a separate cultural heritage has not been satisfactorily demonstrated by any substantial minority group with that posture. Barriers of economic and social status, customs, language, and traditions continually get in the way of acculturation of the minority population.

The plight of the rural Indian, on or off the reservation, is exacerbated by his isolation, his dependent status for too long, his lack of preparation for modern nonfarm society, and his uncertainty about where his future lies. He is still, today, "ill-fed, ill-clothed, and ill-housed"—in other words, in poverty.

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[17] Ibid.

[18] "Rural Poverty and Regional Progress in an Urban Society," Task Force on Economic Growth and Opportunity, Fourth Report, Chamber of Commerce of the United States, 1969, pp. 63–64.

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APPENDIX TABLES

Table — Page

1. Indian population in selected States, rurality of States and Indian population, and Indians on reservations, 1960 — 38
2. Distribution of rural Indians and of total rural population, United States, by age, 1960 — 38
3. Size of family: Rural Indians and total rural population, United States, 1960 — 39
4. Distribution of family income: Rural Indians and total rural population, United States, 1960 — 39
5. Occupation of employed rural Indians and total rural population, United States, by sex, 1960 — 39
6. Employment status of rural Indians and total rural population, United State, by sex, 1960 — 40
7. Years of school completed by persons 14 years old and older in the rural Indian and total rural population, United States, by sex, 1960 — 40
8. Selected Indian and U.S. vital statistics, 1954 and 1964 — 41
9. Number and distribution of population by residence in 16 counties in which at least 1,000 rural Indians lived in 1960 — 41
10. Poverty-linked characteristics in 16 counties in which at least 1,000 rural Indians lived in 1960 — 42
11. Family income distribution in 1959 of the nonwhite population in 16 counties in which at least 1,000 rural Indians lived in 1960 — 42
12. Occupational structure among nonwhite males in 16 counties in which at least 1,000 rural Indians lived in 1960 — 43
13. Industrial structure in the nonwhite population in 16 counties in which at least 1,000 rural Indians lived in 1960 — 44
14. Estimated population of rural "nonreservation" Indian groups in the United States, 1960 — 45

TABLE 1.—INDIAN POPULATION IN SELECTED STATES, RURALITY OF STATES AND INDIAN POPULATION, AND INDIANS ON RESERVATIONS, 1960

State	Indian population, number	Percent of total State population that is rural	Percent of Indians in rural residence	On reservations	
				Number	Percent
Arizona	83, 387	25. 5	90. 0	83, 387	100. 0
California	39, 014	13. 6	47. 1	830	2. 1
Colorado	4, 288	26. 3	58. 2	1, 428	33. 3
Florida	2, 504	26. 1	59. 1	1, 183	47. 2
Idaho	5, 231	52. 5	86. 8	4, 194	80. 2
Iowa	1, 708	47. 0	16. 8	465	27. 2
Kansas	5, 069	39. 0	29. 7	729	14. 4
Michigan	9, 701	26. 6	48. 3	1, 073	11. 1
Minnesota	15, 496	37. 8	69. 0	11, 015	71. 1
Mississippi	3, 119	62. 3	94. 6	2, 617	83. 9
Montana	21, 181	49. 8	87. 9	19, 014	89. 8
Nebraska	5, 545	45. 7	64. 4	3, 168	57. 1
Nevada	6, 681	29. 6	74. 9	6, 000	89. 8
New Mexico	56, 255	34. 1	84. 1	55, 715	99. 0
North Carolina	38, 129	60. 5	95. 5	3, 310	8. 7
North Dakota	11, 736	64. 8	90. 0	10, 314	87. 9
Oklahoma [1]	64, 689	37. 1	63. 0	64, 596	99. 9
Oregon	8, 026	37. 8	67. 9	2, 560	31. 9
South Dakota	25, 794	60. 7	82. 3	23, 693	91. 8
Utah	6, 961	25. 1	76. 4	4, 676	67. 2
Washington	21, 076	31. 9	66. 6	14, 446	68. 5
Wisconsin	14, 297	36. 2	72. 0	6, 924	48. 4
Wyoming	4, 020	43. 2	89. 5	3, 464	86. 2
Total, 23 States	453, 907	--------------	76. 9	325, 457	71. 7

[1] All Indian reservations in Oklahoma except that of the Osage Tribe have been terminated since 1960.

Source: 1960 Census of Population PC(1)B and data from Everett E. White, IHS, HEW, dated Dec. 30, 1968.

TABLE 2.—DISTRIBUTION OF RURAL INDIANS AND OF TOTAL RURAL POPULATION, UNITED STATES, BY AGE, 1960

Age	Rural Indians		Total rural population	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Under 5 years	64, 340	16. 9	6, 260, 791	11. 6
5 to 9	56, 988	15. 0	6, 083, 155	11. 3
10 to 14	48, 481	12. 7	5, 725, 977	10. 6
15 to 19	37, 080	9. 8	4, 487, 549	8. 3
20 to 24	25, 934	6. 8	3, 076, 511	5. 7
25 to 29	21, 829	5. 7	3, 023, 849	5. 6
30 to 34	20, 161	5. 3	3, 306, 444	6. 1
35 to 39	18, 550	4. 9	3, 436, 986	6. 4
40 to 44	15, 825	4. 2	3, 275, 216	6. 1
45 to 49	15, 378	4. 0	3, 122, 993	5. 8
50 to 54	13, 120	3. 5	2, 754, 841	5. 1
55 to 59	15, 046	4. 0	2, 415, 273	4. 5
60 to 64	8, 500	2. 2	2, 051, 452	3. 8
65 to 69	7, 309	1. 9	1, 855, 498	3. 4
70 to 74	5, 139	1. 4	1, 424, 809	2. 6
75 years and over	6, 626	1. 7	1, 753, 081	3. 3
Total, all ages	380, 306	100. 0	54, 054, 425	100. 0
Median age	17. 7	--------------	27. 3	--------------

Source: 1960 Census of Population, PC(2) 1C and PC(1) 1B.

TABLE 3.—SIZE OF FAMILY: RURAL INDIANS AND TOTAL RURAL POPULATION, UNITED STATES, 1960

Size of family	Rural Indians		Total rural population	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
2 persons	10,878	16.9	4,033,744	30.6
3 persons	10,091	15.7	2,673,386	20.3
4 persons	9,325	14,5	2,522,948	19.1
5 persons	8,915	13.8	1,757,769	13.3
6 persons	7,515	11.7	1,035,401	7.9
7 or more persons	17,637	27.4	1,165,107	8.8
All families	64,361	100.0	13,188,355	100.0

Source: 1960 Census of Population, PC(2) 1C and PC(1) 1D.

TABLE 4.—DISTRIBUTION OF FAMILY INCOME, RURAL INDIANS AND TOTAL RURAL POPULATION, UNITED STATES, 1960

Income	Rural Indians		Total rural population	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Under $1,000	18,025	28.0	1,310,295	9.9
$1,000 to $2,999	22,085	34.3	3,112,294	23.6
$3,000 to $4,999	12,391	19.2	3,154,303	23.9
$5,000 to $6,999	6,557	10.2	2,670,812	20.3
$7,000 to $9,999	3,659	5.7	1,422,191	10.8
$10,000 to $14,999	1,290	2.0	1,198,998	9.1
$15,000 and over	354	.6	319,458	2.4
Total families	64,361	100.0	13,188,351	100.0

Source: 1960 Census of Population, PC(2)1C and PC(1)1C.

TABLE 5.—OCCUPATION OF EMPLOYED RURAL INDIANS AND TOTAL RURAL POPULATION, UNITED STATES, BY SEX, 1960

Occupation of employed	Rural Indians				Total rural population			
	Males		Females		Males		Females	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Professional, technical, and kindred	1,701	3.5	1,324	7.4	760,566	6.0	572,794	12.3
Farmers and farm managers	6,067	12.6	752	4.2	2,265,808	18.0	109,498	2.4
Managers, officials, and proprietors, except farm	1,079	2.2	314	1.8	963,065	7.6	174,598	3.8
Clerical and kindred	1,015	2.1	1,527	8.5	465,488	3.7	958,857	20.6
Sales workers	465	1.0	467	2.6	512,327	4.1	344,867	7.4
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred	5,266	11.0	115	0.6	2,249,467	17.9	49,112	1.1
Operatives and kindred workers	8,170	17.0	1,929	10.8	2,553,796	20.3	859,977	18.5
Private household workers	125	0.4	2,332	13.0	16,212	0.1	442,899	9.5
Service workers, excluding private households	1,939	4.0	3,986	22.3	431,953	3.4	675,614	14.5
Farm laborers and foremen	8,613	17.9	2,074	11.6	1,016,358	8.1	212,521	4.6
Laborers except farm and mine	9,413	19.6	348	1.9	963,524	7.6	31,359	0.7
Occupation not reported	4,199	8.7	2,740	15.3	402,050	3.2	216,147	4.6
Total employed	48,052	100.0	17,908	100.0	12,600,614	100.0	4,648,243	100.0

Source: 1960 Census of Population, PC(2) 1C and PC(1) 1C.

TABLE 6.—EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF RURAL INDIANS AND TOTAL RURAL POPULATION, UNITED STATES, BY SEX, 1960

Employment status	Rural Indians				Total rural population			
	Males		Females		Males		Females	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Labor force	61,191		20,494		14,028,047		4,946,572	
Armed Forces	2,191				751,090			
Civilian labor force	59,000	100.0	20,439	100.0	13,276,957	100.0	4,934,846	100.0
Employed	48,052	81.4	17,908	87.6	12,600,614	94.9	4,648,243	94.2
Unemployed	10,948	18.6	2,531	12.4	676,343	5.1	286,603	5.8
Not in labor force	50,280	100.0	86,940	100.0	4,807,228	100.0	13,168,374	100.0
Inmate of institution	4,009	8.0	1,178	1.4	476,758	9.9	251,482	1.9
Enrolled in school	15,737	31.3	15,042	17.3	1,644,527	34.2	1,743,148	13.2
Other, under 65 years old	22,694	45.1	62,268	71.6	1,099,553	22.9	9,020,556	68.5
With own child under 6			26,956	31.0			3,423,707	26.0
Other, 65 years and over	7,840	15.6	8,452	9.7	1,586,390	33.0	2,153,188	16.4
All persons 14 years and over	114,710		107,434		18,835,275		18,114,946	
Labor force participation rate		53.3		19.1		74.5		27.3

Source: 1960 Census of Population, PC(2) 1C and PC(1) 1D.

TABLE 7.—YEARS OF SCHOOL COMPLETED BY PERSONS 14 YEARS OLD AND OLDER IN THE RURAL INDIAN AND TOTAL RURAL POPULATION, UNITED STATES, BY SEX, 1960

Years of school completed	Rural Indians				Total rural population			
	Males		Females		Males		Females	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
No school years completed	13,759	12.3	15,791	14.7	462,648	2.5	325,732	1.8
Elementary:								
1 to 4 years	16,431	14.7	12,589	11.7	1,584,075	8.4	1,041,925	5.8
5 to 6 years	15,130	13.6	14,213	13.2	1,713,055	9.1	1,410,388	7.8
7 years	10,900	9.8	10,580	9.9	1,654,407	8.8	1,372,365	7.6
8 years	17,797	16.0	16,788	15.6	3,766,743	20.0	3,398,506	18.8
High school:								
1 to 3 years	23,866	21.4	23,537	21.9	4,128,913	21.9	4,317,171	23.8
4 years	9,946	8.9	10,873	10.1	3,651,156	19.4	4,410,406	24.3
College:								
1 to 3 years	2,787	2.5	2,319	2.2	1,036,750	5.5	1,239,932	6.8
4 years or more	855	.8	744	.7	837,552	4.4	598,505	3.3
Total	111,471	100.0	107,434	100.0	18,835,299	100.0	18,114,930	100.0

Source: 1960 Census of Population, PC(2) 1C and PC(1) 1D.

TABLE 8.—SELECTED INDIAN AND UNITED STATES VITAL STATISTICS, 1954 AND 1964

Vital statistics	Indians	United States (all races)
Infant mortality (deaths per 1,000 live births):		
1964	35.9	24.8
1954	65.0	26.6
Maternal deaths per 10,000 live births:		
1964	6.3	3.4
1954	18.4	5.2
Mortality by specified cause (deaths per 100,000 population):		
Tuberculosis:		
1964	21.3	4.3
1954	54.0	10.2
Gastritis, enteritis, etc.:		
1964	19.3	4.3
1954	56.0	4.9
Morbidity by specified cause per 100,000 population (cases reported per 100,000 population):		
Tuberculosis:		
1964	184.1	26.6
1954	571.0	62.4
Dysentery:		
1964	417.5	8.5
1963	428.1	8.4
23 Federal Indian reservation States birth rate (registered live births per 1,000 population): 1964	43.1	21.0
Average age of death, 1964	43.8	63.6
Life expectancy at birth, 1964	63.5	70.2
Median age of population	17.3	29.5
Percent of population under 20 years	55.2	38.5

Source: Indian Health Highlights, 1966 edition U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Public Health Service, pp. XVI, 7.

TABLE 9.—NUMBER AND DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION BY RESIDENCE IN 16 COUNTIES IN WHICH AT LEAST 1,000 RURAL INDIANS LIVED IN 1960

State and county	Total population 1960	Percent rural 1960	Percent rural nonfarm	Percent rural farm	Percent rural nonwhite is of total population, 1960
Alaska:					
Bethel	5,537	100.0	100.0		90.9
Wade Hampton	3,128	100.0	99.0	1.0	94.6
Arizona:					
Apache	30,438	100.0	83.7	16.3	77.5
Navajo	37,994	67.7	58.3	9.4	48.6
Montana:					
Big Horn	10,007	72.1	39.7	32.4	33.3
Glacier	11,565	60.8	48.4	12.4	35.7
New Mexico:					
McKinley	37,209	52.5	38.6	13.9	42.2
Sandoval	14,201	81.9	77.4	4.5	42.0
North Carolina:					
Hoke	16,356	81.3	45.7	35.6	55.1
Robeson	89,102	79.7	37.2	42.5	52.9
North Dakota:					
Rolette	10,641	100.0	68.3	31.7	43.8
Sioux	3,662	100.0	63.2	36.8	45.2
Oklahoma:					
Adair	13,112	100.0	73.8	26.2	23.3
McCurtain	25,851	80.8	62.1	18.7	18.7
South Dakota:					
Shannon	6,000	100.0	85.8	14.2	84.1
Todd	4,661	100.0	69.2	30.8	58.1
Total	157,316				

Source: 1960 Census of Population, PC (1) C.

TABLE 10.—POVERTY-LINKED CHARACTERISTICS IN 16 COUNTIES IN WHICH AT LEAST 1,000 RURAL INDIANS LIVED IN 1960

State and county	Low income[1] (percent)	Education[2] (years)	Infant mortality[3] (rate)	Unemployment[4] (percent)	Fertility[5] (number)	Migration[6] (percent)
Alaska:						
Bethel	77.2	2.0	94.2	34.9	6,326	(7)
Wade Hampton	84.3	1.6	87.9	21.8	(7)	(7)
Arizona:						
Apache	64.9	.9	43.3	20.4	5,537	[8] −22.2
Navajo	71.3	4.5	54.6	20.1	5,307	[8] −8.7
Montana:						
Big Horn	52.7	8.5	59.4	28.6	(7)	−16.4
Glacier	55.0	8.8	54.5	32.5	5,238	−6.2
New Mexico:						
McKinley	63.1	1.0	42.8	15.6	5,571	[8] −11.2
Sandoval	81.4	5.8	44.7	14.5	4,977	−9.2
North Carolina:						
Hoke	82.8	5.7	56.2	7.3	5,395	[8] −19.8
Robeson	82.6	6.5	46.3	5.9	4,802	[8] −21.8
North Dakota:						
Rolette	61.5	7.5	33.9	35.9	7,276	−24.2
Sioux	64.8	8.5	71.1	28.1	(7)	−23.0
Oklahoma:						
Adair	85.2	5.8	32.3	5.2	(7)	−22.5
McCurtain	80.9	6.1	35.5	6.0	5,702	[8] −27.9
South Dakota:						
Shannon	66.7	7.9	55.9	21.3	5,502	−20.8
Todd	72.2	8.3	71.0	24.2	(7)	−21.5

[1] Low income: Percent of all nonwhite families with incomes under $3,000 in 1959.
[2] Education: Median years of school completed by nonwhite persons 25 years old and over, 1960.
[3] Infant mortality: Number of deaths under 1 year per 1,000 live births in the nonwhite population, 1961–65.
[4] Unemployment: Percent of the civilian labor force 14 years old and over unemployed in the nonwhite population 1960.
[5] Fertility: Number of children ever born per 1,000 women ever married, ages 35–44, in the nonwhite population, 1960.
[6] Migration: Net migration of the population 1950–60, all ages.
[7] Not available.
[8] Nonwhite population only.

Sources: 1960 Census of Population PC(1) C for individual States, Bureau of the Census, tables 87 and 88; "Infant and Perinatal Rates by Age and Color, Each State and County, 1956–60 and 1961–65, "U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. January 1968; Bowles, Gladys and Tarver, James, "Net Migration of the Population 1950–60 by Age, Sex, and Color," U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Oklahoma State University, and U.S. Department of Commerce, November 1965.

TABLE 11.—FAMILY INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN 1959 OF THE NONWHITE POPULATION IN 16 COUNTIES IN WHICH AT LEAST 1,000 RURAL INDIANS LIVED IN 1960

State and county	Percent						Median family income
	Under $3,000	$3,000 to $5,999	$6,000 to $7,999	$8,000 to $9,999	$10,000 and over	All families	
Alaska:							
Bethel	77.2	13.8	5.2	2.4	1.4	100	$1,575
Wade Hampton	84.3	12.4	3.3	....	....	100	1,370
Arizona:							
Apache	64.9	23.0	5.2	4.4	2.5	100	1,718
Navajo	71.3	18.2	5.3	3.4	1.8	100	1,195
Montana:							
Big Horn	52.7	26.7	10.6	5.6	4.4	100	2,778
Glacier	55.0	24.8	8.3	5.7	6.2	100	2,716
New Mexico:							
McKinley	63.1	24.5	5.4	3.6	3.4	100	1,800
Sandoval	81.4	13.6	2.3	1.8	.9	100	955
North Carolina:							
Hoke	82.8	14.2	2.2	.5	.3	100	1,264
Robeson	82.6	13.8	2.1	1.1	.4	100	1,242
North Dakota:							
Rolette	64.1	27.6	5.1	2.7	.5	100	2,281
Sioux	64.8	26.5	5.9	2.8	....	100	2,000
Oklahoma:							
Adair	85.2	10.8	2.8	....	1.2	100	1,530
McCurtain	80.9	14.9	3.1	.3	.8	100	1,742
South Dakota:							
Shannon	66.7	20.9	7.8	4.0	.6	100	1,775
Todd	72.2	17.1	7.6	3.1	....	100	1,338

Source: 1960 Census of Population, PC(1) C for individual States, table 88.

TABLE 12.—OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE AMONG NONWHITE MALES IN 16 COUNTIES IN WHICH AT LEAST 1,000 RURAL INDIANS LIVED IN 1960

State and county	Percent						Number
	White-collar [1]	Blue-collar [2]	Service workers [3]	Farm-workers [4]	Occupation not reported	Total employed	
Alaska:							
Bethel	30.6	46.1	14.0	....	9.3	100	271
Wade Hampton	29.6	46.7	17.8	....	5.9	100	135
Arizona:							
Apache	12.6	69.6	4.8	5.9	7.1	100	2,446
Navajo	12.3	66.9	9.6	3.3	7.9	100	1,663
Montana:							
Big Horn	14.5	35.9	7.4	39.5	2.7	100	365
Glacier	22.2	29.0	5.0	41.1	2.7	100	441
New Mexico:							
McKinley	9.7	55.2	4.5	18.0	12.6	100	2,384
Sandoval	5.5	70.6	1.9	14.2	7.8	100	527
North Carolina:							
Hoke	4.2	34.6	7.9	51.8	1.5	100	1,436
Robeson	5.4	28.3	3.9	59.6	2.8	100	9,073
North Dakota:							
Rolette	8.8	39.7	14.7	35.4	1.4	100	285
Sioux	38.6	25.0	17.8	15.0	3.6	100	140
Oklahoma:							
Adair	9.1	39.7	5.0	38.4	7.8	100	242
McCurtain	10.4	59.4	4.7	24.1	1.4	100	831
South Dakota:							
Shannon	18.3	30.6	9.8	39.4	1.9	100	409
Todd	8.4	38.4	6.7	42.8	3.7	100	297

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[1] White-collar occupations: Professional, technical, and kindred workers; managers, officials, and proprietors, except farm; clerical and kindred workers; and sales workers.

[2] Blue-collar occupations: Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers; operatives and kindred workers; and laborers except farm and mine.

[3] Service workers: Private household and service workers.

[4] Farmworkers: Farmers and farm managers; farm laborers, unpaid family workers; and farm laborers and farm foremen.

Source: 1960 Census of Population, PC(1) C for individual States, table 88.

TABLE 13.—INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE OF THE NONWHITE POPULATION IN 16 COUNTIES IN WHICH AT LEAST 1,000 RURAL INDIANS LIVED IN 1960

[In percent]

State and county	Agriculture, forestry, fisheries, and mining	Construction	Manufacturing	Transportation, communication, and other utilities	Wholesale and retail trade	Finance, insurance, and real estate	Business and personal services	Entertainment and professional services	Public administration	Industry not reported	Total employed (both sexes)
Alaska:											
Bethel	8.5	...	3.1	11.3	13.9	...	14.1	23.8	15.6	9.7	100.0
Wade Hampton	24.5	...	10.6	2.7	18.5	...	2.7	22.5	10.6	7.9	100.0
Arizona:											
Apache	11.5	19.4	13.7	8.0	5.7	0.2	4.7	22.5	7.1	7.2	100.0
Navajo	6.6	18.2	9.2	11.4	9.0	...	5.7	20.5	8.9	10.5	100.0
Montana:											
Big Horn	34.8	8.2	5.9	1.9	2.5	...	5.0	26.8	13.8	1.1	100.0
Glacier	31.6	6.0	2.0	5.1	14.9	1.8	9.0	19.7	7.3	2.6	100.0
New Mexico:											
McKinley	18.4	8.4	14.0	8.6	8.5	...	4.8	14.1	8.3	14.9	100.0
Sandoval	11.5	15.8	20.1	6.9	7.6	...	6.9	10.6	6.4	14.2	100.0
North Carolina:											
Hoke	47.3	4.6	11.5	2.2	4.3	.2	16.5	10.4	1.5	1.5	100.0
Robeson	56.4	4.8	7.2	1.8	6.2	.1	12.2	7.4	1.0	2.9	100.0
North Dakota:											
Rolette	22.6	3.1	10.6	6.4	5.4	...	11.2	28.4	10.6	1.7	100.0
Sioux	11.1	4.0	...	...	3.6	5.8	11.1	35.1	25.3	4.0	100.0
Oklahoma:											
Adair	35.0	9.9	12.8	5.2	6.7	2.4	8.5	5.2	6.7	7.6	100.0
McCurtain	19.6	5.7	29.8	1.5	11.2	.4	15.1	11.1	3.1	2.5	100.0
South Dakota:											
Shannon	26.4	7.2	1.9	1.2	1.3	2.7	10.6	30.7	7.2	10.8	100.0
Todd	35.0	12.8	2.7	...	6.0	...	8.2	19.0	15.0	1.3	100.0

Source: 1960 Census of population, PC(1) C for individual States, Table 88.

TABLE 14.—ESTIMATED POPULATION OF RURAL NONRESERVATION INDIAN GROUPS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1960

State	Number	State	Number
Oklahoma	37,730	Alabama	754
North Carolina	31,345	Delaware	541
California	13,995	South Carolina	535
New York	6,950	Massachusetts	425
Oregon	2,955	Texas	370
Louisiana	2,470	Rhode Island	300
Wisconsin	2,400	Ohio	130
Michigan	1,715	Nevada	100
Maine	1,435	Utah	100
Virginia	1,131		
Nebraska	1,000	Total	106,381

Note: Excludes population of counties having fewer than 100 rural nonreservation Indians.

Source: "Rural Nonreservation Indian Groups in the United States," by Calvin L. Beale, ERS, 1968, unpublished paper.

THE AMERICAN INDIAN: NEEDS AND PROBLEMS

By ALBERT JENNY II*

FOREWORD

Federal efforts to provide economic assistance for the American Indians have a long but not very successful history. Albert Jenny II describes this history, going back to the Dawes Severalty Act of 1887. He argues that Federal policy has been paternalistic, inconsistent, and inadequately funded, and that even the most well-meaning formulators of policy have failed to recognize the Indians' desire to maintain their cultural autonomy. Indian distrust of Federal policy is understandable in view of this history, but it intensifies the difficulties of executing adequate policy today. Although the new Federal programs instituted since 1964 have failed as yet to show conclusive results, a new public attitude of increased concern, together with an apparent greater willingness to accept cultural pluralism in the United States, suggest that a real change for the better in Indian affairs may be underway.

Introduction

The American Indian, like other men, has two basic needs—to survive, and to control the quality of his life in accordance with his own insights and values. Well over half-a-million Indians in more than two hundred communities live in the United States at the present time. Each of these communities has had its separate history of survival efforts. Each represents a surviving distillation of values and concomitant life-styles which vary from each other, and, taken together, contrast more or less sharply with majority patterns of behavior in our society. Nearly all of these communities are very poor in terms of the material resources they would need to realize the fullness of *any* valued way of life—their own, *or* that of the majority.

For the greater part of the time since Indians have been living on reservations, rather than freely roaming or building upon their native land, they have been offered only one road out of a most unsatisfying, meager existence—that of assimilation into the majority. At least since the Dawes Severalty (or General Allotment) Act of 1887, it has been assumed by most whites that it would be a rather magnanimous gesture to offer Indians the opportunity to become part of the mainstream. Two factors were continuously ignored: (1) the pervasive sense of cultural difference from the white majority on the part of the several Indian groupings, which persists in spite of all dilutions and fragmentations of earlier Indian values, and (2) the extremely sophisticated and expensive procedures which would be required if one were to seriously undertake the acculturation of one people to another with any hope of success.

In recent years, there have been indications that some influential segments of the white community interested in Indian affairs are beginning to think along lines of strengthening Indian communities, as such, rather than dispersing individual Indians throughout the nation to become merged in the general population. Some whites have long understood the Indian desire to remain autonomous culturally, but Federal agencies did not begin to work meaningfuly in this direction until late 1964, when a number of at least partially Indian-generated self-help programs were funded. There is no guarantee, of course, that such efforts will continue. Federal Indian policy has shifted with the winds of politics many times since the reservation system began. A very brief history of Indian affairs since the Allotment Act of 1887 will serve to set the stage for an examination of the general question of Indian needs and problems.

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INDIAN AFFAIRS SINCE 1887

In the last quarter of the 19th Century, three organizations were formed to "help" the Indian: the Women's National Indian Association, the Indian Rights Association, and the Lake Mohonk Conference of Friends of the Indian. These groups were the driving force behind the Dawes Severalty (or General Allotment) Act of 1887 (Alberts, et al., 1966:9). The purpose of the Act was to divide tribal lands into parcels and assign these to individual Indians, with full title and citizenship to devolve upon them in twenty-five years. "Excess" land left after allotment was opened to homesteading by whites. The Act was implemented only on reservations where pressure for Indian lands existed, and in the course of time, Indian lands were reduced from 138 million acres to approximately 52 million acres. When President Grover Cleveland signed the Act, he stated that the "hunger and thirst of the white man for the Indian's land is almost equal to his hunger and thirst after righteousness." (Farb, 1968:256).

One might ask how this was intended to "help" the Indian. Those who, at the time, really believed they were acting on the Indians' behalf had two explanations. They felt that individual ownership of land by the Indians would place at least some limit on white depredations. Without such individual allotment, it was feared that whites would ultimately take over all Indian land. The other point was in line with the perennial feeling that Indian ways must be brought in line with the practices of the dominant society, that individual ownership of land would "civilize" the Indians, for their own good. The General Allotment Act provided for instruction in the arts of agriculture and animal husbandry. Little thought was given to any possible incompatibility between the requirements of an agricultural life and the values of many of the Indian communities involved, and, in any case, the technical assistance offered has been adjudged by later investigators to have been wholly inadequate, even if the Indians had been enthusiastic about the prospect of becoming farmers. Present problems and the possibilities for cooperative action are complicated by the fact that many Indian groups still assume that any offers of Federal assistance will similarly disregard Indian values, and, in any case, will be of insufficient strength to do any good, if and when implemented.

Between the General Allotment Act of 1887 and the second decade of the 20th Century, three changes in Indian conditions occurred: economic stabilization at a level of extreme poverty, levelling out of population decline, with strong indications of an upturn, and a growth in public sentiment in favor of more fair treatment of the Indian (though still very little understanding of what such fair treatment might be from the point of view of the Indian himself). When a cadet at West Point, the future General, George Armstrong Custer, had written in a term paper, "The red man is alone in his misery. We behold him now on the verge of extinction, standing on his last foothold . . . and soon he will be talked of as a noble race who once existed but have passed away." (Steiner, 1968: x). However, by 1910, or so, the trend had reversed itself. Vine Deloria, Jr., former Director of the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI), estimates that there may be at least one million persons of known Indian ancestry today, while Mel Thom, Chairman of the National Indian Youth Council, puts the figure at one and one-half million (Steiner, 1968: 324).

Fairer treatment of the Indian is in evidence in the public controversy which led to the defeat of the Bursham Lands Bill. This Bill would have given white squatters on Indian lands title to land they were using, which would have been exceedingly disadvantageous to the Pueblos of the Southwest. In fact, a Committee of One Hundred, appointed by the Secretary of the Interior to investigate the Pueblo land case, "deplored the effort to obliterate the unique qualities of Indian cultures," possibly the first time a government-sponsored body had officially spoken on behalf of pluralism. This occurred in 1923.

Private organizations interested in the plight of reservation Indians were also at work, and, in 1928, the first major advance in public knowledge of Indian affairs, publication of the Meriam Report by the Brookings Institution, made the formulation of enlightened policy a distinct possibility. This report clearly stated that the multiple correlates of poverty—ill health, poor housing, inadequate real or cash income, and other factors—were all interrelated, so that "causes cannot be differentiated from effects" (Meriam et al., 1928). The report listed the three causes of Indian poverty as: (1) the destruction of the economic basis of "primitive Indian culture," (2) the irrelevance to modern economic conditions of the social systems remaining from the past, and (3) past government policies. The second of these could be viewed in diametrically opposite ways. One might attempt to meet this problem through modification of the economic conditions prevailing in specific Indian societies, or one might attempt to modify the Indian social systems themselves. Even in 1928, the second approach was largely taken for granted as the appropriate solution by most whites who hoped to alleviate or abolish Indian poverty.

Nevertheless, the Meriam Report was a step forward, and by 1934, the Indian Reorganization Act, styled the "New Deal for American Indians," had become law. This act—

1. Prohibited future allotment of tribal lands, permitting tribes to assign use rights.
2. Returned to the Indians land not preempted by homesteaders.
3. Permitted tribes to adopt written constitutions and charters of incorporation.
4. Provided funds for establishing revolving credit unions, for aiding the tribes in forming internal organizations, for educational assistance, and for the purchase of land.
5. Permitted the various tribes to choose by referendum whether they wished to have the act apply to them.

Most reservations today operate under constitutions set up under this act.

The balance appeared to have finally swung in the direction of Indian cultural pluralism, for, not only had the Indian Reorganization Act been signed into law, but a new Indian Commissioner had been appointed whose high regard for Indian lifeways broke sharply with the previous assimilationist approach. From 1933 to 1945, John Collier served as Indian Commissioner, and under his direction a policy was instituted based on the concept that the "beauty and wisdom of Indian traditions could enrich the totality of American culture." Solutions to specific problems were sought with this concept in mind. Extravagant praise was heaped on Collier. Oliver LaFarge wrote, "For about a hundred years the Bureau of Indian Affairs, charged with the protection and advancement of the original inhabitants of the United States, functioned hit or miss, with good intentions, sometimes, by trial and error always, with a total disregard of everything that the steady march of scientific knowledge had to offer. * * * today, under Commissioner Collier's administration, a completely changed Indian Bureau is not only calling upon science for all that it can give but is also, through its testing of science in practical application to human life, contributing to our knowledge." (LaFarge, 1942: vii–ix; Spicer, 1961: 169).

However, Collier's administration of Indian Affairs did not go unopposed: "Critics on one side called Collier a romantic and argued that he went to ridiculous lengths to reestablish long dead traditions thereby hampering the progress of groups which had made great strides toward acculturation. Other critics shared Collier's basic philosophy but pointed out that the format he developed for self-government and economic improvement was too arbitrary and no more suited to some tribes than earlier programs designed to expunge Indian distinctiveness." (Lurie, 1961: 480). The Indians themselves, by and large, ever mistrustful of the Federal government, considered Collier's approach just another temporary Washington policy, and since it was inadequately funded, its successes were comparatively few. On some reservations, however, in spite of the long history of half-finished, ill-conceived, and mis-administered programs, a certain amount of enthusiasm was generated by Collier's patent good intentions.

Upon the advent of World War II, however, Indian pessimism was newly justified. Officials entrusted with Indian administration, under the stress of wartime budgets, slipped back into 19th Century attitudes. Congress began talking about terminating both the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, with the intention of assigning responsibility for Indian reservations to the several states. This would have meant withdrawal of Federal supports, institution of state taxes, and the inevitable alienation of tribal lands, since very few Indians had been trained to compete for wages in the general economy. Only a handful of tribes were actually terminated. Indians managed to bring up difficult legal complications in most cases, halting termination procedures indefinitely. Among the tribes that were terminated were the Menominee of Wisconsin and the Klamath of Oregon, both originally holding valuable timber lands. (McNickle, 1962: 62). The Menominee reservation is now a county of the State of Wisconsin, subject to all the regulations and problems of county government, while its inhabitants have neither the means nor the know-how to cope with them properly.

In 1954, the BIA began two programs related to increasing population pressure on Indian reservations and the difficulties of reservation economic development. The first of these was initially called the Voluntary American Indian Relocation Program, later changed to the Employment Assistance Program. The aim of this Program was minimum subsidy of urban migration and employment placement of Indian families and adult individuals in industrial centers ranging from Cleveland, Ohio, to Los Angeles, California. Upon arrival at such destinations, Indians found themselves doing the most menial jobs, if any, and living in the worst slum areas. They soon decided to return to the reservation, but since the BIA had sent them as far afield as possible, in order to discourage returning home, getting back was maximally difficult. In spite of this, it appears that a great many did return home. Those who managed to stick with their new experiences and "make good in the big city" were probably the ones who would have been most likely to solve reservation problems had they stayed home.

Various estimates exist as to the number of Indians living "off the reservation." Fred Eggan writes, "As we have seen, about one-third of the Indian population are no longer on reservations and are making their way in the white world. But some two-thirds of the Indians still prefer reservation life, despite its well-known difficulties. To the social anthropologist the reasons are clear. Man does not live by jobs alone, but in society. On the reservation the Indian is surrounded by kinsmen and friends, and patterns of sharing remove some of the hazards of existence. And there are rituals to maintain the relation between man and nature, as well as between man and man. The Indian who ventures into the white world meets with good will but also with race and class prejudice. But as Indian communities form in the cities they create again a society in which they can live." (Eggan, 1966: 166–167).

William H. Kelly, on the other hand, lists 285,600 Indians living on reservations out of a total of 550,908, as of 1960, giving the annual rate of increase as 28 per 1,000. However, when referring to the general ways Indians are making a living today, Professor Kelly writes, "The majority—perhaps three-fourths—of the Indians in the United States make their entire living through wage work on and off their reservations. Even so, Indians attach a great social and symbolic significance to their land and, almost universally choose to remain on their land as self-employed farmers or livestock growers until economic necessity forces them to abandon agriculture or supplement income from this source through seasonal or temporary wage work.

"This change toward wage work reflects a growing Indian population on a fixed land base, an abandonment of subsistence agriculture, and a desire for a higher standard of living which can only be secured, in agriculture, through an increase in size of land holdings." (Kelly, 1962; Owen et al., 1967: 612–613).

In an effort to meet the need for at least some salable skills on the part of Indians, the second BIA program was initiated. It was entitled the Vocational Training Program, and provided for short-term trade school courses. Employment placement was offered after graduation. These placements also were relatively far from home, and it had frequently been overlooked that unions almost invariably would not accept Indian members, either because their training was not up to standard, or for other less plausible reasons, so that, once again, stranded Indians had to find their way home to reservations where there were no opportunities to use their new skills.

These experiences led to BIA efforts to attract light industry plants to reservation sites, but since most reservations are far from major markets, and there is no social base for well-developed utilities and facilities, such as electric power, water, good roads, and the like, only a few small plants, attracted by an inexpensive and abundant labor supply with no union involvement have come in. These only use a fraction of the Indian population, and at a very low standard of both production and pay. Such shifting and inadequate policies, then, are the backdrop against which current Indian problems may be examined. They are among the major reasons for the prevalent attitude of pessimism regarding programs coming out of Washington that one found in conversation with most Indians until quite recently.

NEW DIRECTIONS

In 1961, shortly after the Kennedy Administration assumed office, a Task Force was appointed to study Indian needs. The report of this Task Force stated, in part, "The experience of the past few years demonstrates that placing greater emphasis on termination than on development impairs Indian morale and produces a hostile or apathetic response which greatly limits the effectiveness of the Federal Indian program. The Task Force believes it is wiser to assist the Indians to advance socially, economically and politically to the point where special services to this group of Americans are no longer justified." (McNickle, 1962: 63).

It was also in 1961 that the American Indian Chicago Conference was held under the auspices of the University of Chicago. This event was originally conceived by Dr. Sol Tax, but emphasis throughout the Conference was on Indian initiative, with whites unobtrusively observing. There were 467 Indians in attendance from 90 bands and tribes. Out of this came a Declaration of Indian Purpose, the intended function of which was to guide the Bureau of Indian Affairs in its policy-making activities. The Declaration stated, "Our situation cannot be relieved by appropriated funds alone, though it is equally obvious that without capital investment and funded services, solutions will be delayed. * * *" (McNickle, 1962:66). Its final two paragraphs read, "What we ask of America is not charity, not paternalism, even when benevolent. We ask only that the nature of our situation be recognized and made the basis of policy and action.

"In short, the Indians ask for assistance, technical and financial, for the time needed, however long that may be, to regain in the America of the space age some measure of the adjustment they enjoyed as the original possessors of their native land." (Lurie, 1961: 498).

There was a general spirit of cooperation throughout this conference. Only the outright assimilationists and their opposite numbers, the Indians who wish a return to full sovereignty as independent nations, stayed away, both being relatively small minorities within the total Indian world.

Then, in late 1964, Community Action Programs were instituted by the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO). These led to a somewhat temporary reversal of pessimism in some Indian areas. When the OEO entered the picture, local policy administration on Federal reservations was divided mainly between the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the Indian Health Division of the Public Health Service, which had been an independent agency since 1955 (before which time it was subordinate to the BIA). According to the 1966–67 *U.S. Government Organization Manual* (U.S. Government, Office of the Federal Register, 1966: 256–257), the objectives of the BIA are: ". . . maximum Indian economic self-sufficiency; full participation of Indians in American life; and equal citizenship privileges and responsibilities for Indians." The same document lists principal BIA activities:

1. To act as trustee for Indian lands and moneys held in trust by the United States, and to assist the owners in making the most effective use of their lands and other resources;
2. To provide public services—such as education, welfare aid, and law and order—when these services are not available to Indians through other agencies;
3. To furnish guidance and assistance to those Indians who wish to leave reservation areas and enter normal channels of American economic and social life;
4. To collaborate with the Indian people (both tribally and individually) in the development of programs leading toward full-fledged Indian responsibility for the management of their own property and affairs and gradual transfer of public service responsibilities from the Bureau of Indian Affairs to the agencies which normally provide these services; and
5. To assist Indian tribes and groups, in cooperation with local and state agencies, in developing programs to attract industries to reservation areas.

This could have been a beneficial approach, but three main difficulties arose over the years. Programs which the BIA has carried out or attempted to carry out have tended to be conceived and administered paternalistically, creating and maintaining an attitude of dependence on the part of Indians, with attendant indifference and hostility arising at various places and times toward any thoroughgoing efforts to induce change. Secondly, incoming new administrations, or even changes of personnel within incumbent administrations have frequently caused the sudden shifts in policy alluded to earlier, so that programs which might have been making some headway were dropped, or reversed in midstream, leading to pronounced cynicism among Indians. Thirdly, there has been a tacit assumption evident in the nature of most such programs that Indians should assimilate to the American norm in behavior, attitudes and values. Obviously, this assumption has not been well received, since it runs counter to the widely cherished goal of cultural autonomy held by so many Indians. The combined effect of the indifference and hostility generated by paternalism, the cynicism rooted in inconsistent and abruptly terminated programs, and antagonism toward the assimilationist tendencies implicit in most Federal programs, plus the general lack of improvement in living conditions, has been a very deep hopelessness and lack of faith in any proposed ameliorative measures (Alberts et al., 1966: 18).

In attempting to cope with this state of affairs, the Office of Economic Opportunity proposed three innovations:

1. Indians were to be asked to design their own programs and the funds for implementation were to be placed directly in Indian hands, thus defeating the dependency bred of paternalism;
2. community action in the development of self-sustaining programs, conceived, implemented and maintained by Indians was to be encouraged, thus defeating the insecurity and cynicism bred of vacillating and disappearing programs;
3. the flowering of Indian ways and values through fostering the economic viability of reservation communities was to be encouraged, thus defeating the antagonism bred of forced acculturation (Alberts et al., 1966: 19).

Immediately new problems arose to impede the implementation of these well-intentioned plans. The degree of sophistication required to create workable proposals for correcting the economic and other inequities of Indian life (at least, as seen by OEO officials) was not often present on Indian reservations. As a result, tribal attorneys and other outside white assistance was brought to bear, and, in spite of the original intent, Indians found themselves receiving Community Action components designed by outsiders, though more influenced by Indian initiatives than past efforts had been. In view of past experience, however, many Indians were alienated by this turn of events, and initial enthusiasm waned.

Actually, there was even more reason for disillusionment than this brief oversimplification of events indicates. Most Indian groups had been oversold on the degree of autonomy they were going to have under OEO auspices by a Task Force sent out from Washington. The new departure from earlier paternalistic efforts to ameliorate Indian conditions was underscored by these men, a state of affairs which undoubtedly arose quite innocently from a natural desire on the part of the initial purveyors of the OEO message to arouse enthusiastic interest in their audiences. They succeeded. Informality and felt needs were assumed by the Indians to be appropriate bases for proposals. On many reservations contacted, Indians stayed up nights, debated at length, and did write their own proposals—some eminently reasonable, even if not geared strictly to 20th Century America. However, they did not meet the (heretofore unmentioned) criteria of the officials in Washington, and—this is the most incredible thing about the whole procedure—they were not informed of what, if anything, was wrong. Only much later, in haphazard fashion, did it become evident that prescribed forms and legal constraints definitely limited freedom of choice. It was then that outside help was resorted to, but this whole sequence of events obviously led to a rapid drop in the initial enthusiasm shown by many Indians. The result was that traditional Indian leadership tended to look upon the whole program as just one more dole to be exploited in customary fashion, rather than as a true invitation toward revitalization for Indian communities and individuals.

CURRENT PROBLEMS AND SOME BARRIERS TO THEIR SOLUTION

Present-day problems of Indian communities are basically economic and psychological. Put simply, they are poverty and the life-styles of economic dependency. Both of these point directly to the need for truly enlightening education and technological training for Indian men and women, geared to their own cultural constraints and values. However, these will be of no avail if they are not simultaneously accompanied by the development of resources and the creation of functioning enterprises within Indian communities, so that such education and training will not merely torment Indians, by inspiring rising expectations without any gain in material well-being or cultural independence.

There are, of course, problems within these problems. While the primary problems of Indians involve obtaining viable economic bases for their communities, obtaining employment and the training for such employment, and, in the case of those who would like to leave the reservation, acceptance by the white community, and the education that would make such acceptance more likely, there exist certain cultural characteristics within many Indian groups, which, as interpreted by whites, tend to impede programmatic solutions. Factionalism and nepotism, Indian style, are among the value-bound obstacles which stand against solving the primary economic problems. They make it very difficult for white-inspired programs to work, and, at the same time, as long as they are misunderstood by whites as infractions of the rules rather than alternative cultural patterns, which, if properly strengthened, might revive Indian societies, they discourage white funding of purely Indian programs.

The kinship orientation of many Indian groups leads to a special kind of factionalism, somewhat differently expressed among Northern Plains Indians than among Southwestern Indians. One can observe among the reservation descendants of the former a phenomenon that has been termed in other contexts, the "segmentary opposition of kindreds," where the several segments of a kin-group are suspicious and wary of each other at each level of distance in relationship, but unite against common threats or in pursuit of proffered opportunities only available through cooperation. Members of each segment appear to fear that the other segments at the same level (say several sets of brothers' descendants, each set being cousin to the other set) may overstep the bounds of self-seeking, violating the principle of the "image of limited good," which they themselves profess never to violate. (This principle, held to be true by many Indians, implies that there is only so much of any good available, and if one person or group takes more than a proper share, other persons or groups get less than their share.) Thus, one has groups of people refusing to be "aggressive" in the modern industrial sense, on the one hand, but suspicious of and hostile toward each other, on the other hand, for fear that one of the "other" groups will take advantage of some situation which may arise. The factionalism bred of this kind of social relation militates against strong policies and incisive responses to development programs.

Among Southwestern Indians, kin-based factions are also present, but perhaps because of the lesser degree of derangement of their original culture by whites, or the greater social cohesion developed through having faced an environment of scarcity from time immemorial, where subsistence agriculture forced long-term cooperation, the divisive aspects found in the Northern Plains are not present in marked degree. The factions are generally held in balance by powerful indigenous leadership. This is the true leadership, which is often covert in relation to whites, behind the ostensible leadership that holds such tribal offices as have been created by whites. It is the latter group which deals directly with whites, the true leaders being frequently unknown to outsiders. In the Southwest, factions tend either to mirror each other in cooperation with (or rejection of) outside programs, or to perform complementary roles.

Closely allied to factionalism on Indian reservations is an Indian variety of "nepotism." Among Indians, this is nothing more nor less than the honorable fulfillment of primary duties. To achieve a position of eminence or the power to dispense patronage, and not distribute this good fortune among one's kin would be a major infraction of Indian cultural imperatives.

Again, there is a difference, of marked importance, in the manner of implementation of this cultural characteristic as between the Northern Plains and the Southwest. Because of the greater structural cohesiveness and historical continuity in the Southwest, the leaders of most if not all kin-groupings are able to dispense some degree of patronage, so that the existence of kin-groupings works as a mechanism for widespread distribution of benefits throughout a given reservation. In the North, on the other hand, those few kin-groups with more acculturated, aggressive members are the chief recipients of or participants in the benefits of programs, while most other kin-groups are practically untouched. This is not to say that efforts are never made by Indian leaders in the North to involve non-kin, but they appear to be somewhat feeble, and are often politically motivated when they occur. The best jobs do often turn out to be held by members of a very few kin-groups. Many of the outsiders, while admitting this to be a natural course, given Indian concepts of kin-loyalty, nevertheless resent the prevailing state of affairs, and assist in the process by refusing to cooperate or learn about such opportunities as may in fact exist (Alberts et al., 1966:389–391).

A few cases will serve to document the role of unemployment as an Indian problem. Graham Holmes, former Bureau of Indian Affairs Area Director for the Five Civilized Tribes of Oklahoma has noted, "Of 19,000 adult Indians in Eastern Oklahoma, between the ages of eighteen and fifty-five, an estimated 10,000 or 52.6 per cent were unemployed; of the 10,000 jobless adult Indians, well over half received no unemployment insurance, or any other welfare insurance whatever." (Steiner, 1968:6). Among the Rosebud Sioux, 23.5 per cent of fully employable males were unemployed in the summer of 1956, and one-fourth of reservation families had annual incomes of less than $500. Sixty per cent of all Rosebud relocatees returned to the reservation after attempting city employment. (Eicher, 1961:192). Again, regarding Indians living in Yankton, South Dakota (most of whom are either from the nearby Yankton reservation or the Santee reservation), Wesley R. Hurt, Jr., states that their paramount problem is finding employment. "Many of the jobs available to the unskilled laborer are seasonal in nature because the cold winters force industries such as the seed company and box factory to curtail their production. However, the general lack of winter work is only one aspect of the employment problem. The Indian generally lacks training, is uninformed and non-aggressive in his search for jobs, and, in addition, many employers are reluctant to hire members of his race" (Hurt, 1961:227).

A variation on this theme is found among the Houma of Louisiana, who live out a meager existence shrimping in the bayous, and trapping. They live on top of one of the richest potential natural gas and petroleum fields in the United States, but, because of unfamiliarity with the law, and general lack of education, they have lost most of this land through tax sales and other devices of non-Indian oil prospectors. Recently, there has been some agitation on their part to reclaim this land, but lawyers tend to feel that, in spite of the value of the area, untangling the legal problems of reclamation would cost even more (Fischer, 1968: 137).

There are considerable differences between the percentages by occupation of employed U.S. Indian males (14 years and older) and those of all U.S. males (same age group). Combining some of the items in a table presented by William H. Kelly, it appears that 64.38 percent of employed Indian males are engaged in farming, farm labor, and other labor (except mining), as opposed to 23.66 percent of all U.S. males. On the other hand, 31.05 percent of all U.S. males are in professional, managerial, and clerical work, as opposed to 7.65 percent of U.S. Indians (Kelly, 1962; Owen et al., 1967: 615).

In May, 1967, a Research Conference on American Indian Education was held at Pennsylvania State University, in the hope of breaking through the barrier that apparently has stood between the Indian and his getting an education that he can use. As in other minority groups, Indian children do as well as any others up until they are eight or nine years of age. Then they begin to fall behind, and, before long, to drop out of school altogether. Two factors have been considered primarily responsible for this. By the time children have reached the ages noted, they become aware of the status of their group, and the unlikelihood of their having a future consonant with the goals of the education they are receiving. Consequently, they lose interest in playing the game. The other factor lies in the lack of orientation of teachers in Indian reservations, by and large, toward Indian cultural differences. Aggressiveness is expected where shyness is the Indian rule. Children are singled out for praise or blame where it is considered disgraceful to be in the limelight for any reason. In other words, Indian children are often made so uncomfortable in the school setting that they are unable to function as pupils.

The objectives of the Research Conference were:

1. To provide a forum for persons representing diverse groups, and with different kinds of experience in Indian education research, to express their viewpoints on the needs for long-range research and development in Indian education;
2. To provide guidelines, specifically, for a national status survey of Indian education which is being planned by the U.S. Office of Education;
3. To identify and to encourage competent researchers who might wish to become involved in interdisciplinary research in the field of Indian education.

Indian leaders, government officials, social scientists, and educators attended the conference, and, shortly after its conclusion, the National Indian Education Advisory Committee (NIEAC) appointed an all-Indian sub-committee to plan a national study of American Indian Education (Aurbach, ed., 1967: 151).

CONCLUSION

The chief effect of most efforts to help Indians, as such efforts are presently constituted, if carried out in optimal fashion in terms of their stated ends, would be, under present reservation conditions, to markedly increase relocation possibilities and consequent acculturation processes. Indians generally appear to oppose such an eventuality, and would prefer programs leading ultimately to an economically viable reservation where Indians could maintain old associations and their own patterns of existence. Vine Deloria, Jr., former Director NCAI, is quoted by Steiner as having made a strong statement on behalf of the ideological basis for Indian separatism: "It isn't important that there are only 500,000 of us Indians. What is important is that we have a superior way of life. We Indians have a more human philosophy of life. We Indians will show this country how to act human. Someday, this country will revise its constitution, its laws, in terms of human beings, instead of property. If Red Power is to be a power in this country, it is because it is ideological." (Steiner, 1968: x).

Mr. John Belindo, Executive Director of NCAI, is presently directing the allocation of funds received by NCAI toward the economic development of reservations, with the ultimate hope that communities exemplifying Indian ways and values will become strong and serve as functioning enclaves of cultural pluralism within the United States. Mr. Belindo has indicated that plans have already been made for some fifty reservations. It is too early to tell how this particular effort will work out, but all the events leading up to this point, the American Indian Chicago Conference, the activities of the Office of Economic Opportunity, the National Research Conference on American Indian Education, and an apparent greater willingness to accept cultural pluralism in this nation, all point toward a real change in Indian affairs.

It may be of interest here to quote part of a resolution adopted 44 to 5, by leaders of thirty tribes, at a conference called by the U.S. Department of the Interior in February, 1967:

"We, the representatives of thirty Indian tribes from ten States:

"Economic development: We desire an American Indian Development Fund, of low interest, long-term nature, comparable to the funds committed to our South American cousins (via the Alliance for Progress) and the native peoples of Africa and Asia. Aid to these people totals in excess of $3 billion annually—more than was spent on the American Indian between 1789 and 1960.

"To provide rapid economic growth in the underdeveloped areas of our own country, the Indian reservations, we should immediately provide $500 million in loan funds in this proposed fund for economic development of the reservations. * * *

"We American Indians are tired of proposals which offer limited assistance and exact as the price, the risk of losing our traditional protection afforded by Federal trusteeship. We have increasingly good relations with the BIA and are not hampered by present laws and statutes in our community development. However, like any undeveloped area, we need the capital to develop. Trusteeship by the Federal government was the price the U.S. government paid for this continent and we do not agree to give it up now, nor in the future.

"Human and economic development is the essence of trusteeship. Poverty should no longer be its mark or result. * * *" (Steiner, 1968: 297–198).

There are at least two roads out of poverty for American Indians, one leading toward ethnically and culturally separate communities, the other toward individual assimilation into American society. There would seem to be no reason why *both* paths should not be entered, although flourishing enclaves with value structures differing from the norm have not been common in the American past (aside from the several "intentional societies" such as Brook Farm, the Oneida Community, and religious groups like the Amish). Other minorities, both ethnic and ideological, might be intrigued by a successful evolution of Indian communities along separatist lines.

Oscar Handlin, writing of our relations with non-Western peoples, is quoted by Stuart Levine, "In general, the anthropologists have been inclined to recommend that the social and cultural structure of a society, including its theology, be accepted without direct efforts toward immediate alteration.

"Such a course has obvious liabilities as far as policy is concerned. To put it most concretely and most bluntly, it surrenders the hope of transforming the basic value systems of the great masses of people who must be our allies in the near future. It involves the incalculable risk of materially strengthening groups whose ideas are fundamentally divergent from our own, and who would therefore, in the future, make unreliable partners. If it is not possible to spread the notion of democracy to men brought up in a patriarchal or traditional society, have we any assurance that the collaborators our aid now brings us will ever acquire an interest in our ultimate objectives?" (Handlin; Levine and Lurie, 1968: 4–5).

Levine replies, regarding the American Indian, as follows: "If we had within our borders a group which, in maintaining its essential cultural unity, identity and character, constituted a threat to the well-being of the nation as a whole, most Americans, I would guess, would feel that an attempt to alter its "social and cultural structure" should be made, humanely, of course, but made, nevertheless. * * *

"But such melodramatic issues are really not involved in the Indian situation. Indian people, first, in no sense threaten national well-being. Indian values and ideals are not especially incompatible with national norms. And Indian cultures have always adapted extremely well to change when they have been given anything like a fair chance to make a go of the new situation. Their societies can be altered quite radically without losing their essentially Indian structure and flavor.

"Indian values, when they are properly understood, are incompatible only with some of the less essential features of the dominant culture. Indian societies are traditional societies; most are less individualistic than the general society. Extended family or "clan" ties are strongly felt; to Indian people, the American "nuclear family" seems a lonely arrangement. But none of this differentness in any sense threatens the rest of us. Indeed, we could perhaps learn some useful psychological lessons from it." (Levine; Levine and Lurie, 1968: 5–6).

The general impression, derived both from the literature and direct interviews, remains that Indians prefer the path leading to viable cultural pluralism. They do not wish, seemingly with rare exceptions, to leave their own communities and assume the white man's ways.

There is some question as to the cause of this great affection for reservation life (entirely aside from the ordinary pull of birthplace and kin felt by many who are not Indian). One would surmise from some accounts that there is an innate compulsion among Indians to go back to the reservation. In reasonable terms, however, could it not be that the Indian returns to the reservation so faithfully because he is usually far less acquainted with the ways of the outside world than other men, and, furthermore, enters a world almost uniformly unfriendly and cold, indifferent to his wants and idiosyncracies? If Indians were invited to make a truly voluntary choice between pluralism and acculturation, and an exceedingly carefully thought-out (and well funded) effort to educate and acculturate could be envisioned, combined with an equally well implemented effort to provide a welcoming and sustaining environment in the outside world, perhaps a fair number of Indians would lose their reluctance toward taking the step of relocation and entrance into the larger society. Perhaps not. At any rate, previous efforts in this direction have not been sufficiently coordinated or intensive to produce the conditions whereby this hypothesis might be tested. Given existing conditions, Indians on reservations frequently appear to be aware of the unstated bias toward assimilation of most programs, and under these forced conditions, to reject them as anything other than a temporary source of funds or diversion. It is conceivable that fully elective programs avowedly pointed in *each* of the directions discussed, and presented to Indians, as such, for voluntary choice, might generate far more enthusiasm than the present offerings with conceptualization of ultimate cultural outcomes concealed or at least unstated.

An editorial in the NCAI Sentinel states, "We would advocate, therefore, a program of acculturation rather than a temporary patchwork of assimilationist programs. Acculturation is, we feel, a program by which tribes can be encouraged to change behavior patterns by giving them the opportunity to develop programs incorporating their present values with new opportunities for human resource advancement. Teach *HOW* credit works by allowing tribal credit unions to be developed, teach *HOW* to manage land by allowing tribes more freedom in leasing and range management and land consolidation. * * *" (NCAI Sentinel; Steiner, 1968:303).

To achieve success, even with such a twofold approach, would require intensive communication regarding real and immediately perceivable benefits to follow, in order to meet the tendency on the part of many Indians (which they share with other more or less alienated groups) to think in terms of immediate gains rather than long-term goals. Programs geared toward acculturation would have to be made much more powerful than they are now, in the sense noted above (effective and relevant education combined with assurance of genuine acceptance and adequate placement in the "outside" world) while those intended to create economically viable communities would require the coordination of many government agencies with private industry, in the creation of the kind of functioning economic base for each such community which could be sustained and enhanced by the Indians themselves in accordance with their own aims and values.

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BARRIERS TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

By GORDON MACGREGOR *

FOREWORD

Confinement to reservations was, of course, an artificial arrangement imposed on the Indians by white men. Gordon MacGregor describes the failure of the plains Indians ever to adapt to the confined life of the reservation. Their history is thus a long one of continuing economic and social disintegration. If economic development on the Indian reservations is to succeed today, it must be accompanied by intensive social services designed to correct the attitudes of dependence, apathy, and hostility which have been engendered by many years of ill treatment.

Introduction

This article has been written to consider some of the reasons for the past failures and present handicaps to economic development on Indian reservations of the United States. Efforts to provide Indian tribes new economies to replace those of hunting, fishing and wild food gathering began nearly one hundred years ago. Yet many tribes live in a "culture of poverty" and have acquired no agricultural or other technology by which they can maintain an adequate level of living.

Some explanations are to be readily found in inadequate land resources, poor soils and the forced acceptance of land leasing caused by the heirship problem.

Because Indians have been unable to sell, transfer, or consolidate their inherited rights to allotted lands, except among a very few tribes, these properties have been frozen in an unusable state. The only benefit that can be derived feasibly is rental. Leasers are usually white men. Thus the limited land base for an Indian economy becomes further decreased by this leasing system.

The allotment system established by the Federal Government to provide Indian families homesteads on which they might become self-sufficient farmers, has been in itself-defeating. First, many Indians had no technological background or knowledge of the economic system on which American family agriculture is based. Second, most of the Indians who were nonagricultural in pre-reservation times felt no motivation to take up farming. It was women's work—if anyone's—and gave no prestige or acceptable occupation to men of Indian societies.

The agricultural program also became self-defeating in that at the same time that it was being encouraged, the Indian people starving on the reservations were being given rations of food. This ration system has been followed by other forms of food or cash subsidy, welfare programs, and employment programs financed by Federal appropriations. With this outside support supplemented by land rentals and more recently per capita payments for broken treaties, or taking of Indian lands for reservoirs, and practice bombing areas, Indians have developed a dependency upon Federal financial support. This development has resulted in general disinterest in or rejection of taking up individual farming or cattle raising.

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This dependency upon Federal largesse and windfalls in the form of tribal payments has contributed to the failure of any positive or constructive adaptation to the general patterns of American life. This is particularly true of those Indians who remain oriented to their traditional ways of life, and bitter toward their historic and present treatment at the white man's hands. This negative adjustment has become an entrenched culture of dependency.

The solution or reorientation toward a more constructive and viable life for Indians on reservations does not lie in a correction of the heirship problem or by a reduction or modification or by a reduction of individual and family subsidy programs. Indian populations on reservations have now gone through such a long period of attempted accommodation to the white man's life and have been so frustrated, defeated and impoverished that their problem now has deep and serious psychological dimensions.

It is assumed in this commentary that the primary interest of the Joint Economic Committee is in the economic development of these Indians who now suffer from lack of employment or some other means of gaining a livelihood. The observations of this report are addressed to these difficulties and the causative factors.

It must be emphasized in passing that not all Indians fall in this category of poverty and dependency. Many Indians have moved into American society and its economy with great success. The Bureau of Indian Affairs has unfortunately no records on this movement nor accounting for their success. Education, training in technical skills, opportunities in urban industrial centers are some of the explanations for success. But by and large it appears that intermarriage and the transmission of the ideas, values and customs by white American parents and their mixed blood descendants have accounted mainly for this process of adaptation and acculturation. It has been an informal and unconscious process of culture change.

For the Indian reservation residents who have not undergone this experience especially in the years of childhood training and those who although of racially mixed parentage, have remarried into the Indian full-blood population this process of assimilation has been eliminated. In them the process of change has taken a very different course. The nature of this process with its many variables appears to account primarily for the barriers and handicaps to achieving a viable economic or satisfying social adjustment.

The process has been one of group and personal breakdown or disintegration. The steps and manisfestations briefly described reveal the basic problem of today's impoverished Indians. It will also indicate that any program of economic development must be incorporated within a broad social, psychological and educational program for change. It must also realize that Indian failures of adaptation have not been solely the result of poor and inconsistent Federal policies and programs in the past. Failures have been also due to the nature of Indian responses based on the fundamental principles of their life ways and the reactions to a highly dominating and coercive society. In this domination the Bureau of Indian Affairs has been the cultural agent of American society.

The process of Indian change and limited assimilation has also lacked the stated but infrequently practiced principle of executing program planning and administration *with* Indian understanding and participation as well as consent. Programs cannot be successful to any degree if they are planned and implemented by non-Indian outsiders *for* Indians.

If we may employ one tribe—the Sioux—as an example, the course of this disintegration can be put in specific if somewhat exaggerated terms. The Sioux and other Indians of the Plains exemplify the major difficulties of adaptation of many of today's Indians.

The Process of Tribal Disintegration

The history of the Plains Indians on their reservations began with tribal disasters. They were overcome militarily and deprived of their food supply by the near extermination of the buffalo. Confinement on reservations was at first near-imprisonment. The means of maintaining personal prestige for men through skills and feats in war and hunting were closed. It is understandable that the beginning of life on the reservations created deep feelings of bitterness and hostility. Being thrust into dependency for food and protection upon the Federal Government, only deepened the tribal resentment. These attitudes have continued over time as barriers to positive adaptation. Although some acceptance has been made to the white man's way and the internal feeling of hostility has lessened, their poverty and social conditions have added to their bitterness and hostility. The lack of adequate income and economic opportunity and the ration system that provided insufficient food and a badly balanced diet led to extensive ill health and to a high rate of infant and early adult mortality. Illness and physical weakness have contributed to the unemployability of many men and women.

The most significant negative happening was the rapid destruction of their old life with little or no preparation for a new pattern of their own choosing or construction. The economic bases and natural resources were all but lost. The organization of family life, leadership and social control built on the former economy began to crumble.

The strong Federal and missionary attacks on the ancient religions, regardless of what may have seemed necessary in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries for suppressing pagan, obscene or torture elements of Indian customs, had a destructive effect in undermining the system of ideas and moral order that gave cohesion and stability to the tribal life. There has followed the spread of the so-called Peyote cult to replace the old religion with a new form comprised of old religious symbols and customs and directed toward the personal problems, unhappiness, and ill health of its adherents. Acceptance of this cult is far from universal but it appears to grow as it soothes present psychological anxieties and fills a need for an Indian-rooted belief system.

For the majority of Indians, secularization leading to an absence of religiously supported values or a code of moral standards is characteristic.

The deterioration of former tribal cultures has been accompanied by a growing acceptance of white or American economic and social forms as each generation becomes further removed from the old life and experiences American education, employment and rural or urban living.

But the change has not been one of direct transition or substitution of new for old customs, attitude or outlook on life.

The process with crushing of old ways, self-defeating programs of agriculture and rigid education poorly adapted to Indian needs for understanding has brought cultural confusion. Administration and school discipline was for many decades conducted in an atmosphere of oppressive domination and coercion to bring about assimilation. No mutual plan of transition or system of ordered relationship between American and Indian ways of life were established. Indian ways were seen by whites as incompatible and a life to be abandoned for adoption of their own. Languages were in conflict and Indian speech was forbidden in the schools before English could be learned. The effect was a breakdown in communication between members in the two different societies and to a lesser degree between generations of Indians.

This entire process has brought confusion to those who would adapt to a new life or lead their Indian communities into an orderly and satisfying life within the limitations of reservation environment. Young people especially are torn between the desire to have a job and earn money, rarely available on the reservation, and to remain in the Indian community and its familiar social life. The course of events during the history of reservation existence has led to a barren life devoid of the social and personal satisfactions that the former life offered and socially healthy and active communities provide. An increasing number of children grow up in unstable or broken homes. Fathers without any status in their communities or families or steady jobs seek escape in drinking and in casual marriage relationships. Outside the family and kinship group there are no special groups or associations in which to find some constructive activity. Recreation and recreational activities, except for scattered consolidated school buildings, are absent. Young adults have little healthy recreational life. Driving broken down cars and drinking are regular pastimes and escape from boredom.

Although informal leaders appear in communities who might organize a more orderly and satisfying life among their people, they receive little recognition from agency or tribal officials. Local leadership remains ineffective. Officials elected to tribal councils frequently become caught between their constituents who expect the council to manipulate the Indian Agency and Bureau for immediate services placing cash into their hands, and the Agency staff asking the council to join in long term programs of economic benefit such as, conservation, housing and education—which show little immediate results.

In these relationships councilmen are expected to act according to the consensus and concern for personal problems of tribal members in the manner of patriarchal chiefs. In relation to Agency and other officials, councilmen are expected to act with the aggressiveness and competitiveness of the white man. These expectations place great demands on personal and political skill of Indian leaders. The great failure leads to political defeat and inconsistency and strong factionalism in Indian politics.

Such weakening of the tribal structure combined with economic inactivity has brought great psychological stress and change in Indian personalities. The conditions given above have over time led to much apathy and passivity. Indians appear confused and without hope. But dissatisfaction with their low level of living, resulting from well remembered defeat, ill treatment and inconsistent and ineffective social, economic and educational programs has continued the early bitterness and open or covert hostility. Delinquency and criminal behavior have followed.

Personality maladjustment and psychological problems are now increasing in the wake of this history of social and personal deterioration. That an increasing rate of suicide and suicide attempts are now becoming a major concern of the Indian Health Service and other Plains Indian Reservations is an index of the seriousness of the Indian psychological problem.

This description of the conditions and processes that over time led to social breakdown of Indian communities which in turn have led to insecurity, deep anxiety, personal maladjustment of individuals has been entered into for one reason. It is to underscore the fact that the poverty, personal and social disintegration must receive the support of many sources and attention for dealing with the whole problem of rehabilitation. Economic development is certainly one procedure, but it cannot succeed alone.

SOME THOUGHTS ON RESERVATION ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

By Bill King*

FOREWORD

New efforts to provide the Indians with economic development assitance have proliferated within the last 5 years. Bill King points out the variety of situations found on the different reservations. He also points out that economic development affects the entire area, not just the Indian reservation, and that development planning must be carried out in this regional context. King also discusses some of the problems faced in drawing Indian men into regular industrial employment. The availability of Federal employment and welfare support, together with the extended family system, can reduce the attractiveness of lower paying industrial jobs. If industrial development on the reservation is to succeed, the Indians must participate in its planning and the type of jobs provided must be those which the Indians are willing and able to perform.

Introduction

You have asked me for comments on some of the prevailing problems on the majority of American Indian reservations which must be faced in order to bring about successful industrial development, and other sorts of viable employment activity aimed at reducing excessively high rates of unemployment in these areas. Those who undertake industrial development programs on behalf of Indians—and there are some very able persons working in this area—must face the fact that reservation communities compete directly with 18,000 American towns and cities also on the lookout for new economic opportunities. It is no wonder that program planners in the Indian field often are so attentive to landing a prospect—virtually any prospect—that they do not always anticipate in advance the full spectrum of local problems, much less always seek the involvement of Indian people.

Initially, this paper will comment briefly on the range of reservation community types, since it is most important to understand that no single or, for that matter, no several approaches to economic development can possibly apply to all. Next, some of the more obvious problems in adapting a reservation work force to compete in the off-reservation market place are reviewed. The paper then turns to some of the sociocultural factors which pertain in typical reservation communities and how these affect the development of a competitive work force. Finally, a consideration of how community development principles can be utilized to attract new economic activities and to adjust these activities into the life of an Indian community, will be presented.

As an example of how considerable effort often is rewarded with relatively meager results, I have appended to the paper a summary of the major industrial developments which have been undertaken on the Rosebud Sioux Reservation in South Dakota over the past five years. The Rosebud example also illustrates some of the problems treated in the paper which are more or less inherent in many, if not most, reservation industrial development efforts.

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Never before have so many agencies concentrated so much effort on reservation economic development as is true at present. In addition to the pioneering efforts of BIA, which in 1954 first seriously undertook to lure industry to reservations, both the Indian section of the Office of Economic Opportunity and the Economic Development Administration of the Department of Commerce directly employ, or indirectly finance, specialists in economic development to work on behalf of reservation Indians. Assisted by Federal funds and by grants from private foundations, the National Congress of American Indians also is attempting to better Indians' economic lot. A growing number of colleges and universities near Indian country are involved. Other Federal agencies, notably the Departments of Labor and Health, Education and Welfare, are focusing the attentions of their newly-organized "Indian Desks" on training reservation work forces for local employment. Representatives of the burgeoning national training industry increasingly are focusing on the relatively small but rewarding Indian field. Any single reservation with a minimum land base of 1,000 acres and a minimum population of 200 has no doubt had some sort of economic development efforts made on its behalf during the past four of five years.

The principal basis for this worthy concentration of effort is the obvious need: the rate of Indian unemployment is more than ten times that of the nation taken as a whole. The enormity of the Indian economic problem, however, should not cause us to overlook the fact that at least a part of this focus on bettering the Indian's economic condition results from reservation communities being, usually, far easier to relate to than are most impoverished areas of the nation. Reservations are, by definition, *administered* communities since they are conveniently directed by the agency superintendent-tribal council system. Potential investors, staffs of concerned government agencies, a host of economic consultants, and others who derive their livelihood from attempting to better the economic lot of the poor, find Indian reservations simple to contact initially and to work with subsequently. Some of the larger reservations have as many as fifty formal efforts at socio-economic betterment underway at a given time—a fact which dramatically highlights this point.

A second significant factor in gaining a quick overview of reservation economic development has to do with the relationships, between the nation's reservation areas, virtually all of which have been declared eligible for economic assistance, and nearby non-Indian communities which, in many instances, do not enjoy a similar designation. In the great majority of cases the airports, factories, feed lots, and irrigation projects which have resulted are of benefit to Indian and non-Indian alike. Sensitive observers, however, cannot help being concerned with the fact that, in some instances, the fruits of these nominally joint efforts are of only incidental benefit to the Indian community in whose name the development was initiated.

TYPES OF INDIAN COMMUNITIES

There are 270 Indian "reservations" in the lower 48 States. Another 24 trust reserves, along with 100 Federally-owned land areas, have been set aside in Alaska for Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts. These range in size from the 14,000,000 acre Navajo Reservation, upon which 100,000 Indian people live, to single-acre California "rancherias" with no resident populations. Some, as is true of most of the Alaska areas, are located a great distance from larger communities and further cut off from them by the most tenuous systems of transportation and communication. Others, as certain of the Nevada colonies, some of the reservations in Washington, Arizona, New Mexico, Michigan, Wisconsin, New York, and the Indian areas of Western Oklahoma, are contiguous to or surrounded by urban or urbanizing areas. In the upper Midwest and in Oklahoma especially, reservation land often was parcelled out to individuals in trust allotments. This practice has resulted in a great deal of Indian land being sold to whites who, within the external boundaries of certain reservations, outnumber the former owners many times over. On the Flathead Reservation in Montana, for example, whites exceed Indians by roughly ten to one! An even greater population disparity holds true on the Sisseton Reservation in North and South Dakota where only ten percent of the old reserve remains in Indian ownership. On the South Dakota Pine Ridge and Rosebud Sioux Reservations, with aggregate Indian populations in excess of 17,000, less than 50 percent of the land remains in Indian hands; and much of the economic control is exercised by whites or by so-called "mixed bloods" who in some cases maintain only the most nominal, tenuous, and opportunistic sorts of tribal identities.

There are 129 reservations in the lower 48 States with Indian populations of at least 200 persons and at least 1,000 acres of trust land which have been the focus of recent economic development efforts. Of this number, 25 have greater non-Indian than Indian populations within their original boundaries; 45 are adjacent to, or in close proximity to, urban areas; and 38 have lost 50 percent or more of their original reservation areas to whites. These figures do not include the situation in Oklahoma where land alienation and residence in close proximity to large non-Indian populations is the rule. Clearly, simple generalizations about how to approach reservation economic development are invalid.

Also of importance in seeking a direction for reservation economic development is an awareness of the changing residence patterns of many reservation populations. More than one-third of all "reservation" Indians presently are living away from their home communities, often in the larger urban areas of the West Coast, the upper Midwest, or in the Southwest—particularly in Oklahoma and Texas. By far the largest off-reservation population is in Los Angeles County where between thirty and forty thousand Indians, especially Sioux, Navajos, and native Oklahomans, presently live. Under half of these have moved with the assistance of the BIA Vocational Training and Placement Program. The influence of these stabilizing urban Indian colonies in attracting others from the rural areas is only beginning to be appreciated; some observers expect that 1970, the decennial census year, will see, for the first time in history, more American Indians in small towns and in urban areas than on their home reservations.

The direction of this discussion is not to suggest that economic developments in reservation areas should be avoided; rather, it is apparent that isolated, all-Indian economic developments are not always consistent with the economic and demographic realities of much of so-called Indian country. Indians are less handicapped with geographic isolation than was the case even 25 or 30 years ago. Increasingly, reservations are integrating into larger communities of non-Indians. To maximize development dollars set aside for Indians and to assure meaningful and permanent economic development efforts, joint planning for the *total* community, Indian and non-Indian, often makes the greatest sense. But, in order to avoid possible exploitation of Indian interests by stronger and economically more experienced neighbors, the strongest possible advocacy must be maintained for Indians by their leaders and by those advising and assisting Indian leadership.

ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF A RESERVATION WORK FORCE

In many of the target areas of Indian economic development, typically the larger reservations upon which the BIA maintains superintendencies, a range of economic conditions exists about which too little is known and to which those undertaking economic development tend to pay too little attention. Employment by the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Indian Health Service is the most significant source of Indian income on virtually all of the larger reservations. Not only are most permanent non-skilled or semi-skilled agency jobs filled by local Indian people (bus drivers, school and hospital support staffs, maintenance workers, road crews, and a variety of professional aides, etc.), but each year many part-time employees are hired for special construction projects, forest fire suppression, etc. Usually more than half of all Federal employees, although rarely the best paid employees, are recruited from local community members.

Indian employment has expanded dramatically since 1963, first with Area Redevelopment Administration projects and more recently through local employment opportunities funded by OEO, EDA, and other agencies. On the Navajo Reservation, for instance, more than 2,500 Indian people, mostly Navajos, work for the Bureau of Indian Affairs and another 650 are employed by the Indian Health Service. More than 2,900 jobs currently are funded by the OEO sponsored Office of Navajo Economic Opportunity and another 2,250 Navajos work in tribal jobs. Thus, a total of almost 8,000 Navajos, out of an estimated work force of 30,000 work at Federal or tribal jobs. (Not included in these figures are those Navajos employed for shorter periods in Neighborhood Youth Corps activities, work training programs under Title V, or other sorts of training activities for which subsistence is paid.)

Virtually all reservation employment of Indians by the government is more under the control of the employees than may appear on the surface. Reservation concepts of time, production standards, and absenteeism all tend to prevail. This derives partly from the fact that none of these activities involves anything like industrial production in which cost must be balanced against efficiency. Too, supervisor performance is evaluated, in large measure, by the extent to which employee satisfaction is expressed. Federal and tribal employment under these conditions represents the toughest possible competition for a struggling new industry offering its workers the minimum wage.

A second factor to consider in planning economic development derives from the *de facto* program of income maintenance which is inherent in the reservation system. The mass of unemployed or underemployed reservation Indians have minimal, nonetheless very real, income subsidies which have developed gradually and which are pretty much integrated into the cultural life of the group. Most pay no rent on their inadequate homes, nor are taxes paid on the trust land they own. Comprehensive medical services are available at no cost as are virtually free educations for Indian children. Federal boarding schools for children from the poorest reservation families, and for those from broken or disrupted homes further stretch limited cash income.

Another condition, which has an almost unknown effect on the sorts of economic reorientation which reservation industrial employment implies, results from our almost total ignorance about how incomes obtained from multiple sources are allocated and distributed to the members of a reservation family. That Indians share what they have with relatives is widely accepted; we need to know more about how. A hypothetical Indian extended family, let us say, is composed of two parents, five minor children, and several adult sons and daughters with small children of their own. Let us further suppose that this family shares among its members a BIA bus driver's salary, some income from allotted farm lands leased to non-Indians, limited income from seasonal agricultural labor, two aid-to-dependent children allotments, some limited income from the sale of cattle, and intermittent wages from a local CAP program. We have little idea how far the cash income, coupled with the income supplements mentioned, goes toward meeting the economic needs of this family. Certainly we have no objective basis for assuming, as we all too often do, that its "unemployed" members will flock to industrial jobs should these become available.

SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF A RESERVATION WORK FORCE

Social disorganization, with such accompanying manifestations as drinking, broken homes, fatherless children, etc., are the rule rather than the exception in many Indian communities. In this social environment, not uncommonly, women are the active family heads and as such provide a better potential for developing a work force than do Indian men. Indian men with a long history of unemployment, or of intermittent or casual labor, seem to treat the prospects of steady employment with considerable trepidation. Typically, they privately express fear that they cannot handle a steady job and often hide their concern over failure behind a good deal of bluster and rationalization that the job is "women's work," that it lacks status, etc.

There is wide agreement that many reservation Indian men view open-air jobs in which they can work in large groups, under easygoing supervision and without too much attention paid to absenteeism or tardiness, as providing ideal working conditions. The Indian Division of the Civilian Conservation Corps provided jobs of this sort in the 1930's and early 1940's and are recalled by many as the high point in their work experience. The widespread employment of many Indians in the wartime economy in no small way resulted from the job-conditioning gained in CCC work. That this sort of activity remains popular with Indians was clearly established in the early 1960's when CCC-type activities were briefly reintroduced under the sponsorship of the Area Redevelopment Administration. On many reservations where these activities were initiated it is reported that Indian men, including some who had been employed steadily at off-reservation jobs, flocked back to join ARA labor gangs.

It is most unfortunate that many of those who work so diligently on behalf of decent and permanent jobs for reservation Indians pay so little heed to fundamental problems of reorienting the really difficult-to-work-with of the reservation unemployed. Few seem to accept the idea that there is a good deal more to moulding these economic outcasts into a competitive work force than prolonged on-the-job training in technical skills which lasts only as long as does the training subsidy or the patience of the trainee. Assisting socially and psychologically handicapped persons to join an industrial work force, whether they derive from an urban ghetto or a rural reservation, calls for exceptional skills and may prove quite costly. Commonly the enormity of the problem leads to ignoring it and concentrating on retraining again and again that portion of the work force which has least trouble finding jobs unaided. This suggests that a new approach to job development and skill training seriously needs to be explored.

There seems little doubt that most reservation men and women prefer to work than to remain idle and collect welfare. Initially, at least, the work must take an accepted "Indian" form. Gang work, of the sort outlined above often must be the starting point for economic reorientation. In this, the community development worker rather than economic development expert may prove to have the more valuable skills.

Community Development and Reservation Economic Development

It has become fashionable recently to "involve" local people in planning for economic development activities which will affect them. Instances of industrial development where plans made in Washington and brought to the attention of local Indian community leadership as accomplished facts are diminishing in number. Nominal involvement of local leadership, however, all too easy to achieve within the administered reservation system, does not provide the broad base of planning and community support that gives some assurance of success to a profit-oriented activity. That which passes as local involvement often is the mere presence of Indian spokesmen in a meeting of representatives of industry and one or more government agencies. The role of the community representative is at best advisory—answering asides directed to him such as, "Joe, isn't it true that your tribe always has wanted frozen food processing plants—that your people used to be good farmers and can't wait to start raising green peas again," or something of that sort. All too often the answer is a monosyllabic affirmative.

Conditions external to the Indian community, over which it has no control, are of such magnitude and complexity that one cannot carry the matter of local involvement and community control to academic extremes if jobs are too be gathered from the much competed-for national pool of job opportunities. However, these guidelines for maximum local involvement do make practical sense:

1. The broadest sort of initial expressions of interest in permanent job opportunities must be sought from Indian community membership. The community developer must be prepared to assist local people to build upon and to broaden what inevitably comes through initially as narrow and naive responses. Often he must be prepared to assist community leaders to "rough in" a range of alternative plans for achieving stated community employment objectives. If these are not practical, then he must withdraw and allow local leadership to sort out the problems and rearrange alternatives themselves. His role is primarily that of an arbitrator, a teacher, and a generalist researcher, never that of a community leader.

2. A sound rule-of-thumb is to help people build on what already exists. If the local pool of chronically unemployed works best in indulgently-led "gangs," then economic development activities which most nearly approximate these conditions must be sought.

3. Indian leadership (not mere spokesmen) must be assisted to understand that one can't always have unlimited subsidized tribal enterprises, canned CAP-like employment components, round after round of subsidized "training" activities which serve as a substitute (in the minds of many recipients, at least) for employment, along with permanent economic developments. Indian leadership and those who advise it must learn to reject forcefully some of the conflicting programs offered.

It will be recalled that, of 129 reservation areas with populations large enough to consider seriously economic development, 70 either are part of, or are in close proximity to, communities in which Indians numerically are in the minority.

4. Although work activities in an all-Indian setting are most attractive to many Indian people, employment as part of a mixed work force is sometimes more practical. A major function of the community development worker involved in economic development should be to assist in creating mixed economic opportunities when these seem to make the best sense and to help facilitate the adjustment of Indian workers into them.

5. Finally, the community developer must serve as a generalist-planner who helps Indian leadership and community members to prepare for the social and economic complexities which likely will attend economic developments. Most reservation communities have grown up around a BIA Agency complex, a mission, or some similar limited-purpose nucleus. These communities typically lack facilities to serve a sudden influx of new workers. At Shiprock, New Mexico, for example, when a large electronics plant was brought in with virtually no prior community planning, it was housed in the only building in the community devoted solely to recreation. Other service facilities for the large work force were virtually nonexistent. Fortunately these conditions are being rectified.

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND JOB TRAINING

The relatively high expenditure per capita for overall programs on at least some reservations is attracting increasing comment. The aggregate annual cost of all Federal, state, tribal, and local programs on the Pine Ridge Reservation is reported to be just under $8,000 per family. Reports of this sort lead some to favor rejecting the entire idea of programmed services to Indians in favor of diverting their costs *per capita* and allowing Indians to use a portion of this "income" to pay for municipal and other services in the manner of residents of more typical American communities. This, of course, represents an overly simple solution to very complex social and economic problems. A modified version of this plan, however, utilizing a *portion* of existing budgets for direct payment to *selected* reservation residents, opens the door to a whole new approach to job training and general economic reorientation of chronically unemployed or underemployed Indian people without appreciably raising the cost above present budgets.

I suggest that certain funds budgeted for welfare services, some vocational training activities, community action programs, public works programs, etc., be re-programmed to provide an income subsidy for the chronically unemployed of a reservation. This would provide a form of income maintenance to be exchanged for the use of certain amounts of the unemployed person's time. The purposes for which this "bought" time would be used would be subject to negotiation between program managers, hopefully made up in large part by community leaders, and individual program clients. The idea being that, if sincerely approached, an unemployed person will himself turn to that activity which he senses will best assist him to improve his chances to become a productive employee.

Initially, many participants likely will decide to undertake activities which do not seem relevant to the ultimate goal of reduced unemployment—requests for certain types of adult education, seemingly impractical sorts of locally-conducted vocational training activities, decisions to "clean up" the community with CCC-type labor gangs, etc. Others might want to spend their time getting on top of a drinking problem or undertaking other sorts of personal improvement activities.

The process of continued negotiations with local people for the use of their "bought" time would be employed as the program moves away from its initial phases and enters into direct negotiations with business and industry to locate economic developments in the community. Local persons, mainly those who have demonstrated the highest potential for steady employment, would be involved to the fullest possible extent in attracting economic developments and in selecting the most suitable from the range of possibilities. The income subsidy initially would be a potent force in attracting the interest of business and industry. The individual subsidy would be withdrawn as soon as a worker became a self-reliant member of the local work force. Subsidies likely would need to be maintained indefinitely for those members of the community providing certain service functions—day care center operation, carrying out certain forms of recreational activity, etc. And, as a practical matter, some community members, because of physical and psychological limitations, would need to have their incomes maintained permanently, just as presently they are being supported by categorical and general welfare assistance.

APPENDIX

Economic Developments on the Rosebud Reservation

The Rosebud Sioux Reservation, located in central South Dakota, has a resident Indian population of about 7,000, mainly in that portion of the reservation contained in Todd and Mellette Counties. Rosebud has been one of a limited number of reservation areas in which the Office of Economic Opportunity concentrated its efforts on behalf of Indians during the past four years.

Rosebud also has been served by a special Indian program sponsored by the Economic Development Administration of the Department of Commerce as well as by economic development activities by the National Congress of American Indians. The Rosebud Indian Agency has an industrial development staff; and two full-time tribal employees, paid with EDA and tribal funds, also direct their principal efforts to economic development.

In 1963 the first low-rent public housing built on any reservation was located at Rosebud. In 1965, 385 units of so-called transitional housing, mainly using local Indian labor, were constructed with funds jointly provided by the Public Housing Administration, OEO, and BIA. In early 1969, 400 additional housing units were completed by a private contractor using significant numbers of local Sioux men. The construction of close to 1,000 units of new housing in the past five or six years has had profound and diverse affects on the reservation economy.

Industrial development activities (that is, activities which have a profit motive) undertaken during the same period include:

1. *Sioux Dairy Co-op.*—In 1964 the Rosebud Sioux Tribal Council backed this effort financially and furnished the physical facility in which it is located. The business continues in operation, but only two of its eleven employees are Indians. It is reported that the Sioux do not find co-op activities attractive; the hours demanded are long and irregular.

2. *Rosebud Manufacturing Company.*—This activity was initiated in 1965 through the tribally-financed Rosebud Development Corporation and a private investor. The company manufactures formica-topped kitchen counters.

At one time the facility employed 47 Sioux men under a BIA-funded on-the-job training contract; the plant presently employs fewer than twenty persons. Following some serious personnel and financial problems, the activity was able to get on its feet through contracts with various reservation housing activities. Whether it can compete with the industry in the absence of continued reservation housing programs is open to serious question.

The present limited success of this activity is said to be due to new resident management which local workers like and respect. And, after a long period of labor turnover (many Indian people say that they worked for this factory only until they could find a job with OEO or with one of the reservation housing programs), a more or less stable work force has been built. It is understood, however, that this force is mainly composed of persons who have held jobs for extended periods off the reservation and not from among the many local people who were at various times on-the-job trainees in the plant.

3. *Rosebud Jewelry Company.*—Begun in the summer of 1967, this business lasted less than a year. Reasons given for its failure (in manufactured beads, etc., from dried corn kernels) were under-capitalization, lack of promotion of the product, etc. The most creditable reason for its failure seems to be that the Indians who worked in the activity were poorly paid and left it for better wages paid by the CAP or by the housing programs.

4. *Rosebud Electronics.*—This industry has been most successful in placing female workers. Started in the summer of 1967, it assembles electronic components for a major national corporation. The present work force is about 65, all but two of whom are Indians. Women outnumber men twelve to one. Men, it is reported, become bored with the routine assembly activities. A large percentage of the single women who work in the factory have children and previously drew ADC grants.

Plans for expanding the facility are under way. Its very capable manager, who is credited with its high degree of employee satisfaction, reports that he could hire 30 additional women if he had a place for them to work. It is housed in old government quarters turned over to the Rosebud tribe.

5. *Rosebud Sign Techniques.*—Under the same management as Rosebud Electronics, this small facility, employing five persons, was begun during the summer of 1968. The principal customer for the highway signs it produces is the Bureau of Indian Affairs. While efforts are being made to sell signs to other sources, it is doubtful that more employees will be hired since, with the complex equipment employed, production cannot be expanded without additional personnel.

INDIAN IDENTITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

By Sol Tax and Sam Stanley *

FOREWORD

An understanding of the type of economic development desired by the Indians themselves is fundamental to the success of any program of assistance. Sol Tax and Sam Stanley suggest that the Indians have two goals which must be achieved simultaneously. The first is to protect the Indian cultural identity. The second is to make an adequate economic adjustment to the modern environment. When Indians have been free to do so, they have been able to adapt to changing circumstances. They have done this successfully for 25,000 years. The Indians cannot, however, be coerced into adjustment. Programs for Indian economic development must have maximum internal autonomy, and the Indian community must be allowed to manage its own funds.

As soon as one approaches the problem of American Indian economic development, there is acute awareness of the complexities which are concealed by this formulation of the basic problem. Instead of taking a conventional approach to the subject, i.e. defining economic goals in terms of resources and needs, we shall be anthropological and try to start with the Indians themselves. This means that we must put forth what they tell us about their problems, and we must draw on the best efforts of our colleagues to help with the historical perspective.

In the context of economic development, the average Indian may turn out to be an additional increment of unskilled labor. This might be one way in which the economist would describe him—a kind of shorthand approach, but it is not ours. We can only begin by asking, "What does the Indian regard as most important in the world today?" Our shorthand answer to this is (1) His identity, and (2) Making a livelihood. Analytically, these two can be separated, but for most Indians they are fused; and in some ways, they constantly find that in pursuing one they are forced to give up the other. This has led to the misconception that the Indian is lazy, incompetent, and wholly lacking in the ability to adjust to new conditions. Mistakenly, he is accused of wanting "to go back to the blanket," and anthropologists are too often viewed as wanting this for Indians. Hopefully, we can contribute something that will clarify the present situation.

In any case, we wish to emphasize and get on the record that: to consider the economic development of American Indians, it is imperative at the outset to recognize the necessity of fulfilling two conditions simultaneously, neither at the sacrifice of the other.

The first is the non-violation, indeed the protection, of Indian identity and the values by which Indians live. Here it must be understood that for Indians this involves tribal identification, not individual or "Indian", but, for example, Hopi.

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The second condition necessary for fulfillment is that, without threatening Indian identity or violating Indian values, we must assist Indians in making a better economic adjustment to what can be considered a new environment by making relevant resources available to them.

From every point of view, the American Indian is the most unique of all of our citizens. He entered the New World over 25,000 years ago. There is a good deal of evidence which vividly speaks of his many accomplishments. Looking at the Western Hemisphere as a whole, we should note that he had reached the southern extremes (from a presumed northernmost starting point—the Bering Sea) by at least 10,000 years ago. He may have arrived at Tierra del Fuego earlier, but this is all we know at present in the broadest sense about his earliest movements in the New World. His successful adaptation to the New World is parallel to what we know of the early post-glacial adaptation of the ancestors of the present European populations to the prevailing conditions of their Eastern Hemispheric environment. From the very day that he entered the New World, he was confronted with the problem of making a livelihood. How could he survive over time in this new environment? This historical question is more relevant to our present day than most people imagine. A brief systematic survey of the American Indian adaptation to his environment will demonstrate this.

One anthropologist who has tried to focus on the overall adjustment of American Indians throughout the New World is the late Clark Wissler. Though much of his work is not now fashionable, he is owed a debt of gratitude by all who would look at the early people of the Western hemisphere as a whole. Wissler is relevant also because he was one of the first who focused on some classification of Indians in terms of broad regional groupings based on the notion of major subsistence pattern. If we look at these groupings, we may better grasp the essential characteristics of each major adjustment.

Taking the continent as a whole, Wissler identifies eight separate areas: Caribous Area, Salmon Area, Bison Area, Eastern Maize Area, Wild Seeds Area, Area of Intensive Agriculture, Manioc Area, and the Guanaco Area. (1938) These eight in turn can be grouped: three of them being the homes of hunting peoples, three of agriculturalists, one of fishers, and one of gatherers of wild seeds (p. 3). Here is the way in which he describes each of the eight within the context of its grouping:

> ### HUNTING AREAS
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> In the caribou area live two groups of tribes generally recognized as having little in common, the Eskimo and the Canadian Indians. As we shall see later, this view as to their diversity is in a large measure justifiable, but with respect to food they have close similarities. It is customary to characterize the Eskimo as a people living upon sea mammals, particularly the seal; but we must not overlook the fact that their winter clothing is of caribou skin and that the flesh of that animal is an important part of their diet. However, the severe winters of their extreme northern range drive the caribous southward and leave the seal the only recourse during the period of prolonged darkness. Yet whenever the caribou are in reach the Eskimo places his chief dependence upon them. Thus, while our classification should not be permitted to obscure the

large part that sea mammals play in the domestic economy of the Eskimo, the caribou is absolutely indispensable to his existence, not so much for food as for winter clothing. Hence, we see that Eskimo culture must be considered as a modified form of caribou culture.

The Indians of this area, chiefly the Déné and Northern Algonquin tribes, are an inland people occupying the sub-Arctic tundra and the sparse forest belt below it, which gradually shades off into the denser forests of southern Canada. Among these tribes we find the typical caribou culture. Vivid pictures of the prehistoric caribou hunting life have been penned by Hearne [1] and its surviving form by Warburton Pike. [2] In southern Canada the moose and other deer were also available and in the far north the musk-ox; wood bison were also found in a few localities, and hares and other small animals were eaten when needed. Though not reaching the seacoast at any place, these inland tribes had within their range lakes and rivers well stocked with fish, and in season frequented by water fowl. As with the Eskimo, these sources of supply were drawn upon in season. Yet all these foods were merely supplementary, for the people pinned their faith to the caribou and developed their whole feeding and clothing complex around this animal. Consequently, the failure of the caribou in any locality for even one season alone would spell disaster.

The methods of hunting are fully described in the descriptive literature of the several tribes, but, as always, such methods are largely dictated by the habits of the animals themselves. Among both the Eskimo and the Indians, the method of killing caribou is to drive or stampede them into artificial or natural lanes or defiles where the hunters are concealed. A variant of this is to run them into deep water, where they are at the mercy of swift canoe men. Snaring is also highly developed, even the largest game being caught in this way. Fishing of whatever kind is with three forms of appliances: the harpoon, the hook and line, and the net. These methods were both known to the Eskimo and to the Indian, though not used by both to the same relative degrees.

The cache is an important invention of this area and has found its way into our own culture. The name is usually applied to an elevated or a subterranean enclosure for storing dried or frozen meat. The caribou, living in great herds, must move forward as they graze over the almost barren tundra and the hunters must follow with equal speed. So the cache method was devised to solve the problem. The kill of the day is dressed as quickly as possible and then cached, after which the pursuit is again taken up. Thus, each family group will have a number of stores in various accessible places upon which they may draw in case of need.

The bison area is contiguous to the caribou area, but is of far less extent. It is also entirely inland, and like the upper portion of the caribou area, is comparatively treeless, except along the water courses and upon the higher ridges. The tribes formerly residing here are known to us as Buffalo Indians, and no characterization could be more exact. Along the foothills of the mountains, elk were formerly abundant and also mountain sheep, and out on the plain antelope were to be met, but these were obscured by the seething masses of bison, or buffalo encountered everywhere, summer or winter. Edible fish were not abundant, and some of the tribes observed a taboo against them as well as all water animals.

The methods of hunting bison bear certain analogies to those employed in the caribou area. Before horses were introduced, small herds were enticed or stampeded into enclosures where they were shot down at will; at other times they were rounded up by systematic grass firing and while in compact formation attacked at close range by foot men. [3] In favorable times, the surplus meat was dried and packed in bags.

This is a convenient place to note the manufacture of pemmican, a process which appears in some parts of the caribou area, but which seems to be more characteristic of this area. To make pemmican, the dried meat of the buffalo was pounded fine with stone hammers and packed in bags which were then sealed with melted fat. A special variety of pemmican was prepared by pulverizing wild cherries, pits and all, and mixing with the pounded meat. This is known in the literature as berry pemmican. There was also a variety in eastern Canada and New England made of deer and moose meat. When properly protected, pemmican will keep for many months and being compact and easily transported forms an exceedingly valuable food. From the very first it was adopted by Canadian and Arctic explorers among whom it is still the chief dependence.

In pemmican we have our first good example of the many ingenious processes by which the various groups of mankind have converted raw foods into more serviceable and conservable forms. In all cases, the chief consideration seems to have been its preservation and availability for transport.

The next great hunting area is in South America. From the interior of Argentine to the Horn we have in the main an open country, suggesting the central portion of the United States. There are few trees and in some parts, as the celebrated Pampas, there are rich, grassy plains. At the time of discovery (1492), the fauna here was not so rich as that of the northern continent. Yet the guanaco was abundant. This is considered to be the wild llama, a ruminant having close similarities to the camels of the Old World, but much smaller. Another animal of economic importance was the rhea, or American ostrich. The early accounts suggest that the original human inhabitants of this area were a nomadic hunting people, primarily dependent upon the guanaco, which they pursued with the bola and the bow. For this reason we shall speak of the region as the guanaco area. In the extreme southern part of the area, or lower Patagonia, we find a condition somewhat like that of the Eskimo, the tribes tending to live more on fish and seals, until we reach the Fuegians, who were almost entirely dependent upon marine fauna.

Spanish colonization soon made great changes in the guanaco area proper by the introduction of horses and cattle.* The latter soon ran wild in great herds like the buffalo of the northern continent, and the former not only ran wild, but were domesticated by the natives. Dobrizhoffer [4] has given us most readable accounts of how completely these natives assimilated horse culture. Some of the Patagonians are still famous for their horsemanship.

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*Col. Church [6] states that horses were purposely turned into the Pampas in 1535.

Though it is true that in these three great hunting areas the main food was flesh, many vegetable products were used. Even in the Arctic the Eskimo gather berries and edible roots in summer. Throughout the caribou area proper, the berry crop is considerable, and judging from Morice's [5] account of the Carrier some tribes dried and pressed them into cakes for storage. Edible roots also played an important part. As we come southward into the bison area, the flora grows somewhat richer in wild fruits, such as the cherry, plum, strawberry, etc., while in the more arid portions, the prickly pear is abundant. Of roots there were several species, but particularly the prairie turnip (*tipsina*, in Dakota). Even in the guanaco area we find the *Aucaria imbricata*, a kind of pine tree growing along the eastern border of the Andes, bearing abundant nuts, not unlike chestnuts, which are eaten raw, boiled, or roasted. Here also the *algarrabo*, or mesquite tree, abounds and from its seeds a food is prepared. In the treeless parts of Patagonia are the prickly pear and a few other scant food plants, while the pampas proper is devoid of all except a few edible grasses. On the other hand, the territory of the Fuegians is fairly well provided with berries which they use, but also produces wild celery and scurvy-grass, of which they make no use.

THE SALMON AREA

All the streams between San Francisco Bay, California, and Bering Straits, Alaska, draining into the Pacific, are visited by salmon. These ascend from the sea en masse to spawn, constituting a "run," in local speech. As they reach the very headwaters, they are available to all the tribes of this drainage, even those far inland. The run for each species of salmon occurs but once a year and this developed periodic seasonal practices not unlike those of agricultural peoples. As the time for the run approaches, the tribes gather upon the banks of the streams, equipped with fishing appliances, dip nets, harpoons, and weirs, as the local conditions may require. Then when the salmon pass, they are taken out in great numbers, to be dried and smoked. In the interior of the Columbia Basin, the dried fish are afterwards pounded fine in mortars, thus being reduced to a state not unlike pemmican. This pulverized food is carefully stored in baskets as the chief reserve food supply of the year. The tribes on the coast and outlying islands engage in sea fishing all the year and are almost entirely dependent upon the marine fauna, but those of the interior hunt deer and other game to complete their diet.

Of vegetable foods there are several varieties. Inland, several species of roots are gathered, dried and pounded fine in the same manner as dried fish. The chief root is camas but there are several other species in general use. In their proper season, berries are also very numerous in certain localities.

One striking peculiarity of these inland people is the extent to which they pounded or pulverized dried flesh and vegetables quite like agricultural peoples treat forms of grain. The trait seems to be almost a conventionality and leads one to suspect that the idea was borrowed from their southern neighbors who, as we shall see, were in contact with grain grinders. The tribes of the coast, particularly the indented island-studded part north of Puget Sound, did not have this pulverizing habit, nor did they make very extensive use of roots. Dried fish and berries were their staples. Where available, a kind of clover was eaten green and the inner bark of the hemlock worked up into a kind of bread-like food.

While in this area the tribes of the coast maintained fairly permanent villages; those of the interior were rather nomadic, or more correctly, moved in an annual cycle, according to their food habits. Thus at the salmon run each group took its accustomed place on a river bank; then as berries ripened, they shifted to the localities where they were abundant; later they moved again for the gathering of roots; again for hunting deer, and so on in one ceaseless round. To a less extent this seasonal shifting prevailed among the coast tribes, for by the use of canoes they could readily reach the places sought and return again to their villages.

This correlation between the use of wild foods and instability of residence is perhaps more striking in this area than in the others but, nevertheless, holds for all. The Eskimo regularly shifted from sea to inland and back again as winter set in, likewise, the caribou, bison, and guanaco hunters, each in their respective habitats, shifted according to seasonal requirements. The more extended and definite annual cycle of the salmon area seems to be due to the fact that each of their staple foods was available for but single short periods of the year, not unlike so many successive harvests of an agricultural people whose fields were far apart.

THE AREA OF WILD SEEDS

The area of wild seeds is often spoken of as the "acorn area," and will frequently be so designated in this work. However, it should be borne in mind that in southern California acorns are found only on the uplands and mountains and that in the surrounding parts and eastward over the Great Basin wild seeds take their place. Yet, since the most typical culture is found in central and southern California, we may consider the acorn the most characteristic food.

At the proper time acorns are stored in large basketry bins to protect them against thieving rodents. The raw acorns are not palatable, for they contain a large amount of tannic acid; however, this objection is eliminated by pounding the kernels into flour and then leeching with hot water. Good descriptions of this ingenious process may be read in the publications of the University of California. From this substance, a kind of bread or cake is made, which proves to be a very satisfactory food, but even here this is supplemented by foods from several varieties of wild seeds, roots, herbs, and grasses. [7] The tribes on the eastern side of the mountains out on the arid plateaus are forced to get along without the acorn and in consequence eke out their living from but a scant flora. One peculiarity of the area is the rarity of berries and fruits, which is in contrast to the interior of the salmon area.

The term "digger," generally applied to the natives of this area, was suggested by their persistent gathering of roots and plants. It was also an expression of contempt due to the contrast between the scanty diet of these Indians and those of the bison area with whom travelers were more familiar. Likewise, the fauna was not particularly favorable. Deer were to be found in the mountains, but rarely in large numbers, and small game animals were not numerous. In the eastern part, the rabbit was an important item, and as noted above, salmon were caught wherever they made "runs," and other fish were used when available. Likewise, the coast people depended to some extent upon the marine fauna. Thus, notwithstanding the popular idea of modern California as an ideal habitat for us modern Americans, it must be regarded as rather unfavorable to the development of primitive tribes, for while enough food could be found, the daily routine of gathering it in small bits was time-consuming in the extreme. Moreover, in parts of Nevada, Utah, and Idaho the margin of even this sort of food was so narrow that many species of insects were eaten.

THE AGRICULTURAL AREAS

There are just two cultivated native food plants, maize and manioc (cassava), that rise to the level of chief staples. Both take the highest rank in excellence among the world's foods, and after the epoch-making discovery of Columbus were quickly spread to other parts of the world. [8] The uniqueness of these plants and the sharp contrast they make when compared with the cultivated staples of the Old World, is the strongest possible argument for the independent development of American culture.

In the first place, we have a distinct agricultural area in the eastern half of the United States, including a very small section of Canada. The chief crop was maize, on which account we speak of this division as the eastern maize area. Although its contact with the great agricultural area of Mexico and the south is slightly broken in Texas, we have no reason to doubt a historical connection between the two areas, and consequently we may consider them as parts of the same whole. The remaining inland boundaries of this eastern maize area mark the approximate climatic limits to its growth. These limits also define the distribution of agriculture, from which we have reason to infer that the introduction of that art did not precede the introduction of maize culture. However, this is a problem to be discussed later. We see, then, that the Indian tribes had extended agriculture in the east to its physical limits. The stretch of country from Louisiana to Maine presents considerable climatic variety which is reflected in the aboriginal crop lists, for though maize was grown throughout, it seems to have been more exclusively toward the north. Roughly considered, in the northern half of the area, the crops were squash, beans, and maize, all planted in the same field, while in the southern half, maize was supplemented by a kind of millet, and squashes gave way to melons, sweet potatoes, and gourds.

Tobacco, though not strictly a food, may be noted here. It was extensively grown in the south, and its cultivation carried as far north as the climate permitted.

Wild plants were also abundant and many species were used. Parker's [9] exhaustive study of Iroquois foods shows how completely that people drew upon the contiguous flora. From the data at hand, we have reason to believe that in the south a still greater number of species were eaten. In the far north wild rice became almost a staple; but while, as Jenks [10] has shown in his laudable investigation of this food, it was sometimes planted by the natives, it was not truly domesticated as was rice in the Old World.

Of manufactured foods, other than those made of maize, maple sugar takes first place. Practically every essential detail of the process now in use was developed by the Indians of this area before 1492. The sugar maple being a northern tree, the trait is almost peculiar to the northern half of the area, though the box elder and a few other trees have, in later times at least, permitted a makeshift extension of the art. That any kind of sugar was made in the south is doubtful.

Another food deserving mention is oil derived from hickory and walnuts. This oil was highly characteristic of the south and added a valuable element to the otherwise starchy diet. In early days the natives did a good business in supplying this oil to the colonists. In some parts of the Atlantic coast plain tuckahoe (a fungus) bread was made, and in the south, persimmon bread.

Of foods and dishes made with maize there is a long list, which is in the main the same as we ourselves use. Two noteworthy studies of this aspect of maize culture by Carr [11] and Parker [12] show how completely the white colonists absorbed the maize complex of the Indians.

One important characteristic of agriculture in this area is that it was woman's work, the man being a hunter. This sexual division of labor tended to give a well-balanced diet, but was not constant throughout, for in the far north where agriculture dwindled out into the caribou area, vegetable foods were decidedly in the minority, while in the extreme south, where agriculture was rather intense and the flora rich, the fruits of the chase were in the minority. The chief game was the deer. The bison of the prairies found its way as far east as the Alleghanies, but except in the open country was not an important item. The wild turkey and various small game were also abundant. Fish were taken where found by the usual methods, but in the south the use of poisons was general.

Next we turn to the great area of intensive agriculture, the only one in the New World, where work in the fields is not regarded as woman's work exclusively, and in which hunting ceases to be an occupation. As may be anticipated, it is also the home of the most advanced Indian cultures. We see from the map that it extends to about 35° on either side of the equator and is thus almost entirely within the torrid zone. On the other hand, all of this surface, except a narrow coast belt and a few intervening valleys, is the most elevated land in the New World. It is upon these highlands exclusively that maize was grown. Furthermore, there is a general tendency to aridity throughout, which, combined with the elevation, gives a very favorable climate. It is just the region where the most intensive cultures would be anticipated. As we proceed with the later sections of this book, the reader may be appalled at the complexity and variety of peoples in this area; hence it is fortunate that at the outset we are able to see one element of unity in the whole.

Beginning with the north, we have the pueblo-dwelling peoples of southwestern United States and northern Mexico. Besides maize, beans, melons, squashes and sunflower seed were the chief crops. In historic times, at least, onions and chili peppers were favorite garden plants; and according to local conditions, the following wild plants were largely used; piñon nut, mesquite, bean and saguaro. Tobacco and cotton were cultivated. Fish as food was not an important factor, in fact, it was under the ban of some tribes. Game was rather scarce, rabbits being the most numberous. Turkeys were domesticated. Of prepared foods, the most unique is the *piki* maize bread, made in thin, paper-like sheets.

For the remainder of the North American part of the area the Nahua and Maya may be taken as the types. Here agriculture was more highly organized than in any of the areas we have discussed. With the former, maize is made into peculiar cakes called "tortillas," which, with beans and the inevitable chili pepper, constitutes the usual menu. If we add to this cacao we have the list for the Maya also. In the lower parts, especially in Central America, there were many fruits, many of which are now cultivated by Europeans, as the mammae apple, the alligator pear, the cashew nut, together with the fleshy stalk of its tree, the tomato, pineapple, etc.

The Andean region of South America is peculiar in that at almost any point one may shift from high to low valleys, thus quickly passing through several varieties of climate. Likewise, one may, by lateral shifting, encounter deserts and the most well-watered stretches in succession. All this tends to nullify the effects of changing latitude, so that the aggregate agricultural conditions in Colombia, Ecuador and Peru can be made the same. Still we find some cultural differences.

The Chibcha peoples of Colombia in the highlands raised maize, potatoes, sweet potatoes, manioc, beans, tobacco, coca, and cotton. They did not have the llama, and game was scarce, but carefully protected and conserved. The other peoples of Colombia did more hunting but in addition still cultivated maize. Salt was manufactured in favorable localities and formed an important article of trade.

The adjoining highlands of Venezuela formerly had a hunting and maize-growing population which was exterminated by the Spaniards.

Ecuador was partly under the control of the Inca at the Spanish conquest but, no doubt, still retained its former food habits. Its population was almost exclusively agricultural. Maize was the staple except on the highest levels, where quinoa was substituted. Potatoes were universal, and coca, peppers, and other plants in the lowest valleys. On the coast there was fishing.

To the south was the Inca empire with its highly organized agriculture. Here the crops were about the same as for Ecuador, but in favorable places manioc, ground nuts, beans, gourds, tomatoes, guava, and fiber plants were raised. Hunting was carried on in an organized manner, large drives being made over great areas. The game animals were chiefly the guanaco and vicuña, of which the flesh was often dried and stored for the use of the army. The familiar term "jerked meat" is believed to have come from the *charqui*, as this dried meat was called in Peru. Birds were taken in nets, and on the coast there was some fishing.

The great basin of the Amazon with the adjoining coast is one of the world's most typical tropical areas, but almost everywhere throughout there was some native agriculture. As a whole, the area presents some geographical variety, for the eastern part of South America also has its highlands, though far less pretentious than those of the west. Here, however, the elevation was much less; consequently, maize did not become the chief cultivated food, manioc or cassava, taking its place. Otherwise, the range of plants was about the same as in the Andean region. Tobacco, potatoes, and cotton were common. The celebrated maté, or Paraguay tea, and the edible clay of the Botocudo peoples are the principal unique features. Yet, in no case were the tribes of these highlands so dependent upon agriculture as were those of the west coast. In this respect they present a close analogy to the eastern maize users of North America, with whom they are geographically connected by the West Indies. Further, the almost complete delegation of agricultural responsibilities to the women is in itself an indication of the large part hunting played in their sustenance.

Finally, we come to the interior of the continent where high temperature, low elevation, and abundant moisture combine to produce rank flora. Our knowledge of this area is still rather scant, but what information we have indicates that the whole interior Amazon Basin with the contiguous east coast noted above should be considered as one distinct food area. That the art of agriculture is now absolutely unknown to any of the Amazon tribes is doubtful, because far into the interior we find manioc, tobacco, coca, pumpkins, sweet potatoes, etc., growing in the village fields. Also, maize has been reported from a number of localities, though the climate is unfavorable to it. The blowgun with poisoned darts is used in hunting, the game consisting largely of birds and small tree-climbing animals. No living thing is so abundant as to offer opportunity for food specialization, and the native must make use of everything he can lay hands upon. On the upper Amazon and elsewhere the taking of fish by poisoning the water is common. A very characteristic dish of this whole area is the "pepper-pot." Small game of whatever kind is cast into a pot and boiled into a thick broth made hot with peppers. The pot is emptied, but the contents continually augmented (Wissler, 1938: 3–19).*

We have included this extensive survey of the Indian adjustment to the New World environment in order to clarify for the reader once and for all the fact that American Indians were completely capable of undertaking their own economic development from the moment that they entered this hemisphere over 25,000 years ago. They have never lost this *ability*, but they have been seriously hampered in trying to exercise it while maintaining their historic identity at the same time. Where they have been free to adapt, they have displayed a remarkable ability to take all kinds of rapid changes in stride. This has been true even after the arrival of the White Man. In fact, our point is that, in the absence of coercion, the Indian adapted healthily at a dazzling rate of speed.

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* **See Appendices:**
I. Bibliographic Citations for the Wissler Text.
II. Map of Food Areas.
III. List of Plants Domesticated in the New World.

The best example of this is the manner in which the Indian took to the horse. The adoption of this animal into their way of life was perhaps the most radical and rapid of all American Indian adjustments.

Within a few generations, the use of the horse spread from Spanish settlements of New Mexico throughout the central plains states and attracted Indians from all directions. When Indians first acquired horses, they used them as food; but gradually they found that, if the horse were used for hunting buffalo, it could supply many times its weight in meat. Hunting buffalo on foot had not been productive, but with the horse, the plains' way of life changed a great deal. "From all over, other Indian groups converged on the plains and quickly adapted themselves to an economy based on the bison * * * and the plains became a maelstrom of varied and often conflicting cultures." (Farb 1968: 115).

Many groups of great diversity came together and changed their ways due to the new circumstances. Cultures borrowed from each other and fit the new into their old ways. Although differences continued to exist, within a few generations, major cultural differences all but disappeared and similarities arose; for example, the Sun Dance ceremony was eventually observed by nearly every tribe.

"Even more remarkable, this homogeneity was achieved with great speed, was not imposed on unwilling people by a more powerful group, and was done in the absence of a common tongue—save for 'sign language,' the lingua franca of the Plains tribes." (p. 117)

With this "new tool" to kill greater numbers of buffalo than ever before, many of these Indians became extremely wealthy in material goods; but all this ended with the wars of the plains during which "the millions of bison very nearly vanished without leaving any survivors, the plains were turned into a dust bowl, and the once-proud Indian horsemen were broken in body and spirit." (p. 113)

It is not difficult to argue that the subsequent adaptation of Plains tribes has been difficult and tenuous. This, of course, is the reason for the whole Indian "problem." Wounded Knee and other similar events are markers for the time when Indians were no longer free to adapt to changing circumstances.

Lest we be accused of maintaining that no Indian group is able to adopt healthily to 20th Century America, we should like to briefly describe the Caughnawaga Mohawk.

These Mohawks have carried their social patterns and attendant values, developed long before Europeans invaded their land, into the modern world. They depended largely on vegetable foods produced for the most part from domesticated plants. Unlike farmers, they did not grow their crops in permanent fields, but wherever they made camp. Precise details as to how they did their farming are lacking, but all accounts agree that women bore the largest share of responsibility.

Hunting and war were the most highly valued male activities. War tended to be a small group enterprise, and followed the pattern of fighting in all other American Indian tribes. Usually, a man seeking glory or perhaps vengeance would solicit support from a few close friends. If they agreed to participate, a general call for volunteers would be issued. Men were free to join or not, and there was no stigma attached to nonparticipation. The notion of authority, characteristic of Western civilization, was quite foreign to the Mohawks, as it was to all other tribes in the league of the Iroquois to which the Mohawks belonged. In fact, almost all American Indian tribes considered the acceptance of a directive from any leader a matter of choice.

By the end of the 18th century, most of the Iroquois had been placed on reservations. The Caughnawaga Mohawks were settled on the reservation of that name about 10 miles south of Montreal, Canada. For a time they were under the protection of the Jesuits, and the reservation also served as a refuge for Christian Indians from other tribes.

From about 1800 to 1886, the Caughnawaga Mohawks were typical of most reservation Indians. They engaged in a variety of enterprises including lumbering, timber rafting, and dock and circus work. But 1886 was a significant year. Some of the Mohawks were hired as unskilled laborers on the Victoria Tubelor Bridge, which abutted on reservation land. This work opened up new opportunities for the tribe. Since the first contact with structural steel, the vast majority of Mohawk men between the ages of 18 and 60 have become noted for their ability to work at great heights on skyscrapers.

Mohawks today work in the larger cities of eastern North America, but they regard the reservation as their home. As we have noted elsewhere (Tax and Stanley 1968: 146), "For many, the reservation is where their wives, children, and mothers are, and their seasonal homecoming is reminiscent of the return from war or the hunt of bygone days. The patterns for selecting crews to work on the high steel are similar to those that produced war or hunting parties in the past. Authority is still lightly regarded; bosses have no moral basis for expecting their orders to be obeyed."

Even as many Indians eagerly accepted the horse and the Mohawk took to high steel, there was sharp rejection of other Western cultural items. In particular, this was true of the plow. The reasons for not accepting this implement and its attendent complex are varied, but the combination of Indian apprehensiveness and White force would seem to summarize them. We need to look at this combination in perspective in order to better understand the present day Indian "problem."

During the 19th century, the assumption that *the* "human" (civilized?) existence required every man to farm his own piece of land dominated the thinking of all who wielded power over Indians. A corollary assumption was that each family derives its subsistence solely and independently from its farm. They "knew what was best" for Indians, and they possessed the power to bring it about. The attempts to force the Indian to become a farmer probably reached their most ludicrous form in the case of the Makah Indians who live around the tip of the Olympic Peninsula in the northwesternest part of the United

States. These Indians who, for perhaps thousands of years, had successfully developed an economy based on exploitation of their abundant sea resources were given plows and plots of rocky, forested land to till! (Colson 1953: 3–24). Eventually good sense prevailed and the project was abandoned; but, in addition to causing unnecessary waste and human suffering, this experience underscores the importance of letting Indians make their own adjustment in the absence of coercion.

We all know that there are many whites who never had any intention of letting Indians remain Indians. This view is held by many "well-intentioned" people who assume that Indians, like all the rest of us want to change, want to assimilate. They assume that everyone, given the free choice, would want to be civilized just like us. These people have very definite ideas of right and wrong, and one of their ideas of right is that Indians should be civilized, should become like the white man.

What they fail to realize and understand is that perhaps Indians prefer their own way of life and have no desire to change it. In fact, Indians have had many opportunities to change and it should be clear to those who make the above assumptions that those Indians who wanted to change have done so and those who have not changed have not because they do not want to. Furthermore, those who have not and do not want to change resent the further assumption that assimilation is inevitable—which in effect means that all will eventually change even those who do not want to.

In our opinion, no white man has the right to decide what an Indian should be; each man has the right to choose which way he wants to go. Only two solutions have been offered the American Indian by the white man: work hard and assimilate or stay out of sight, out of mind; in other words, get lost in the city or starve on the reservation.

The sheer exercise of power, too often informed by ignorance, by Whites over Indians is not sufficient to account for the tenacious resistance on the part of the latter over such a long period of time. In resisting the pressure to become farmers or what-have-you, the Indians are affirming positively their faith in their own values. However they adapt to the changing environment, these are the trusted guidelines to which they constantly return. It is important for all of us to understand some of the very basic differences in outlook which exist between Western values and North American Indian values.

The distinction can best be understood if we begin by acknowledging that as people engage in activities which permit them to survive and reproduce in a particular environment, they develop a set of beliefs and values. Anthropologists call these their "ethos." The term has a unique reference to the character of a society, particularly in its moral, ethical, and social outlook.

When man discovered how to domesticate plants and animals, he arrived at a new way of adjusting to his environment. The result was a corresponding change in ethos. The hunter ethos gave way to the peasant ethos. Man "discovered" property and began to use concepts of saving, land ownership, and inheritance. He developed a new way of ordering his time—since crops had to be planted, weeded, and harvested, and animals had to be fed regularly. It has even been said that domestication of plants and animals made man a slave to property and time. Finally, the new ethos put an emphasis on individualism and competition. The idea that one man could command another may have originated with domestication. Thus, what we commonly term a civilized society today is in reality a group of people living within a peasant ethos. The term peasant ethos is used here in its broadest sense, encompassing all societies with rigid class structures or hierarchies of social relationships. It is not applied strictly to farmers, since even some hunting groups have practiced some amount of farming of a rudimentary sort.

The hunter ethos stands in direct contrast to the major elements of a peasant society. The hunter considers himself a part of the land and what it bears. He feels imbedded in it. He is a natural conservationist, taking only what he needs for sustenance. He never sees himself as a lord or master, and he does not recognize any moral obligation for one man to obey the orders of another. For the hunter, time and work have not been invented, and if the choice arises he will almost certainly choose the community decision over his own individual self-interest. As might be expected, hunters and peasants have a difficult time communicating with one another because of the extreme contrasts in their patterns of living and outlook.

At the time of Columbus' discovery, most of the lush areas of North America were still inhabited by hunting peoples. This is curious since these tribes had been exposed to peasant cultures, such as the Aztec, for thousands of years. The hunters of North America—the Indians—all knew something about farming, but they apparently decided to remain hunters. Indeed, the American Indian not only failed to become a farmer-peasant before Columbus arrived, but has persistently refused to become one despite the pressures of Europeans and their descendants in North America.

It appears, therefore, that the North American Indian refused to adjust to a farming economy because to do so would have threatened all the values of his hunting ethos, and he chose to live by them as an outsider rather than to give them up. The whole history of the relationships between the Indians and the white newcomers seems to bear this out. Few American Indian groups have chosen even to make a pretense of moving into the mainstream of American life.

Now we are in a better position to understand the success of the Mohawks. High steel work has permitted these Indians to maintain their hunting ethos; they are more fortunate than most American Indian tribes who, despite immense pressures to take on new activities and a new ethos, are willing to suffer poverty and deprivation rather than compromise their ethos. Furthermore, they have not been given the chance to change by choice, despite their demonstrated ingenuity to develop a wide variety of adjustments in the past and present.

The intertwining of the desire to maintain a decent living and one's identity is the crux of the problem as we see it. The question is, "what can concerned persons who have positions of power do about it?" The answer lies partly in examining our own frame of mind, or as one of us put it:

> The conclusion I draw is not that we cannot help other communities of people, but only that we must help them pretty largely on their own terms. To do this we must be prepared to learn at least as much from them as we bring to them. More than that, we must come to them in the frame of mind that admits it can never

> understand all the factors important in the situation, and so offers the widest variety of alternatives to see which might actually be suitable. I think of this analogy: I stand on a mountaintop and am about to empty a bucket of water over the edge, from where eventually it would reach the river below. I could now call in all sorts of wise men with their measuring instruments and their calculators and expect them to predict the exact course the bucket of water will take. Perhaps they would do fairly well; they might theoretically make a perfect prediction if they took as much time about it as would a monkey at the typewriter writing all the plays of Shakespeare. But if they were indeed wise men, I should expect at least one of them to suggest that we empty the bucket and let the water show the path, and then use our ingenuity to explain it. (Tax 1955: 236–237)

But in addition, we can offer assistance in the form of material resources and money. In fact, we have a moral obligation to do so, and in practical terms, it will be to the benefit of all. Surely we now know enough to begin to offer this assistance on the most open and healthy terms possible. If we consider for a minute the two important variables: Material Inputs and Locus of Decision Making, we will be able to chart the consequences of their relationship to each other.

		LOCUS OF DECISION-MAKING	
		In Agency	In Community
MATERIAL INPUTS	Low Emphasis and Amount	Type A Utilize superior knowledge or expertise of experts; accept new teachings; change habits.	Type B Develop leadership; identity problems; formulate goals through democratic means. Use "self-help" with community resources to solve problems.
	High Emphasis and Amount	Type C "Engineering-Physical Infrastructure" Build new facilities needed for development; allow local people to figure out how to use them.	Type D "Comilla Approach" Local group defines own problems; sets own goals. Outside organization helps it achieve goals.

(Choldin, Harvey M., "Urban Cooperatives at Comilla, Pakistan: A Case Study of Local-Level Development")

In this chart, material inputs can be high or low in emphasis and amount while the locus of decision making can be in the agency or in the community. Let us look at the four possible outcomes.

Type A is heavy on power from above, but puts very little in the way of money and material into the solution. It corresponds most closely to what is generally referred to as colonialism.

Type B seeks to develop leadership at the local level, but is accompanied by low material inputs. This comes closest to what happens (ideally) when you introduce the Peace Corps.

Type C occurs when something like a soap plant, running water, a highway, and electricity are all introduced into a community. The material inputs are large, but the agency decides what they will be and where they will go.

Type D is the kind of situation which we would recommend for assisting American Indians. Its major points are that it allows the community to define its own goals (which will surely reflect the group ethos), and features both a high emphasis on and a large amount of material input.

If we want to adopt the Comilla approach to American Indian economic development, then there are some important things that must be understood.

The basic law concerning American Indians requires that we return to the original definition of a special relation between the United States government and Indian communities. American Indians have never lost this conception because unlike most Americans, Indians do not conceive of themselves except *first* as members of communities. American Indians live in "kinship societies." As in any healthy ongoing society, a person is part of a family and its economy and is not expected to be forcibly separated from it, so American Indians are part of extended family groups which form their communities. Even when they move to cities, they form family-type communities. It is "unnatural," perhaps impossible, for Indians to be isolated from their communities. Traditionally the communities banded into larger political units called "tribes" or nations which were recognized by European nations as sovereign. But the smaller communities, whether "sovereign" or not, were indispensable and valid units. These "communities," recognized by their Indian members, must also be recognized as the units with which governmental Indian policy must deal. Individual families and persons have rights guaranteed to every citizen; and legislation need not concern them. Indian *communities* are recipients of what special rights, tradition, treaties, and the needs of Indians require.

American law recognizes corporate groups of many kinds, and provides mechanisms whereby such a group can receive and expend funds under rules established within itself. American Indian communities are not all the same. In one, the authority might be priestly and hereditary; in another secular and elected. The organization of most contains elements of both the sacred and the secular, and generally the spirit is (in great contrast to our own) non-hierarchial, non-authoritarian, stressing the agreement of all (in town-hall fashion) rather than rule by "representatives."

Legislation for American Indians has in the past been unsuccessful both because communities have been forced to operate in terms of our culture rather than their own and because they had no ultimate authority over internal management, being subject to veto power—hence constant surveillance—from outside. What is required, therefore, is a legislative program which provides maximum internal autonomy and authority for Indian communities.

American Indian communities require funds for education, health, welfare, and economic development. The general society provides such funds to replace the resource base which—if restored—would provide independence. Since the resource base (the Continent which Europeans occupied) cannot be restored to Indian communities, money must be substituted. Just as Indian communities managed their resources independently before, for the money to be useful, they must manage it independently now.

The legislation required must, therefore, be drafted in such a way that each of the many hundreds of American Indian communities, however they are defined and bounded by Indians—from the small bands and subtribes to recreated urban "Indian Center" communities—can each in its own way autonomously manage the resources that must be provided.

It would be indeed a strange procedure to try to draft such legislation without full participation of the Indian communities. What is clearly required is Indian-community self-determination for developing the conditions of their self-determination.

In 1961 there was a great conference in Chicago which for the first time brought Indian individuals together from all over the nation, where—entirely on their own—they developed a "Declaration of Indian Purpose." What would be needed now is to invite and make possible participation by every identifiable Indian community—the local Navaho, Cherokee, Iroquois, Salish, Dakotan, etc., etc., groups as well as those in Los Angeles, Minneapolis, etc., etc.—who could themselves make the necessary decision. These are the implications of adopting a "Comilla Project" approach to assisting American Indians to a healthy, viable economic development of their communities.

Before concluding this report, we think it is important to try to give an historical overview of the character of federal-Indian relationships and some suggestions for change. The viewpoint which we are setting forth is not new—in fact, it was advanced in this form as early as 1956 by Dr. Tax. Despite this fact, it applies as forcefully now to the problem as it did then. This, in itself, is some measure of the depth of the problem, especially if we measure the amount of money which has been spent in the last 13 years to "solve" the problem. In order to begin to change the hopeless policies which have been pursued in the past, the American people are going to have to internalize the major points of this overview. Failure to take our recommendations seriously will, at the very least, mean more of the same—poverty, degradation, and defensive adaptation by the Indians—and these are the very problems all of us are trying to solve!

Through all of our history, States as well as the Federal Government have been frustrated with respect to solving the problems of the American Indians. We have vacillated between (1) a policy of starving the Indians into throwing in the sponge and "getting lost" in the general population, and (2) a kinder policy of helping them to get themselves ready to leave Indian ways and get lost in the general population. In either case, they would then be off our consciences, and finally out of our pocketbooks. Both policies have failed.

When we have followed the first policy, and thrown them into the water to "sink or swim," we have found that the Indians neither sink nor swim; they just float, and remain the same problem. When we have followed the second, kinder policy, we have found that Indians do not, in fact, do the things that will lead to their disappearance. They do not want to get lost. The "kind" policy will only work if we have the patience to continue to use our resources to help Indian communities to adjust to the national economy freely and in their own way. But their own way might not be to get lost at all.

Every man and woman has the personal problem of deciding what sort of person he wants to be. Some Indians may want to become white men in their allegiance and their ways; this ought to be their right. But many Indians want to maintain their Indian values and allegiance, and many Indian communities want to maintain for their posterity and identity and heritage that were given to them. They too have this right. It is not for any white man, or Congress, or the Indian Service bureaucracy to demand that Indians stop being Indians.

It is a challenge which has never been met in the United States to help the Indians to adjust economically and socially to American life, so that they actually become financially independent. We cannot begin to solve the problem unless we first recognize that Indians have a right to make this adjustment *as* Indians.

Leaving them free to make their own choices removes the great block to constructive change. What folly it has been to demand that Indians cooperate in plans for making them something other than they want to be! What an interesting experiment, on the other hand, once the block is removed, to develop with them ways toward that greatest freedom which comes with economic independence!

The Indian policy that has most recently been with us has been the sink or swim policy, the less moral way that has never worked and never can. It does not get Indians out of our pocketbooks—indeed, this unchristian policy (as Eisenhower once called it) requires more money rather than less—and it certainly does not get them off the conscience of the nation.

The present policy, aimed at the disappearance of the Indians, is a double-edged sword. On the one side there is a nauseating paternalism. Indians get help from the government because, since we destroyed their means of livelihood, they need it; and it is our moral obligation to continue this help until we and they are wise enough to make them once again independent. But meanwhile the Indian Bureau, like any overprotective parent, demands that the Indians manage their own affairs; but, on the grounds that they do not know how, never lets them try, and become sure, more than ever, that they are incompetent to do so. They say, in effect, that as long as we pay the bills, we shall manage your communities. If you think you are competent to manage your own affairs, then cut yourselves off from the financial assistance as well. Money to live on, or freedom; you cannot have both, so take your choice.

But the Indians have not the resources for the medical, educational, and developmental needs of their communities. So they must choose the continued interference in their local affairs. This satisfies nobody, and gets nowhere. Congress, frustrated, then attempts to use force or bribery to induce Indian communities to make the other choice.

We need an entirely new approach. We need to separate the two problems of *the money which the Indians need for their community services* from *the way the money is used.*

Nobody should ever again interpret our policy as one which is importantly influenced by a desire to save money to the detriment of Indians and in violation of our traditional and moral obligations. It has been and should be our policy to *make it unnecessary to provide special services*, hence to make Indians independent. But until this is accomplished, the money should be provided because it is needed and because it is right. Therefore, the first plank of our policy is to assure Indians that we shall continue to provide in the federal budget the money needed to continue Indian services. For the time being, we suggest that the same budget now provided be continued.

But this money should be spent by the Indians, for themselves, rather than *for* the Indians by bureaucrats. Just as a government might provide a subsidy to a hospital or a university without taking over the functions of administering the hospital or university, so the funds available to Indians should be looked upon as subsidies to assist them to provide their own community services—health, welfare, public order. education, development.

But whatever changes occur from one system of administration to another or from one allocation to another, they should be entirely voluntary on the part of the Indians who are now recipients of the services for which the funds are provided. If Indians prefer to have the federal government agencies continue to administer their services, no change need be made. Whenever, however, an Indian community, or the recipients of services, wish to seek changes in administration, these changes should be provided at once.

The money in the budget is divisible into funds (a) for services: money to pay teachers and build schools; or pay doctors and nurses, and build hospitals, etc., and (b) money for general administration to pay administrative officials in Washington, in area offices, and on reservations.

Funds for services should be continued for the same services. Funds for administration should be made flexible so that as much as necessary can be used by tribes with which to hire non-governmental help for administration of their affairs, when they wish to make a change; and to pay the expenses of a panel of volunteer advisers set up independent of the Department of Interior from which Indian communities may obtain general advice in planning changes in how their affairs may be administered.

If the Bureau of Indian Affairs withers away, it will be because Indians will find other ways, which they prefer, to have their funds administered. There will be no "termination" with respect to provision of services as long as they are needed by Indians. "Withdrawal" will occur not as the government withdraws from its obligations, but as the Indians withdraw from government interference in the administration of their services.

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APPENDIX I

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APPENDIX II


CARIBOU AREA
SALMON AREA
BISON AREA
EASTERN MAIZE AREA
WILD SEEDS
AREA OF INTENSIVE AGRICULTURE
MANIOC AREA
GUANACO AREA

FOOD AREAS OF THE NEW WORLD

106

APPENDIX III

Plants Cultivated by the Natives of the New World Before 1492

The following list[1] enumerates the most important plants originally cultivated by the several Indian tribes before the discovery of the New World in 1492.

Name[2]	*Area of cultivation*
Agave, or aloe	Mexico to Chile.
Alligator pear	Central America and West Indies.
Arrowroot	Tropical America.
Barnyard grass	Mexico and southern United States.
Bean, kidney	Distribution same as maize.
Bean, Lima	Brazil and Peru.
Cacao	Tropical America.
Capsicum or Chili pepper	Do.
Cashew nut	Do.
Coca, or cocaine	Peru and Bolivia.
Corn. (See maize.)	
Cotton	Tropical America.
Cherimoya	Peru and Brazil.
Gourd	Distribution same as maize.
Guava	Tropical America.
Jerusalem artichoke	Mississippi Valley.
Madia	Chile.
Maize	Eastern North America, Meso-America, South American highlands.
Manioc	Amazon Basin to east coast of South America.
Maté or Paraguay tea	Paraguay and western Brazil.
Papaw	West Indies and Central America.
Peanut	Peru and Brazil.
Pineapple	Mexico and Central America.
Potato	Chile and Peru.
Prickly pear or Indian fig	Mexico.
Pumpkin	Temperate North America.
Oca	Chile and Bolivia.
Quinine, and others	Bolivia and Peru.
Quinoa	Colombia and Peru.
Squash	Tropical America.
Star apple	West Indies and Panama.
Sweet potato	Temperate America.
Tobacco and other species	Hemisphere wide except northern and southern extremities.
Tomato	Peru.

[1] Wissler, Clark, *The American Indian*, Oxford University Press. New York, 1938.
[2] Latin names omitted.

READJUSTMENT WITH SECURITY FOR THE AMERICAN INDIAN

By Glenn L. Emmons*

FOREWORD

The Federal Government has always had special treaty relationships with the American Indians. Glenn L. Emmons, a former Commissioner of Indian Affairs, summarizes this history, beginning with the First Continental Congress in 1775. Mr. Emmons then outlines his own view that the present trust relationships must be gradually brought to the end and the Bureau of Indian Affairs abolished. In place of current Bureau of Indian Affairs' programs, individual Indians carried on the tribal rolls at the moment of enactment of new legislation should be accorded regular monthly income support payments. Indian families would thus be given financial security together with the freedom to manage their own affairs.

In the first place, I certainly agree with the Indians in their objection to the word "termination" when referring to the ending of the trusteeship of the Federal Government over the Indian people. To them, "termination" has a connotation of "doom" or "destruction." Many generations of Indians have lived under the paternalism of this trusteeship and therefore have an inborn feeling of dependency on the agency of Government established many years ago to manage their affairs and provide them with special services. Therefore, in abolishing this special relationship between the Government and the Indian, we must be humane as well as practical in the process. We must express to the Indians a new hope and confidence in their future by what I prefer to name, "readjustment with security." We must assure them of the retention of their Indian identification, preservation of their cultures, and the protection of their present homelands.

By terms of treaties, our Government's relation to the Indians is quite different from that with any other minority group. That relationship goes back to the First Continental Congress in 1775 when it established three Departments of Indian Affairs—the Northern, Central, and Southern—each headed by a Commissioner. In September 1824 the Congress established the Bureau of Indian Affairs under one Commissioner and placed it in the War Department, where it remained until it was transferred to the newly created Department of the Interior in 1849.

During all of this period and up to 1879 a great number of treaties were signed with various tribes and bands, and these Indians were located on areas of land called reservations. The lands in these reservations were held in trust for the Indians by the U.S. Government and the responsibility for their management rested with the Secretary of the Interior. This trusteeship extends to this time and of course, under the trust, the Indian owners have never been given the opportunity to manage these properties themselves.

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*Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1953–1961.

Under this paternalistic system, the increase of dependency on the Government for services from one generation to the next is only natural. The populations have grown and so have the management problems. Congress has passed over 4,000 laws relative to the Indians and over 9,000 regulations have been promulgated for the operations of the Bureau of Indian Affairs.

In August 1953, the Congress unanimously passed Joint Resolution 108, which declared:

> It is the sense of Congress that the Trusteeship over all Indian tribes shall be ended as rapidly as possible.

The terms of the resolution are somewhat ambiguous. How soon is it possible to end the trusteeship and under what conditions? If it means when the majority of the tribal members have reached such a stage of well-being as their non-Indian neighbors, then what about the minority group that has not or could not attain that degree of self-sufficiency?

The Congress has been very generous in its appropriations for the operations of the Bureau of Indian Affairs for the past 15 years. These moneys are for carrying on the many responsibilities of the Bureau established by law, such as education, land management, welfare, law and order, administrative costs of the Bureau and many others.

In spite of the generosity of Congress over the years, we still find living conditions on many of the reservations on the level of direst rural slums.

With the Indian population increasing every year, the lands will simply not support the Indians living on them. It should be understood by everyone interested in the Indian problem that most of the Indian people are not interested in being agriculturists even if land was available.

In 1958 we established the Branch of Industrial Development in the Bureau to bring plants on or near reservations for Indian employment. Even if industries are continually induced to the reservations, it is hardly reasonable to assume that every employable Indian will be provided with a job in one of these plants. Also, there will be those who are not employable under any circumstances and also those with families who desire employment but are fearful of leaving the security of the reservation to seek jobs elsewhere.

With the reservation population increasing each year, additional congressional appropriations are requested for the Indian Bureau's operations and the so-called Indian problem grows bigger and bigger and costlier and costlier.

The Government has spent over a billion dollars over the past 4 years on the Indian and yet unemployment on the reservations is still several times higher than the national level.

After 145 years of Government trusteeship, is it not about time to set a definite date for ending this situation, and during that interim to concentrate on programs of education and training for the Indians to enable them to fend for themselves when that time arrives?

Three factors must be taken into consideration in ending the Indian trusteeship:

First, the welfare of the Indian people themselves;

Second, the personnel of the Bureau of Indian Affairs;

Third, the impact on the non-Indian communities near reservations whose economy is tied to the Federal expenditures in those areas through the Indian Bureau.

The legislation suggested below is designed to protect the interests of those elements involved.

It will preserve by law the tribal lands for the tribal members through tax exemptions and a restriction on the sale of these lands for a period of time. This would preserve their homeland, not only for those tribal members who cared to remain on these lands, but for those living elsewhere who would desire to return there in the future.

The tribal members would be given the opportunity to seek a higher standard of living elsewhere with financial security, thus making the tribal lands available for the use of those members who desired that type of occupation.

A great majority of the personnel of the Bureau of Indian Affairs are capable, conscientious, and dedicated public servants, and it is only right and just for their welfare, also to be considered. They are the people to carry out the congressional mandate under this act to abolish their jobs. Therefore, the Bureau employee will have priority rights for employmeent in other Government agencies when his services in the Bureau are terminated by developments created by this act.

The moneys paid the Indians on the ending of the trusteeship would doubtless all be spent for goods or needs for their families in the areas of their domicile. This cash output would far offset the loss of the Federal Bureau payroll.

The sum presently appropriated for fiscal year 1970 for the Bureau of Indian Affairs is $311,010,000 and for the Division of Indian Health, including health facility construction, $118,481,000. Several additional millions of dollars will be spent by other governmental agencies on Indian assistance programs.

Under the law, the Bureau can give its services only to those of one-quarter degree or more of Indian blood and to those who are considered residents on trust lands. It is estimated there are about 325,000 Indians in this status and eligible for the benefits provided under these appropriations.

The suggested legislation includes all Indians of tribes affected by this act who are one-quarter degree or more of Indian blood regardless of their place of residence, with the exception of the natives of Alaska. This group in Alaska, totaling about 40,000 persons, is comprised of Aleuts, Eskimos, and several Indian tribes, and is under the supervision of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. As their situation is entirely different from the other groups covered by this bill, it is recommended that their affairs be transferred to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare within 2 years of the passage of this act.

Under these provisions there would be approximately 450,000 Indians eligible for inclusion on the rolls of this act. The essentials to carry out these purposes are proposed as follows:

"The Congress enacts legislation ending the Federal trusteeship over all Indian tribes within 8 years of the date of passage of the act.

"At midnight on the date of the passage of this Act, the rolls of every tribe will be closed for the purposes of this act. Each roll shall consist of all persons of one-quarter or more degree of Indian blood who are members of tribes under Government trusteeship, regardless of their place of residence and only such Indians living at midnight on the date of the passage of this act will be entitled to any of the benefits of this act. The natives of Alaska are excepted from the provisions of this act, but the responsibility for them shall be transferred from the Bureau of Indian Affairs to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare within 2 years of the date of the passage of this act.

"When the trusteeship over a tribe is ended, the U.S. Government, through the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, shall pay to each individual Indian on this tribal roll prepared beforehand by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the sum of $60 per month. Payment to a minor child shall be made direct to the head of the family until the child leaves his parental care or until he reaches his age of majority. It is intended that the parent shall use these funds for the support of his family. In case the parents are found using these funds for other than the purposes intended, authority is given the local welfare officials to receive and administer the moneys for the use and benefit of the family.

"Prior to the proclamation of the Secretary of the Interior ending the trusteeship over any tribe, it will be the responsibility of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to have the tribe properly and legally incorporated and the Secretary of the Interior will transfer any and all tribal property to the tribal corporation and every qualified member of the tribe will be a stockholder in such corporation.

"As additional compensation to the Indians for relinquishing all the special services now given them by the Federal Government, all the real property of the tribe and all lands individually owned by tribal members held in trusteeship by the Government on the date of the proclamation ending the said trusteeship, shall be exempt from taxation for a minimum period of 20 years from the date of termination of the trusteeship The Federal Government shall pay to the various States in which these properties are located, the taxes assessed on these lands.

"The Federal Government will continue to provide health services for those Indians covered in this legislation by the present administration of the Division of Indian Health, Public Health Service, or some group health insurance plan.

"Any Bureau of Indian Affairs employee who has served 5 consecutive years in the employment of the Bureau shall have preference rights for employment in another Government agency. Any Bureau employee whose job is abolished because of this act and who is short 5 years for qualification for full retirement benefits can elect to retire for the full benefits as though he had served his full time for qualifying for full retirement.

"All the aforesaid money payments to the Indian beneficiaries are exempt from any taxation whatever and will not be considered in determining any benefits under retirement or social security payments."

Under this plan, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the middleman, is eliminated entirely over an 8-year period and the money now used for its operations would go directly to the Indians.

The Indian family averages about five members and would receive $300 per month, which would assist the family head in supporting his family and give him financial security when he goes to a strange community to obtain employment. He would not feel compelled to return to the reservation for Bureau services if he became unemployed. This plan would assure him of the permanency of his homeland if, later in life, he elects to return there.

By this legislation, a substitute economy is created for those states and communities that are more or less dependent on the Indian Bureau's expenditures in their areas. It would also eliminate the fear that an impossible welfare load would fall on them if the Government withdrew its services to the Indians.

The Government will, with this legislation, provide the Indian with the tools for self-adjustment with security, and will have completed its debt to him with honor and justice.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AS A MEANS OF OVERCOMING INDIAN POVERTY

By Robert L. Bennett*

FOREWORD

Respect for Indian culture and values is a vital part of any assistance effort, but some conflict between traditional Indian values and successful economic development is inevitable. Saving, investment, and the profit motive are not a part of many traditional Indian cultures. Nor does individual financial success carry the status that it does in industrial society. Thus some compromises between traditional values and the prevalant economic system are essential if Indian poverty and dependency are to be overcome. Progress can be made both through identifying job opportunities near the reservation and through bringing industry onto the reservation.

Introduction

Poverty is not a new experience for Indian people; it has been with them for many years. With recent national attention being given to the general problem of poverty, poverty among Indian people has been highlighted in many statements by public officials, private organizations and individuals, and by the Indian people themselves. It is an accepted fact that poverty exists in such proportion among Indian people as to make them one of the most poverty-stricken groups in the country. Poverty has been a persistent partner of Indian people and no one knows, but we can hope, that present efforts will do much to erase this blight.

A clear distinction should be made between those poor in America who are outside the productive life of the economy, and those who are poor despite their ability to participate in the labor force. These are different aspects of the problem and require different treatment.

The attack on poverty must focus upon the special conditions and characteristics of the Indian population. There is no simple solution to the problem. Indian people are caught in the backwash of economic development. If we are to overcome poverty, then we need to identify and eliminate the negative forces which are repressing Indian people and to identify and strengthen the positive forces which bring about economic change.

Even when the Indian people accept the objectives of (1) maximum Indian economic self-sufficiency, (2) full participation of Indians in American life, and (3) equal citizenship privileges and responsibilities for Indians, their attainment is still fraught with many obstacles. These arise from the native culture, to which must be added the depressing effects of a poverty culture so interwoven with the native cultures that the two almost become one and inseparable. These cultures have many traits inimical to the objectives which the Bureau has adopted for Indian people in their best interests. Each of these cultures in itself poses serious barriers to economic self-sufficiency, and together they have withstood the onslaught of program after program, so that today we say most Indians are poor—desperately poor—as poor as any group we know of in this rich country of ours.

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*Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1966–1969.

Indian people have lived primarily on a subsistence economy, characterized by low capital investment, do-it-yourself methods, and low levels of productivity. A money economy, however, puts a high premium on managerial skill, proficiency in using capital and labor, and ambition to get ahead. People who must shift from one economy to another must go through a marked change in values. Here one must grasp the significance of the poverty and native cultures, interwoven as they are, as they affect any attempt made by Indian people to change values. I am not concerned with any hypothesis as to whether it is good or bad that these values change. What I am saying is that, to escape poverty, some of the values will have to change. This places the Indian people on the horns of a dilemma—either to change their values or to cling to values which result in poverty as a way of life amidst new and challenging opportunities for economic betterment.

Although we have referred to many Indian people as trying to wrest a living from the land as farmers or ranchers, their basic motivation is not economic but rather an effort to maintain the bases for their way of life. Their efforts are not geared to commercial markets but to subsistence, and they operate in a functional rather than a commercial manner. Their lack of interest in the accumulation of business profits and their lack of desire to ascertain the most profitable use of their own land and labor fit into production for their own use but not for commercial use. Their values can be equated as "an intense attachment to native soil, a reverent disposition toward habitat and ancestral ways, and a restraint on individual self-seekings in favor of family and community."

Indian people lack experience in the use of money and they are at a loss as to how to handle large sums of money wisely. One of the contemporary Indian leaders listed, as priority number one of the basic needs of his people, help in managing money. For the child's education in a money world, it is the principle of saving that is of importance; that is, to postpone immediate pleasure in order to gain future satisfaction. The amount of family income and the way it is earned or acquired has a profound influence on the psychological development of the individual in the family and in the patterns of family life. The social and cultural norms of the family contribute to the choice of vocation and, to a large extent, determine values and managerial practice.

Generations of living outside of a money world and commercial activity has developed an attitude in which satisfaction with simple living is a chief element. Low levels of economic aspiration are essential to the contentment they feel and they may be more completely adjusted in their life than we are in ours.

So the major constraints on economic progress of Indian people have been summarized as:

1. The value orientations and institutions of the tribal leaders, the people, and members of the Bureau of Indian Affairs have not changed in proportion to the sweeping changes in the economy since 1930.

2. Noneconomic factors of the lingering culture which retard economic progress.
3. Inefficient functioning of the capital market.
4. Imperfections in the functioning of the labor market.

One of our contemporary Indian leaders has said that the basic needs of his people include (1) help in managing money, (2) help in facing the reality that the way to achieve economic and social stability is to find the kind of work they can do, either for themselves or in earning wages working for someone else, (3) help in becoming responsible for the health, education, livelihood, and well-being of their families, and (4) help in learning fundamental knowledge of becoming responsible people.

It has been reported that compared with children from more privileged environments, children from lower-class, socially impoverished circumstances tend to enter school with a qualitatively different preparation for the demands of the learning process and the behavioral requirements of the classroom. Among these children there is a high proportion of school failures, school dropouts, and reading and learning disabilities, as well as life-adjustment problems.

Where all of the education and training takes place in the family circle, parents are unable to transmit values, skills, and understandings they do not have. Their way of looking at life puts a rather indifferent value on formal education. In fact, the ideas, facts, and habits learned in school may be regarded as detrimental to the values of the family.

The youth who knows too much may no longer be satisfied to live meagerly, and the school system is a way out of the subsistence way of life. The parents may either accept this or block it.

Many students in our schools are confused about what is expected of them in learning situations, as their parents do not put these expectations upon them. Their confusion produces anxieties. This is another threat to the self-image, which in many is delicate and needs reinforcement. We cannot destroy their self-assertion, but we still need to help them behave in ways appropriate to the society in which they will live. To change some of their inappropriate responses in social situations we need to offer them new experiences in learning and understanding human behavior.

The young people in our schools are feeling the impact of transition within themselves and their environment. There is a degree of conflict produced by this transition which is manifested in many ways, such as agitation by the fact that the student wants to sever his ties to his village situation but is afraid his parents will see this as a rejection of them.

The focus and intent should be to work with the whole person, and every phase of his experience should be evaluated in terms of helping him make a satisfactory and productive adjustment in school and in preparation for his future life.

You do no service to an Indian community by asking an Indian who is in conflict to come back and serve his own people, since he comes back to something he has struggled to leave. We make this mistake many times. This is no service to an Indian community. He should not come back until he is a whole individual and is over his conflict.

Now may be the time when a question should be raised as to whether or not a third dimension exists to the dilemma faced by Indian people in trying to break out of the encirclement of their interwoven native and poverty cultures. This dimension could be identified as the reservation culture which, together with the native and poverty cultures, might provide an almost impregnable barrier to the elimination of poverty. The atmosphere of the reservation culture may create attitudes which breed and insure the continued existence of poverty.

In speaking of the reservation culture, I am not referring to the ownership of property by individuals or the tribe. The ownership and reservation cultures are not synonymous. These are two distinct matters: One, the property, is an asset which with proper utilization and management can contribute to economic sufficiency. The other, the reservation culture, may negate efforts at economic sufficiency.

The reservation system, artificially created because of military and political necessity and maintained for administrative expediency, may be tolerated by Indian people for still other reasons.

Recent experiences in economic development, where efforts have been made to make work available locally as distinguished from transporting Indians far from their home communities to large urban areas for employment opportunities, give us reason for optimism. The two methods used to provide local employment opportunities are in the location of jobs already available in the area and the development of non-agricultural industries in or near Indian communities.

As a result of the first effort, over one-half of the Indian job placements have been in States of the applicants' residence, which in most cases allows either for daily or weekend commuting. This effort has proven very popular with Indians. This effort grew out of the fact that while we had our sights on the large urban centers and a huge volume of job opportunities, yet there were many local job opportunities overlooked.

In connection with the second effort, this has been accomplished through capital investment in businesses using the local resources of Indian communities, such as timber and recreational opportunities, rather than the leasing of these natural resources to outside investors. As a consequence of this effort, the Indian owners of these resources not only are able to provide employment opportunities, but manage, operate, and enjoy the profits of these kinds of commercial enterprises. The additional effort consists of bringing industries into the Indian community where a substantial labor force exists in place. While this labor force may be inexperienced, yet it is highly trainable. Tests have shown that this Indian labor force outranks the general population in the areas of hand and eye coordination, manual dexterity, and patient tolerance of repetitive operations. With the need for this kind of hand work, long an outstanding characteristic of the Indian labor force, the electronics industry in particular has had major successes with Indian employment. Because of the high value and low bulk of its products, this particular industry also is able to overcome the transportation problem, which had hampered industrial development of the isolated Indian areas.

One of the motivations for Indian participation in economic development is the high rate of population growth. Indian leadership is recognizing more and more that strenous efforts will have to be made to provide employment for the new and increasing Indian population.

There is reason for optimism because in this particular area of economic development there has at long last developed a working partnership arrangement by the Indian leaders, private industry, and government, whose combined efforts offer promise of having a major impact on unemployment and its lingering social effects.

Will the Indian people find their way out of this multidimensional dilemma which keeps them victims of poverty?

They will—when the kind of communication is established with them by which they acquire those cultural concepts necessary for their cultural and economic growth and development. They will—when we no longer provide them with the answers, make their decisions, and concern ourselves only with results. They will—when they realize that in order to be happy a person must have a sense of conviction about his own worth and dignity, and that the individual's sense of worth receives major nourishment from work and the rewards it brings.

TRENDS IN EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS OF AMERICAN INDIANS

By Alan L. Sorkin *

FOREWORD

Unemployment and underemployment are fundamental causes of Indian poverty. Alan Sorkin has assembled and analyzed the available statistics on Indian employment and earnings. Declining opportunities for agricultural employment have been an important cause of high and rising Indian unemployment during a period of general prosperity. Although there has been an acceleration of reservation industrial development since 1963, such industries still employ only about 3 percent of the reservation labor force. In 1967, unemployment among reservation Indians remained about 37 percent of the labor force. Because the labor force participation rate is low, this statistic understates the real extent of Indian unemployment.

Introduction

There are an estimated 550,000 American Indians living in the United States, with approximately 380,000 residing on or adjacent to reservations.[1] The remainder have been assimilated, to varying degrees, into the dominant society. Although the vast majority of Indians reside west of the Mississippi River, there are sizeable numbers of Indians as far east as Maine and North Carolina. The Navajo Reservation, in parts of Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah, is the largest in the country, with 120,000 Indians occupying an area the size of West Virginia.

This paper will indicate recent trends in the economic position of the American Indian. Whenever possible, distinction will be made between data relating to reservation Indians and that concerning nonreservation Indians. In order to place this information in proper perspective, the economic progress of American Indians will be compared with that of non-Indians.

It should be noted that the statistics maintained by the Bureau of Indian Affairs regarding the socio-economic conditions of Indians are inadequate, not only from the point of view of the research specialist, but with regard to informing the general public about the standard of living of the first Americans.

The information which is available is often not as current as it should be, nor is it tabulated with the same degree of statistical precision which characterizes the work of other government agencies. For this reason the data to be presented below should be interpreted cautiously.

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[1] There is no official definition which can be applied to distinguish an American Indian from a non-Indian. The 1960 Census takers were instructed to let the respondent indicate his racial identity. The Bureau of Indian Affairs generally restricts services to those one-quarter or more Indian blood.

OCCUPATION CHANGES

Table I compares the occupational distribution of American Indians with that of non-Indians for 1940, 1950, and 1960.

TABLE I.—*Employed males, Indian and non-Indian, by occupational category, 1940, 1950, and 1960 (percent distribution)*

Major occupation group	Indian			Non-Indian		
	1940	1950	1960	1940	1950	1960
White-collar workers:						
Professional and technical workers	3.2	2.6	4.9	6.1	7.8	12.5
Managers, officials, and proprietors, except farmers	1.4	2.0	2.8	9.7	10.6	11.1
Clerical and sales workers	2.0	3.3	5.6	12.2	12.7	13.2
Blue-collar workers:						
Craftsmen and foremen	5.7	11.0	15.5	14.8	18.4	20.3
Operatives	6.2	13.1	21.6	18.3	20.1	19.9
Laborers, except farm and mine	11.4	17.8	20.2	9.3	8.3	7.0
Service workers:						
Private household workers	.2	.3	.3	.3	.2	.2
Other service workers	2.5	3.6	5.6	5.9	6.0	6.8
Farmworkers:						
Farmers and managers	45.6	24.0	9.5	14.9	10.8	6.1
Laborers and foremen	21.8	22.3	14.0	8.5	5.1	2.9

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census. *U.S. Census of Population: 1940, special reports*, "Characteristics of the Nonwhite Population by Race," table 26, p. 83, Washington, D.C., 1943; *U.S. Census of Population, 1940*, vol. III, "The Labor Force," table 66, p. 104, Washington, D.C., 1943; *U.S. Census of Population: 1950, special reports*, "Characteristics of the Nonwhite Population by Race," table 10, p. 32, Washington, D.C.: 1953; *U.S. Census of Population: 1950, special report*, P–E No. 3B, "Occupational Characteristics," table 1, p. 15, Washington, D.C., 1953; *U.S. Census of Population: 1960, subject reports*. "Nonwhite Population by Race." Final report PC(2)–1C, table 33, p. 104, Washington, D.C., 1963; *U.S. Census of Population: 1960 subject reports*. "Occupational Characteristics," final report PC(2)–7A, table 1, p. 1, Washington, D.C.

As the data in table I indicate, there has been a rapid decline in Indian employment in agriculture. While nearly one-half of all employed Indian males were classified as farmers or farm managers in 1940, less than 10 percent were so classified in 1960. The principal reason for the rapid decline in Indian participation in agriculture was the pressure of competition from non-Indian farmers whose greater capital resources and technical skill made farming unprofitable for many Indians.

The above table indicates that there has been a rapid expansion of employed Indians in blue collar occupations. The percentage of Indian craftsmen nearly tripled between 1940 and 1960, while the percentage of non-Indian craftsmen rose by less than two-fifths. The percentage of Indians classified as operatives increased three and one-half times, while the percentage of non-Indian operatives was relatively stable. Interestingly enough, the percentage of Indians in the nonfarm laborer classification nearly doubled between 1940 and 1960, in contrast to a decline over that time period in the percentage of non-Indian laborers. This is because with the decline in agriculture many Indian agricultural laborers simply became laborers in the nonfarm sector of the reservation economy.

Although the percentage of Indians employed in white collar occupations has increased in recent years, it still lags far behind the percentage of non-Indians involved in white collar employment. For example, in 1960 only 4.9 percent of all Indian males were employed in a professional capacity. This was approximately the same percentage of non-Indians employed in a professional capacity in 1930. Moreover, only 2.8 percent of all Indians in 1960 were classified as managers or proprietors, compared to 11.1 percent for non-Indians in 1960.

One of the primary reasons for the great disparity between Indians and non-Indians, as far as the proportion in white collar employment is concerned, is the relative lack of education of the farmer. This is discussed below in some detail.

EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT

Although the educational attainment of Indian males has increased substantially in recent years, there is still a substantial gap in the median educational attainment of Indian as compared to non-Indian males. This is illustrated in Table II.

TABLE II.—*Years of schooling, Indian and non-Indian males, 1940, 1950, 1960*

[Percent distribution]

Years of school	Indian			Non-Indian		
	1940 [1]	1950 [1]	1960 [2]	1940 [3]	1950 [2]	1960 [2]
0	23.8	15.5	9.6	2.1	2.1	2.1
1 to 4	19.9	15.9	12.7	9.0	8.4	6.0
5 to 8	39.0	40.9	37.8	46.2	36.7	31.5
9 to 11	9.7	16.2	22.8	16.7	20.5	21.6
12	4.9	8.1	11.6	14.0	18.8	21.5
13 to 15	2.0	2.4	3.9	5.8	7.4	9.0
16 or more	.7	1.0	1.6	6.2	6.1	8.3
Median	5.5	7.3	8.4	8.4	9.4	10.5

[1] Males 25 years and over.
[2] Males 14 years and over.
[3] Males 25 to 64 years.

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census. *U.S. Census of Population: 1940. Special Reports*, "Characteristics of the Nonwhite Population By Race." Table 24, p. 80, Washington, D.C., 1943; *U.S. Census of Population: 1940. Special Reports*, "Educational Attainment," Table 17, p. 75, and table 18, p. 82, Washington, D.C., 1943; *U.S. Census of Population: 1950.* Vol. IV, *Special Reports*, pt. 3, ch. B, "Characteristics of the Nonwhite Population By Race." Table 10, p. 32, Washington, D.C.; *U.S. Census of Population: 1950. Special Reports*, pt. 5, ch. B, "Educational Characteristics." Table 9, p. 73, Washington, D.C., 1953; *U.S. Census of Population: 1960. Special reports*, "Characteristics of the Nonwhite Population By Race." Table 10, p. 12, Washington, D.C., 1963; *U.S. Census of Population: 1960.* Final reports. "Educational Attainment," table 4, p. 54, Washington, D.C., 1963.

The median level of schooling of the Indian male in 1960, as indicated in Table II, is equal to the median level of schooling of the non-Indian in 1940. Though the median level of schooling of Indian males has increased nearly three years since 1940, only 5.5 percent of Indian males in 1960 had any college training. This compares to 17.3 percent of non-Indian males in 1960 who had received some college training.

Moreover, in 1960, better than one out of five Indian males (22.3 percent) had less than five years of schooling. This contrasts with only 8.1 percent of non-Indian males with less than five years of schooling in 1960. Not only has the relative lack of schooling contributed directly to the relatively high unemployment rates and low incomes of Indian males (to be discussed below), but it has probably reenforced the desire of many Indians to remain on the reservation. This seems likely because many less educated Indians may not feel they would be able to compete effectively in the labor market with more highly educated non-Indians in an off-reservation setting.

In 1967, 60 percent of American Indian youngsters between 6–18 years of age were being educated in public schools, another 5 percent were being educated in mission schools, and 35 percent were being educated in schools operated by the Bureau of Indian Affairs.[2]

There are two divergent trends taking place in Indian education. First there is a substantial increase in the number of Indian high school graduates furthering their education. On the other hand, the high school dropout rate remains alarmingly high. Each of these aspects of Indian education will be discussed in turn.

In 1967, nearly 30 percent of all Indian high school graduates went to college—almost double the rate of ten years ago. Furthermore, in 1967, another 25 percent of Indian high school graduates attended institutions providing advanced vocational training. Moreover, in 1966 (the most recent year for which statistics are available) there were 120 American Indian graduates from four year colleges and universities. This was an increase of 100 percent over the number five years ago.[3]

However, it appears that at most only one-half of all Indian students finish high school. Apker in his survey estimates that less than 40 percent of Indian high school entrants graduate as compared to 60 percent of all American students.[4] Spilka and Bryde state that on a national level in 1963, 77 percent of non-Indian students were graduating from high school as compared to 40 percent for reservation Indians.[5] A recent study by the Northwest Regional Educational Laboratory of the U.S. Office of Education, on the magnitude of the dropout problem on reservations in six Northwestern states, found that 50 percent of the students who were eighth graders in 1962 had graduated in 1967. A few were still in school but virtually all the rest had dropped out before graduation.[6]

Manpower Utilization

For the period under consideration, the unemployment rates of Indians have been several times those of non-Indians. Furthermore, although data are only available for recent years, regarding the unemployment rates of reservation Indians, the statistics indicate that the unemployment rates for these Indians are much higher than those for non-reservation Indians. These points are illustrated in Table III.

Comparing first the data for all Indians with that for non-Indians, it is evident that while the unemployment rate for non-Indians fell 67 percent between 1940 and 1959, the unemployment rate for all Indians *rose* 24 percent.

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[2] Bureau of Indian Affairs, *Statistics Concerning Indian Education,* Washington, D.C., 1967. Approximately one-half of the children attending Bureau of Indian Affairs educational institutions are enrolled in boarding schools located on or off the reservation.

[3] B. Spilka and J. Bryde, "Alienation and Achievement among Ogala Sioux Secondary Report from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs," issues of 1966 and 1967.

[4] Wesley Apker, "A Survey of the Literature Related to Indian Pupil Dropout," unpublished M.Ed. thesis, Washington State University, 1962.

[5]. B. Spilka and J. Bryde, "Alienation and Achievement among Ogala Sioux Secondary Students," unpublished, 1965.

[6] Alphonse D. Selinger, *The American Indian High School Dropout: The Magnitude of the Problem.* Northwest Regional Educational Laboratory, U.S. Office of Education, September 1968.

Table III.—*Male unemployment rates, Indians and non-Indians, selected years, 1940–67*

	Unemployment rates			
	All Indians	Non-reservation Indians	Reservation Indians	Non-Indians
Year:				
1940	28.2			14.6
1949		13.0		5.4
1958			43.5	6.2
1959	37.2	15.4	48.2	4.7
1960			51.3	4.7
1961			49.5	5.7
1962			43.4	4.6
1965			41.9	3.2
1966			41.9	2.5
1967			37.3	2.3

Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census. *U.S. Census of Population: 1940, special reports*, "Characteristics of the Nonwhite Population by Race" table 25, p. 82, Washington, D.C., 1943; *U.S. Census of Population: 1950*, vol. IV, *special reports*, pt. 3, ch. B, "Nonwhite Population by Race," table 10, p. 32, Washington, D.C. 1953; *U.S. Census of Population: 1960. subject reports*, "Nonwhite Population by Race," final report PC(2)-1C, table 33, p. 104, Washington, D.C., 1963; *Indian Unemployment Survey*, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 88th Cong., 1st sess., 1963; unpublished tabulations, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Washington, D.C., December 1966 and December 1967; *Economic Report of the President, 1968*, Washington, D.C. p. 237.

Note: Data for Indians includes males, 14 years and over; data for non-Indians includes males, 20 years and over. Data for reservation Indians is seasonally adjusted, using as a basis the monthly fluctuations contained in the Indian Unemployment Survey:

This increase in the unemployment rate for all Indians is, primarily, a consequence of the great exodus from agriculture in search of more remunerative employment. Since, in most cases, these individuals are limited by lack of training and education, they are restricted to unskilled occupations. Such occupations have relatively high rates of unemployment particularly on reservations where there has been only token industrialization.

The data in Table III demonstrate the extremely high unemployment rates for reservation males. To place these data in proper perspective, one should consider the fact that during the great depression of the 1930's, the unemployment rate for males reached a level of about 25 percent in 1933. In the early 1960's, the male unemployment rate on reservations was almost double the unemployment rate for all workers in the depths of the depression. Another discouraging aspect of the data on unemployment among reservation Indians, is that the unemployment rates seem quite insensitive to the movements of the business cycle. This is exemplified by a decrease of 60 percent in the overall unemployment rate between 1961 and 1967—a period of increasing prosperity. However, the unemployment rate for male reservation Indians declined by only 25 percent.

On some reservations more than half of all males in the labor force are unemployed. This is illustrated in Table IV which presents data on the unemployment rates for selected reservations in 1966. Thus of the reservations included in the table, unemployment ranged from a low of 20 percent on the Colville Reservation in Washington to 79 percent on the Fort Berthold Reservation in North Dakota.

Table IV.—*Unemployment rates, selected reservations in Indian land areas, 1966*

Indian land areas	Unemployment rate
Reservation:	
Fort Apache, Ariz	50
Gila River, Ariz	55
Navajo, Ariz., N. Mex., Utah	39
San Carlos, Ariz	74
Fort Hall, Idaho	56
Leech Lake, Minn	31
Blackfeet, Mont	39
Northern Cheyenne, Mont	24
Pyramid Lake, Nev	23
Fort Berthold, N. Dak	79
Turtle Mountain, N. Dak	65
Pine Ridge, S. Dak	32
Cheyenne River, S. Dak	40
Colville, Wash	20

Source: U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs, "Selected Data on Indian Reservations Eligible for Designation under Public Works and Economic Development Act," unpublished tabulation, December 1966.

In addition the unemployment problem is aggravated by a birth rate which is two to two and a half times that of the national average. This high birth rate coupled with a swiftly declining death rate has brought intensifying population pressure to the already overburdened reservation economy.[7]

On the majority of Indian reservations, the chief employer is the Bureau of Indian Affairs. On the Papago Reservation, for instance, 30 percent of all permanently employed Indians work for the Bureau of Indian Affairs.[8] An additional 17 percent are employed by the U.S. Public Health Service in the Indian hospital located on the reservation.[9]

In past years one of the leading factors responsible for the high unemployment rates among reservation Indians was the sparsity of industry located on the reservations. However, recently there has been an industrialization movement in the Indian land area which appears to be accelerating. The pertinent data are presented in Table V.

Table V.—*Number of plants, and labor force, factories located on Indian Reservations*

	Number of plants established	Number closed down	Total number in operation (end of year)	Labor force	
				Indian	Non-Indian
1957-60	4	1	3	391	171
1960	3	0	6	525	246
1961	4	0	10	702	505
1962	5	1	14	887	600
1963	6	2	18	1,395	1,719
1964	14	7	25	1,668	2,286
1965	21	6	40	2,011	2,479
1966	21	4	57	3,044	3,224
1967	23	3	77	3,730	3,666
1968	36	1	114	4,112	4,775
Total	137	23			

Source: U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs, Branch of Industrial Development, "Summary of Plants Established as a Result of Indian Industrial Development Program," unpublished tabulation, "Summary of Plant Closings," unpublished tabulation; data on labor force from unpublished graph provided by Branch of Industrial Development.

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[7] U.S. Public Health Service, *Indian Health Highlights, 1966*, p. 6. A 1966 task force report on Indian Housing indicates that 10,000 Indians leave the reservations each year (net migration). Many migrate under the auspices of the Bureau's relocation or adult vocational training programs. However, even with this migration there is still an increase in the reservation population of .9 percent per year.

[8] Bureau of Indian Affairs, *Survey of Income and Employment*, Papago Reservation, 1966, p. 9 (mimeographed).

[9] *Ibid.* The Indian Hospital, operated by the Public Health Service, is usually the second largest employer of reservation Indians.

The data indicate the acceleration in reservation industrial development in the 1963–68 period as compared with the slower growth in the 1957–62 period. This parallels the high rate of economic growth in the nation as a whole in the more recent period as compared to the slower pace in the 1957–62 period.[10] In addition the military needs of the Vietnam War have aided reservation development. About a dozen electronics plants have been established, partly to meet defense needs.

The growth of industry on the reservations has also been aided by the Bureau of Indian Affairs on-the-job training program. Under this program employers receive a subsidy of up to one-half the minimum wage established under the Fair Labor Standards Act while the employee is in training. Thus, with the minimum wage of $1.60 an hour, most employers are receiving subsidies of 80 cents per hour for each trainee. The length of training is determined by the Department of Labor. It should be noted that in spite of the recent acceleration in reservation industrialization, only 4,100 Indians out of a reservation labor force of 130,000, or 3 percent, have industrial employment.

SEASONAL UNEMPLOYMENT

Because a relatively high proportion of reservation Indians are still engaged in agriculture or other outside work, there is a profound fluctuation in unemployment during the year. The sole source of data concerning the fluctuations in seasonal unemployment is the 1963 Survey prepared at the request of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. In this survey, Bureau officials were asked to provide data on monthly fluctuations in unemployment. A good percentage of reservations containing 60 percent of the reservation labor force responded. The data provided are for the 1962 fiscal year and are presented in Table VI.

TABLE VI.—*Fluctuations in reservation unemployment, by month, 1962*

Month	Total unemployment	Percent of annual average	Month	Total unemployment	Percent of annual average
January	21, 236	127	August	12, 430	74
February	20, 856	124	September	13, 530	81
March	20, 114	120	October	16, 667	99
April	17, 158	102	November	19, 046	113
May	14, 362	86	December	20, 957	124
June	12, 887	77			
July	12, 458	74	Annual average	16, 809	100

Source: Computed from data contained in *Indian Unemployment Survey*, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 88th Cong., 1st sess., 1963.

The data indicate that January is the peak unemployment month on Indian reservations. Unemployment is 59 percent higher than in August, which is the month when reservation unemployment is lowest. Moreover, in the two month period, March–May, a 30 percent decline in total unemployment is realized while the September–November period brings an increase in total unemployment of over 40 percent.

It is likely that as agriculture continues to decline and industrialization increases, fluctuations in unemployment on a seasonal basis will become smaller.

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[10] For example, unemployment averaged 5.5 percent of the labor force in the 1957–62 period compared with 3.8 percent in the 1963–68 period.

LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION

Manpower utilization is measured not only by the unemployment rate but by the rate of labor force participation. Table VII compares the labor force participation rates for Indian and non-Indian males, 14 and over. The data in Table VII indicate that on a cross section basis the labor force participation rates for Indian males are much lower than for non-Indian males. There are two factors responsible for this. First, the high rate of unemployment among American Indians has discouraged many potential workers from actively searching for jobs, and thus being classified as members of the labor force There is, in addition, a significant number of Indians who have leased their allotted lands to non-Indians and are living on the property income derived thereby. Moreover, the fact that many Indian children start school at 8 or 9 years and do not leave until the ages of 18–20 has created a greater disparity between Indian and non-Indian 14–24 year old labor participation rates than would be the case if Indians began school at age 6 and graduated high school at age 17.[11]

TABLE VII.—*Labor force participation rates, Indian and non-Indian males, by age, 1940, 1950, 1960*

Age	Indian			Non-Indian		
	1940	1950	1960	1940	1950	1960
14 to 24		41.5	40.9		59.2	57.1
25 to 44		80.7	78.0		93.3	93.0
45 and over		69.8	57.8		75.5	72.4
Total	64.6	63.5	60.0	79.0	78.8	77.3

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census. *U.S. Census of Population: 1940, special reports*, "Characteristics of the Nonwhite Population by Race," table 25, p. 82, Washington, D.C., 1943; *U.S. Census of Population: 1940*, vol. III, *special reports*, "The Labor Force," table 1, p. 15, Washington, D.C., 1954; *U.S. Census of Population, 1950, special reports*, "Characteristics of the Non-white Population by Race," table 10, p. 32, Washington, D.C., 1953; *U.S. Census of Population: 1950*, vol. IV, *special reports*, pt. 5, ch. B, education, table 9, p. 73, Washington, D.C., 1963; *U.S. Census of Population: 1960, subject reports*, "Characteristics of the Nonwhite Population by Race," final report PC(2)–1C, table 33, p. 104, Washington, D.C., 1963; *U.S. Census of Population: 1960, subject reports.* "*Educational Attainment*," final report PC(2)–5B, table 4, p. 54, Washington, D.C., 1963.

Part of the disparity in labor force participation rates between Indians and non-Indians stems from the relatively poor health of the former. In 1966, for example, a reservation Indian was seven times as likely to contract tuberculosis, eight times as likely to be afflicted with hepatitis, and three times as likely to die of influenza and pneumonia as a non-Indian.[12]

Perhaps the most discouraging aspect of the data in Table VII is that only 78 percent of the Indian males 25–44 years were in the labor force in 1960. This age span is generally considered representative of the prime working ages. However, in the case of non-Indians, 93 percent of males 25–44 years were in the labor force in 1960.

INCOME

The vast majority of reservation Indians are living in poverty. According to a recent estimate, 76 percent of reservation Indian families earn less than $3,000 a year.[13] Table VIII presents income data for Indian and non-Indian males during the 1939–64 time period.

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[11] On most Indian reservations, school attendance is compulsory until either the age of 18 or graduation from high school. Also, as an increasing number of Indian children attend college, the labor force participation rate of the 14–24 year old groups should continue to decline.

[12] For further information see U.S. Public Health Service, Division of Indian Health, *Indian Health Highlights, 1966.*

TABLE VIII.—*Median income for male Indians and non-Indians, selected years, 1939–64*

[1964 dollars]

Year	Income			
	All Indians	Nonreservation Indians	Reservation Indians	Non-Indians
1939			460	[1] 2,300
1944			670	2,940
1949	870	940	825	3,780
1959	1,910	2,570	1,550	5,030
1964			1,800	5,710
Percent increase 1939–64			290	148

[1] Wages and salaries only.

Source: *Reservation Income*, 1939, unpublished tabulation, Bureau of Indian Affairs, table IV, p. 2, Washington, D.C. 1942; U.S. Bureau of the Census. *U.S. Census of Population: 1940*. Vol. III, The Labor Force. Table 71, p. 116, Washington D.C., 1943; *U.S. Census of Population: 1950. Special Reports*, Characteristics of the Nonwhite Population By Race. Table 10, p. 32, and table 21, p. 72, Washington, D.C., 1953; *U.S. Census of Population: 1950. Special Report*, P–E No. 3B, Occupational Characteristics. Table 19, p. 183, Washington, D.C., 1953; *U.S. Census of Population: 1960. Subject Reports. Nonwhite Population By Race.* Final Report PC(2)–1C, table 33, p. 104, and table 56, p. 234, Washington, D.C., 1963; "Selected Reservations Eligible for Designation Under Public Works and Economic Development Act," unpublished tabulation, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Washington, D.C., December 1966.

The data contained in Table VIII reveal that, on a cross-section basis, Indian income is far below that of non-Indians. Although the income of reservation Indians rose nearly twice as fast from 1939–64 than for non-Indians (290 percent compared to 148 percent), income of reservation Indians was only 32 percent of that of non-Indians in 1964. This compared to a reservation Indian income of 20 percent of non-Indian income in 1939.

The high unemployment rates of Indians are a major factor in explaining their relatively low incomes. Moreover, as indicated above, because of a relative lack of education and training few Indians are able to qualify for the more lucrative white collar positions.

It is interesting to note the widening income gap between reservation and non-reservation Indians. In 1949 the median reservation Indian income was 88 percent of that of non-reservation Indians. In 1959, however, the median income of reservation Indians had declined to 60 percent of the income of non-reservation Indians. The principal reason for the widening income gap between the two groups of Indians is the migration, during the 1950's, of many of the more highly educated and skilled Indians from the reservation to the major urban centers of the United States. In these urban centers, better paying jobs, more commensurate with their level of skill, were available.

However, the standard of living for non-reservation Indians may not differ as much from that of reservation Indians as income levels would indicate. First, reservation Indians are entitled to comprehensive free medical care (provided by the Public Health Service, Division of Indian Health) if they are one-fourth or more Indian blood. Non-reservation Indians are not entitled to such care. Second, reservation Indians often reside rent free on allotted or tribal land, but non-reservation Indians must usually pay rent for housing. Third, the cost of goods and services is likely higher in the urban areas where non-reservation Indians reside (such as Los Angeles, Denver or Chicago) than on many reservations. Thus, since the cost of living is higher for non-reservation as compared to reservation Indians, the *real income differential* between the two groups of Indians is lower than the data in Table VIII would indicate.

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[13] U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs, Task Force, entitled, "Indian Housing Needs, Priorities, Alternatives," unpublished manuscript, October 1966.

Moreover, a recent study by the Branch of Employment Assistance indicated that about 50 percent of a sample of Indians relocated to urban areas in 1963 were living in poverty at the time of the survey (1966).[14]

Finally, it should be noted that approximately 50 percent of those Indians relocated under the Bureau of Indian Affairs' direct employment program (a relocation program) eventually return to the reservations.[15]

Although data are not available for non-reservation Indians, there has been fundamental change in the sources of income for reservation Indians. In 1939, only 38 percent of reservation income was derived from wages, 26 percent from agriculture, 8 percent from arts and crafts, and 28 percent from various sources of unearned income.[16] In 1964, an estimated 75 percent of total income was derived from wages, with 10 percent from agriculture, 5 percent from arts and crafts, and 10 percent from various sources of unearned income.[17]

There is great variation in income between reservations. Table IX presents information on median family income for selected reservations for 1964.

TABLE IX.—*Median family income, selected reservations, 1964*

Reservation	State	Median family income
Fort Apache	Arizona	$1,310
Hopi	do	1,140
Papago	do	900
Salt River	do	2,325
Fort Hall	Idaho	2,235
Leech Lake	Minnesota	2,039
Choctaw	Mississippi	900
Crow	Montana	1,100
Northern Cheyenne	do	3,600
Zuni	New Mexico	2,126
Fort Berthold	North Dakota	1,544
Turtle Mountain	do	2,228
Pine Ridge	South Dakota	1,335
Rosebud	do	900

Source: U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs, "Selected Data on Indian Reservations Eligible for Designation Under Public Works and Economic Development Act," unpublished tabulation, December 1966.

As the data indicate, median family income varied from a low of $900 on the Rosebud, Papago, and Choctaw reservations to $3,600 on the Northern Cheyenne Reservation. It is interesting to observe the variations of income within the same state. For example, median family income on the Crow Reservation in Montana was only $1,100 compared to $3,600 on the Northern Cheyenne Reservation. Moreover, median family income on the Papago Reservation in Arizona was only $900 compared to $2,325 on the Salt River Reservation.

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[14] Bureau of Indian Affairs, Branch of Employment Assistance, "A Followup Study of 1963 Recipients of the Services of the Employment Assistance Program," July 1968 (revised version).

[15] Joan Ablon, "American Indian Relocation, Problems of Dependency and Management in the City," Phylon, vol. 26, Winter, 1965, p. 365.

[16] *Reservation Income, 1939,* unpublished tabulation, Bureau of Indian Affairs, table 2, p. 1.

[17] This estimate is based on unpublished income and employment surveys conducted by the Bureau of Indian Affairs on the Navajo, Papago, Crow, Standing Rock, Pine Ridge, and Rosebud Indian reservations.

STATE INCOME CHANGES

It is interesting to compare the changes in median incomes for Indians from 1950 to 1960 on a state by state basis. This is presented in Table X.

TABLE X.—*Indian median income (males) levels, by State, 1950 and 1960*

State	Income		Absolute increase	Percentage increase
	1950	1960		
Arizona	$539	$1,358	$819	152
California	996	2,694	1,698	170
Idaho	500	1,304	804	161
Michigan	866	2,076	1,210	140
Minnesota	619	1,398	779	126
Mississippi	341	650	309	91
Montana	681	1,368	687	101
Nebraska	746	1,589	843	113
Nevada	865	1,748	883	102
New Mexico	661	1,703	1,042	157
New York	1,401	3,497	2,096	149
North Carolina	628	950	322	51
North Dakota	552	1,278	726	132
Oklahoma	730	1,538	808	111
Oregon	724	2,258	1,534	212
SouthDakota	597	900	303	51
Texas	830	2,017	1,187	143
Utah	520	1,596	1,076	206
Washington	909	2,000	1,091	121
Wisconsin	807	1,961	1,154	143
Wyoming	622	1,220	598	96

Source: Income data from U.S. Bureau of the Census, *U.S. Census of Population: 1950. Special Reports*, "Characteristics of the Non-White Population by Race." Table 21, pp. 72–75, Washington, D.C., 1953. *U.S. Census of Population. Subject Reports.* "Nonwhite Population by Race." Final Report PC(2)-1C table 56, 234–239.

The above data indicate that there has not been much change in the relative rankings of the states vis-a-vis Indian income; that is, the states which ranked highest or lowest in 1950 generally ranked the same in 1960. The rank correlation coefficient is .87. With the exception of New York, Indian incomes in 1960 were highest in the West Coast states of California, Oregon, and Washington. These western states experienced a rapid growth in manufacturing and services between 1950 and 1960 and Indians migrated to urban areas within those states to take advantage of job opportunities and increased incomes. Thus, between 1950 and 1960 median Indian incomes increased $1,698 in California, $1,534 in Oregon, and $1,091 in Washington.

Incomes grew very slowly in Mississippi and North Carolina (only slightly over $300) between 1950 and 1960. This was because many Indians have remained in relatively unremunerative agricultural occupations in those states. In Mississippi many of the Choctaw Indians (the principal Indian tribe in Mississippi) earn as little as $300 a year working as sharecroppers.[18]

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[18] Income data furnished by Robert Murray, Director RCA Family Training Project, Philadelphia, Mississippi.

The low income of South Dakota Indians is due to the steady decline of agriculture in that state and on the reservations and the lack of industry to provide substitute employment. South Dakota ranks 50th in the nation industrially and its Indian reservations have some of the highest unemployment rates to be found on reservations anywhere in the nation.

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

It is difficult to predict whether future income gains for non-reservation Indians will be greater than future income gains for reservation Indians. For example, in the industrial centers of the West, where economic development and population growth are occurring more rapidly than in most sections of the country, an increasing number of high paying industrial and commercial jobs will be available for Indians who have left or are migrating from the reservation.

However, the rapid growth in recent years of industrial plants on the reservations, with prospects for sustained future growth, indicates the possibility that increasing numbers of reservations will become viable economic entities, particularly if agricultural land use can be enhanced.

It should be noted that even with expanding employment opportunities for Indians who prefer to remain on the reservations unemployment rates for adult Indians will likely remain above acceptable levels. What additional policies will the federal government undertake to ameliorate the economic conditions of these people?

Will a large scale road building and public works program be established on the reservations? Will a crash reservation home building program be developed to provide construction jobs as well as decent homes for thousands of Indians? [19] Or will the government perceive the poverty of the Indian as similar to that of non-Indian and attack this poverty with such measures as the negative income tax? The answer to these questions affect not only the Indian people but the nation as well.

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[19] In 1966, according to a Task Force Report on Indian Housing, over 75 percent of all reservation homes were substandard, with over 50 percent needed to be replaced.

ROLE OF MANPOWER PROGRAMS IN ASSISTING THE AMERICAN INDIANS

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR*

FOREWORD

In 1966 and 1967, the Department of Labor conducted an extensive field survey and evaluation of the impact on American Indians of its manpower programs. The report resulting from this study, printed below, describes current programs and makes a number of recommendations for improvement. The recommendations include: an active effort to recruit Indians into higher level Manpower Administration positions; a manpower policy which will assist Indians in attaining work where they live but provide relocation assistance if desired; a greater availability of U.S. Employment Service programs on reservations and in rural areas; and a more vigorous program of followup after job placement.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

I. INTRODUCTION

A. THE STUDY

The general objective of this study was to determine the impact on American Indians of the manpower programs of the Department of Labor, the areas in which these programs have been most successful, the difficulties remaining, and possible solutions.

It was conducted through a series of visits by staff teams to 16 reservations, eight cities, and 11 nonreservation tribes, in the fall of 1966, and the spring and fall of 1967.

B. CULTURAL MATTERS AFFECTING MANPOWER PLANNING

An early conclusion was that in planning manpower programs any attempt to ignore the culturally determined behavior and life attitudes of Indians and shape the programs into the same mold as programs for other Americans represents a blueprint for failure.

Urge toward retention of culture

The Indians' desire to retain their heritage, their reluctance to be assimilated, their attachment to jobless reservations, their intense feeling of individual worth, their aversion to acquisitive aggressiveness and lack of orientation to time values, added to widespread illiteracy and lack of skill backgrounds, are factors which make manpower planning difficult for reservation Indians. Assumptions have been made that the objective of manpower programs should be the reloca-

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***This evaluation study was conducted by Mr. Ralph Walker and Mr. Bernard Goudy of the Office of Evaluation. Miss Ruth Feder, Miss Janet Wegner, and Miss Jacqueline Buckman assisted at various times in the study.**

The study was also conducted with the active collaboration of the national and field staffs of the Bureau of Employment Security, Bureau of Apprenticeship and Training, Bureau of Work Programs, and the State employment services involved.

The Bureau of Indian Affairs cooperated and assisted fully at the national level and in the field.

tion of the Indian off the reservation in areas of employment opportunity. But there are strong indications that the loss of identity resulting from this and the demoralizing effect of frenetic urban living are detrimental to Indians rather than beneficial.

There are significant variations between tribes in work habits, capacity for acculturation, traditions, and ability to adapt.

C. DISCRIMINATION STILL A PROBLEM

Discrimination against Indians in employment varies in degree and quality. But much prejudice, stereotyped thinking, and discrimination still exist, including some among officials administering programs.

II. Reservation Indians

A. CONDITIONS

Reservations are usually isolated from urban centers and without employment opportunities. Unemployment varies greatly, in some reservations running as high as 80 percent at times.

Where the jobs are

In the typical reservation, jobs are found with the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the tribal government, the CAP, and a small industry or two. Only in a few reservations are the crafts industries (pottery, silverwork, leatherwork, beadwork, basketry) of any consequence.

BIA schooling

The Bureau of Indian Affairs can offer extensive schooling to any tribal youth; much of this schooling, however, is off reservation and directed toward fitting the Indian youth to the white man's urban civilization.

B. MANPOWER PROGRAMS

On the reservations, manpower programs include the training administered by BIA, training under MDTA, the public employment program, the Neighborhood Youth Corps, Operation Mainstream, and various special projects under the community action agencies. Coordination of these programs between BIA, CAA's, and State ES offices is seldom close, although interpersonal relationships are generally good. Collaboration and integration of programs, although much to be desired, is the exception.

ES HRD personnel

As one result of intensified effort among Indians following the Indian Manpower Conference in Kansas City in February 1967, USES established 171 positions for State ES employees to serve Indians directly. More than half of these were filled at the time of the visits, but recruitment for many was lagging, apparently because of indifference on the part of some State ES staff.

Role of ES offices on reservations

Although some ES representatives on reservations were doing useful work, ES offices on the reservations were found to be fulfilling a passive and minimal role, recruiting for seasonal farm or firefighting work when available, taking little or no part in general manpower planning for the reservations, and not very well known to the Indians themselves. These offices, generally, were not serving as centers of information for the reservation Indians about the opportunities and demands of the world of work.

MDTA

MDTA training of reservation Indians, in the aggregate, is probably as great in proportionate volume as it is among the general population. However, the need is much greater, the employment opportunities are fewer, the results in permanent employment are much poorer, and little or no attempt has been made to adapt MDTA policy and structure to fit the needs of the reservations.

Policies and practices inhibiting training in crafts, training of "helpers" in the building trades, and training to build up training labor pools on reservation limit the usefulness of MDTA institutional training to reservation Indians. On-the-job training under MDTA is of negligible quantity.

Apprenticeship

Apprenticeship training for reservation youngsters is virtually unknown.

NYC

Neighborhood youth corps programs are very popular on reservations. They offer a return quite disproportionate to outlay in terms of increased pride and self-sufficiency, assistance to the tribal economies, prevention of school dropout and introduction to the demands of a work-oriented society.

Problems include the completely inadequate ratio of slots to need, lack of adequate orientation to work and life beyond the NYC stint, failure to use imagination in developing new and valuable kinds of work for the trainees, and the failure of leaders and Indian youth to realize the particular value of out-of-school programs for Indian dropouts.

In the existing out-of-school programs there are often formidable problems of alcoholism, absenteeism, dropout, which are actually illustrative of the need for this kind of program.

Main-stream

What NYC does for Indian youth, operation mainstream, where it exists, does for their indigent elders. The benefits to the individuals are great, occasional placements into regular employment are made, and where the programs are well-planned, appearance, comfort, and economy of the tribe are strengthened. The basic problem is that this program is not understood by many of the tribes.

III. URBAN INDIANS

Small numbers

The evaluators were surprised at the small numbers of Indians in actual residence in the large cities visited. Many, indeed most, Indians stay only a short while in the cities, then return to their reservations, so that the number of Indian residents at any one time is small. Reliable ethnic records, however, are nowhere available.

Manpower programs

Because of the small populations, the high turnover, the fact that many Indian urban residents are BIA relocates, the general ignorance of Indians concerning Federal programs, and their shyness about going through the complex forms of access to such programs in the cities, there was little evidence of involvement of urban Indians in the manpower programs of the Department of Labor. In any case, applicable ethnic records are not kept.

Living conditions

In their contacts in Indian centers (organizations run by Indians in several cities) and areas of concentration of Indians the evaluators found few indications that a policy of relocation of Indians to large cities is advisable; conditions of slum living, frequent job discrimination, the prevalent alcoholism, the passivity and hopelessness of many Indians there argue against it.

IV. OKLAHOMA INDIANS

Uniqueness

Oklahoma, with 65 tribes of nonreservation but predominantly rural Indians, offers a different social and economic setting. There are radical differences in the education, social standing, and conditions of discrimination between the "Five Civilized Tribes" in eastern Oklahoma and the Plains Indians in the western part of the State.

Regional differences

Assimilation and acculturation are far advanced in Oklahoma, much to the distress of some Indian leaders, who feel that the loss of Indian identity can only be harmful. Manpower programs are easier here and present the same complex of problems they present in any rural or small-town setting.

ES and the Indians

The employment service in Oklahoma identifies well with Indians, but jobs in the rural areas are scarce, and the employment service has been of little help to people without marketable skills. Intensified moves to assist Indians by the national office seem to have had a beneficial effect there.

On the other hand, the resolute determination of the Oklahoma Employment Service to treat full-blood Indians, part Indians, and whites exactly alike, without keeping ethnic records, apparently has worked to the disadvantage of the poorly qualified, nonaggressive Indians, who need to be sought out and actively recruited. In other words, this disadvantaged minority group needs special attention, which cannot be given in an atmosphere of rigid equality of treatment.

Neighborhood Youth Corps

The Neighborhood Youth Corps is very popular among Oklahoma Indians, as it is on the reservations; the problems are essentially the same, except that in Oklahoma out-of-school programs are more plentiful and their potentialities better realized and more skillfully exploited. Some of the best run NYC programs encountered by the evaluators were sponsored by Oklahoma tribes.

There are recruitment problems, compounded by the lack of outreach of the ES in rural areas. There are a few effective examples of close collaboration between NYC sponsors and Employment offices in placement.

Dropout from the NYC out-of-school programs, as on reservations, is often heavy due to the same cultural and economic factors.

V. Testing of Indians

The tests being given Indians for employment screening and MDTA are generally acknowledged to be inadequate or improper for Indians, because of linguistic and cultural problems. However, the use of the tests persists, with the standard norms, because of the lack of anything else to use, and because of a belief that tests of some sort are necessary.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

The evaluators endorse the 12 recommendations of the Ad Hoc Advisory Committee to USES on Indian Employment, with the reservation that the committee puts too much emphasis on moving Indians into urban environments and the mainstream.

The committee's recommendations concern (1) establishment of the duties of an Indian "desk," (2) establishment of halfway house program, (3) encouragement of in-service or out training, (4) analysis of human and natural resources of reservations, (5) full utilization HRD concept, (6) staffing of ES offices with Indians, (7) participation of organized labor, (8) preparation of information packets, (9) emphasis on employment, (10) encouraging employers to expand into reservations, (11) bringing groups of employer representatives to reservations, and (12) organization of Indian economic development corporations.

The recommendations of the authors of this report follow:

1. That mandatory sensitivity courses on Indian mores, psychology, traditions, and needs be developed and given officials who work with Indians;
2. That an active effort be made to recruit Indians for high-level Manpower Administration positions;
3. That the Department establish an Indian manpower policy which will assist Indians to attain work where they live, retaining their traditional values but will assist in relocation if desired by Indians;
4. That USES concentrate its efforts to aid Indians into the reservation and rural areas;
5. That USES prepare and issue guidelines for ES activity in serving Indians, covering policy, concept of service, and collaboration with tribal governments and other agencies;
6. That firm steps be taken to fill all of the jobs specially created by USES for serving Indians;
7. That continuing mechanisms be established for coordination of programs in Indian areas;
8. That USES vigorously promulgate the concept of followup after placement by Indian ES personnel, and that MDTA projects for Indians contain one "coach" or after-placement counselor for every 20 trainees.
9. That MDTA be made more responsive to the needs of reservation and rural Indians through the encouragement of (a) training in the traditional Indian crafts; (b) training of Indians as helpers in the building trades; (c) use of MDTA to establish labor pools; and (d) use of other valid means of selection than standard tests.
10. That a task force or study group be created to study and make recommendations on the advisability and feasibility of a separate NYC program for Indians.

I. INTRODUCTION

Background of study

This study was conducted in two stages:

1. Between August 1966 and February 1967 in the Southwest, and
2. From September to December 1967 in the Northern and Midwestern States in the South.

It was planned as part of the series of the role of manpower programs in relation to major minority groups in this country.

The first stage was conducted in conjunction with the study of the Spanish-speaking people of the Southwest and a preliminary report on manpower programs for Indians for highly restricted circulation was prepared in 1967. The present report incorporates the findings for the whole country.

How it was conducted

Field work included visits to 16 different Indian reservations, eight cities with substantial Indian populations, 10 tribes in Oklahoma, and Menominee County, Wisconsin.

In the areas visited, as many persons as possible were interviewed who might have been considered to have some knowledge of the economic situation of the Indians, their opportunities for training and employment, their attitudes toward manpower programs, and the results and effects of such programs. Discussions were held with State officials, regional officials and others responsible for manpower programs for the Indians. In addition, statistics and data were secured wherever available.

The overall objective was to determine the impact of the Department of Labor's manpower programs on the Indians, the successes these programs have had, and the difficulties they have encountered.

Upsurge of interest

One of the motivating factors behind the study was the upsurge of interest in the American Indian and his problems of poverty, unemployment and the cultural disorientation. Sociologists, anthropologists, labor economists, and others are attempting to come up with solutions to the American manpower dilemma concerning Indians. The Department of Labor itself in the last 2 years has undertaken materially to strengthen and to improve its service to Indians. Indians have been given special attention in antipoverty programs.

The conscience of Americans concerning the genocide of the last century and the continued aggressive swindling of the Indians by selfish interests, plus the impetus of the antipovery movement of the past several years, resulted in heavy expenditures aimed at eliminating poverty and unemployment.

Problems created by Indian aversion to assimilation

The bewilderment of the American people, however, in confronting the general aversion of the Indians to assimilation into the so-called mainstream of American culture is clearly exemplified in the frustration of the managers of various manpower programs, who have attempted to speed up such assimilation, with indifferent results. We do not expect to advance a solution to the very basic policy question of whether the Indian should be assimilated into the dominant culture or whether he should be encouraged to retain his tribal and traditional identity. This question, which is several generations old already, may never be resolved, and will continue to create difficulties.

Coverage gaps

The particular strength of this evaluation study can be found in its broad coverage and the attempt it has made to obtain as many different points of view as possible. There are still gaps, however, because of lack of staff time to extend the coverage. For example, the Indians of New York State and other areas of the eastern part of the country were not visited. The Lumbee Indians of North Carolina and some Southwestern tribes such as the Apaches had to be omitted.

Attempts to learn Indian attitudes

We make no pretense that this quick study penetrates very deeply into Indian psychology. Indians generally are reserved and do not open up often on initial contact with strange officials. Often they say the things they believe they are expected to say. Only those who have been well acculturated and who know what is expected through such studies are likely to talk freely in interviews of the sort which we conducted. To alleviate this difficulty we solicited a great deal of second-hand information from Indian sponsors and managers of programs and others who had had an opportunity to sound out tribal sentiment.

Biases of the evaluators—admiration for Indians

Also, we must admit to certain biases which developed. We grew to admire the Indians tremendously as a group, to marvel at their courtesy and dignity even in the midst of abject poverty, and to appreciate their lack of aggressive acquisitiveness. Even their reserve appeared to be the symbol of an inner strength as well as an insulation against the deteriorating influences of white society.

Value of their heritage

The second bias is this: After visiting a few reservations, we began to sense the unique and priceless cultural heritage of the American Indian, battered and adulterated as it now is. We realized what a tremendous loss to mankind would be the obliteration of this culture, call the obliteration process what one will—assimilation, acculturation, or termination. We became strong partisans of the belief that the Indians should be encouraged and helped to preserve their culture and to retain their tribal cultures, if they wish. This position is, consistent with a great body of enlightened opinion in this country, and with prevailing opinion among the Indians themselves.

With the qualifications and limitations indicated above, some important insights were gained during the evaluation into the manpower problems of Indians as these problems are intensified by Indian aspirations, cultural characteristics, and the residue of a very unhappy recent history.

II. Reservation Indians

A. VARIATIONS BETWEEN RESERVATIONS

The truth—Wide variations

The general public tends to generalize too much about Indians, to assume erroneously that all Indians are alike. The truth is considerably different. Indians are not alike, and there are wide variations between reservations. There is as much difference between the enormous Navajo reservation (with an area the size of Belgium and the Netherlands combined) and some of the smallest reservations as there is between Russia and Switzerland. Ethnologically, linguistically, and culturally, the differences between the Apaches and the Eastern Cherokees are greater than between the Swedes and the Italians.

Economic variations

There are also great variations in the economic conditions of the places visited. The Mountain Utes of Colorado, for example, are wealthy enough to make an annual per capita payment of $1,200 to tribal members, while the per capita annual income of some of the tribes is so small as to be hardly measurable in American terms. Some reservations visited, notably the Salt River Reservation in Arizona, have the potential for considerable wealth because of the promixity of their land to burgeoning urban development, while others exist on isolated, infertile, and useless land with no usable mineral resources. Many reservations have potential for tourist development because of lakes, parks, and because of the attraction of the Indians themselves. But none of the others visited can remotely approach the volume of tourist business done on the Cherokee Reservation of North Carolina, where every summer on of the country's greatest tourist floods spills out of the Smoky Mountains National Park, and inundates the whole reservation.

Variations of prejudice

There are significant variations, too, in the relationships and attitudes of the reservation people with the white population around them. The prejudice against the reservation Indians in the northern part of the country is well known; here the stereotypes about the Indians are heard on every hand. Here there is possibly some justification in comparing the reservations to ghettos, although Indians can leave if they wish for larger cities and find housing without the blatant discrimination which afflicts the Negroes. The Choctaws of Mississippi are victims of the very strong prejudices of their neighbors against nonwhites, since the Choctaws have a mixture of Negro blood.

The fortunate ones

In the Southwest, on the other hand, it is often actually an advantage to be an Indian in looking for work outside the reservation, and there is little general prejudice against the Indians socially, in housing, or in educational institutions. The Cherokees of North Carolina, surrounded as they are by southern mountaineers, have to a considerable extent absorbed the mores and ways of thought of their neighbors, intermarry with their neighbors, and experience little or no discrimination when they move outside the reservation.

Variations in cultural retention

There are also variations between tribal groups in their attitude toward acculturation and their willingness and ability to adopt the methods of the white man in business, in religion, in language and in household economy. Thus the Zunis have maintained intact to this day one of the oldest genuine civilizations existing anywhere in the world, with their own culture and religion. Other tribes have virtually lost their traditions, language and any vestige of religious ceremonies or beliefs.

Similarities

Despite all these differences there are similarities and elements of uniformity. Generalizations can be made concerning the level of education; the attachment to the reservation way of life; the lack of tradition; knowledge and incentive toward making business profits; and the Indian tendency to adhere to his extended family or clan and to share his goods with members of the clan and the tribe. Also of late, under the leadership of groups of younger Indians, including the National Congress of American Indians, there has been developing a pan-Indian movement and "Indianness" stronger than ever before, so that today it is possible to look at the Indians as a group in considering some of their manpower problems.

Clinging to heritage

It is hard to escape the conclusion that the Indians have retrogressed under the stifling rule of the white man. In the sense that the Indian has lost his independence, much of his feelings of self-worth, and much of his identity as a person, this is true. But it is also true that the Indian has done a remarkable job of clinging to some of the best of his heritage, in spite of all the attempts of white society to make him over in the white man's image.

Manpower problems thus created

Whether one looks at the present divergence of Indian culture from white as being a preservation of the good or a clinging to obsolete values, it nevertheless poses real problems in the manpower picture. Many Indians lack what the white man calls "time sense." They often have a tendency to leave their jobs to return to the reservations because of some family illness, because of a religious ceremony, or because of plain homesickness. A few of them get drunk periodically. Most of them lack some kind of acquisitive ambition which the white man has. All of these pose problems to the white employer who feels that his employees should be on time, should work a steady 40 hours per week, and should attempt to progress on the job.

That many of the Indian workers, perhaps most of them, are good workers by any standards, assumes less importance in many areas than the reputation created by a few of the Indians who do not conform.

The cultural problems which appear to affect manpower programs most are those concerned with education, attachment to reservations and language.

Opportunities

1. *Education.* The educational possibilities for reservation Indians are usually considered rather good. Practically any Indian youngster who has the ability to be schooled can be sent to a school run by the

Bureau of Indian Affairs, either on the reservation or in a boarding school off the reservation. This system will take the youngster through high school and even through college. In addition, in many of the reservations we visited there are opportunities for reservation youngsters to attend public schools in the neighboring counties.

Breaking down tribal identity

Many Indians don't like the system of BIA schooling because to them it appears to be devoted to the principle of breaking down tribal identity and bringing the Indian youngster into the culture of the white man. In Indian boarding schools, youngsters from different tribes with different native languages and different backgrounds are brought together and are taught standard white school curriculums which do not emphasize to any great extent Indian culture and history. The theory has been that by giving the Indian youngster this kind of education the Indian youngster would be better equipped to make his way in the world.

The BIA system also provides some vocational education (to be distinguished from the vocational training given adult Indians by BIA to prepare them for relocation in urban settings). Some of the more affluent tribes have established their own schools on the reservation.

Literacy

Whatever the variations in the system and whatever its general efficacy, the result is increasing literacy, although dropout is very heavy in some tribes, and the results of the schooling are said to disappear after a few years of reservation life without the necessity to use the education.

Illiteracy

Illiteracy among the older generation in most tribes is still prevalent. There are tens of thousands of adult tribesmen who cannot read, write, or speak acceptable English.

Data on literacy

We attempted to find national statistics on Indian educational levels and literacy. Apparently, however, none are available from any source, except those which appear in the 1960 census. (See United States Census of Population, 1960, Nonwhite Population by Race, table 10.) Here it is indicated that 10 percent of all Indians over 14 have had no schooling and nearly 60 percent have had less than an eighth grade education. Half of all Indian children who enter do not finish high school, and despite ample scholarship funds from the BIA and other sources only 1 percent of those Indians over 14 had completed 4 or more years of college in 1960 (only one-third of those who entered). Indeed, according to the special census report of that year, the median number of school years completed by Indian males over 14 was 8.4, and by females, 8.5.

Causes for dropout

During our own visits we found indications generally of very heavy dropout from school. This was explained by our informants as being due to parental indifference, to drunkenness among Indian high school boys, to transportation problems, to the pull of the reservation on boarding school youngsters, to language problems, and, perhaps most of all, to a failure on the part of the youngster to see that his education would advantage him very much. Also, where Indian students are mixed with white in public school systems, there is often an attitude of superiority of the white children which is galling to the Indians. Their ever-present poverty keeps them from dressing so well as the whites. Their natural reserve is often associated with stupidity by inexperienced and insensitive teachers.

Why they don't like the city

2. *Attachment to reservations.* The Indian's attachment to his reservation is difficult for white people, particularly urban white people, to understand. It can only be understood by another Indian or by someone who has also grown up in a protective society with extended family ties and a distinctive way of life. The Indian likes reservation life better than city life—many of them have tried urban life and have returned—because despite its poverty, it is more satisfying to their sense of individual worth, more responsible to their tradition of communal interdependence and sharing, less hectic and antlike, and, even in the direst poverty, less ugly than life in city slums. There is something else which is perhaps more important than any of the comparative reactions noted above—outside the reservation, in the middle of white society, the Indian loses his identity as an Indian and as a member of his tribe. Identity based on what is left of the Indian tradition is important to them and for the most of them, according to Indian informants, have no desire to become imitation white people.

Manpower planning to relocate them

With his certain conviction that his own way of life is best, the average American finds it hard to understand this. Most Government policy and most Government planning, including manpower planning in the past, has been based on the proposition that it is in the Indian's best interest to move him out of the reservation into the "mainstream." The relocation and vocational education policies of the Bureau of Indian Affairs have been directed toward this end. The Indians have cooperated, then have returned to the reservation.

Those who stay outside

Some have stayed outside, of course, and a few have made good in the white man's sense of the term. In many municipalities there are small colonies of Indians who are trying desperately to retain something of their Indianness. What we saw in the study of the urban life of Indians does not lead us to the conclusion that it is best for the Indians to move to the cities. If the Indians are to be helped to the maximum by manpower programs, these programs will have to be meshed with other programs for improving conditions and opportunities for living on the reservations.

Survival of native tongues

3. *Language.* The persistence of the Indians in clinging to their ancestral languages is a cause of bafflement to persons who are convinced that the knowledge and use of English is essential to being an American. Even those who understand the survival of the native tongues believe that Indians will have to conquer their unemployment and poor living conditions in English. In the present social context

there is reason for this. The Government over the years has pursued policies of education designed to encourage the substitution of English for the tribal languages. There have been interludes in which, under tribal pressures or under particularly enlightened leadership, the Government has encouraged the writing of local languages, but efforts to teach the Indian languages in the schools have been sporadic and generally have died because of lack of impetus from those who make policy.

Interest in tribal tongues

Wherever we went in the course of this study, the gradual decline of the native languages, for the most part still unwritten, was deplored by tribal spokesmen. Some tribes are spending tribal funds to have grammars and vocabularies prepared.

Language of the elders

The general pattern on the reservations, as well as in the nonreservation areas of Oklahoma and Wisconsin, is that among the older people the knowledge of English is subordinate to that of their native languages. Many of them are unable to speak more than a few words of English.

Language of the younger

The young people, as might be expected, having gone to school in English use English more than the tribal language. Those in the middle age groups show varied patterns. In some tribes, such as the Navaho, the language problem is acute. In securing employment outside the reservation, they usually have to work in groups with a member who knows English acting as interpreter.

Illustrations of variations

The variation between reservations in the use of English can be illustrated on the one hand by some of the Pueblos of New Mexico where practically no English is spoken in everyday life, and on the other hand by the Fort Berthold Reservation where the coexistence of three different tribes with distinct languages has required the use of English as a *lingua franca*.

Possibly the Choctaw Reservation in Mississippi is fairly typical. A household survey there in 1963 showed that 4 percent of the families used excellent English, 57 percent used good, and 39 percent used poor English.

Language problems at work

The language problem is quite important in the manpower picture. For industry on the reservation, there are always interpreters and foremen who speak the native language. When uneducated or poorly educated Indians work outside the reservation, the problem of communication intensifies. The problem is compounded because of the natural reserve of the Indians. Rather than make any great attempt to explain themselves to their employers when a misunderstanding arises, they often will simply say nothing, or leave.

Materials and instruction in native languages

Because of the large diversity of distinct Indian languages, most of them are spoken by only a relatively small number of people. It is manifestily impractical to adapt manpower training or orientation materials to these languages, with the possible exception of those that are already written and spoken by the larger groups, particularly Navaho and Dakota. However, among Indians where the knowledge of English is not widespread or general, the use of native language instructors and counselors should be encouraged. Below (Section F) we discuss the role which speakers of native languages are playing and can play in connection with Employment Service activities, where it is important, even necessary, that there be a capability in an Indian language.

Other communication problems

Besides language there are other communication problems. Reservation Indians (except those who have been educated in white public schools and who know firsthand the white man's way and are prepared to imitate them) are usually slow to express their thoughts, ambitions and desires to strangers, to Employment Service officials, to well-meaning academicians making surveys on the reservations, or to instructors. Among these Indians throughout the country there seems to be an etiquette which requires slowness, deliberation and patience in communication. Few white people, particularly in the hurly-burly of the industrial milieu, possess it or understand it.

C. LIVELIHOOD AND UNEMPLOYMENT

It is difficult to generalize about the means of livelihood of Indians in diverse tribes in different locations of the country, in States with different economies. Some patterns are discernible, however.

Plants on reservations

Here and there factories and plants are located on the reservations. Some of them are tribally owned, some of them are owned by outsiders who have been induced by the tribes to come in. Some of them are wood manufacturing industries, some are electronic industries, some are needle trades industries and furniture plants. These employ limited numbers of Indians with mixed success. Many such industries have folded because of the lack of understanding of foremen and supervisors of the Indian's attitude toward work, some because of sales or transportation difficulties. Many, however, are still operating; practically all of these are small.

Just outside

Immediately outside the reservations, within commuting distance or at least close enough so that the workers can maintain their ties with the reservation, several thousand more are employed in places like Farmington, N. Mex., and Philadelphia, Miss.

BIA, CAA

Except for plants inside the reservations and immediately outside, the largest steady employers are the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the community action agencies. The latter have fused new vitality into the economies of many tribes, although the unemployment problem is much too great for a solution to be achieved this way.

Indian unemployment by any standard is catastrophic. When it is added to inadequate shelter, particularly in the rough climate of the Northern States, the poverty of the Indians has a quality which cannot be imagined until it is seen firsthand. The erroneous belief of so many Americans that, as wards of the Government, the Indians are supported by the Government, is prevalent even in communities bordering on the reservations and was actually encountered among some employment service officials close to reservations.

Unemployment

When all of the opportunities from steady year-round employment for reservation Indians are added together, the proportion is still very small. At various times of the year unemployment on the typical reservation is very heavy, sometimes running as high as 80 percent. When there is seasonal employment, the percentage goes down, of course. Seasonal employment includes the tourist industries (particularly on the Cherokee Reservation in North Carolina), firefighting (a lucrative and well-liked means of employment for many of the northern and southwestern Indians), and farmwork, much of which is done in the general area of the reservations, with a considerable amount done out of migrant camps in various locations. Self-employment by the reservation Indians is general, although many of them farm small plots. Business doesn't seem to be their forte, even where opportunities for small independently owned businesses are plentiful.

Craftsmanship died out—revived

At one time the tradition of craftsmanship among most of the Indians throughout the country was very strong, but it died out during the depressing years after the final conquest by the whites. The only area in the country where it has been generally and successfully revived is in the Southwest, where basketry has been revived among one or two tribes, pottery has continued strong among the Pueblos, and silversmithing, particularly among the Zuni, Hopis and Navajos, has procured a large worldwide market. In the shape seen by most tourists, silversmithing is really a modern industry which has been developed since the 1880's by enterprising Indian leaders and whites who foresaw the market.

Their own outlets

One difficulty is that, by the time the usual middlemen and retail outlets have made their profits, the amount which is left for the craftsmen is often not commensurate with the effort which went into the work. To offset middleman expenses, some of the tribes have developed their own arts and crafts organizations and their own outlets, with increasing skill in marketing distribution. Many tribes may eventually make craftsmanship a very important source of income. Even now some of the the smaller pueblos derive their principal income from their famous pottery.

D. DISCRIMINATION

The eagerness of so many white people interviewed, including some Employment Service officials, to deny that discrimination against Indians exists is indicative more of changing social values than of the actual situation.

Where discrimination is

There is widespread discrimination throughout the northern tier of States and in Mississippi against Indians socially and in employment. The discrimination is often as strong as that against Negroes and is justified on the basis of undependability in employment (see above) and the alleged dirtiness of the Indians themselves. We observed no more of the latter among Indians than we have observed among poor whites. It is really immaterial to the question of discrimination, which is rooted so deeply in the American tradition and history. Even if Indians overnight became paragons of cleanliness, sobriety, and conventional morality, they would still be discriminated against. This is illustrated by the fact that in the areas of greatest discrimination, those who live and act like whites are still considered second-class citizens by their neighbors.

Where discrimination is not (so much)

In the Southwest and among the Cherokees of North Carolina, the picture is somewhat different. Discrimination exists in employment, but is balanced somewhat by a kind of reverse discrimination which causes employers to want to employ Indians. Also, in these areas there is no racial antipathy, and North Carolina mountaineers or Southwestern Anglos who marry Indians lose no social status.

The pendulum swings full cycle in eastern Oklahoma, where to have even a small proportion of Indian blood is a matter of great pride among white people, and persons with one quarter or even one-eighth of Indian ancestry proclaim themselves to be Indians.

In many areas there is obvious police discrimination against Indians who are arrested on the slightest pretext when off the reservation. This frequency of arrest contributes to the stereotyped picture of the Indian as belonging to an undependable criminal element, and the arrest records, unfair as they may be, often mitigate against employment.

Employment service variations in attitude

Without intending to do so, many Employment Service officials in employment offices serving reservations betrayed their own prejudices against Indians by expressing irritation and disgust about matters concerning which, with a little understanding, they would have spoken differently. Again there seemed to be wide variations within States, ranging from the almost complete acceptance of Indians in the biggest Indian State, Arizona, to an attitude in one or two other States which approached rejection.

The concern and interest of the national leadership of the U.S. Employment Service (see below) must be translated somehow to all the States involved with Indians before the picture can be uniformly good.

Officials of Neighborhood Youth Corps programs and CAA programs, often Indians themselves, and BIA, appeared to have fewer problems of prejudice and identification.

Resentment

Resentment toward discrimination is building up among Indians, particularly the young Indians. So far it has not taken many overt forms, but this can be expected in the future.

E. CONNECTION BETWEEN BIA PROGRAMS AND LABOR DEPARTMENT PROGRAMS

Good points

Relations between the field staff of BIA, the State employment service and the NYC sponsors are generally friendly and cordial, and there are examples not only of coordination, but of collaboration between them. Thus, in a Phoenix licensed practical nurse course, the basic education of the 20 to 25 Indians in the course was provided under MDTA with BIA furnishing the vocational component. In Sandoval County, N. Mex., the coordinator of the concerted services program involves BIA from the Navaho Reservation and the United Pueblos very frequently in his projects for joint action. There are numerous instances where the employment service has done testing for students under the auspices of BIA. BIA officials frequently send Indians to the nearest employment service office. In Oklahoma some very successful NYC projects are run by the tribes with aid from BIA. On the reservations NYC projects are usually under the CAP, which in turn is under general tribe supervision, and in all of these cases, BIA has some input, sometimes actually assisting in drawing up proposals.

Bad points

The examples given above, however, should not convey the impression that collaboration between BIA and BIA programs and officials in Labor Department Government officials is the rule. The above are exceptions. There is a very great deal of inertia in this area—inertia due to the fact that for many years each has run an independent operation, without a great deal of interchange with other agencies. In the past there seems to have been a feeling that attempts to cooperate would signal to the other agency that someone was trying to move in on its territory. Partly for this reason, the attempts of the national office of the Employment Service to better the Employment Service's capability on reservations has been carried out with more diffidence than otherwise in the area of relationship between the Employment Service and the BIA.

Carryover of attitude toward BIA

The love-hate relationship of the Indians with BIA, well known to BIA officials and to others, is a complicating factor. Because of recent moves, the suspicion with which Indians generally have viewed BIA efforts toward assimilation may be lessening and many Indians may no longer believe that BIA's ultimate objective is the obliteration of tribal culture. But such feelings are still very strong. Indians generally, except the most knowledgeable leaders, make little distinction in their minds between BIA-sponsored programs and other manpower programs.

BIA and Employment Service placement

The BIA assistance program includes both manpower training and placement services. The placement services of BIA and of the Employment Service are often most effective when Indians are placed within commuting distance or at least within weekend visiting distance of the reservations.

Although the orientation of the BIA employment assistance program appears to be toward relocation, employment assistance officers and education officers often work hard to assist tribal members to get jobs near by so that they can stay on the reservation. Placement activities can be particularly effective when coordinated between a BIA employment assistance officer and the local Employment Service office.

More can be done

It would seem that much closer collaboration is possible. For example, BIA manpower training could be complemented by MDTA, or vice versa, and the use of BIA educational assistance in MDTA training sites would seem to be important. Very little of this is being done. We encountered occasional statements that officials on one side or the other felt that the other program was competitive. Where such a feeling exists in either agency, it hampers effective collaboration.

Relocation to small towns

Relocation to the larger cities, whether through BIA, through MDTA or through Employment Service placement action, found little support among the Indians with whom we discussed it. In fact it found little support among Employment Service people themselves. Some local office staff thought that Indians should be relocated into white society but in smaller towns and among rural societies instead of the cities, on the assumption that it would be easier and that they would not be contributing to the slum population of the cities. Also they felt the chances of their remaining would be increased.

The Muscatine relocation

An example of this, apparently successful, at least in its initial stages, was an arrangement between the Employment Service of South Dakota and BIA whereby three families moved to Muscatine, Iowa, from the Rosebud Reservation and worked for a tomato-processing plant. The BIA funded the relocation, but the State employment service found the jobs and arranged for the receiving community to establish an organization for counseling them and guiding them. This group will be built up if successful, and the project should be very carefully watched as showing a way to a possible better future for Indians who wish to be relocated.

F. THE U.S. EMPLOYMENT SERVICE AND THE INDIANS

How well the Indians know Employment Service

1. *Image.*—In our opinion there is no Indian "image" of the Employment Service, as there might be said to be among the Mexican-Americans or the ghetto Negroes. Until U.S. Employment Service began to station interviewers on all of the larger reservations, to most reservation Indians the Employment Service was a nebulous, uncertain organization concerned with unemployment compensation. In any case it was a white man's organization which didn't concern them much because they had their own employment assistance office in the BIA quarters.

Farm work through Employment Service

Many of the Indians know the employment offices in cities outside the reservations to be places where they go to get farm jobs. There are a few locations such as the Navajo Reservation in Arizona where representatives of the Employment Service have been stationed for years. These permanent stations were, and are, known as places where one can obtain seasonal farm work off the reservation, fire-fighting work at times, and the like. At no time, and not even now, have the Employment Service offices been considered places where the Indians can go to find permanent work in the cities or on the reservation. The BIA employment assistance office is still considered the place for that.

Varying degrees of dynamism

Some of the Employment Service representatives have acquired a reputation for being hardworking, cooperative people who are interested in the welfare of the Indians. Some, however (and this applies to the Indian representatives as well as the white representatives) of those who serve the reservations are not particularly active or dynamic in their efforts to think of ways to serve the Indians.

Expansion of services

2. *Extent of Employment Service services to Indians.*—Since the Kansas City conference in February 1967 U.S. Employment Service has tried to fill the gap which had been present in its services to Indians. An Indian desk was planned, although we understand that no one was placed in the job, and that now an Indian Office in the Manpower Administrator's Office has been created, 198 human resources development positions were established specifically to serve Indians and were distributed among the States. During our second round of visits in the north and the south, we encountered many of the persons who have been selected for these HRD positions. There were some patterns here which became apparent: The majority, although not all, were Indians (on September 15, 1967, 112 out of the 171 filled were Indians) and considerable difficulty was encountered in recruiting for Indians to fill these positons. This was because of (1) difficulty in finding Indians with sufficient education and desire to undertake this sort of job; (2) competition from community action agencies for this same type of Indian; (3) rigid State civil service requirements, which meant in many instances that the Indians did not meet the requirements for permanent positions, and if hired, had to be placed on temporary positions; and (4) indifferent recruitment efforts in a few locations.

Some foot-dragging

A majority of State employment services and local Employment Service offices having jurisdiction over Indian reservations have earnestly attempted to implement the directive. However, there were instances where people were obviously dragging their heels out of inertia or ignorance about what was needed. We believe that, despite the difficulties, all of the available positions should have been filled by the end of 1967 mostly with Indians.

Policy

Other efforts by the Employment Service included the encouragement of research, supplementing the smaller community program so that it can serve reservations, the establishment of seminars at the universities for Employment Service personnel, and the urging of manpower advisory committees to form subcommittees aimed at improving services to Indians.

An ad hoc Advisory Committee to U.S. Employment Service on Indian Employment Programs was established. It was chaired by Dr. Daniel Kruger, professor of industrial relations, Michigan State University, and consisting of four subcommittees (economic development, research, education and training, and job placement) with representatives from among tribal leaders, employers, educators, and individuals who represent employer organizations and appropriate Federal agencies. The committee was charged with the responsibility for advising on the development of employment and training opportunities for Indians on reservations and in communities with sizable Indian populations and the assistance of Indians with job-related problems.

A meeting of the advisory committee on June 19–20, 1967, in Washington, D.C., resulted in a number of important recommendations, which are listed in section VI of this report.

Positives in the new efforts

In view of this effort and all this interest on the part of the national office and some State offices, how effective actually is the service which is given to Indians on the reservations? The answer is: The result is not yet commensurate with the effort. Contact has been reestablished and coverage has been increased. The Indians who come to the area of tribal headquarters are now aware that there is an Employment Service, and everywhere the HRD personnel go over the reservations visiting people, awareness of the Employment Service and what is available is greater than it was before. These are all positives.

Recruiting for NYC and Job Corps and occasional MDTA training has been moderately successful although there were complaints. Also most of the employment testing done for the reservation Indians, whether for BIA, for employers, or for schools is done by the Employment Service. These are also positives.

Negatives

Negatives can be found in the persistent attitudes of some Employment Service personnel who cannot bring themselves to consider the problems of the Indians as seriously as they should, the lack of job opportunities which the Employment Service people have to offer the Indians, the lack of the close collaboration with employment assistance officers of the BIA, and the absence of a consistent idea of what the Employment Service is supposed to do for the Indians.

What is ES role

This last statement may startle some and it should be explained. The Employment Service role on the reservations is far from clear cut. Most of the employment offices serving Indians are concerned with finding jobs for Indians *off the reservation*, temporary jobs in agricultural work, lumbering, firefighting, and the like. Only a minimal part of the total Employment Service activity on the reservations is concerned with filling or developing jobs on the reservations in collaboration with BIA, the community action agencies, and others. There is general agreement that it is in the latter area that the employment future of the reservation Indian lies. Irritation was expressed by some Employment Service personnel stationed on reservations that Indians did not flock to the opportunities for temporary work which they advertised. Based on this, the conclusion was voiced more than once that the Indians do not really want to work.

What is needed most

What is lacking is a sense of direction, a guideline as to what they should do for the Indians. They are, in effect, trying to translate a regular employment office to the reservation, and the result is, inevitably, a feeling of futility. They should have guidelines related to Labor Department policy. (There are recommendations on both Labor Department policy and USES adaptation of it at the end of this report.)

Increase the Indian staff

How can the services the Employment Service renders to Indians be extended further? One answer is obvious. Fill the vacant positions at once; if necessary, working with State civil service systems to modify requirements. Whenever a moderately qualified Indian is found who knows the language of the tribe, this can be considered an asset so valuable that it should overbalance his lack of education. If State civil service requirements are not flexible enough to admit this, a strenuous effort should be made to get them changed. The Indians thus employed can be given special titles such as interviewer–interpreter (as they are given in Arizona) or ethnic specialist. In South Dakota at the time of the visit a job title of Employment Service aide was being developed to replace the interviewer 1 position for Indians. Many such devices are possible, and should be coupled with opportunities for training and education, so that Indians hired can have the opportunity for advancement.

Collaboration

The other principal way in which Employment Service services to reservation Indians can be extended will be discussed more in detail in a later section. Essentially it consists of closer collaboration of the Employment Service representatives with BIA and the community action agencies.

Outreach

3. *Other deficiencies and problems in Employment Service service to Indians.*—Several problems in Employment Service service to Indians on reservations have been mentioned in the previous section. One problem mentioned but not stressed above is difficulty in outreach. This has been partially solved by the addition of the HRD personnel, but remains a problem because of the isolation of many households on reservations and the difficulty in reaching them.

Counseling

One of the greatest deficiencies in Employment Service service to Indians is the lack of vocational counseling. The small size of the local offices serving reservations and the lack of professional qualifications of the personnel stationed on the reservations tend to make such service almost impossible. Also, the isolation of Employment Service personnel on reservations and their lack of contact with the fountainheads of employment make it difficult for them to communicate comprehensive information about the world of work to the Indian tribesmen.

Separate form CAP

Much could be done to remedy this deficiency by bringing someone periodically to the reservations, with the collaboration and the help of the community action agency, to counsel individuals or groups. In fact some CAP directors expressed their desire to have Employment Service people come in to do such counseling. It seems to us, in any case, that here is an opportunity for the Employment Service to work with the CAP directors. Employment officers could be set up in the vicinity of the CAP, sometimes in the same building, so that persons who visit one office can also visit the other. When the Employment Service representative is out, an Indian can receive the information he wants from a community action employee. As it is, Employment Services offices often are placed in separate little buildings on the reservations which are not in themselves centers of activity and which are not frequented by the Indians.

The service concept

Perhaps the most significant deficiency of Employment Service service to Indians is a subtle one, which we advance with the full knowledge that its concepts will be contested by many knowledgeable people. It is this: The Employment Service's offices which serve the reservation are still oriented to the idea that the heart of the Employment Service operation is to take job applicants who come into the office seeking jobs and find jobs for them.

What ES should concentrate on

That the ultimate object of practical ES activity is the finding of full-time work for individuals we do not deny. However, we submit that in view of the scarcity of actual concrete job opportunities at or near the reservations for Indians, the Employment Service could be much more useful and perform a much greater service if it concentrated its reservation efforts in the areas of job information and counseling about job opportunities, in developing information for the tribal leaders and for individuals about what is being done in other reservations concerning work opportunities, in holding training session on what white employers demand from their employees, in counseling young people about the kinds of training they might find most useful and where it could be obtained, and in other service activities not involving direct referral to jobs available for Indians.

This does not mean, of course, that they should not do the latter: It does mean that the personnel selected for serving the reservations should be chosen for their qualification for other aspects of service and their understanding of the people they are trying to serve. If these things were done in collaboration with BIA and with the community action orgaizations there would, we believe, be much improvement in employment services to reservation Indians.

G. MANPOWER TRAINING—MDTA ON THE RESERVATION

MDTA compared with Public Law 959

On the reservations it is generally considered easier to establish a manpower training project under BIA auspices than an MDTA project because only one agency, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, is involved.

Also the training conducted by BIA is better known and understood by the Indians, it can be explained to them by the BIA employment assistance representative at their tribal headquarters, whom they are accustomed to consult, and who frequently makes presentations at tribal council meetings.

Reasons for lack of MDTA activity

There is a conspicuous lack of MDTA activities on the reservations. The principal reasons on the reservation lie neither in fund shortages nor possible competition from BIA programs. Rather, they lie in (1) lack of employment opportunity within commuting distance, (2) the lack of interest, innovation, and vigorous attempts to overcome difficulties on the part of many (not all) ES personnel, particularly prior to the renewed emphasis on Indian matters in 1967.

Other difficulties

MDTA training for reservation Indians has also been plagued by a number of other difficulties. The most obvious opportunities have often been in the building trades because of fairly extensive building programs on the reservations. What is needed here are courses for training Indians to perform under the supervision of skilled journeymen. Yet the rigidity of the MDTA system, the requirements for union approval, etc., effectively preclude in many places such short, term training in the building trades. In one case the building trades union in the nearby city would give approval only if a guarantee was given that Indians would compete off the reservation. This obviously was impossible to give, since no one can control people in such a way. Besides it was discriminatory. The guarantee was not given and the training was not given.

MDTA for "helpers"

To help solve some of these difficulties, MDTA courses could be developed for "helper positions," particularly in the apprenticeable occupations.

There are other problems: There is apparently problems of competition for clients between OEO programs and MDTA. The OEO programs pay more. There is the problem of the Indian attitude toward any kind of training since long years of dependence have made many of them look upon any kind of training program as simply another opportunity for a livelihood rather than a bridge to productive wage earning employment.

Problems of training off the reservation

Dropouts from MDTA courses, particularly those courses given off the reservation, pose a particularly acute problem. From our visits, we recevied the impression that the record with respect to the taking of MDTA courses by Indians boarding off the reservation has been generally unsuccessful because of financial and social problems. The families of Indian primary wage earners want to be with them during training. (Indian families are usually very close.) There have been numerous mistakes made in sending heads of families to nearby cities without making provision for the drawing of subsistence by the trainees and their families at the training locations. In several instances the families have moved in without understanding the implications of what they did; thus the trainees lost their subsistence and dropped out. Part of this is due to lack of initiative on the part of ES personnel, part of it is due to lack of knowlege on their part, and part perhaps has been due at least at times in the past to a certain amount of indifference toward the problem.

Keeping them in MDTA courses

In MDTA courses, as in employment, Indians respond well to treatment as individuals of worth and react negatively to impersonal, condescending, or rude treatment. They have the same difficulties in attending MDTA courses regularly that they have in working regularly on the job, since they have not become accustomed to living their lives by the clock.

The record of ES personnel in Menominee County, Wis. (until recently a reservation), in counseling Indian MDTA trainees, coaching them, keeping them in training and on the job shows that, given enough interest and enough staff and enough sympathy for the problems of the Indians, excellent results can be achieved. Problems of attendance and dropout are less on reservations themselves where the tribal leaders themselves can be induced to help keep the Indians in training.

Why don't they respond?

We repeatedly encountered statements from Indian spokesmen and from employment service officials to the effect that Indians have not been responsive to MDTA. Apparently this statement is based on lack of response by Indians to courses advertised in cities near the reservation. Part of the lack of response is due to native reserve. Part of it probably is due to the confusion in the minds of tribesmen between MDTA and the manpower training programs of BIA and OEO. (In talking with Indians who are not directly involved in these programs, we found it almost impossible to get answers which distinguished between them.) There are indications that when Indians understand what the training is, what it is aimed at, and what it can do for them as individuals, they do respond.

The MDTA Indian question

Perhaps the most fundamental policy question concerning MDTA policy on courses for reservation Indians is whether these courses should be planned, directed, and focused on jobs in or near the reservation or for relocation outside the commuting distance in cities away from the reservation.

Relocation a debatable goal

We question the validity of the facile assumption we have encountered on the part of national office personnel and others that MDTA should imitate BIA's relocation program and attempt to train large numbers of Indians for relocation. The Indians are not likely to respond affirmatively to this in numbers. Those who do respond and are relocated are not likely to stay. There is also the deeper social question as to whether this sort of action actually benefits society. There is no real purpose in adding to the burdens of our inner cities by moving in poorly educated people with a completely different cultural tradition, whose adaptation will be next to impossible and whose children will inevitably deteriorate in the slums of the cities.

The direction we think MDTA should take

In our opinion, planning of MDTA training should be coordinated very closely with planning for industrial development in or near the reservations, and MDTA should make little or no effort toward training reservation Indians for relocation away from the reservations unless tribal leaders specifically request it. There are, of course, individual circumstances where this kind of thing may be feasible. However, the people planning our programs must divest themselves of the discredited idea that the only solution for the Indian problem is to train them to be like white people and to move them into the large cities.

Crafts training

Some OEO programs have encouraged craft work. Some of these have been successful, others have not; however, this is a field with which Labor Department programs have had little connection. Abortive attempts have been made at MDTA training in crafts work, but have generally been considered inconsistent with the principles and policies of the MDTA program. We believe another look should be taken at the MDTA policies concerning crafts training. It would help if the CAA's on the reservation could organize cooperatives for marketing and supervising production. BIA could also help. This would require initiative and collaboration to a greater extent than is now the general pattern. We are not attempting to minimize the difficulties of marketing. Often white people who work with Indians on craft programs have difficulty understanding the Indian psychology concerning work. An Indian manager of an arts and crafts shop may accept inferior work from a tribe and pay him just as much for his product as he pays the tribesmen who make superior goods, in order to avoid damage to the ego of the workman. Then, in sales to the tourists, the manager may have to adjust his prices as best he can.

Whatever the problems, there is potential here, as is illustrated on the Cherokee Reservation in North Carolina. There cheap foreign-made imitations of Indian arts and crafts compete in the shops alongside the not very plentiful objects made by the Indians on the reservation. Tourists will gladly pay much more for the genuine Indians goods.

A sad case of misdirected craft training

A particularly pathetic instance was encountered on one reservation where under MDTA about a dozen potters had been trained for a factory which some local people were attempting to establish under EDA funds. When we asked the people running this program whether or not there had been any attempt or there was going to be any attempt to have the Indians manufacture pottery with the traditional designs of this tribe, the answer was "no." They would be manufacturing only commercial pottery of standard design and competing with other conventional potters in this country. Yet this tribe had an old tradition of pottery with distinctive designs, and there is little doubt that it would have found a ready market at prices much higher than the machine-produced standard product they were intending to manufacture.

A labor pool from MDTA

The basic tenet of MDTA that training should be for available jobs can be challenged, insofar as the Indian reservations are concerned. We could make no study of the feasibility or advisability of building up a trained labor pool on the reservation which would serve to attract industry. If we consider only training in specific skills, the idea is probably impractical, since predictions of exactly what kind of skills will be likely to attract industry are difficult. However, building up the general work capability of adult Indians, their literacy, their ability to communicate in English, their knowledge of what is demanded in standard working situations in the white man's world—all of these could be done in advance of and in anticipation of employment opportunities on the reservation.

OJT

On-the-job training under MDTA is virtually nonexistent in some areas, particularly in the Southwest. At some places earnest efforts have been made to provide OJT for Indians. Success has not been of the same level as the OJT training for other elements of the population. Part of this was the problem of a proud people who cannot adjust to working conditions, who interpret, often rightly, the tone of voice of foremen and white fellow workmen as indicating contempt or condescension or disrespect for the Indian as a person.

Dropout

Part of it is due to the work habits of the Indian themselves, which include absenteeism and lack of dependability in the white man's sense. Dropout for these reasons is quite heavy. We encountered one plant manager who projected the most rabid prejudice against Indians, yet was managing a plant on a reservation which had and was going to have more OJT trainees.

Lack of communication

In a few instances, we found that on-the-job training which might have been made available to Indians in areas just outside the reservation was not provided because of the lack of knowledge of ES officials serving the reservation and of BIA employment assistance officers concerning the opportunities that were available. Obviously there was a lack of communication somewhere between the BAT representatives and the Employment Service and the Employment Service and BIA on the other. In one particularly flagrant instance where we had been assured by State BAT people that there were numerous opportunities available for Indians, we found an utter lack of knowledge on the part of the people who would have to refer the Indians to such training.

What OJT courses need

On-the-job training with respect to Indians needs much more basic education and orientation into the ways of work built into the courses than OJT ordinarily does even for disadvantaged people. The incidence of dropout, we believe, would be much less if this were done. We consider it essential that any on-the-job training programs in the future, whether done under MDAT under the concentrated employment program, the work incentive program, or any other manpower program, give due consideration to this factor.

H. APPRENTICESHIP

Ignorance about it

It has been our observation in the course of several evaluation studies that knowledge about the purposes of apprenticeship or the regulations governing it, is minimal or nonexistent in nearly all circles except those directly concerned with it. Misconceptions about apprenticeship are rife. Reservation Indians follow the pattern. As a rule they know nothing about apprenticeship. There are a few exceptions, a very few. For example, the construction staff of the Navaho tribe at one time had some apprentices.

At one reservation

At one place visited, the employment service official of a nearby local office serving the reservation did not know what apprenticeship was. In talking to him about it he kept responding in terms that had no relation whatever to an actual apprenticeship program. When apprenticeship was explained to him, he was rather surprised. At the same reservation, the employment assistance official of BIA did not understand the apprenticeship program.

Information about apprenticeship is part of a general body of information which Indian young people should get concerning training and job possibilities outside the reservation. The most apparent source of such information is through the Employment Service representatives on the reservation, if the reservation has one. The second most apparent source is through the employment assistance adviser of the BIA agency on the reservation. The third source is through the school counselors either of BIA schools or public schools. The giving of such information should not be part of a campaign to induce Indian youth to leave the reservation and become apprentices, which should continue to be a matter of individual choice. However, it should be part of the general effort to inform Indians about possibilities for work and training.

I. NEIGHBORHOOD YOUTH CORPS

The BIA school mix

Attempting to assess the overall impact and image of the Neighborhood Youth Corps among reservation Indians is complicated by the fact that many tribal youngsters of high school age attend off-reservation BIA boarding schools, some quite a distance away. The inschool projects conducted in these schools may or may not include the youngsters of a particular tribe.

Thus, in a high school at Ignacio in the Southern Ute Reservation, a number of Indian boarding school pupils live in dormitories on the reservation and attend the public high school there. Most of them are Navahos from the reservation. The inschool NYC project at Ignacio includes, in addition to Navahos, Utes, local Spanish Americans, and Anglos who live within the reservation.

Some reservations conduct inschool NYC projects for reservation youngsters who are attending high school off the reservation; in these cases the tribes furnish employment.

The importance of NYC

No matter how complicated the arrangement or the sponsorship may be, the inschool NYC program has been a godsend to the reservations. The income earned by these youngsters may not seem much to the more affluent, but it is tremendously important to tribal youngsters and constitutes a boost to the tribal economy.

Benefits

In addition to the usual benefits of increased self-confidence caused by having money and being able to buy better clothes, the work experience which these projects give to Indian youngsters is of immense value in bringing them out of their traditional reserve and giving them the ability to communicate better with employers and strangers. The prestige of NYC inschool programs on the reservations is enormous.

There are some objections to NYC wage levels, since adult Indians can't earn this much on the reservation or off, other than in federally sponsored programs.

Big deficiency

The principal deficiency of the inschool NYC projects on the reservations visited was that there simply were not enough slots even to begin to fulfill the need.

Some needs for help

Some school officials fear that if there were more slots, it might be difficult to find proper work-training assignments for the youngsters with an adequate distribution of supervisors. However, indications are that more teachers' aides are needed. Also (and to the best of our knowledge this has not been seriously considered by the Neighborhood Youth Corp leadership as being necessary or advisable), most of the reservations could use good Indian high school students as tutors for their youngsters who are falling behind and about to drop out, and for adults who wish to learn to read, write, and speak English. This could offer an excellent opportunity for some NYC youngsters not only to earn money but to be of particular use to their tribe.

Vacant slots and selection of relatives

On one fairly typical reservation CAP officials informed us that 500 youths on the reservation appeared to qualify for 30 NYC slots. Because of this they tried to select those from the poorest families. In many reservations all the Indian families meet the criteria for the Neighborhood Youth Corps. Yet, vacant slots exist sometimes because of misunderstandings and delays, and general lack of experience in dealing with the white man's mores and laws. Selection of relatives is a problem on most of the reservations, since what the white man calls "nepotism" with a derogatory connotation is an accepted ethical manner of behavior among Indians. They are often unable to understand why they should not select close relatives.

Politics

Tribal politics also enter into the NYC picture. At the time of our visit to the gigantic Navajo reservation they had no NYC project because of the conditions brought on by a hard-fought tribal election. In another reservation friction between the CAP leadership and the tribal council chairman was in effect ordering the NYC directors to report directly to him, bypassing the Community Action Agency.

Few out-of-school programs

Relatively few out-of-school programs have been set up. Those we encountered during our visits were on the Hopi, Cherokee, Rosebud, and Red Lake Reservations. One reason for the lag in out-of-school programs is that sometimes the out-of-school programs are in the hands of county and non-Indian local people who are only moderately aware of and sympathetic to the problems of Indians. In one instance the CAP Director stated flatly that he did not want an out-of-school program because he didn't want to reward school dropouts.

Where there are programs and slots, there sometimes appears to be difficulty in keeping them filled because of resistance to required educational activities and because the young Indians toward whom the program is aimed are oftentimes not conditioned to accepting steady work. NYC out-of-school assignments on the reservations are simply considered jobs. Yet the fact that these young Indians are reluctant to engage in this kind of "work" is in itself indicative of the need for these programs, in which they can be positively recruited and counseled to stay in the program, and to learn the obligations and privileges of work for wages, as these are seen by the dominant society.

Leading to later work

It is generally recognized that even with the best of supervision and the best of counseling, NYC can hardly lead to a real orientation to the kind of work which will be expected of these youngsters later on. In one small out-of-school reservation project, an innovative arrangement had been made with an employer under which the trainees would work 3 months, including 32 hours per week for NYC and 8 hours for the company, then they would enter full-time employment for the employer. Shortly before our arrival, however, legal questions had arisen because the trainees were in actual production during NYC hours, and the project had to be terminated. The employer did agree to hire all the trainees who were working for him, and thus the project achieved its purpose.

Opportunities for meaningful work

In traveling about over the reservations we saw numerous opportunities for NYC out-of-school work which would, we believe, fall within the legal requirements of these programs, offer a chance for some training even though rudimentary, and be of benefit to the tribe. For example, the roads on many of the larger reservations are very poorly marked or not marked at all. A stranger on the reservation often cannot determine which road to take even from the imperfect maps. A system of simple wooden road signs or streets signs painted and lettered by stencil would be of considerable benefit. The tribe or BIA could furnish the equipment and materials. The NYC trainees could do the work. Substandard housing could be repaired by NYC trainees, with BIA furnishing material and supervision. Recreation spots can be built.[1]

Any project is beneficial which provides an introduction to working for a supervisor under conditions requiring steady attendance. In-school or out-of-school trainees who work in tribal headquarters and for BIA on the reservation obtain valuable training. On the Navaho reservation where they were used as community aides and park recreation aides the additional benefits of these public contact jobs are apparent. Also on the Navaho reservation some of the youngsters in the previous NYC project worked at the Employment Service branch office where they could learn methods of applying for jobs and talking to people.

The matter of guidance

All of these assignments are valuable. They would be more valuable if they could be accompanied by effective counseling, guidance, and information about working conditions, working opportunities, limitations on working opportunities and the like. Sometimes this is available through NYC officials who know the youngsters personally and talk to them individually when problems arise. Provided the NYC officials have sufficient knowledge, such informal guidance can be of immense value to the youth. The nominal role which the Employment Service plays in vocational counseling of NYC trainees should be increased. One of the principal needs of the Indian youngster is information about the outside world, what he might do there, what the pitfalls are, and what the opportunities are. Also, there is a need to dispel misconceptions.

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[1] These possibilities for NYC out-of-school activities could as well be applied to Operation Mainstream.

The Boys' Club at Cherokee

One of the most imaginative and successful uses of the Neighborhood Youth Corps was encountered on the North Carolina Reservation where work for youngsters in the out-of-school program includes various jobs supervised by the Boys' Club: jobs in fish management, as safety aides, bus captains, lawnmower crews, and mechanics, and in construction work, carpentry work and the like. The Boys' Club, which began as the Boys' Farm Club, has been incorporated since 1964; it operates a cooperative fertilizer and feed business, building supplies cooperative, auto shop, school bus company, etc. The manager of the club is a former NYC director and vocational education teacher who often aids in the unofficial counseling of NYC youth. The majority of the supervisors in the club at one time were NYC trainees themselves. Several current bus drivers on the reservation were formerly bus captains or safety aides. The club sells farm and building supplies on a nonprofit basis. An NYC graduate is the manager of the farm and building supply section and NYC trainees deliver, and act as salesmen. The club repairs and maintains all vehicles of the tribe. Club buildings were built by the NYC trainees, who do wiring, plumbing, laying of foundations, carpentry work, and the like.

Features and advantages

The advantages of this type of operation are obvious, not only for the immediate tasks performed but also from the training. A feature of the trainees' experience here is that a number of the boys rotate jobs to obtain a wider range of experience. The club has classroom facilities which are useful in remedial and supplementary classes. This operation, which is so closely linked with the NYC program of the Cherokee Reservation, is of such significance that we urge that it be studied by BWTP officials and by other tribes.

NYC slots outside reservations for reservation Indians

The NYC projects on the reservations would be more valuable to the Indians if training slots could be established in nearby cities outside the reservations where the trainees could become better acquainted with the job expectations of white employers. This would not necessarily be aimed at encouraging the Indians to remove from the reservations. Most of these tribes are trying to bring industry and employment to the reservation, and this type of NYC training would create a better trained work force for prospective employers. Under the present NYC system this would be very difficult without the establishment of local coordinating groups. Also the transportation problem is very real for the reservations, and a busing system would probably have to be worked out.

Followup

Although in the reservation NYC projects visited there was very little post-training followup, the populations of most of the reservations were small enough for the officials to know rather well what happened to each youngster when he completed his NYC training. However, this informal followup should be firmed up and made a part of the NYC system.

Use of NYC earnings

An ingenious method of determining what is being done with the money earned by NYC in-school youngsters was tried in the Cherokee Reservation. There had been criticism that the NYC program simply provided money for buying alcohol and cars. In August 1966, the $8,000 payroll was made up entirely of rare $2 bills. It was possible to trace these bills and check on how the money was spent. It was discovered that most of it was turned over to grocery stores and some to clothing stores as far away as Asheville, North Carolina. Very little was discovered in taverns or liquor stores.

Alcoholism, however, is a problem in some reservations with out-of-school trainees. It causes absenteeism, and sometimes leads to dissipation of NYC earnings.

Criticisms

Criticism of the NYC program followed the usual lines: not enough counseling, sometimes inadequate supervision, and occasionally that the trainees didn't have to work hard enough. An intelligent criticism was given by a BIA official who said that many Indian youngsters are reluctant to meet the public and prefer the sheltered jobs which NYC now offers. He felt that a good counseling program might identify such youngsters and encourage them to get into jobs where they can meet the public.

Transportation

Transportation on the reservations is always a problem, particularly on the larger reservations, since NYC out-of-school trainees have to find a way to get to the work site.

Educational materials

Another problem is the difficulty in getting materials for remedial education. In one tribe where they attempted to start remedial education they had no guidance, tried local resources through GSA without result, went to nearby air bases and found that the materials were too advanced. This would seem to be an area where materials from the national office would be useful.

Personal difficulties

On the poorer reservations the conditions under which Indian youngsters have been reared and the cultural differences between them and the whites affect their response to training programs, whether labeled Neighborhood Youth Corps or something else. Their reserve and shrinking from contact which teachers and others often call backwardness, their sensitivity to charges that they are dirty and smell bad, and their feeling that they are rejected by white youngsters and by white supervisors, lead to extensive dropout from NYC and from school. Youth from many areas retain tribal religious feelings which are misunderstood and mocked, sometimes even by Mexican-American youths whose poverty may approach their own.

In passing, we should note that the summer NYC programs in all reservations were universally approved and generally considered successful. However, there was distress in several locations because more trainee slots were not made available in the summer.

Separate Indian NYC

The problems of NYC programs on the reservation as well as their potentialities are sufficiently different from those of NYC programs elsewhere in our society to warrant, we believe, serious consideration for the establishment of a separate NYC Indian program under much the same theory as the separate Indian CAP program in OEO.

Great potential

As we see the NYC program both in-school and out-of-school, it offers more at the present time to brighten the future of the reservation Indians than any other Department of Labor manpower program. The potential of the NYC program has hardly been tapped. There is opportunity here for some work in developing some really meaningful activity, staffed by youngsters, who can learn much that is valuable at the same time they are producing much that is beneficial to their tribes. The opportunity is far greater than the present limited allotment of slots can show.

J. OTHER MANPOWER PROGRAMS

Benefits of mainstream

1. *Operation Mainstream.* On reservations, work programs are needed for older Indians whose capabilities and prospects are much more limited than any of the younger Indians, who often have insurmountable language problems, and whose lack of skills has made them unemployable outside the reservations. There could hardly have been a better model developed for such people than Operation Mainstream as we have observed it on the reservations. Most of the projects have concerned the preparation of tourist facilities, cleaning up beside the roads, planting, and beautification. These are the kinds of things which older men without skills and without knowledge of English can do well under proper supervision. They are also the kinds of things in which they and the tribe can take pride. They add to the sum of self-respect on the reservation and in addition provide a source of funds and a boost to the tribal economy. Examples of Operation Mainstream participants obtaining work from other employers as a result of their mainstream experience are numerous enough to indicate that this kind of benefit should not be minimized. However, the most important benefit to the individual is to the older Indian of substandard health and capability who would have no chance whatever to earn any money for himself and his family without this.

Collaboration

Where cooperation with other Federal efforts on the reservation can be accomplished in skill training, language, and literacy training, legal advice, health assistance, and the like, the benefits of Operation Mainstream can be greatly enhanced.

Problems

There are not enough of these programs. Tribal leaders do not understand them; CAP officials, if they understand them, have sometimes been unable to muster the necessary enthusiasm or support for them; there are problems of organization, transportation, and supervision which are simply beyond the capabilities of many tribes. There is turnover, particularly in women who quit to take care of their families, and alcoholism often is present among these older Indians.

Need for information and models

Guidance is badly needed. The evaluators were asked repeatedly for information about Mainstream projects, how they could be gotten off the ground, and so forth. During the time of the visits and the recent transition of the program responsibility from OEO to BWP, the field representatives of BWP were not particularly well versed in Operation Mainstream and were unable to give often times the kind of details, advice, and guidance which was necessary. As this report is being written we hope this difficulty has been cleared up. If not, it is strongly suggested that BWTP officials should hold institutes or orientation courses for their field personnel on Operation Mainstream.

Problems of title V

2. *Title V of the Economic Opportunity Act.*—Although title V programs were being phased out in anticipation of the new work incentive program, its successor, some of the problems and lessons learned from the small number of title V programs in operation on the reservations are important. The rather generous payments to heads of families, and the certain knowledge of many that at the end of the title V program the wage earners would be unable, no matter what kind of jobs they got, to go into the job market and obtain as much money, were a hindrance to effective placement after the program. Transportation often has proved to be an almost insurmountable problem for Indian title V trainees. Differences in the administration of the welfare system between the local counties and BIA have effectively blocked programs in some places.

There was a real lack of imaginative thinking about what the title V program can do, and in none of the reservations visited did we see the highly successful rebuilding of homes of welfare clients which was being carried on in Sandoval County, N. Mex. There was also a real problem of coordinating aims between those administering the program and the Employment Service.

A problem concerning Indians

3. *Job Corps.*—Although the Job Corps is not a Labor Department manpower program, the Labor Department is involved, since Employment Service representatives often do recruiting for the Corps. We learned from our visits that there is a very real problem with respect to Indians and Job Corps which the Job Corps has apparently not solved. The problem is that the cultural differences between the Indians who go to the Job Corps camps and the larger number of Negroes there are so great that really beneficial results for the Indians are very difficult to achieve. Dropout is very heavy. Indian youngsters are naturally shy and reserved, and less addicted to the types of aggressive behavior which are learned in the ghettos. This contributes to the inevitable homesickness of the Indian youngster away from the reservation. Our very limited experience leads us to the suggestion that perhaps the Job Corps is unsuitable for reservation Indians and recruitment efforts there should be dropped. This is a suitable subject for further study by OEO.

Effect on tribes

4. *Other Community Action Programs on Reservation.*—Many of these with manpower components or overtones are well known and there is no need to describe them here. CAP projects on reservations have a general record of success. The CAA is usually one of the largest employers in the tribe, and much of the professional and administrative capability of educated members of the tribe is concentrated in the CAP leadership. With the exception of MDTA, the Labor Department manpower programs which have an effect of the reservation are practically always administered by CAP. Withdrawal of CAP funds and CAA leadership from reservations would be a very heavy blow to the Indians.

III. URBAN INDIANS

A. GENERAL SITUATION AND CONDITIONS

Small number

An attempt was made to study urban Indians, particularly the Indians in Denver, Albuquerque, Los Angeles, Phoenix, Oklahoma City, Tulsa, Minneapolis-St. Paul, and Seattle. Pieces of information were secured about Indians in smaller places in Duluth and Gallup. From the beginning we were surprised at the small numbers of Indians living in cities. Many figures concerning urban Indians which we have seen in books and have heard appear to be greatly exaggerated. That there are no reliable statistical sources for data on urban Indian population was discovered early in this study, and we had to depend upon the best local estimates we could find. In Denver, which we had been told was a principal center for urban Indians, the best estimate we could get was that the Indian population ranged from 2,500 to 3,000 and that the Indian population there had been close to this number for several years in spite of the very heavy influx and large turnover.

Examples

In the Los Angeles metropolitan area, there are possibly 15,000 to 20,000 altogether who have come from all parts of the Southwest. In Seattle, a major Indian center, there are 6,000, more or less; and in Minneapolis-St. Paul, 8,000 to 10,000. In Albuquerque, surrounded as it is by Indians, one would expect a large urban Indian population. However, there are only a few thousand. In Tulsa and Oklahoma City, valid statistics are impossible, because of the mixture in Indian blood in the general population; but it was stated that the number of persons on tribal rolls living in these cities is small. In Phoenix, the number is indeterminate; but there, as elsewhere, the best estimates indicate that the permanent Indian population is small.

Indian mobility

Indians come to the cities looking for work; they may find work; they may work for a while; then they go back to the reservation to be replaced by someone else. Those who are relocated by BIA to such centers as Los Angeles and Denver often return to the reservation after having worked a few months or years. During our visits, we did not encounter the floating summer Indian population created by the seasonal migration of Indians from Arizona and New Mexico into cities in Utah and elsewhere to work during the summer, but who return to their southwestern homes during the winter. This seasonal influx sometimes gives rise to exaggerated figures about urban Indian populations.

Reasons for urban turnover

Some reasons for the instability of the Indian population in the cities have been mentioned above—their attachment to the reservations, and (in Oklahoma and Wisconsin) to their rural tribal areas, their inability to adjust to the conditions of living in the city, their exploitation and cheating by unscrupulous white people in the cities their inability to get ahead because of the demands of visiting relatives, and their own lack of knowledge of how to manage their money. Another reason has only been hinted at—the overpowering pressure and ugliness of life in the slums where the Indians so often reside, and the contrast between this life and reservation life, which, although deprived economically, at least is relatively relaxed, with real values of friendship and a sense of belonging. The result is homesickness for the tribe, for the sheltered society of the reservation, for the comfort of the extended family, for the security which the tribal tradition and ceremonies can give.

Indians of various tribes in the cities

Since the Indians in the cities come from various tribes, they have an "Indianness" which is not so apparent on the reservations. That is, they look upon themselves as Indians to some degree, rather than as Papagos, Navajos, or Blackfeet, and will cooperate with numbers of other tribes. Most of the cities have Indian centers, some created by individual initiative, some by particular churches, or by other organizations. These centers attempt to offer places of gathering, places of consultation, and, in some instances, legal and even financial assistance. Their success depends a great deal upon the skill of the management. Many of the Indian managers have little experience in the kind of management which this kind of center requires: thus, some are successes; many are failures.

After BIA

The Indian who is brought to the city by a BIA relocation project finds it hard to shake off his BIA dependence. However, BIA has a time limit for assisting him, and after this has passed, he theoretically is dependent upon whatever apparatus is available to non-Indians in the city for employment and other assistance.

Discrimination

The matter of discrimination against Indians in the urban setting is very hard to define. Discrimination undoubtedly exists, and at places is quite heavy. Some of it is based on a few unfortunate experiences which employers have had with Indians, and the tendency of Americans to generalize on the basis of very limited experience. Thus, an employer who has had one Indian employee who was absent every Monday because he was in jail for drunkenness, may refuse to hire any other Indians in the fear that they're all that way. Employers in Oklahoma City might refuse to hire any Indians "who look like Indians" from any part of the State on the basis of a few unfavorable experiences with some of the less cultured Indians from the northwestern part of the State.

In the Southwest

In the Southwest, with the exception of western Oklahoma, we did not encounter as much discrimination based on racial antipathy, as is prevalent in some of the Northern States. The reverse discrimination mentioned above, in which employers are anxious to hire Indians, appears to be present only in the Southwest, particularly in Denver and Phoenix.

Variations in attitude toward Indians

In ethnically conglomerate cities like Gallup, racial discrimination is virtually nonexistent; Indians may even have an advantage in employment. Stores and other public institutions want Indians who can deal with their Indian customers; speak their language, and so forth. In Tulsa, the possession, of Indian blood, or being "full blood," is actually a mark of distinction, and may bring advancement. In California, the proportion of Indians is so small that attitudes pro or con do not seem to have crystallized. Here, however, Indians often share in prejudice against the Mexican-Americans. In Seattle, the visibility of the "skid row" Indians, mentioned by several informants and observed by us, leads to a stereotyped unfavorable Indian image which contributes to job discrimination, although it was reported that the Boeing Co., the principal employer, does not discriminate.

Their work

Occupations of urban Indians, like those of the white, range from unskilled to professional. The professionals are less visible, in the cities having merged into white society. The skilled workmen, often trained and relocated with BIA help, and their families furnish much of the clientele of the Indian centers and Indian organizations. The unskilled or poorly skilled, who drift in and out of the urban areas, can usually find only menial or day labor work in the cities, if they can find work at all.

B. EMPLOYMENT OFFICE CONTACTS

Little special effort

In the larger cities the small proportion of the Indian population minimizes their importance in regular employment office business. Ethnic records are not kept, there is little special effort made to serve Indians as such, and counselors and interviewers are not specially trained (with a very few exceptions) or oriented toward the problems of Indians. The misconceptions of the general population (that Indians are supported by the Government, that they are lazy and don't want to work, etc.) are often shared by ES personnel in the cities.

There is apparently no conscious discrimination by ES personnel, in the larger cities, and most of those we interviewed, seemed anxious to help Indians, but the insignificance of the group as an urban minority, plus the fact that the BIA employment assistance offices in the cities are concerned with relocatees for six months after relocation, has lessened the frequency of outreach and contact.

Need for orientation

ES personnel in cities with Indian population need orientation and training in the problems and characteristics of the Indians who move into their cities.

The Indians' point of view

On the other side of the coin, Indians who come from reservations have little knowledge of State Employment Services, and tend to ignore them in the cities, even when they are unemployed. They often try to obtain employment assistance from the BIA office, which may try to send them to the ES office. Rather than face the unknown, however, the unemployed Indian may simply drift back to the reservation.

C. URBAN INDIANS IN MDTA

Lack of visibility

In the larger cities Indians are hardly visible in MDTA courses, either institutional or OJT. There are never enough opportunities for all the disadvantaged, no special efforts are made in recruiting to reach the small concentrations of Indians in the cities, and records of Indian participation have usually not been maintained. In these cities, the person who is identifiable as an Indian because of his appearance, his self-proclaimed status, or his recent arrival from a reservation, seldom applies for MDTA training.

In smaller cities near reservations, natually, the proportion of Indian residents and of Indian MDTA enrollees is greater.

Not a priority in cities

We do not feel that the need to increase the participation of urban Indians in MDTA is urgent. The priorities for action in this area lie in the reservations and rural areas. But ES offices should continue to encourage Indians to take available courses, should collaborate more closely with the BIA employment assistance offices located in some of the cities to offer courses to relocatees or other Indians who are underemployed or unemployed. Indian centers should receive literature and visits from ES personnel.

D. APPRENTICESHIPS FOR URBAN INDIANS

Difficulty of spotting

Occasional traces were found of Indian apprentices. For example, out of 15 names picked at random in a spot check with the State Director of Apprenticeship in New Mexico, two individuals were identified as definitely Indian. These were carpenter apprentices. Four Indian ironworker apprentices were reported in Duluth. Generally, however, Indians are not very noticeable in apprentice jobs and in the city areas are hard to identify, particularly if they have common Spanish or British surnames.

Lack of knowledge

The statement was heard several times that Indians don't know about apprenticeships. However, considering the tiny Indian populations of these cities, it is doubtful that their ignorance is any greater than that of other population groups.

Opportunities for apprenticeships

Apparently, in the cities there is little or no prejudice against Indians in apprentice positions. In fact, many informants made the statement that they would be glad to get Indians provided they could do so. In Phoenix and Denver, we were told that those responsible for selecting apprentices would lean over backwards to secure Indian apprentices. In Denver, the opinion was advanced that the Indian youth who was educated well enough to be an apprentice would, like the Negro and the Spanish-American, prefer to get a white collar job because of the prestige attached.

E. URBAN INDIANS AND THE NEIGHBORHOOD YOUTH CORPS

The minuscule Indian urban population does not offer a fertile source for recruitment for NYC. There are a few here and there; usually, however, the urban Indian who loses his job and whose income drops below the family eligibility level for eligibility to NYC, usually returns to his reservation. There are NYC programs in the Indian schools located in the cities, of course, and these are very important for them. In the Oklahoma cities, where the dividing line between the Indian population and the non-Indian is difficult to discern, there are NYC trainees of all degrees of Indian blood, including a few full-bloods.

IV. Oklahoma Indians

A. GENERAL SITUATION AND CONDITIONS

Present status

The Oklahoma Indians do not live on reservations. This is a salient and important fact and a subject of much confusion. At the Kansas City Manpower Conference in February 1967, the representatives of the Oklahoma tribes were constantly frustrated because discussion all centered around the problems of reservations Indians. At the present time, there are about 65 tribes in Oklahoma, totaling about 65,000 people who own private property, live on farms, or live in the urban setting, and who have almost been assimilated into the dominant society. The tribes still have their special identities and their chairmen are recognized by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. As tribes, they often still own land or mineral rights; they continue to press suits against the U.S. Government; and they show worse conditions of unemployment and illiteracy than the dominant white culture of Oklahoma.

The progress of assimilation

The process toward assimilation is moving at a fast pace among the educated—slower among the less well educated. The children of one of the tribal leaders to whom we talked are in or are planning college, speak only a few words of their tribal language, know a few tribal dances, but have practically no knowledge of Indian culture. This man said, "In 30 years the Indian will be practically extinct. I hate to see the Indian culture go, but this is the price of successfully living in the white man's world." This attitude was frequently met among Indian people in Oklahoma who have achieved middle class educational and economic status.

Differences between East and West

Conditions in eastern Oklahoma, particularly among the "five civilized tribes" (Choctaws, Chickasaws, Cherokees, Seminoles, and Creeks) differ in many essential details from those in western Oklahoma, where most of the Indians are members of the Plains Tribes. The five civilized tribes, and the others associated with them, such as the Osage and the Delaware, are generally considered to have advanced further toward the white man's culture than the Plains Indians in the West. Their almost complete assimilation into the local society is not reflected in the West, particularly in the Northwest, where the Indians are still considered a race apart, and are subject to considerable discrimination. In the eastern part of the State the dividing line between the Indian part of the population and the white population is often impossible to discern. Many tribal members who are prominent in Indian affairs are only one-quarter Indian. The five civilized tribes have a long tradition of intermarriage with whites, some of the most famous chiefs in their history having had only a small fraction of Indian blood.

Wealth and poverty

For the Indians, Oklahoma is a land of contrasts. On one side, there are the wealthy millionaire Indians who have made money in oil; on the other hand, there are the poor, illiterate Indians who can barely speak English or who speak none at all, who must still converse in their own language, and who can read and write in no language who still harbor considerable resentment against their treatment by the white man, and who resist assimilation.

Difficulty of generalization

In such a setting, statistics about "Indians" are hard to come by Generalizations which are made by Oklahoma informants usually upon further questioning, turn out to be made about those who are predominantly Indian; that is, those who are one-half Indian or more

Rise and decline

For the past several decades, the Indians in Oklahoma have appeared to drop behind the white population in material and educational progress. There was a time in the history of the State when some of the tribes, particularly the five civilized tribes, were progressing faster than other Americans, and in the fullness of prosperity and cultural richness, their autonomous "nations" were rapidly reaching a pinnacle which would have created envy in most any group. However, the participation on the side of the Confederacy led to harsh action after the Civil War, and a gradual retrogression.

Many of the cultural characteristics of reservation Indians have been retained by the Oklahoma Indians. They still have the tendency to share their property with one another, the inclination to cling to their home communities and to return to them, the maintenance of the extended family, and the like.

Considering assimilation

Oklahoma is one of the centers of the "New Indians", representatives of a militant movement attempting to retain an Indian identity. There are also strong "conservative" Indian societies in Oklahoma ("Conservative" to an Indian, means one who is attempting to preserve Indian traditions, religion, and language). There is an unspoken but increasingly important alliance between the two groups.

Discrimination

Discrimination against the Indians in Oklahoma is present. In Oklahoma City it was reported by a Negro leader that there is widespread discrimination against Indians "who look like Indians", but little or no discrimination against Indians who look like white people.

We encountered at places the stereotyped conception that Indians are untrustworthy, drink a great deal, and generally make unreliable employees. Such opinions were more prevalent in the western portion, and for the most part has to do with Plains Indians who have not yet been so fully acculturated. One employment service official working in eastern Oklahoma, but who had come from western Oklahoma, said that he had been surprised at the difference in attitude.

Whether or not the reservation is a community with well-defined limits in which the Indian can maintain his own identity and to some extent rule his own destiny, or whether it is, as some contend, a continuing symbol of discrimination, the fact is that the lack of reservations in Oklahoma has created some special problems. The Indians for the most part are anxious to retain the racial and tribal identities, but find it more and more difficult. Where the tribes are intermixed in the same locality, as is the rule rather than the exception, the conflicts of tribal loyalties and the possibility of discrimination by officials with affiliations in one tribe against members of another tribe are always present.

Separate Indian identity

The Oklahoma Indians, at least their leaders, want to be considered as a separate group with separate problems. Yet, officially, most elements in Oklahoma have erased the outward symbols of segregation and differentiation so that many administrators take great pride in not knowing who is an Indian and who is not an Indian.

The problem this poses for Federal and State officials is mainly one of emphasis, direction, and identification.

B. EMPLOYMENT AND THE ES

Conditions of employment

Many of the Indians in Oklahoma do farm labor. This work is dwindling. Formerly, in the eastern portion, thousands of them worked in the timber industry, but the timber is now exhausted and this means of livelihood has disappeared. Most of the Indians who are employed in Oklahoma are employed in services outside the larger urban centers and in the factories scattered throughout the State. Much of their work is intermittent and seasonal, which partly explains their poverty. There is a consensus that the Indians in Oklahoma are unemployed and underemployed to a much greater extent than whites.

The close connections of the Employment Service of Oklahoma with Indian groups, the large number of ES employees who have varying portions of Indian blood, and the general lack of any kind of orientation toward discrimination insure that over most of the State Indians do not look upon the Employment Service as an agent of discrimination. Employment Service staff members encountered by us who expressed the stereotyped prejudices about Indians were few.

Employment Service and lower strata Indians

This identification with the Indians of Oklahoma by the Employment Service does not necessarily mean that the Indians look upon the Employment Service with a universally favorable image. The large number of Indians with poor education lack marketable skills. In the rural areas of Oklahoma there is little employment for them. In the urban areas such as Tulsa, practically any Indian who is willing to work can find a job. Often, however, his qualifications insure that the work to which the Employment Service can refer him must be of the casual laborer or lower paid service type. This creates some resentment, and there is some feeling on the part of Indians that they are being deliberately kept underemployed by the government structure.

Little help to unskilled Indians

A State welfare official said that the Employment Service offered no real help to people without marketable skills. An Urban League official said that the Employment Service is not effective with low-income groups. An Employment Service official stated that the disadvantaged are reticent about coming to the employment office to apply for work.

Favorable part of the image

A Cherokee tribal official, however, stated that even back in the hills, practically all of the Cherokees are familiar with the Employment Service, but they don't come in because the Employment Service can give them no jobs, and because they have no cars to travel to the employment office; they have no education, no mobility.

Favorable comments

A BIA official in Oklahoma stated that the State employment service is receptive toward doing everything possible toward helping the Indians. A chief of a prominent tribe said that he encourages Indians to register at the Employment Service because sometimes jobs outside the State result, that Indians hear about the Employment Service from word of mouth, that sometimes they use the Employment Service to get directions toward migrant work, then may go out on their own.

Negative part

Most of the Indians, irrespective of their feeling concerning the effectiveness of the Employment Service, indicated that the Employment Service had very few jobs for them. In western Oklahoma, where the Employment Service faces its greatest problems because of employer attitude toward Indians, this pessimism seemed to be greater.

New efforts

The moves of USES to strengthen its capability for serving Indians have benefited Oklahoma. Newly appointed Indian HRD representatives late in 1967 were making manpower surveys and analysis in areas of Indian population. The Oklahoma State Employment Service has prepared information packets for distribution to tribal groups and others.

Location of YOC's

The YOC's in Oklahoma City and Tulsa have made earnest efforts to improve their capacity for service to Indians, including Indians on the staff and outreach capability. However, both these YOC's are handicapped by extremely inconvenient locations on upper floors of downtown office buildings. The employment service role with respect to NYC youngsters in Oklahoma varies greatly from area to area. In most instances, the relationships are good, and the employment service will furnish whatever services are requested of them by the NYC sponsoring staff.

C. MDTA TRAINING

Lack of outreach

The employment service's lack of outreach capability affects enrollment in MDTA courses, since only those Indians who are alert enough, well-enough oriented to urban society, or who are brought to the employment office by knowledgeable friends or community organizations are in line for MDTA enrollments. The general lack of discrimination and race consciousness on the part of employment service personnel, prevalent in much of the State, strangely enough seems to work to the detriment of Indian participation in MDTA. The employment service officers are so conscientious about taking people who come to the office irrespective of race that the nonaggressive Indian who stays in the background and who would, were he approached, be quite anxious to enroll in an MDTA course, often doesn't get the opportunity.

MDTA boarding classes

In Oklahoma, much MDTA training is concentrated in training centers run by existing schools, such as Northeastern State College and the Okmulgee Technical Institute. The trainees are sent in from other parts of the State on a subsistence basis and are actually boarding students. This is a good device for a heavily rural State with limited vocational training facilities and is indicative of an earnest desire to make the benefits of MDTA available to all people in the State. It is also consistent with our recommendations in previous evaluation reports concerning the establishment of MDTA training centers.

Lack of ethnic data

However, attempts to determine the number of Indians who were benefiting from this arrangement fell rather flat. To begin with, the instructors didn't know who was an Indian and who was not; no ethnic record was kept. When knowledge was pooled and people's personal knowledge of who was an Indian and who was not was called upon, it was found that the number of actual Indians, that is, those one-quarter Indian or more, was proportionately quite small.

OJT in western Oklahoma

The OJT project at Sequoyah Mills Anadarko (400 slots plus proposal for 360 slots at Elk City funiture plant and negotiating 300 slots at another subsidiary) should be mentioned as an example of what can be done in training Indians for steady work on permanent jobs.

D. NYC

Where tribes sponsor NYC

The Neighborhood Youth Corps program in the Indian regions of Oklahoma has a bright and positive look, and is rather popular with the Indians. The Osages and Cherokees are sponsors of extensive NYC programs covering not only their own tribesmen, but members of other Indian tribes and white people, and Negroes as well, over several counties. Indians are proud of these programs, and very proud of the fact that the tribes are sponsoring them. Much of the initiative in sponsoring them is due to suggestions and assistance rendered by the Bureau of Indian Affairs in developing and preparing the proposals.

However, their administration has been in the hands of the Indians themselves, and has been carried on with imagination and initiative.

Followup at Pawhuska

The Osage project with headquarters at Pawhuska gave us a view of the most careful system of followup and the most positive connection with the employment service that we have yet found in NYC in-school or out-of-school projects. Very careful records are maintained the youngsters are followed after they leave both the in-school and out-of-school projects, and the directors of the project themselves do not hesitate to make special arrangements for a particular youngster to be given special attention at the employment office in Tulsa, or elsewhere in the area.

Early prejudice

In the early stages of the NYC program when the NYC sponsors attempted to find training slots for Indians and Negroes in Oklahoma City, it was stated that they encountered a great deal of prejudice against both Indians and Negroes, and that people were reluctant to work with either Indians or Negroes. Once the introduction was made, however, there was no more difficulty. Some officials indicated that they felt that NYC had done a lot around Oklahoma to break down some of the remaining prejudice.

Reductions

In Oklahoma, as in other Southwestern States we visited, there had been a substantial reduction in NYC slots during the second year of operation which caused a great deal of trauma.

Recruiting

Much of the recruiting was done by employment service in places where the employment service has the capability. However, the lack of outreach capability by the employment service, lack of travel funds, and so forth, has greatly inhibited employment service usefulness in recruitment. There is a problem in the recruitment of Indians in the rural areas. Unlike reservation Indians, they are reported to be suspicious of Federal programs and to pay very little attention to the average white who comes around attempting to persuade them to undertake some governmental program. Indian outreach personnel are needed.

Counseling

A substantial amount of counseling of out-of-school trainees is going on. Most of it, however, is not done by the employment service, but by counselors hired by the sponsors. The Indian youngsters badly need continuing advice and guidance.

Placement

Placement by the employment service is spotty. In some cases, particularly where there are close connections between the NYC sponsor and the employment service, it is fairly good. In other places, there is no real attempt to have the former NYC trainee placed by the employment service. In many instances, the NYC sponsors run their own job development centers to locate jobs. Followup, generally, except for the Indian-sponsored projects already mentioned, is nominal.

A report has been received from Oklahoma on 1966 high school graduates who were in the Cherokee NYC project. Out of a total of 623 graduates, 254 (41 percent) were in college, 178 (28 percent) were employed in industry, 69 (11 percent) were in the Armed Forces, 39 (6 percent) were unemployed, and the others were married, or could not be traced.

Indian boarding school

An interesting facet of the Osage project is that in their area they have a BIA Indian school which has 250 Eskimos in it. These Eskimo children did not arrive with clothing suitable for the climate. They, and many other children there, have no income source at all. NYC, for those who are fortunate enough to be chosen, furnishes an income for them. However, at the time of the visit there were 1,100 Indian children in school, most of them eligible for NYC, and only 10 NYC slots were available. This indicates the tremendous need. NYC sponsoring officials hoped that the summer NYC program would help this matter. They indicated that some of the Indian kids were so hungry for work, and needed any amount of money so badly, that they would ask for as little as 1 hour of work, although this was completely impractical. As a result of conditions at this boarding school, the dropout rate was very, very heavy.

Oklahoma City dropouts

Despite the popularity of NYC with Indians and despite the need which it fulfills, many of the Indian youngsters have real problems and the dropout from NYC's out-of-school program is relatively heavy. For example, in an NYC out-of-school project of 125 enrollees in Oklahoma City, of whom 12 were Indians, there were only four Indians left at the time of the visit. Eight other Indians had dropped out. Their reasons, as given by the sponsors:

(1) Male, on probation and ran away because he couldn't stay put;
(2) Female, irregular, ran off, picked up by the law, which took her back to the girl's training school;
(3) Female, irregular, became pregnant;
(4) Female, quit to enroll in an MDTA course;
(5) Male, was recommended for full-time employment but his police record was found out; after that he started straying off irregularly, and finally quit;
(6) Male, simply quit, no reason known;
(7) Female, disappeared and could not be located;
(8) Male, married, left for reasons not known.

The problems of many Indian families in an urban society are well illustrated by the above. The youngsters drift toward delinquency, the parents towards alcoholism, and it could be said that their urge to return to the reservation or their marginal farms is really an instinct for survival.

Rural dropout

But dropout problems are not confined to urban Indians. In two rural counties between Tulsa and Oklahoma City with almost exclusively Indian populations, 45 had been enrolled in the last 18 months, and practically all had dropped out. The field representative of the sponsor said that the principal cause underlying their dropping out was lack of home discipline, the permissiveness of the Indian family in which they had been raised was responsible, If they felt a little bad, they didn't come in. If they got drunk over the weekend, they wouldn't come in on Monday, and might not come back at all. They are also in constant trouble with the police. This description appeared to apply to one or two particular tribal groups in this area, and was not echoed in other counties within the same project. As indicated earlier in this report, there is a great deal of variation among tribes.

Inschool problems

The difficulties of adjustment are also noticeable in the inschool project. A county school official made almost the same statement as the out-of-school field representative concerning the lack of initiative, lack of concern, lack of discipline in the home.

NYC social problems

He said they were not dependable on the job. Many of them had very rough home situations. The marriage customs of the white people don't mean a whole lot in some of the tribes. One high school boy who was in the NYC program had been living in the home of a half-sister who was pregnant, father unknown. This boy himself had a 14-year-old girl living with him and she was pregnant. The school arranged the marriage, helped get them certificates, blood tests, and so forth, got some benefits from BIA, and the like. But at the last minute the girl's mother refused consent, and there was no marriage. These problems, of course, are not radically different from the problems which NYC sponsors face everywhere.

Remedial services

Shortly after our visit to Oklahoma, funds were made available by BWP for remedial services in some of the projects. However, there was no indication at the time that the sponsors would be able to extend this into future years. Remedial services and supportive services are very badly needed by the Indians.

Lack of vocational counseling

The lack of vocational counseling by experienced and knowledgeable vocational counselors, both for in-school trainees and out-of-school trainees, was freqently mentioned. In some cases they attempt to get this through BIA or the Employment Service. Wherever the sponsors have asked the Employment Service for group counseling sessions, it has always been available. Apparently, there have been few attempts to get individual vocational counseling from the Employment Service for other in-school trainees or out-of-school trainees. We were told that the Indian youngsters badly need the most elementary information concerning the world of work, the kind of jobs they can get, where they can get them, and the like.

Parent-child relationship

One of the difficulties is that the Indians want to be segregated. Their traditions includes more deference to their elders than is customary in white American society. This means that if an Indian youngster is counseled personally by a non-Indian, he may become confused and go home and report either incorrectly to his parents, or his parents will not understand this third-hand information about what the counselor has recommended. The youngsters are very hesistant to move without the consent of their elders. An Indian counselor will recognize this and take it into account, is more likely to put it into terms which the parents will understand, and may be in a position to talk with the parent themselves.

Trainability a criterion

One NYC sponsoring official presented what he considered a real problem. He said that with the increasing emphasis on education of NYC trainees instead of merely giving them work, a screening will be made for trainability, and thus the really hard-core kids, the retarded, the bottom-of-the-barrel will be eliminated. He said that there was a ruling that no out-of-school youngster can stay in the program more than 6 months unless he had at least 6 hours of supportive services, and that some of the enrollees really were not up to the level where they could take the supportive services which were needed. He could, he thought, get an exception for these, but the problem was illustrative of the growing emphasis on trainability.

If the basic purpose of NYC is simply to take the youngsters off the streets and give them an introduction to work and an income for a short time, this official's argument would make considerable sense. However, it does seem that the task of training NYC youngsters is an important one and so long as exceptions are possible from the rules, the emphasis on training should be continued.

Transfer out-of-school to inschool

It was in Oklahoma that the difficulty in transferring out-of-school NYC trainee enrollees to inschool slots became most dramatic. Instances were brought to our attention where out-of-school trainees wanted to return to school, should be encouraged to return to school, but could not return to school without some income. Attempts to work them into the local on-going inschool slots had run into difficulty because (1) the inschool slots were filled, and (2) there was a waiting list. Usually the inschool and out-of-school trainees had differing sponsors. In an instance where they had the same sponsor, the Osage project, it was stated that this could always be worked out. Elsewhere the necessity for some kind of flexibility to permit this was not apparent. Since one of the purposes of the NYC out-of-school program is to encourage youngsters to go back to school, it would seem that something should be done to make this kind of process easier.

V. TESTING OF INDIANS

Lower scores on GATB verbal

It is to be expected that Indians who are not completely fluent in English will score lower on the verbal portions of the general aptitude test battery, and such a result was reported by the Employment Service people who administered tests to Indians in the offices which we visited. The difficulty of the Indian in verbal tests is due to (1) usually English is not his native language, not the language in which he originally began to think, and often not the language spoken in his home; and (2) even if English is his natural language, his cultural background is often so different that he has difficulty getting into the proper psychological mood for the test, and in addition many of the questions, or situations, in the tests are foreign to him.

Are tests needed?

In most of the localities we visited, particularly in the Southwest, it was recognized that standard tests were inadequate, or even improper for Indians. Yet they were still given because anything else was lacking, and possibly because it was felt that they were required. There were indications that the more imaginative Employment Service people were using the test properly as only rough indications of certain abilities, and were not using them as screening devices for Indians. For example, the CAP director from one of the largest pueblos in New Mexico objected strongly to the use of testing on Indians in making selections for MDTA, but was told by the MDTA representative of the Employment Service that the tests were only rough guides, that they recognize the problems of Indians in taking tests, and that test results were ignored in some cases. This happened in other places too. It raises the question as to why the tests should be given at all. Would not other measuring devices, including interviewing, be sufficiently indicative?

Special uses of testing

A more defensible use of testing was apparently made in selecting people for positions in which manual dexterity was necessary. The electronics plant on the Navajo Reservation is an example. Indian women in particular are reputed to have extremely high manual finger dexterity, and apparently in the GATB, they test very highly in this faculty. In a few localities, there are agreements to test the BIA employment assistance clients. Most of these employment assistance clients who are not fluent in English do rather poorly on the verbal portions.

We found the State employment test technicians reluctant to make any comparisons of Indian verbal scores with those of other ethnic groups, since any opinions they have are not based on any kind of scientific evidence. However, it is obvious that the scores of Indians as a group on available tests are lower than those of whites. There are exceptions, especially among tribes where English is the normal language of the homes. Work sample testing was frequently mentioned as being part of the answer. Work was underway toward developing a special set of norms for the Navajos in connection with testing for electronic assembly work.

Some innovations—Why necessary?

There have been attempts to use the IPAT "Culture Fair" test with the Indians. Generally these efforts have not been considered successful. However, a particularly imaginative use of this with monolingual Cherokee speakers in Oklahoma is worthy of note. In recruiting NYC out-of-school trainees for the Wild Life Commission project, many of the youngsters didn't speak English well enough really to be tested. However, once they were persuaded to be tested, the employment service put those who could speak English between others, and reported the results as satisfactory. They then tried the same thing on migrants from Texas, 80 percent of whom had no English, and believed they had good luck there. Again, however, the question arises, if it is necessary in order to get any kind of results to go to such devices, why give the test at all? Why not simply make the selection on the basis of interviews?

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. RECOMMENDATIONS OF AD HOC ADVISORY COMMITTEE

The recommendations of the ad hoc advisory committee to USES on Indian employment programs are repeated below:

1. The Indian desk should be situated at Department level and headed by a person of American Indian ancestry, who would have major responsibility for the coordination of activities between the Federal and State governments, industry, and the community-at-large to bring the Indian population into the mainstream of our economy,
   - (*a*) The desk should provide proper interstate coordination of funded programs (when more than one State would be involved), establish priorities and allocate funds as needed programwide rather than along narrow State considerations,
   - (*b*) The desk should work closely with unions to assure equal opportunity for Indians in all activities requiring union affiliation,
   - (*c*) The desk should help tribes in program development and should facilitate and assist in a fuller utilization of existing Federal and State programs which can help to improve the socioeconomic status of Indians.
   - (*d*) Research and development should be important functions of the desk. These activities would serve to determine what services were needed in particular kinds of situations involving Indians on and off reservations, and allow for alterations and innovations in programs designed to help the target group. Indians who desire to stay on reservations should be given the opportunity to develop their talents in productive employment thereon. The same should apply to those who desire to seek opportunity elsewhere.
   - (*e*) As an extension of the Employment Service, the Indian desk should also be concerned with the administration and dissemination of job market information and should, therefore, be a source of direct assistance to Indians and employers alike,
   - (*f*) The desk should not only be concerned with establishing jobs or finding employment for the Indian people, but it should also look into vocational training employability development, development and the bringing of industry onto or near a reservation. The Indians should be given maximum exposure to job opportunities and training. Furthermore considerable efforts must be made to facilitate the individual potential for growth and development, and
   - (*g*) The Indian desk should work in close cooperation with the Bureau of Indian Affairs, appropriate units of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and other Federal agencies which have programs relating to the Indian. This will enable the Indian desk to become more involved in the total programs for American Indians.
2. A half-way house program should be established to ease the cultural shock of Indians moving from reservations to an urban environment.
3. Inservice training or OJT training should be encouraged and urged on employers of Indians to upgrade the skills of Indians and make them available to employers on or off reservations.

4. A thorough analysis of the problems and the human and natural resources should be made on the various Indian reservations and in communities with large Indian populations to get at the heart of the economic and social needs of the group.

5. The HRD concept should be utilized to the fullest extent possible to reach Indians, even in the most remote areas and ghettos on or off reservations.

6. The USES and its affiliated State agencies should make maximum use of Indians in staffing local offices and filling outreach positions.

7. Representatives of organized labor should be asked to participate on all committees and in economic development programs at every level—State, national, local.

8. The USES should prepare an information packet of all programs that touch on the problems of Indians. In addition, a packet of materials should be prepared which show success stories of tribal economic and industrial activities.

9. Since the problems of bringing Indians into the mainstream of our economy are so vast and will require the resources of many agencies, the Employment Service should be primarily involved with employability and job development.

10. With proper economic resource inducements, the Employment Service ought to look into the possibility of utilizing local employers as well as large national firms to expand their establishments onto reservations. The support of groups such as Plans for Progress, National Association of Manufacturers, and the Chamber of Commerce should be made available to these groups.

11. Groups of employer representatives should be brought to the reservations and exposed to first-hand information about the successful enterprises already established.

12. Economic Development Corporation should be encouraged and organized on reservations to help the Indians help themselves.

Our findings lead us to agree with all of these recommendations, although there seems to be too much emphasis on moving Indians into urban environments and into the "mainstream," concepts which, in our opinion are rapidly becoming outmoded, which in the past have led to a general record of failure in manpower development, and which will continue to do so in the future.

The committee's recommendations are, of course, general and need to be translated into a specific action program.

Our recommendations are as follows:

B. SENSITIVITY INDOCTRINATION

It is inevitable that the prevalent misconceptions of white people about Indians should be shared by many Federal and State officials. It is less excusable that Federal and State officials who have to work with Indians and to pass on Indian programs should be ignorant of Indian psychology, traditions, or conditions. and should therefore frequently make blunders of fact and relationships. Yet this is constantly happening.

The new Indian specialist heading the Indian desk in the Office of the Manpower Administration will be able to help at the national level. But very badly needed are indoctrination courses conducted by Indians and experts on Indians, somewhat like the seminars given for USES HRD Indian personnel, but more perhaps like the indoctrination given Indian trainees on how to live in the white man's world. The white man who works with Indians needs to know very much about them.

Recommendation No. 1

That the Manpower Administration's new "Indian desk" undertake as an urgent task the development of courses on Indian mores, psychology, traditions, and needs, organized roughly on a regional bases, and that attendance be mandatory for officials of national and regional offices who work with Indians, and strongly recommended for State ES officials.

C. RECRUITMENT OF INDIANS FOR THE MANPOWER ADMINISTRATION

To improve the Department's posture toward Indians, as well as increase the understanding of officials in the area of Indian problems, it is essential that more Indian spokesmen be available in higher level positions. Indians who are willing to work in the cities, and who have the requisite professional qualifications, are hard to find. Positive recruitment efforts are needed. The new Indian desk should take an active part in such recruitment, and the National Congress of American Indians should be called upon for assistance.

Recommendation No. 2

That an active effort be made to recruit knowledgeable and able Indians for high-level positions in the Manpower Administration, the national offices of USES and BWTP, and in the offices of Regional Manpower Administrators and Regional Directors who have Indian tribes in their regions, and that State ES offices be encouraged to do the same.

D. AN OVERALL DEPARTMENT POLICY FOR INDIANS

The conflict between the ideals of total acculturation and retention of tribal identity and traditions cannot be resolved by the Department of Labor, by the Bureau of Indian Affairs or any by other governmental agency. It should not be attempted. The Indians should do it themselves, and the Department of Labor, along with other Government agencies, should assist them, either as a group or as tribes, to attain their objectives.

The Manpower Administration, we believe, should establish a basic policy defining the purpose of manpower programs for Indians, to serve as a framework for planning, as follows:

Recommendation No. 3

That an overall Indian manpower policy of the Department of Labor be established in terms similar to the following: It is the policy of the Department of Labor to help American Indians attain the capability for steady work at standard wages in the locations where the Indians live or nearby, encouraging the Indians, if they wish, to retain their tribal traditions and values. At the same time, provided viable programs to do so can be mounted, and the tribal councils involved specifically request it, the Department of Labor will assist in manpower efforts leading to relocation of of trained Indian workers.

E. CONCENTRATION OF ES EFFORT

Whether or not the above is adopted as department policy, USES should channel its efforts for Indians in directions where they will do the most good.

We can only comment favorably on the earnestness of the national office of USES in its efforts to improve services to Indians. In these efforts, however, there is still considerable dissipation of efforts in the unproductive sphere of attempted assimilation. Badly needed is a sense of direction, a guideline for concentration of limited resources. Because of the above need, limited employment opportunities, and lack of interest by Indians in visiting the employment offices on reservations, some ES representatives lack opportunities for activity.

Recommendation No. 4

That USES concentrate its efforts for Indians into the reservation and rural Indian areas, with the aim of encouraging training and job development in these areas, assisting vigorously in efforts to develop or bring in industry, and counseling and guiding Indians in matters concerning work.

F. GUIDELINES FOR PERSONNEL SERVING INDIANS

The report discussed the feeling of futility resulting from the attempts of State ES personnel to translate regular employment offices to reservations without any real sense of direction or guideline as to what they are expected to do for Indians. The following recommendation results from this.

Recommendation No. 5

That USES prepare and issue guidelines for ES activity in serving Indians, covering items such as (1) department policy, (2) the concept of service by counseling and guiding Indians and helping bring in industry, and (3) the necessity for close collaboration with tribal councils, community action agencies, and BIA.

G. STAFFING ACTION

USES national office efforts to staff the new positions for Indian assistance with qualified Indians have, at a few places, apparently run afoul of State regulations and indifference, inertia, and ineptness on the part of those responsible for recruiting. USES needs to take vigorous action as follows:

Recommendation No. 6

That USES instruct its regional offices to have careful and thorough checks made into the staffing and operation of every position created for the purpose of serving Indians, and to take, or recommend, whatever steps are necessary to carry out the intent of the national office, including securing of changes in State civil service requirements.

H. COORDINATION

The problems of coordination of programs to serve Indians are, in a sense, like such problems everywhere, but there are unique features.

In the manpower field three agencies are primarily concerned; OEO, DOL, and BIA, and (very important) the tribe Local education officials are concerned where MDTA is involved. Public Health and Department of Agriculture officials should also be involved. There should be a continuing mechanism for effecting coordination and collaboration, so that, among other things the ES and BIA employment staffs can work closely together, so that MDTA and community action programs can be meshed, the ES representatives can come out of their frequent semi-isolation and become a part of community action, and all Federal officials can plan jointly with the Indian tribes themselves.

> *Recommendation No. 7*
>
> That a system of local coordinating committees be developed and promulgated simultaneously by the Manpower Administration, the Office of Economic Opportunity, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The initiative should be taken by the Manpower Administrator, inviting the other agencies to participate in preliminary discussions.

I. USE OF COACHES

The problems of newly employed Indians in adapting to the demands of white employers result in heavy absenteeism and turnover. This can and has often been disastrous to OJT programs and continued placement efforts of ES and BIA.

In concentrated employment programs coaches are engaged who counsel newly employed persons, and work with the employers to keep the new employees productive, dependable, and on the job until they have adjusted to the working conditions. These coaches can explain working rules, classifications, union rules, the necessity for promptness and dependability, and so forth.

Something like this is needed generally for Indians. The new Indian personnel of the Employment Service stationed on reservations theoretically could perform this function, although their experience in industry may be limited.

We encountered one example of success in such endeavors by an Indian "community aide" under ES.

> *Recommendation No. 8*
>
> *a.* That USES actively and vigorously promulgate the concept of followup on the job by Indian ES personnel on reservations, furnishing these personnel needed training in methods of "coaching" and making sure that they have adequate transportation facilities to all parts of the reservations and to nearby cities.
>
> *b.* That MDTA-OJT institutional projects for Indians include one such Indian "coach" or counselor for every 20 trainees. Such a person would work with the trainees during training, assist in their placement, and continue to work with them after placement.

J. CHANGES IN MDTA PROGRAMS

The handicaps and difficulties of MDTA programs in helping reservation Indians were discussed in the body of the report. Also discussed were the need for crafts training, and training for helper positions among Indians, and the inequities of testing prospective Indian MDTA trainees with standard tests.

Recommendation No. 9

That MDTA be made more responsive to the needs of reservation and rural Indians through the encouragement of:

a. Training in the traditional Indian crafts;
b. Training of Indians as helpers in the building trades;
c. Use of MDTA to establish labor pools on reservations;
d. Use of other valid means of selection than standard tests.

If there are impediments to any of the above in MDTA policy or in the attitudes of labor union locals, ways of overcoming these obstacles without harm to the overall objectives of MDTA should be vigorously sought.

K. SEPARATE INDIAN NYC PROGRAM

That the Neighborhood Youth Corps represents a shining hope to rural and reservation Indians is abundantly clear. The tragedy lies in the limited number of slots available. The words "drying up" applied to NYC programs for Indians seems to be adequately descriptive. Problems and benefits of NYC among Indians are sufficiently distinct from those of the rest of the population to warrant separate direction for it.

Recommendation No. 10

That the Manpower Administrator create a task force or study group, containing staff planning personnel, BWTP officials and experienced Indian NYC sponsors, to study and make recommendations on the advisability and feasibility of a separate NYC program for Indians.

AN ECONOMIC EVALUATION OF ON-THE-JOB TRAINING CONDUCTED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS: CONCEPTS AND PRELIMINARY FINDINGS

By LOREN C. SCOTT and DAVID W. STEVENS*

FOREWORD

In order to insure the effectiveness of Federal programs to assist the Indians, it is necessary to be able to systematically evaluate the the progress made under different programs. Lawrence Scott and David Stevens have developed a conceptual framework for evaluating the private and social benefits of the Bureau of Indian Affairs on-the-job training program. They have applied this model to a sample of 78 trainees, comparing number of months worked in the year and average monthly earnings before and after training. There was a significant increase in the number of months worked and in average earnings following training, but the evidence suggests that this was at least partly due to the recruitment and screening of the trainees, rather than to the training per se. The training periods appeared to be unnecessarily long. It may be that the same benefits could have been obtained with a smaller expenditure of Federal funds.

Introduction

This paper explores the evaluative methodology and preliminary findings from a study of the effectiveness of the Bureau of Indian Affairs on-the-job training program (BIA–OJT). Two other BIA employment assistance programs, direct employment assistance (DE) and adult vocational training (AVT), are not included in this analysis.

The evaluative framework is presented first, followed by a brief outline of the administrative procedures used in carrying out the statutory directives. The tentative findings from interviews with participating employers are presented in a third section, and preliminary analysis of responses to a mailed questionnaire by former trainees follows this. Tentative conclusions are presented in a final section.

I. AN EVALUATIVE FRAMEWORK

Introduction.—The purpose of this section is to introduce the evaluative criteria set that will be used in subsequent pages to study the effectiveness of the BIA–OJT program in achieving its established objective(s). This presentation is a skeletal synthesis of relevant methodological contributions made by our predecessors in evaluating public sector programs.[1] No claim to originality is made although to our knowledge this paper represents the first *application* of economic analysis in evaluating the BIA–OJT program.[2]

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PUBLIC SECTOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND THE BIA

Public Law 959 states in part, that—

> * * * in order to help adult Indians who reside on or near Indian reservations to obtain reasonable and satisfactory employment, the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to undertake a program of * * * on-the-job training * * *[3]

The Chief of the Branch of Employment Assistance, BIA, states that:

> All of the various activities of the employment assistance program are directed toward employment. * * * On-the-job training is the activity whereby employment is immediate and the individual learns while working.[4]

This statement of purpose, or single-factor objective, appears to be explicit enough at first glance. However, employment is not usually desired as an end itself, but rather serves as a surrogate for two other objective factors; namely, increased income (consumption) and a redistribution of income (consumption). [6, p. 23; and 4, pp. 177 ff.]

Recognition of a multifactor objective suggests the need for a quantitative weighing of the component elements. [3] Otherwise, there is no basis for evaluating the relative effectiveness of the program in achieving each of its multiple objectives. For purposes of this paper, it is assumed that only redistribution of income is considered in BIA–OJT program decisionmaking.[5]

Two levels of decisionmaking *are not* considered here, although it is recognized that social welfare maximization ultimately requires attention to these allocation decisions. [See 5.] It is assumed that the division of resources *between* the public and private sectors has already been accomplished. It is also assumed that the allocation of resources *within* the public sector has been determined among the competing broad objective factors such as national defense, law enforcement, and investment in human resources.

The decisions that *are* of interest in this paper are those that determine the division of public sector resources within the BIA between on-the-job training and other programs restricted to Indian participants, and those which allocate resources to substitute and complementary programs in public agencies other than the BIA which are available, but not restricted, to Indian participants.

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[1] Selected references to the methodological literature on program evaluation are indicated by bracketed numbers in the text, which in turn refer to a bibliography at the end of the paper. Each source cited will be understood by noneconomists. Direction to the more technical literature on specific conceptual problems can be found in the citations in these sources. [See 10.]

[2] The authors are aware of, but have not seen, Alan Sorkin's manuscript for the Brookings Institution. Our understanding from a brief conversation with Sorkin is that his analysis is limted to the DE and AVT programs, and is based on records provided by the Employment Assistance Branch of the BIA. For reasons that will be made clear in the following pages, this would appear to be an inadequate source of evaluative data. For an economic evaluation of the AVT program in Oklahoma see Paul R. Blume, "An Evaluation of Institutional Training Received by American Indians Through the Muskogee, Okla., Area Office of the Bureau of Indian Affairs," unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Oklahoma State University, 1968.

[3] 70 Stat. 986, U.S.C., sec. 309.

[4] Letter to Loren C. Scott, from Walter J. Knodel, dated Sept. 3, 1968.

[5] We will argue, however, that apparently even this factor has not been effectively introduced as a criterion for allocating program resources. See p. 32, below.

PROGRAM OBJECTIVES AND EVALUATIVE CRITERIA

It was shown above that Indian employment is the statutory objective of the Employment Assistance Branch of the BIA. The assumption was therefore introduced that Indian employment is sought without reference to the effect on non-Indian and total consumption. This is probably an accurate representation of the BIA objective, but it clearly does not reflect general social preferences. Therefore, third-party (external) effects of the BIA–OJT program must be considered. More will be said about these externalities below; temporarily it is assumed that increased Indian employment is the sole objective, and attention is directed in the following paragraphs to the evaluative criteria relevant to this narrowly conceived goal.

THE INDIAN EMPLOYMENT (CONSUMPTION) OBJECTIVE

One indicator of BIA–OJT program effectiveness would be the isolation of a level of earnings by Indian participants which exceeds what they would have earned in the absence of the program. However, such a measure is impossible to achieve directly because of an inability to determine what income *would have been*. Nevertheless, reasonable procedures have been developed to secure an acceptable proxy for this earnings concept.

Even with the estimation of a positive earnings differential that can be attributed to the training program, however, many important questions would remain unanswered. All that would be known is that the participating Indians' earnings stream had risen over the time period covered.

Did the participating Indians incur personal costs (or realize non-earnings benefits) in connection with the program that should be subtracted from (added to) the earnings increment in order to arrive at a more meaningful measure of *net private benefit?*[6]

Is the timespan that was used in the earnings comparison the appropriate one? It is almost certain that an earnings differential derived for a year soon after participation in the program would not continue at the same level through the remaining years of work. Therefore, assumptions must be made about both the direction and magnitude of change, and the time profile of the estimated differential. The latter assumption is necessitated by the fact that earnings (consumption) in the future are not valued as highly as income today. Therefore, future earnings must be discounted to obtain a present value transformation,[7] which in turn can be compared with costs.

Even assuming that these conceptual and data problems can be resolved, and that a satisfactory measure of the net private benefit of the BIA–OJT program has been determined, two major questions remain unanswered. Could the participating Indians have been helped to secure *larger* net benefits with the same expenditure of public sector resources?[8] And, given the objective of increasing Indian employment (consumption), were the participating Indians the appropriate ones to achieve maximum gains from a given expenditure? The latter question introduces the importance of differentiating between private and social costs and benefits.

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[6] It is not necessary, or even desirable in many instances, to limit the contributing cost and benefit factors to those which already have a dollar value. For instance, employment, and earnings derived from employment, allow environmental changes that affect future productivity of children in the household. The value of this effect should be considered in calculating the return to training. A monetary value can be placed on *any* factor, although there may be disagreement about the particular "shadow price" chosen. [4, pp. 33 ff.] It must also be recognized that the market price of those factors that do have existing price tags may also be a poor measure of the social valuation of the resources in question. See the section on "Opportunity Costs" below.

[7] This discounting procedure and the determination of an appropriate rate have received substantial attention in the technical literature. A good treatment of the issue, and further citations can be found in [6].

PRIVATE AND SOCIAL OPPORTUNITY COSTS

The opportunity cost concept refers to the pricing of a resource using the value that would be placed on it in the best alternative application. A given resource can only be applied to one use at a given time. Therefore, a good measure of the value placed on the resource in the chosen application should be the return that would have accrued if the best foregone alternative had been selected instead. In the context of the last question raised in the preceding section, it should be clear that a net *private* benefit to participating Indians is not synonymous with a net *social* benefit, even accepting the narrowly conceived objective of Indian employment. In addition, it will be shown below that when the objective is itself broadened the private and social measures of net benefit are likely to differ widely.

PROGRAM PRESENCE-ABSENCE AND THE MEASUREMENT OF EARNINGS DIFFERENCES

Practical techniques for isolating the effect of a given treatment (e.g., BIA sponsored OJT) on a specified objective (e.g., Indian employment) have received intensive consideration in the literature on public sector program evaluation. [See 10.] Two basic methods have been used to date. One technique, called the control-experimental method, involves the selection of a group of labor force participants whose experiences are considered to be comparable to what the treatment recipients would have experienced in the absence of the program. An alternative method, called the pre-post technique, compares the pretreatment and posttreatment experience of the participants themselves, usually with appropriate adjustments for factors that are thought to have influenced the objective measure but which cannot be attributed to the treatment itself. The experimental-control method will not receive further attention here because the alternative pre-post technique is adopted in subsequent sections.[9]

The pre-post earnings data are to be used to determine the with and without training difference in earnings. These are not the same concept, however. [11] Among the factors that contribute to a divergence of these two concepts are changes in the market environment in which the earnings accrue, assumptions about what the participants' market responses would have been in the absence of the program, and self-selection factors. Each of these factors is discussed below.

THE MARKET ENVIRONMENT

The earnings stream is a composite price-time measure. The price element is the money wage rate which is affected by a number of market factors such as the level of aggregate economic activity, net excess demand (positive or negative) for the skill complement in question, and a variety of institutional factors including minimum wage legislation, labor union activity, and labor mobility patterns. The time element is itself a composite of willingness to work (a supply response) and opportunity to work (the demand environment) and each of these elements is related to the price factor and its determinants.

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[8] The technique discussed so far determines only the private return to the *existing* program, without pursuing the question of whether the program design is the *least-cost* method for attaining a given objective.

[9] The authors have recently secured information on 141 new entrants into the BIA-OJT program. These data will allow the introduction of the control-experimental technique in subsequent analysis, and a comparison of the results of the two techniques.

The implication of this is that changes in these market environment factors should be quantified and the estimated difference in the earnings stream must be adjusted to reflect all changes which cannot be attributed to the training program. The net adjustment magnitude could either inflate or deflate this gross differential, depending upon the environmental changes that occurred.

RESPONSE TO SITUATION IN ABSENCE OF THE PROGRAM

Since the participating Indians did enter training it is necessary to make certain assumptions about what their market orientation would have been in the absence of the program.[10]

Given the market environment during the period from the inception of training until the time of data collection, what would the participants have done in the absence of training? Would they have continued their pretraining pattern of market activity? Or, would they have been geographically or occupationally mobile to take advantage of opportunities as they become available? Or, might they even have dropped out of the labor force altogether in response to an unsatisfactory return for work effort expended?

The choice of the appropriate assumption for the group in question requires intimate knowledge of the relationship of their labor force participation to the dynamics of local, regional, and national levels of economic activity. For instance, if the general level of economic activity has risen substantially during the training and posttraining periods, it might seem reasonable to deflate an estimated difference in preearnings and postearnings streams to account for the higher probability that a given number of months would have been worked even in the absence of the program, and probably at a higher wage rate since wages, prices, and aggregate demand are positively related. However, if a closer examination determines that the demand for labor services of the type the trainees embodied prior to their OJT participation was actually declining because of technological advances or shifts in productive activity, the prepost income stream differential should be *in*flated to indicate that the pretraining level could not have been maintained over the subsequent period, and that the contribution of the program to the participants' earnings stream is greater than the unadjusted comparison. Again, however, it is necessary to assume something about the individual's response to a decline in the demand for his services in the absence of the OJT program. Would he have become discouraged and withdrawn from the labor force, or would he have sought alternative opportunities in the growing economy. The assumption made influences the calculated return to participation in the training program.

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[10] These assumptions are necessary regardless of the technique adopted. If the control-experimental technique is used the assumptions are necessary prior to selecting the appropriate control group. When the prepost method is used the assumptions determine what adjustments of the pretraining earnings stream are necessary.

SELF-SELECTION EFFECTS

Assuming all of the previously mentioned conceptual problems have been resolved, another barrier to the achievement of an accurate estimate of the private return to training remains. The very act of application for and completion of the program may indicate a higher motivational level that that exhibited by nonparticipants. If this is true, the generalizing the findings from past participants to other Indians may be inappropriate.[11]

It should be recognized that the pre-post technique effectively controls for this phenomenon in calculating the private return *to those who participated*, but the problem lies in generalizing these findings. In the use of the control-experimental method, the significance of this factor would lie in the necessity to recognize its presence as a criterion for selecting an appropriate control group.

PLACEMENT AND TRAINING COMPONENTS OF THE PROGRAM

It will be useful in the empirical sections of this paper to consider two separate functions of the BIA–OJT program. On the basis of the statutory enabling legislation, the primary function of the program is seen to be on-the-job *training*. The Chief of the Branch of Employment Assistance, BIA, interprets this as follows:

> On-the-job training may be defined as instruction in the performance of a job given to an employed worker by the employer during the usual working hours of the occupation and for which workers are paid.[12]

There is another less obvious, but perhaps more important function of the BIA–OJT program, however, and that is the *job placement* function. It is conceivable, and even likely, that some proportion of the estimated pre-post differential in earnings is attributable to the shift from low wage, perhaps intermittent, jobs to relatively higher wage jobs with greater associated employment stability.[13] The importance of this is that with no extraordinary increase in productivity; that is, no investment in training per se, there might still be an increase in earnings, if entry into the program shifts an Indian worker out of an isolated employment sector, defined as one that is not affected by the general pattern of economic activity, and in to the mainstream of productive involvement.

TRAINING: GENERAL AND SPECIFIC ASPECTS

A distinction has been drawn in the literature between training that is specific to a firm and training that is transferable to other firms. [2] The criterion on which the distinction is based is whether the increase in worker productivity that accrues from the investment in training can be restricted in whole or in part to the firm providing the training. To the extent that the productivity increase can be restricted to the firm, the wage rate can be held below the worker's net contribution to the value of production, because the best alternative employment opportunity would be at a lower level of productivity and a correspondingly lower wage.[14]

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[11] This may not be relevant in the BIA–OJT program because initial application is frequently at the initiative of the Bureau.

[12] Letter to Loren C. Scott, from Walter J. Knodel, dated September 3, 1968.

[13] Our preliminary analysis suggests that the pretraining earnings of the Indian participants in the BIA-OJT program studied were unrelated to the trend of average earnings in selected Oklahoma employment sectors over the 1960–66 period. We interpret this to mean that the Indians' pretraining employment was isolated from the general regional trend of rising price levels associated with expanding aggregate demand. Therefore, if the posttraining Indian earnings stream is inflated by trend price and productivity increases, this component of the estimated prepost earnings differential *should not* be taken out in deriving the net return to the *program*. It *should* be taken out of the return attributed to training, though, because the "placement effect" alone would have produced this increase, without any extraordinary increase in productivity. The validity of this argument rests on the assumption that in the absence of the BIA-OJT program the Indians would have remained isolated from the regional trend of economic activity.

At one extreme, if the increase in productivity is completely specific to the firm offering training, the firm can pay a wage rate equal to what could be secured in the best alternative, and all returns to training would accrue to the firm. In this case, use of the observed wage rate as the price component of earnings would not capture any of the return to training.[15] Of course, if the *private* return to training is being calculated, this is desirable, because the private return is zero. However, the social return should include the increased output.

The other extreme would be a case where the increase in productivity is perfectly general (would accrue regardless of the employing firm), meaning that the firm offering training could not capture any of the return and would, therefore, force the trainee (or the BIA) to bear the full cost of training.

The relevant empirical procedure, therefore, becomes one of determining which parties bear what share of the training costs, and to whom the returns are accruing.

EARNINGS: EMPLOYMENT AND WAGE EFFECTS

It has been noted that "* * * the same increase in earnings can be obtained through expenditures which increase the probability of employment or increase worker productivity" [1, p. 82]. In one sense, this relates to the earlier distinction drawn between placement and training effects, but it also requires the analyst to separate the time and price components of the earnings measure. This is accomplished in this paper by presenting data on the average number of months worked annually for both the pretraining and posttraining periods. The posttraining data should be adjusted for the increased expectation (higher probability) that a given number of months would be worked because of the higher level of economic activity, *if* Indian expectations should be related to aggregate activity (see footnote 13). Again, the BIA–OJT program should not be credited with improvements in employment opportunity that are attributable to the dynamics of the general level of economic activity, nor should the return to the program be reduced if such a relationship does not exist.

THE BIA–OJT PROGRAM: THIRD-PARTY EFFECTS

Up to this point it has been assumed that the sole objective criterion was the private and social return to the BIA–OJT program as it has been conceived in the past. Conceptual issues involved in this evaluation have been discussed in detail, and appropriate references to the literature have been indicated. Little attention has been paid to specific cost issues because the data necessary for this aspect of the evaluation are not yet in a usable form. (See 2, 7.) It has been emphasized, however, that no matter how sophisticated the measurement of private or social benefits may be, these measures are meaningless for resource allocation decisions without knowing the resource costs involved in securing the benefits. It was also noted that even if we calculate a *net* return for the existing program, we still cannot say whether a higher net return could have been achieved for the same group under a modified program. Finally, it was stated that given the objective of Indian employment it might be desirable to alter the eligibility criteria as a means of increasing the return for a given expenditure.

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[14] This issue is complex, and may strike some readers as an unnecessary complication of the analysis. It should be noted, therefore, that the appropriateness of earnings as a measure of increased productivity depends on the assumptions made about firm behavior with regard to this issue. See [2].

[15] This assumes that the firm absorbed the costs of training in anticipation of receiving the returns from increased productivity. Since the trainee could always quit and leave the firm with incurred costs but no accruing returns, it is more likely that both the costs and returns will be shared by the firm and the employee. See [2].

The final issue that should be considered from a social welfare perspective is what effect the BIA–OJT program has on Indian nonparticipants and non-Indians. These effects are called externalities, or third-party effects. (See 9.) We are not urging that BIA decision makers adopt this perspective, but rather that the allocation of public sector resources at a higher level include the considerations explored below.

When an Indian enters training under the auspices of the BIA–OJT program what effect does this have on both his own situation and the employment opportunities of others? Would the Indian trainee have gotten the same job in the absence of the program? Would someone else have taken the job if the Indian had not? If so, does this person remain unemployed or introduce an iterative bumping effect by taking another job that would have been filled, et cetera? Does someone else take the trainee's previous job? If so, would he have remained unemployed otherwise, or does he leave a previous job open? Does entry into the training program remove a production bottleneck which thereby allows increased employment in other related occupations?

The small absolute size of the BIA-OJT program to date minimizes awareness of any bumping effect that may accompany Indian employment. However, the existence of a *scale effect* should not be overlooked. If Indian employment were to be rapidly expanded through the BIA-OJT program at the expense of non-Indian opportunity, acceptance of the program may be less easily secured, even though the resulting distribution may be considered socially desirable. The path of least resistance is obviously to place Indian trainees in new jobs that neither they nor anyone else would have secured otherwise. Questions were asked of both participating employers and former trainees to get at this question of what their respective market responses would have been in the absence of the program.

We do not want to leave the reader with the impression that all external effects are "disbenefits" (11), or undesirable. It has been suggested that the distribution effect itself may be desirable; but even if it is not, the supply of low productivity job seekers (and holders) is diminished by the BIA–OJT program, and this puts upward pressure on wage rates associated with these types of work. While the employment effect of this pressure, and resulting earnings, cannot be categorically predicted because of the possibility that the remaining low-skill level workers will be replaced by less costly capital equipment, it is likely that increased employment opportunities at higher wage rates will result. Similarly, transfer payments may be reduced by the investment in on-the-job training.

METHODOLOGICAL SUMMARY

The purpose of this section has been to introduce the reader to selected techniques and problems associated with evaluating public sector resource allocation. The most readable items in the literature have been cited at appropriate places.

Perhaps the most important caution we can urge upon the reader before proceeding to the empirical sections is to recognize the tentative and partial nature of the data presented. Hasty conclusions based on inadequate data could lead to less effective programing, instead of improvement. We think the analysis presented does have important implications for the BIA–OJT program, and a forthcoming monograph (8) will include a more comprehensive methodological and empirical presentation.

With this conceptual introduction, attention is shifted in the next section to a brief outline of the administrative aspects of the BIA–OJT program.

II. ADMINISTRATION

PUBLIC LAW 959

In 1956, Congress passed Public Law 959 to provide vocational training for American Indians. After devoting 16 months to establishing the administrative framework, actual training began in January 1958. During the subsequent 8 years 19,519 Indians received training through funds appropriated under the auspices of Public Law 959.[16] Again, with respect to on-the-job training the law states:

> * * * in order to help adult Indians who reside on or near Indian reservations to obtain reasonable and satisfactory employment, the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to undertake a program of * * * apprenticeship, and on-the-job training, for periods that do not exceed 24 months. * * * For the purposes of this program the Secretary is authorized to enter into contracts or agreements with any * * * corporation or association which has an existing apprenticeship or on-the-job training program which is recognized by industry and labor as leading to skilled employment.[17]

The sole administrator of Public Law 959 is the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The BIA coordinates the activities of 10 *area offices*. The area offices formulate policy recommendations and supervise the activities of the *agency offices* which are the grass roots administrative branch of the BIA. There are numerous agency offices, including 11 in Oklahoma.

The Branch of Employment Assistance is the unit of the BIA which administers Public Law 959. Each agency office has an *agency employment assistance officer* who assists Indians in completing the application for on-the-job training (OJT). This officer either accepts or rejects the applicant. The opinion of the agency employment assistance officer is then reviewed by the *area employment assistance officer*. The area officer has veto power over the agency officer, but usually yields to the latter's judgment since the agency officer has more direct contact with the applicant.

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[16] 14,640 participated in Adult Vocational Training (institutional) and 4,879 received on-the-job training.

[17] 70 Stat. 986, U.S.C. sec. 309.

THE OJT PROGRAM[18]

The sequence of events leading to an Indian entering the OJT program begins with the selection of a firm to undertake the training. Each area office employs an *area industrial development specialist* whose job is to make contacts with employers who might qualify to participate in the program. The manual which the BIA follows in administering the OJT program specifies that the participating firm must meet two basic standards: (1) it must not be owned by an individual and (2) it must have an existing OJT program which is recognized by industry and labor as leading to skilled employment. The industrial development specialist is not the contract negotiator. His job is exploratory in nature. He explains the availability of the program and if the employer is interested, he arranges a meeting with the contract negotiator.

The Commissioner, Area Director, or anyone to whom they have delegated their authority, is responsible for the negotiation of and compliance to the terms of the contract. The *area property and supply officer* is generally responsible for negotiating the terms of the contract. The *area employment assistance officer* then handles the OJT program phases and the administration of the contract.

The manual also specifies that the facilities of the prospective firm are to be inspected to determine if there is adequate heating, lighting, toilet facilities, and if safety practices are followed. Equipment and tools are to be inspected for safety and general condition. An attempt should be made to determine if adequate housing is available in the vicinity for the trainees. The firm's OJT program is to be investigated to determine the period of its existence, number of persons who have completed training, their present places of employment, the number now employed by the prospective firm, and the number of supervisors and instructors employed to furnish training.

Details are then to be worked out for the OJT program. Two variables in particular are negotiable: (1) the amount of the wage rate to be paid by the BIA and (2) the length of the training period for each skill. The manual stipulates that the portion of the wage rate subsidized is not to exceed one-half of the established minimum wage under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, per week for each trainee, based on a 40-hour, 5-day workweek. For example, the present legal minimum wage is $1.60 per hour. If the trainee's starting wage rate was $2.50 per hour, the BIA would pay $0.80 of that hourly wage rate. If the trainee began at $1.50, the BIA would pay $0.75 of that hourly rate. If the trainee were to work 54 hours per week, the BIA could subsidize only 40 of those hours.

Once the details of the contract are worked out prospective trainees are referred to the participating firm. The screening, evaluation, and referral of trainees is the responsibility of the area employment assistance officer, although he is usually assisted by the agency employment assistance officer. The final selection of Indians to be trained is made by the participating employer. The employer is not required to hire every person referred to him by the BIA.

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[18] *Indian Affairs Manual Release 43-159*, U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Oct. 3, 1963.

III. The Demand for Indian Trainees: Participating Firms

BIA SELECTION OF ELIGIBLE FIRMS

The selection of the firm to conduct on-the-job training is one of the more crucial aspects of the BIA–OJT program. Many of the Bureau's trainees have experienced only seasonal employment, or have poor job stability records. They need the experience of having an 8-hour day, 5-day week job, with the accompanying regular paychecks. This cannot be accomplished in a firm which must shutdown and layoff workers from time to time due to lack of orders. Though BIA officials cannot predict future levels of economic activity, they should seek reasonable assurance that a chosen employer is financially secure and expects sufficient work-force stability so that the probability of trainee termination due to inadequate product demand is low.

Six of the nine firms included in this study are still in operation. Five of these were visited and the person in charge of the OJT project was interviewed. The other operating firm, which trained only one Indian, was not visited. The requirement that all firms be equal opportunity employers was roughly confirmed by observation while touring their respective facilities. With respect to other legal requirements, none of the firms were owned by an individual. Only two of the firms visited indicated they had an established training program of any sort. This is a period of time, beginning with initial placement, during which the trainee acquires and perfects a skill. The other three firms visited did not speak directly of an apprenticeship training program, but their method of training new employees was essentially the same as for those who said they had an established program. A man is hired and works closely with a supervisor until his task is mastered.

None of the firms contacted became aware of the BIA–OJT program through the Area Industrial Specialist. Two were solicited by an Area Employment Assistance Officer, one became aware of the program through other financial dealings with the BIA, another inherited the program with a firm it bought out, and the fifth was managed by a man who is a former BIA Area Industrial Specialist.

CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS

Once a firm is selected, two variables are to be negotiated—the portion of the wage rate to be borne by the BIA and the length of the training period. In the past, only the latter has been negotiated. The participating firms have been granted the maximum hourly subsidy and then the length of the training period for which the subsidy is to be paid is negotiated. A comparison of the length of these negotiated training periods with the time subjectively estimated to be necessary to master the skill suggests that the negotiated time period is frequently longer than the time required to learn a task. Two of the more striking comparisons are illustrated in the following job descriptions taken from actual contracts:

Taper (cardboard box maker): *32 week training period.* Folds ready-cut box blanks along scored lines and fastens edges together by one of the following methods: (1) coats flaps with glue and presses them together. (2) interlocks corners by means of tabs. (3) seals edges with strip of gummed tape.

Furniture Assembler: 12 month training course. Assembles and fastens together prefabricated parts into frames, section or complete articles of furniture. Trims and sands component parts to make them fit together forming sections or subassemblies, and clamps parts tightly together with hand or machine clamps. May drive nails, screws or dowels through joints or reinforce them.

Further evidence is presented in table 1. In the post-training mailed questionnaire, former trainees were asked to respond to the following question:

> When you were in the on-the-job training program, how many weeks did it take you to learn to do your job without help?

It should be noted that trainees are generally not aware of the length of their negotiated training period. The replies of 72 respondents are listed opposite the length of training period negotiated for their particular OJT skill.

Table 1.—*A comparison of negotiated training periods with amount of time trainees think was required to learn task*

Length of negotiated training period (weeks):	*Number of weeks trainees indicated was required to learn task*
6	4, [1] 24
8	3
11	1
12	1, 1, 2
13	1, 2, 2, 4
14	2, 2, 3, 4, 6
26	1, 2, 2
32	1, 2, 2, 3, [2] 32
39	1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 6
46	1, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 12
52	1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 4, 4, 4, 4, 6, 12, 16, [2] 52
78	1, 6, 7

[1] The only respondent whose estimate exceeded the contract time.

[2] Respondent's estimate identical with negotiated period, suggesting knowledge of the contract regulations.

One respondent indicated it took him longer to learn a task than the time period negotiated. An additional two respondents indicated it took them the full length of the negotiated training period to learn their task.

While touring the facilities of the five plants which were visited, employees and plant managers were asked to estimate the length of time required to learn given tasks. Their answers were similar to those illustrated in table 1. In only one case did a plant manager estimate a training period longer than the negotiated training period for a particular task.

The length of the negotiated time is based on information given in the *Dictionary of Occupational Titles* (DOT) [19] and the knowledge and experience of the representatives of the firm and the area employment assistance officer.

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[19] *Dictionary of Occupational Titles: Occupational Classification and Industry Index*, 3d ed., vol. II, 1965, U.S. Department of Labor. The training time periods shown in the DOT are themselves questionable in some cases. For example, the DOT suggests a training period of "over 30 days" to become an usher, p. 509.

SELECTION OF TRAINEES

Once the terms of employment have been determined, Indians desiring OJT are screened by the Bureau and referred to the participating firm for employment and training. One plant manager felt this was the most valuable aspect of the program. He wanted to train a core staff and the Bureau sent him the best people they had available. A less enthusiastic response was expressed by another plant manager, who recalled that the first round of referrals included "every drunk in town." This BIA prescreening aspect of the program appears to have varied widely among the firms. For instance, sometimes this BIA screening-referral function is not involved at all in placing the trainees. Two firms (whose contracts involved 121 trainees) indicated that if an Indian comes to the firm looking for a job and if he appears employable, the firm hires him, then contacts the local BIA office to determine if he is eligible for subsidy.[20] This firm-to-Bureau method might be partially explained by an inadequate number of referrals being made from the Bureau to the firm. In fact, one of these firms indicated the reason they no longer had an OJT contract with the BIA was because the Bureau could not provide them with enough trainees.

All five firms stated they were actively hiring other personnel at the time they began participation in the BIA–OJT program. Each also stated that hiring was carried out only to fill normal vacancies and that the subsidy had not encouraged the creation of new jobs.

SUMMARY

Table 2 shows the rankings in five categories of the BIA trainees by the representatives of the firms visited, relative to other new employees. BIA trainees were estimated to have compiled higher absentee rates and poorer punctuality records than other new employees. These were generally thought to be inherent characteristics of Indian employees which tend to improve the longer the employees stay with the firm. Those trainess who completed their training were given above-average ratings on productivity and work attitudes by all five firms. No consensus was discernible with respect to turnover rates. On the whole, all five firms believed the program was a success in their plants.

TABLE 2.—A COMPARISON OF BIA TRAINEES RELATIVE TO OTHER NEW EMPLOYEES

	Firm				
	1	3	4	5	9
Turnover	Higher	Lower	Same	Higher	Same.
Absenteeism	do	do	do	do	Higher.
Punctuality	Poorer	Better	Better	Poorer	Poorer.
Work attitudes	Higher	Higher	Higher	Higher	Much higher.
Productivity	Same	do	Same	do	Higher.

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[20] One trainee wrote that he was working for a participating firm and one day he was called into the office and informed that he was now a BIA trainee and his wage would be paid in part by the Bureau.

IV. PRE-POST COMPARISONS: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS

TRAINING CHARACTERISTICS

By 1968, the Oklahoma area offices of the BIA had initiated and completed nine OJT contracts with firms located in Mississippi and Oklahoma. A firm-by-firm breakdown of the number of entering trainees, completions, dropouts, percentage completing training, and BIA subsidy payments is shown in table 3. Of the 226 Indians who participated in the program, 118, or 52 percent, completed their training. The total cost to the Bureau of servicing these nine contracts totaled $228,159, of which $82,000 represented administrative costs.

TABLE 3.—TRAINEE ENTRANTS, COMPLETIONS, DROPOUTS, PERCENTAGE OF COMPLETIONS, AND SUBSIDY PAYMENTS BY FIRMS

	Number entering training	Number of completions	Number of dropouts	Percent completing training	BIA subsidy payments
Firm:					
1	76	43	33	57	$64,068
2	19	3	16	16	5,348
3	21	11	10	52	4,103
4	18	7	11	39	4,093
5	8	6	2	75	2,210
6	26	9	17	35	17,130
7	12	10	2	83	8,161
8	1	1	0	100	2,600
9	45	28	17	62	38,446
Total	226	118	108	52	146,159
BIA administrative cost					82,000
Total, BIA outlay for OJT program					228,159

Firm No. 2, which went out of business before several of the trainees had completed their training, was the first firm granted an OJT contract by the Oklahoma BIA offices. Two other firms are also no longer in operation. An accurate count of the number of trainees still employed by their training firm is not available.

Data on the personal characteristics of the 226 trainees are available from their employment assistance applications. These applications also provided pretraining employment and monthly earnings records on 151 of the trainees. The remainder of the pretraining data and all the posttraining data were secured through the use of a mailed questionnaire. Seventy-eight usable replies were received. This is a 35 percent response rate which is reasonable for this method of data collection.

Selected characteristics of these 78 respondents when they entered training are illustrated in table 4. Public Law 959 states that this program is "* * * primarily for Indians who are not less than 18 and not more than 35 years of age." None of the respondents were under 18 years old and only 17 were over 35 years of age.[21] Forty-six had not completed their high school education. Seventy-three percent of the respondents were married, and 78 percent were males, indicating an emphasis on providing training for those who have persons depending on them for economic support.

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[21] Of the total population of 226 trainees, 1 was 17 and 34 were over 35 years of age.

TABLE 4.—SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 78 RESPONDENTS AT THE TIME OF ENTERING TRAINING

Description	Number	Percent
Total	78	100
Sex:		
Male	61	78
Female	17	22
Age:		
18 to 20	8	10
20 to 25	23	29
26 to 30	20	26
31 to 35	10	13
36 to 40	9	12
Over 40	8	10
Education (highest grade completed):		
0 to 8	24	31
9 to 11	22	28
12 or more	32	41
Marital status:		
Married	57	73
Single	17	22
Widowed, divorced, separated	4	5

PRE-POST COMPARISONS, TOTAL RESPONDING GROUP [22]

The comparisons presented in this subsection group together responding male and female trainees ranging along the age continuum, who have widely differing educational attainment, and who may or may not have completed the full on-the-job training period. Subsequent sections present sex, age, education, and did–did not complete comparisons, of these same measures separately. A time constraint has precluded the presentation of the results of multiple regression analysis, but this evaluative technique represents the core of the forthcoming monograph (8).

The responding Indians had been employed an average [23] of 7.4 months annually prior to entering the BIA–OJT program.[24]

During the posttraining period covered the responding trainees (N=78) were employed an average (mean) of 10.8 months annually.

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[22] The findings reported here refer only to the records of former trainees who responded to the mailed questionnaire. Since data are available on the pretraining experience of nonrespondents also, statistical tests will be conducted of the randomness of the respondent sample taken from the total trainee population. If significant differences are found the findings reported here cannot be generalized beyond the group studied. These statistical tests, dispersion measures of averages presented here, and tests of statistical significance of differences between measures shown in this paper, will be included in (8). In the absence of these procedures, the reader is urged to interpret all figures shown here with great caution.

[23] All averages presented in this section are arithmetic means, $\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N} n_i}{N}$

[24] The number of months employed, both pre- and post-, were regressed separately on the national nonwhite unemployment rate to test for a relationship between Indian employment opportunity and the aggregate level of economic activity. The nonwhite unemployment rate was adopted as the best available proxy for minority group employment opportunity. In neither case was a statistically significant relationship estimated. (See 8.) Therefore, the data on number of months employed have not been adjusted to reflect changes in the aggregate level of economic activity. See footnote 13 for a discussion of the rationale for using a similar procedure to test the relationship of earnings to the level of activity. In this case, the posttraining level of earnings of Indian trainees was found to be significantly related to the aggregate index used (a time-series composite of the average weekly earnings in selected Oklahoma employment sectors), and appropriate adjustments will be made in (8) to separate the placement effect from the training effect. Both posttraining earnings and employment have been adjusted for age on the basis of a relationship estimated by regressing the pretraining values of each on age. These adjustments may be biased because tests for collinearity of age with other factors affecting earnings and employment have not been conducted yet, but such tests will be included in (8).

The average (mean) monthly earned income prior to training was $185, while the average post-training level (adjusted for age) is $323.[25] Thus the respective mean differences between pre- and post-training periods are 3.4 months annually and $138 a month.[26]

PRE-POST COMPARISONS, BY SEX

When the comparisons made in the preceding paragraph are separated into male and female groups, interesting differences appear,[27] as shown in table 5. Because of the small number of observations and absence of statistical tests of differences, we are reluctant to state conclusions from the data in table 5, but it is difficult to resist introducing one speculative hypothesis to explain the size of the observed increase in female earnings. It is likely that the extremely low pretraining earnings level is based on part-time as well as intermittant work, and that entry into the BIA–OJT program precluded continuation of this time preference.[28] Note that the large increase for females is due to a lower pretraining base, not to higher posttraining earnings.

TABLE 5.—PRE-POST COMPARISONS OF EARNINGS AND EMPLOYMENT, BY SEX

	Male (N=61)	Female (N=17)
Average (mean) number of months employed annually prior to training	7.8	6.5
Average (mean) number of months employed annually after training	10.7	10.6
Mean difference (months)	2.9	4.1
Average (mean) monthly earned income prior to training	$205	$125
Average (mean) monthly earned income after training	$333	$308
Mean difference	$128	$183

PRE-POST COMPARISONS, BY DID OR DID NOT COMPLETE TRAINING

Continuing the cross-tabulation presentation, table 6 presents the prepost comparative data by whether or not the training program was completed.

TABLE 6.—PRE-POST COMPARISONS OF EARNINGS AND EMPLOYMENT, BY COMPLETION OF TRAINING

	Completed (52 persons)	Did not complete (26 persons)
Average (mean) number of months employed annually prior to training	7.2 mos.	8 mos.
Average (mean) number of months employed annually after training	10.8 mos.	10.5 mos.
Mean difference	3.6 mos.	2.5 mos.
Average (mean) monthly earned income prior to training	$188	$186.
Average (mean) monthly earned income after training	$327	$330.
Mean difference	$139	$144.

When combined with our findings from the employer interviews and the subjective estimates by the responding trainees about the length of time it took to actually learn to perform their job assignment without unusual supervision, this comparison strongly suggests that the Indian trainee who fails to complete the prescribed training timetable has nevertheless achieved a plateau of achievement comparable to what the Indian who completes the schedule attains. This could mean that the entire productivity increase accrues very soon after initial employment, as suggested by both the trainees and present employees in the firms.[29]

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[25] The length of the posttraining period differs among the 78 respondents, thus there is an upward bias in the earnings data reported here. As was indicated in section I above, assumptions have to be made explicit about the predicted direction and magnitude of the prepost differential beyond the coverage of the follow-up contact. Several alternative assumptions will be introduced in (8) to show the effect of the premises on calculated returns.

[26] Again, no statistical tests have been conducted on these estimated differences, and they are gross measures of the private return to training with no netting out of private or social costs incurred in achieving these gains or addition of nonearnings benefits accrued, and there has been incomplete adjustment for influencing factors other than training.

[27] See footnote 25 for interpretive precautions.

[28] This possibility will be explored in (8).

PRE-POST COMPARISONS, BY EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT

Still another way of looking at the pre-post differences is to distinguish between high school graduates and nongraduates.[30] Do the trainees need a high school diploma to benefit from the BIA–OJT program? Or, if both groups realize an increase in earnings, do the graduates realize a relatively greater advantage? Our preliminary findings are shown in table 7.

TABLE 7.—PRE-POST COMPARISONS OF EARNINGS AND EMPLOYMENT, BY EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT

	High-school graduates (N=32)	Nongraduate (N=46)
Average (mean) number of months employed annually prior to training	8.4 mos	6.9 mos.
Average (mean) number of months employed annually after training	10.6 mos	10.8 mos.
Mean difference	2.2 mos	3.9 mos.
Average (mean) monthly earned income prior to training	$189	$186.
Average (mean) monthly earned income after training	$340	$319.
Mean difference	$151	$133.

These preliminary data suggest virtually no difference in the post-training experience of the respective groups.

PRE-POST COMPARISONS, BY AGE

The final breakout presented in this paper is by age, since the program is explicitly directed toward the 18 to 35 age range. These data are presented in table 8, below.

TABLE 8.—PRE-POST COMPARISONS OF EARNINGS AND EMPLOYMENT, BY AGE

	18 to 20 (N=8)	21 to 25 (N=23)	26 to 30 (N=20)	31 to 35 (N=10)	36 to 40 (N=9)	Over 40 (N=8)
Average (mean) number of months employed annually prior to training.	7.3 mos	7.0 mos	7.5 mos	6.7 mos	8.9 mos	8.6 mos.
Average (mean) number of months employed annually after training.	11.0 mos	10.7 mos	11.1 mos	10.2 mos	10.8 mos	10.3 mos.
Mean difference	3.7 mos	3.7 mos	3.6 mos	3.5 mos	1.9 mos	1.7 mos.
Average (mean) monthly earned income prior to training.	$122	$187	$171	$223	$241	$189.
Average (mean) monthly earned income after training.	$335	$338	$344	$337	$306	$265.
Mean difference	$212	$152	$173	$113	$65	$76.

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[29] Measurement of productivity increases is extremely difficult. While the presence or absence of wage rate increases cannot be accepted as the sole criterion of productivity changes, they do provide *an* indicator of such changes. For instance, if the appropriate comparative earnings index remains constant while wages rise in a given occupation, this suggests that productivity *may be* rising in this sector. The analyst should then go beyond the numbers to see whether institutional changes such as union organization, or altered market conditions have occurred. If not, then more confidence can be placed in the actual training effect on wage rates. Again, this issue is explored at greater length in (8).

[30] Once again, we caution the reader that the relationships shown are not net effects. Multiple-regression analysis is necessary to effectively control for the effect of other relevant factors. For example, all of the nongraduates may be females, who have been shown to have had fewer months of pretraining employment annually than males. There is, then, an interaction here that would have to be controlled before net influences of one or the other factor could be determined.

The number in each age classification is so small that we do not think it is appropriate to state even tentative conclusions. In particular the reader is urged to look at both the pre- and post-training *levels* of earnings, as well as the difference.

V. CONCLUSIONS

Our objectives in writing this paper have been to present a conceptual framework, or set of criteria, for evaluating the BIA–OJT program; to briefly describe BIA administrative directives for entering into contractual agreements with participating employers; and to explore information secured from participating employers and former trainees in response to questions about their unemployment and training related experiences.

The time constraint imposed by the publication deadline has precluded the completion of many analytical procedures the authors think are essential to an understanding of the relationships among the factors investigated. For this reason, we have repeatedly referred the interested reader to Mr. Scott's forthcoming monograph [8]. Nevertheless, we cannot assume that all readers will have access to this more comprehensive treatment of the issues explored here. Thus we are obligated to state tentative conclusions here that may prove to be false under further scrutiny. With this final caution, our assessment of the BIA–OJT program at this time follows.

With regard to the two partial measures of economic achievement, the prepost *change* in average number of months employed annually and the prepost *change* in average monthly earnings, the program appears to have had a positive effect. On the average, the Indian trainees were employed 3.4 more months each year and earned an additional $138 each month, compared with their experience before receiving training. Of the 78 respondents, 49 were fully employed during the posttraining period, compared with 11 in the pretraining period. These appear to be substantial gross private benefit figures. However, conclusions concerning net private and social returns require an awareness of the resource costs incurred in achieving these benefits. These cost data are not available at this time, so no cost-benefit derivations can be presented here. However, see [8].

We got a distinct impression from participating employers that the training slots filled by BIA subsidized Indian trainees would have been filled anyway, by qualified Indians or non-Indians. This brings the subsidy issue into question. It may be that the training slots would have been filled by others, but that it is socially desirable to move further down the productivity queue and make up the difference between the value to the employer of the designated less productive Indian and the employer's best alternative applicant. No evidence was uncovered that indicates the existence of such a productivity differential. In fact, in some instances a trainee was recruited and hired by the firm and then placed on the roster of subsidized Indian employees.

Additional evidence strongly suggests that the most attractive aspect of the program was the recruiting and screening function, since the time span covered has been one of increasingly tight labor markets (an increasing relative scarcity of qualified applicants for job openings at current market wage rates). We do not have evidence to suggest that *no* subsidization is needed, but we are concerned by the observed pattern of contractual subsidy at the statutory limit in all cases. There is a hierarchy of embodied productivity represented among Indian applicants for OJT, which suggests that a continuum of subsidy rates, as a proportion of the market wage (up to twice the subsidy amount), should be observed. This is not the case.

We are also concerned that the negotiated length of the prescribed training periods may be unnecessarily long. Evidence to this effect was presented in Section III, above. Again, in light of the responses received from both participating employers and former trainees, the job duties were usually performed competently (i.e., without extraordinary supervision) within a few weeks from the date of initial employment. If this is so, and if the job slot was not a new one designed specifically for the Indian trainee, the employer could reasonably be expected to bear the full wage cost after the extraordinary supervision is withdrawn.

With regard to the recruitment of employers and potential trainees we are concerned because not one of the employers was recruited by the BIA person assigned to this task. On the supply side, it is apparent that the Adult Vocational Training program is more popular among the eligible Indian population. There is a long waiting list for that program, compared with an inability to recruit enough qualified applicants for the OJT program in some cases. This is why doubt was expressed in footnote 5, above, about the effectiveness of achieving even the narrowly conceived objective.

On what basis is AVT so much more popular than OJT? BIA officials cite mobility characteristics of the respective applicant groups as one determining factor. It is quite possible that self-selection should be constrained in some ways to direct Indian applicants into the program that will best meet the combined objectives of private and community preferences.

Again, then, we are back to the expression of a need for a quantitative specification of the multiple factors contributing to social welfare maximization. Once the multi-faceted objective is explicitly stated we must seek information about how a given amount of resources can make a maximum contribution to achieving this objective, or from another perspective, how the objective can be attained with the least amount of resources. We think this paper constitutes a step in that direction.

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LAWYERS ON THE RESERVATION: SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR THE LEGAL PROFESSION*

By Monroe E. Price**

FOREWORD

Among the many projects of the Office of Economic Opportunity has been the provision of legal services for Indian reservations. The position of the lawyer on a reservation is much different from that of the lawyer for the urban poor, both because of the Indian culture and because of the vast potential and actual natural resources held by Indians. Professor Price, who is closely connected with California Indian Legal Services, examines the program and some of its unique cultural problems and obstacles. He then discusses the proper role of the legal services lawyer on the reservation and concludes that he must act as architect in helping to define, effect, and manage economic development of the reservation's resources.

Introduction

This is an essay on a tiny corner of the legal profession, a small but growing band of lawyers financed by the Office of Economic Opportunity to provide legal services for American Indians. But, as is sometimes the case, a part can illuminate the whole, and here, in the hothouse of the reservation context, important questions about the law and lawyers can be treated in a comparative way within a domestic setting. The experience of the OEO lawyers provides some insight into the relationship between law and economic development and also into the role of a lawyer where there is substantial social and institutional change.

The lawyers, about 40 in number, are distributed throughout the country: there are OEO programs at the Choctaw Reservation in Philadelphia, Mississippi; at Cheyenne River, Crow Creek, and Rosebud in South Dakota; at Zuni Pueblo in New Mexico, Papago and Navajo in Arizona, Wind River in Wyoming; and in a statewide program in California. In addition, the Alaska, Montana, and Wisconsin statewide OEO programs have a heavy Indian emphasis. These OEO lawyers have been at large in a setting where the major question is the creation of climate where the tribal governments, long blighted, weakened by heavyhanded intervention and by an intolerably ambiguous role, are beginning to show signs of health and strength. The lawyers are in an environment where the tools of a legal system designed to assist in the representation of individuals against one another or against the State may not contribute, and may in fact conflict, with OEO's primary strategy of hastening the process of tribal development and independence. The activities of these lawyers, the cases they bring, and the difficulties they face provide opportunities for analysis of longstanding problems from a

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new perspective. In some ways, the lawyers in the legal service programs have represented a significant infusion of new influences into a closed society composed of Government officials and Indians.

It would be repetitious in this article to include the usual litany of statistics about the conditions of poverty among American Indians. There is general agreement on the matter. [1]* Yet a few introductory words about the legal systems involved will be helpful. We expect that the relationship between Government and citizenry is normally controlled by systematized law, at least in theory, and this has been true—also in theory—of the relationships between the Federal Government and the tribe and between the Federal Government and the individual Indian. [2] Indeed, the spillover or hangover of this lengthy relationship is a mountain of dusty regulations, obsolete doctrine, unique theories of supervision, and subtle and pervasive over regulation and dependence. Because the very existence of Indian organizations is now dependent on the pleasure of Congress, law has taken on a role in the life of Indians that it has thankfully not assumed over the life of almost any other group except for those involved in subversive activities. The Government's power is of life and death dimensions. When Congress, in a fit of rancor, decides there shall be no more Menominee Tribe, then it can, as it did in 1954, alter Menominee existence; [3] if it thinks that the small pieces of land set aside in California have served their purposes and should now be distributed in a way that will make the land (if not its owners) come into the mainstream of American society, it can unilaterally do so. [4] And the draconian power of law stretches far beyond the land. If the Congress decides that the internal law administered by the tribal authorities is not good enough for American citizens, it can decree that those laws will be of no effect unless they comport with Federal standards or are approved by the Secretary of Interior. [5] The Secretary of Interior, through his minions, intervenes in the activities of reservation governments and individual decisions in intimate and debilitating ways.

What all this power means is that the legal system, as a whole, has done exactly what law is usually intended to prevent: it has contributed uncertainty and provided an abrasive influence. It has been invoked as a weapon of denial—the agent of the Bureau of Indian Affairs decreeing what a group of people cannot do, what action it cannot take.[6] In that sense, it has impeded the development of political organization. Federal law has also damaged the normal growth of relationships between persons because of its definitions of crimes, its scheme of remedies, and its establishment of status, for it has been the legal system of an alien culture, imposing rules about behavior that may have been at odds with customary practice.[7] If the genius of the common law at large has been its ability through slow growth to conform ideals to societal mores, then that genius has not had a chance to flourish in the reservation setting; the goal, virtually from the beginning, was to use law to mold behavior—to make Indians more like white men—rather than to make a law that codified or respected behavior.[8]

This history accounts, in large part, for what might be called the rustiness of the legal process. A principal feature of the legal system has been the fact that the usual adversary, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, is unused to combat and, as a consequence, does not always respond in the expected fashion. For example, when a lawyer for a small tribe called a local official of the Bureau in California to protest a decision, the official suggested that he did not have to talk to the lawyer; it was the official, not the attorney, who had the best interests of the Indians at heart. Because the Bureau officials have matured in a system that is colonial and not adversary, they have difficulty in summoning forth the appropriate response. When an Internal Revenue Service agent calls, a lawyer can attempt to explain what lies at the base of the misunderstanding. There may be an argument between the two, but areas of disagreement will emerge and the scope of the contest will be virtually certain. Furthermore, there is a general awareness of when the process of informal tug and pull and appeal has ended and formal steps must be taken. And the lawyer has some idea of the formal steps within the Government hierarchy before a court action will ensue.

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*See notes, beginning p. 213.

In the Indian context, this structuring aspect of potential litigation is absent. There is rarely a concept of time, a concept of the limits of regulation, or a concept of meaningful response. The "Secretary's discretion" becomes the rallying point for any kind of action, no matter how unwarranted. And at the lower levels of the service, each agent tries to protect his decision or lack of decision by delay. Reservations, by and large, are scarred with unsolved legal matters. Title to land is littered with unanswered questions. The lawyer faces the maddening prospect of educating his adversary to the meaning of dealing with citizens who have attorneys. Bureau officials have trained their Indian wards to accept, almost without question, their statements. The "law" has been a distant force that sanctified their decisions rather than one that could place limits upon them. [9] Examples are legion. In land management, in education, in every field the problem is the same. The local agent has had unlimited power without meaningful challenge to his exercise of discretion. As a consequence, he has forgotten that there are boundaries placed by law on his conduct and his decisions. The relationship is colonial in that sense.

I. THE LAWYER AND THE TRIBE

The principal characteristic of the environment faced by the lawyer on the Indian reservation is the tenuously constructed, unsure tribal organization. For the smaller reservations, there may be virtually no organization at all; factionalism may be rampant, leading to an inability to build a constitutional structure.[10] On the larger reservations, the problems are more predictable. The governments are inadequately funded, and the leaders, with outstanding exceptions, suffer from lack of experience and education. They are, moreover, under great pressure. The revolution of rising expectations is just about to come to the reservation, and tribal governments have started to feel the momentum for change. The long tradition, partly cultural, partly encouraged by the Bureau, that it was not right for Indians to picket and demonstrate, to be uncivil like "other" minoirty groups, is beginning to be shattered.[11] Furthermore, the lands where the reservations are located—no matter how poor at the time of investiture—are now starting to fall in the suburbs of cities, along freeways, near airport sites, and are becoming potentially valuable in numerous other ways. Consequently, there are great questions about the direction to be taken in land use, and because land use and culture are so closely related, the new debate has intensified friction between traditionalists and less traditional groups on the reservation.

The tribal governments, then, find themselves besieged by problems at a time when many still have feelings of inferiority and dependence, and the prospect they face is far more severe problems in the future. The potential for internal conflict is especially evident in three areas: (a) the division of resources; (b) the political process of the tribe; and (c) the administration of justice. In resource allocation, the Oglala Sioux of Pine Ridge, S. Dak., passed an ordinance several years ago that would have changed the system of allocating grazing permits to give a significant preference to members of the tribe with at least one-quarter blood quantum. [12] Other members who held substantial cattle interests complained bitterly and alleged that the council action was discriminatory. Their position, which implied constitutional limits to tribal action, was favorably viewed by the Secretary of the Interior, who disapproved the tribal ordinance. [13] More generally, where there is now a substantial off-reservation population (such as at the Yakima Reservation in Washington), there are frequent charges that the tribal leadership favors the on-reservation group in the disbursement of income or reserves for capital improvement. [14] An example of the potential for political conflict is the method for selecting tribal council members. Reservations are often fragmented into chapters or other political subdivisions from which representatives are selected. It may be that the system of apportionment, as in the Cheyenne River Reservation, is so unfair that by almost any standard the scheme raises serious constitutional questions. [15] In the administration of justice, conflict between individual and group arises where the tribe and the tribal judiciary seek to keep professional attorneys out of the litigative process. [16]

These conflicts between individual and tribe, often affecting the future course of political leadership and economic development, have presented the young OEO lawyers on the reservations with frequent dilemmas. They have been hired, ostensibly, to protect the interests of individual Indians who qualify for service; under a predominant view of their responsibility, they have little right to discriminate among appropriate applicants for their services. Yet in the reservation context, where the lawyer is a particularly important figure, where there may be few other non-Indians who are not connected with the Bureau of Indian Affairs or the Public Health Service, they can scarcely help having some important influence on the existing tribal structure. They must make subtle decisions concerning how much to attack and how much to support the present structure. They must decide how much to identify with the present leadership and strenghen it and how much time to devote to those who seek change. They must determine how much effort to devote to building the social organization and how much effort to devote to the servicing of the needs of individuals.

To suggest the difficulty of these problems in greater detail, I will discuss two fairly current matters. The first issue involves the recently passed Civil Rights Act of 1968, the "right to counsel" requirement, and its relationship to the tribe. The second is the crisis-filled history of the largest Indian legal service program in the country, the Navajos' DNA. [17]

A. THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AND THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL

Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 [18] sets forth a series of standards to govern the powers of the tribal councils and tribal courts. Heralded as a "Bill of Rights for Indians," it was the culmination of a long effort by Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina. Senator Ervin's subcommittee on constitutional rights had determined that "one of the most serious inadequacies of tribal government arises from its failure to conform to traditional safeguards which apply to State and Federal Action." [19]

In addition to other important standards, the Act requires by section 202(6) that "No Indian tribe * * * deny to any person in a criminal proceeding the right * * * at his own expense to have the assistance of counsel for his defense." On the surface, this seems a simple and logical requirement and one that should be implemented immediately. [20] The meaning seems fairly clear, and an OEO-funded lawyer on a reservation, representing a client convicted of a crime in tribal court, would seem to have no choice, but to challenge any reservation rule that did not permit a lawyer to appear in a criminal prosecution. But let us assume the following circumstances: The reservation has a rule, passed by the tribal council, prohibiting professional attorneys from appearing in tribal courts. The tribal judges are not lawyers, and they do not have an extensive formal education, but they are wise and good judges who have developed techniques for seeking a just solution that may be sharply different from the techniques of the normal adversary process. [21] Moreover, there may be a cadre of tribal members—almost professional—who appear in the courts as advocates, who have some training and experience, but who are not lawyers. (Indeed, several of the OEO-funded programs are expanding and professionalizing such lay counsel for more effective representation in the tribal courts.) Furthermore, there probably is no prosecutor in the courts to purify through contest the contentions of defense counsel, nor is there money in the tribal coffers to expand the system by hiring a prosecuting attorney.

Those are the first level contextual problems that a tribe faces with section 202(6). But there are more subtle issues, too. The provision guarantees counsel (at defendant's expense) only in criminal prosecutions. It is only clear that there are criminal prosecutions by the Indian Courts because of terms and practices that have been imposed from the outside. We may start with the easy assumption that there has to be some system of dispute settling, and some of the settlements must involve the imposition of certain sanctions. Yet the customary approach in many Indian settings was far richer in the range of sanctions, in the choice of alternatives, than was the non-Indian equivalent. Indeed, even at present, as Mary Shepardson has documented, there are nonformal methods of dispute settling in the interior of the Navajo reservation in cases that we would call criminal. [22] The dispute or the violation of mores was presented to some figure respected in the community—perhaps a medicine man—who announced some disposition. It may have involved certain degrees of shame, or banishment, or compensation to the injured party. Federal officials who viewed the reservation as a place to impart ideas of civilization found this barbarian practice of informal settlement of disputes intolerable. Indeed, the whole system of tribal courts developed as an educational device to teach the heathen about law and order, so that they would know about written rules, judges, and due process of law. Then, on that great day when all Indians would be civilized, when the reservation would vanish, an Indian would not be surprised when he had to obey the laws of Wisconsin, nor would he be shocked when he entered the marble halls of a municipal court judge. Criminal trials were imposed on reservations in this century, for the most part, and have only provided a partial method for the adjudication of disputes. It would not be unfair to say that if the reservations could regress in their method of adjudicating disputes, they would be replicating some of the experiments in alternate tracks and noncriminal dispositions that are now the vogue among commentators on American criminal law. [23] What I mean to suggest is that on the reservations there may be a loose and sometimes nonexistent line between criminal and noncriminal trials, particularly because those terms are so clearly non-Indian in both origin and significance. The want of a sharp line is beneficial, perhaps something that should be encouraged. Yet the Civil Rights Act, by requiring counsel in a "criminal proceeding," may force a hardening of the categories prematurely. It may be the role of the OEO-funded attorney, or any attorney with some institutional connection with the tribe, to urge ways in which the tribal council and tribal courts can minimize the scope of section 202(6) rather than to argue the circumstances in which counsel must appear. [24]

There is a third set of problems posed by section 202(6), which springs from the extraordinary nature of Indian tribes. Assuming that we can answer the question of what constitutes a criminal proceeding, still the tribe, the defendant, and the lawyer for the defendant must decide what constitutes "counsel." Indeed, that is now a problem of great significance, for a number of tribes, including the Navajos, are presently making rules concerning who may practice in tribal courts. And here there is an important principle of sovereignty at stake. One of the nice powers of being a State, or being a State court, is deciding who can practice law within the State and who can appear in the State's courts. It is a power that should not be underestimated, because the decision determines the scope of the monopoly practitioners hold, the extent of their financial and political possibilities, the shape and course of the judicial system. [25] As part of the process of imposing counsel on the tribal courts, there is some indication that the Federal Government is also trying to say what the qualifications for counsel should be. To be sure, counsel in a criminal proceeding might mean nothing less than a regular lawyer, certified, for example, by the Arizona or New Mexico bar. It seemed a simple matter. But since the passage of the act, and partly to blunt its impact, serious thought has been given to the power of the reservation to determine who shall practice law in its courts. A number of restrictions have been suggested, all of them with some degree of reason. First, it might be useful for a tribe to require that counsel practicing in its courts pass an examination that demonstrates some familiarity with tribal law.

Second, there might be some language requirement since many clients will speak only or predominantly the Indian dialect. Third, there might be some sort of residence requirement. These are not unusual requirements; they mirror the restrictions normally placed on the practice of law by the several States. [26] Yet there is some reluctance to allow the Indian tribes to impose them. The Office of the Solicitor for the Department has informally notified tribes that counsel means what one would normally consider it to mean, lawyers admitted to practice in the State in which the reservation is located. Language requirements are completely discouraged, and residence requirements are not even contemplated. Yet the issue is rife with important considerations of soverignty. It is not only the theoretical power than is important, but the exercise of that power. If there is a substantial interest in developing strong and meaningful Indian courts that have an independent validity, that are more than pale carbons of inferior State tribunals, then the tribal development of standards governing who should practice before the courts is exceedingly important.

Because these rules are important to the reservation, they should be important to the OEO-funded lawyer who may be considering a complaint in a habeas corpus action that his client was not represented. [27] In this respect, the OEO lawyer is slightly different from the lawyer who is retained on a one-time basis by a particular tribal member. The OEO lawyer, because of his continuing relationship with the tribe, with his dual interest—both in his client and with all potential clients—sometimes must think twice about the position he should espouse. If he, in his role as lawyer, as architect, has fixed views concerning the pace and form with which lawyers should be introduced into tribal courts, then he may not make all the arguments that he would otherwise make if his sole objective were to reverse a conviction or to obtain a new trail. As a lawyer, he has the opportunity to bring a variety of traditional reservation practices before the stern gaze of an often ununderstanding non-Indian judge in a non-Indian court. [28] Which issues he brings, and when, will have an enormous impact on the tribe. The lawyer can take a laissez-faire view and do what coldly seems necessary, but there seems to be a consensus among the OCO lawyers on the reservations that such a position is irresponsible. In each reservation, there are cases that should be brought sooner and cases that should never be brought, for one of the functions of the OEO lawyer on the reservation is to contribute to the growth and health of the tribe. He is part of a community action program that is very specifically designed to build an organization.

Thus, the OEO-funded lawyer confronted with section 202(6) of the Civil Rights Act has responded differently, depending on the reservation he serves. At Rosebud, S. Dak., the legal services attorney has pressed for the full representation of criminal defendants before the tribal court, offering to serve as counsel in those cases where the defendant cannot secure a retained attorney. The grounds for his position are largely the existing legalization of the tribal court at Rosebud. Indeed, that reservation is one of the few in the Nation that has an attorney sitting as judge—a non-Indian from a nearby town who sits in an appeal capacity under appointment of the tribe. Furthermore, the criminal trials are *really* criminal trials, with incarceration in a most unpleasant jail the result of conviction. Finally, on the Rosebud Reservation, there are no advocates experienced in the tribal courts who are able to defend people accused of crimes for a small fee. The OEO lawyer is also seeking to aid the tribe in securing funds for a prosecutor so that there will be a full-blown adversary system to assist the judge, a far better system than defense counsel pitted directly against the bench. [29].

On the Navajo Reservation, the situation is quite different, and the position of the legal services program, DNA, is also quite different. In addition to the rules for professional attorneys adopted by the court [30] with assistance from the University of New Mexico School of Law and others, there is now a complement of lay counselors who have experience and skill in the tribal courts. [31] Furthermore, the tribal judges on the Navajo Reservation often view their role in a "criminal" prosecution as one of mediating between the defendant and the complainant and seeking a solution under which both parties walk out of the court happy. In this climate, DNA, not surprisingly, has taken the attitude that the sharp intervention of counsel, forcing a solution through the dictate of a Federal district judge, is not wise at the moment.

B. THE NAVAJO LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM

The second example of the effect of OEO attorneys on the tribe involves not a single issue, but an entire program. It involves the potential for conflict between reservation establishment, tribal members, and OEO lawyers, which arises almost by the very existence of a powerful legal services program.

In 1964, Theodore Mitchell, a graduate of the Harvard Law School and a tough westerner, undertook the monumental task of building a $1 million a year program to provide adequate legal services to the 100,000 indigent Navajos stretched across a reservation as big as West Virginia. There were incredible obstacles—recruiting a first-class staff to what was widely considered a desolate area, securing adequate housing on a reservation where there was hardly enough housing for tribal personnel, coping with the difficult problem of dealing with a client population many of whom spoke a different tongue, and setting up a parallel Navajo-manned legal service system for the tribal courts. With courage, bluster, and bravado, Mitchell moved toward what most people would have considered impossible. The rigor and romance of the program turned its remoteness from a liability into an asset; idealistic young lawyers began to flock to the program until Mitchell had a staff—including VISTA lawyers—of more than 20 professional attorneys. An excellent cadre of Navajo administrators was assembled, which developed substantial grassroots support for the program through the community education effort. It has become one of the biggest and most striking of the legal services programs in the country.

At the apex of the development, Mitchell, in August 1968, was banished from the reservation. [32] It was clear from the outset that at the heart of the controversy was a dispute over power. The OEO-funded program had become strong in such an important sense that it challenged the importance of the tribe. Whether the challenge took an overt form or not, it was implicit in the gleaming strength of the energetic attorneys, in their wide support throughout the reservation, in their thousands of dollars worth of equipment and books, in the acknowledged fact that the OEO lawyers could accomplish things that other people could not—that, in fact, often a person should come to DNA rather than to the tribe or the Bureau for help and assistance. In a society that is exceedingly sensitive to symbols, the emblems of strength displayed by the legal services program were too striking.

Again, the historic context is important. The reservation governments have had a shaky existence, suffering the whims of Congress and the overarching impostions of impolite bureaucrats from the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The tribal chairman, in all this, has often been something of a cog, a powerless representative with the seeming responsibility of leadership. While strong leadership has in fact developed in some reservation contexts, the tendency has been for an uneasy wearing of the crown. While the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 [33] made some improvements in the relationship between Federal Government and tribal government, the goal of strong tribal governments has not been realized. Indeed, the Economic Opportunity Act, with its hope of providing more adequate financial assistance directly to the tribe and curtailing dependence on the Department of the Interior, was the most important effort since 1934 toward strengthening the tribal structure.

The actions involving DNA should be viewed in this historical context. At least as far as the Indian desk at OEO was concerned, [34] the large amounts of money that were being funneled by OEO to the tribes were designed to improve the sense of sovereignty, to indicate, in a sense, that tribal governments as well as other governments were free to err, to make mistakes in spending public funds. The community action programs became, on many reservations, the funding vehicle for vast efforts that the tribe had wanted to undertake, but could never finance, such as housing programs and training programs; cultural programs were begun that could never have been approved through the staid and sterile chain of command at the Department of the Interior. In large part, this was true at the Navajo Reservation. The community action program (CAP) soon became the second largest employer on the reservation. A vast homebuilding and home repairing program was undertaken. An enormous pioneering educational effort was begun, first through Operation Headstart, then through the funding of a pioneer Rough Rock School, which introduced experimental techniques quite exciting in nature, and finally through the beginning of the first Indian junior college. Other large and striking programs were also undertaken. All these were under Navajo control; at the critical points in the development of the dispute the community action program was, in fact, closely alined with the tribe.

In this setting, the legal services program presented a striking contrast. If all other programs were under close tribal control, then the legal services program can be said to have striven for independence. As was the normal reaction of all the lawyers placed in reservation settings, and in urban settings as well, the idea that an attorney who was to represent indigents would be controlled by the community action program was anathema. Throughout the whole legal services system there was an effort to insure that the CAP's priorities would not control the priorities of the legal services program, nor that CAP's strategy become its strategy. The effect of the independence, however, was that instead of supplementing the power of the tribe, the legal services program, in a crucial sense, detracted from it. It did so formally by disagreeing to certain decisions and suggesting that certain lawsuits be brought; [35] it did so politically by developing grass roots strength at the chapter level, [36] which could be interpreted as providing the base for political challenge to the incumbent chairman of the tribe; and it provided a challenge informally by becoming, through the accumulation of excellence, a sounder, more certain dispenser of results than the tribe. Finally, the legal services program had a payroll that rivaled that of the tribe.

The conflict between the Navajo Tribe and DNA seems, at one level to be exactly the sort of confrontation where caution by the lawyers was counseled in the previous discussion of the Civil Rights Act. Yet the confrontation between DNA and the tribe should be seen as involving not a withering of the strength of the tribe but a strengthening of the normal political process within the reservation. The paradox of the OEO-funded lawyer on the reservation is such that despite these seeming symbolic attacks on the sovereignty of the tribe, the DNA program was in far more important ways a buttress to sovereignty, a reinforcer of the tribal structure. This was particularly true as DNA, under severe attack, demonstrated the enormous amount of community support that it had developed in its short span. Indeed, the supportive aspect of DNA's politicization helps to explain how legal services programs, acting at their best, are effective parts of community action programs.

One of the peculiar questions, conceptually, from the beginning of the Community Action Program was the relationship between the goals of the CAP Board of Directors and legal services, or stated differently, how legal services could fit into an overall strategy to use CAP funds to organize and channel the political energies of the community. It was always hard to understand how legal services programs could serve as integral portions of the CAP efforts; normally they perceived their role as totally unrelated. [37] The standard legal aid effort was the worst offender. Hiding behind the slogan that its mission was to provide for poor people the same kind of legal services that people who had money could afford—that it should provide the best legal service possible for the people who walked through the door—the legal aid agencies asserted independence from the CAP as a way of keeping social reformers out of their hair. The legal aid lawyer religiously avoided working with the CAP personnel; indeed, there was usually conversation between them only at refunding time. [38]

DNA took another course, a course that made it effective, but also brought it into conflict with the tribe. In essence, the Director of DNA, its staff, and its Board viewed the legal services program as itself a community action program. It was to be concerned in a broad way with education, economic development, cultural growth, and political strengthening. The lawyers were not to rely solely on the flow of cases into the offices. They were to ask the architectural question that was at the base of OEO: how can we, guided by the board of directors, and given close to $1 million in Federal funds, deploy our forces and our money in a way that will contribute to the elimination of poverty on the reservation? The asking of that question meant that the legal services program, rather than merely serving as lawyer to indigents, would become a political force, with a viewpoint that would likely differ from that of the tribe itself. DNA became an effective program, not because it provided good legal services to people who came to the door, but because it provided the political functions that the CAP was designed to produce, the creation of a political effort toward change, toward redistribution of resources, toward less reliance on the Federal Government, toward the training of new political leaders. The presence of conflict forced the program to become intensely political. An enormous proportion of time was spent in self-preservation to gain the support of the people. And through the process of gaining that support, DNA created attitudes and forces that will have a long-range impact on the future of the Navajo reservation. [39]

II. The OEO Lawyer and Economic Development

As difficult as are the attitudinal issues confronting an OEO lawyer who participates in legal conflicts within the reservation, the ambivalences surrounding the lawyer's role in economic development are even greater. These problems are particularly striking because an important characteristic of providing legal services on Indian reservations (distinguishing it from OEO's urban role) is the quite different potential for economic development. Unlike the urban poor, the reservation poor normally possess a considerable common asset, usually land. [40] It would be natural if the presence of this resource encouraged a different strategy for the legal services attorney.

The problem in economic development of the proper role of the OEO lawyer is so complex that OEO lawyers on the reservations have been more or less stymied. Impediment after impediment has prevented or discouraged applying legal skills in a way that will have an appreciable impact on income levels. For example, the restriction against taking fee-bearing cases is sometimes, although falsely, perceived as a barrier to significant involvement in the economic development task by OEO lawyers. A substantial impediment has also resulted from the historic tendency of the Federal Government to leave development goals undefined, or perversely to shift from one definition to another without the substantial and considered participation of the Indian group involved. [41] Indeed, it is possible to say that the concept of economic development itself has fluctuated from period to period, reflecting central prejudices concerning the style of life on Indian reservations. Although "economic development" as a matter of fashion now summons forth rather unanimous concord, the term masks important differences about such questions as the relationship between work and income, the conflict between cultural growth and economic growth, and political prerequisites for reservation development. Because those questions have rarely been sharply faced, the function of the lawyer is treacherous.

In this section, an attempt is made to define certain aspects of the economic development role that reservation lawyers must confront. First, as has been indicated, there is the basic problem, rooted in deeply held attitudes, of assisting in the definition of the economic development goals; second, there is the function, close to the lawyer's heart, of expanding the resources available for development and the closely related function of unraveling the legal complexities that make the use of the resources almost impossible. Third, there is the necessity of encouraging the growth of adequate managerial expertise. The lawyer must understand all these aspects of his role if he is to be able to advise his clients on establishing the legal forms appropriate to their desires and needs.

A. DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS

The current approach of most officials of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, as well as of those in other Government agencies, is to emphasize development of a sort that maximizes the opportunity for work rather than the opportunity for income. [42] As a consequence, development plans often have little or no relation to the cultural and political goals of the reservation. [43] This approach is a matter of substantial consequence to the legal services attorney since Federal goals are a significant limit on the strategies he must pursue. In the absence of the prejudice in favor of work-related development, the existence of natural resources could mean that his function would be to help make a poor man rich, rather than just a little less poor. But such a view raises cultural hackles. On the procedural level, there is the nagging problem of representing poor people where there is a chance of a payoff in the future out of which a nice fee could have been drawn. [44] Naturally, there was continuous concern in the beginning of the legal services programs generally that these programs were driving marginal lawyers out of business. Their concern was extended to the reservations, and at one time there was a general rule proscribing legal services programs form representing tribes rather than individuals. Culturally, income-directed development was upsetting because of a deep-seated feeling, in Americans in general and in lawyers as products of America, that the road up for poor people is (and should be) long and hard, and that work, not income, is the direction that must be taken. Because the mental set is for OEO lawyers to alleviate conditions of poverty by eliminating discrimination that may prevent a client from getting an entry level job that pays slightly above subsistence salary, or providing a little greater security so that the client will not be arbitrarily ejected from his dwelling, or providing modest opportunities for self-employment and management, or assisting by offering welfare benefits, there is little thought given to using legal techniques to change the allocation of resources radically and provide a comfortable source of funds for the formerly poor. In the urban context, it is almost impossible for the legal services lawyer to find any means whereby the latter strategy of rapid income change would succeed. In the reservation context, that did not have to be the case, yet the influence of strongly held attitudes often produced roughly similar approaches.

It is important for a legal services attorney to understand the development goals of the reservation he serves; otherwise he will be unable to advise his clients on matters that are resource oriented, such as how assignments and allocations of land should be made, what challenges or suggestions to offer concerning an internal tax system or even concerning the nature of the educational system. In California, particularly in the southern reservations, California Indian Legal Services has begun encouraging the sharper definition of development goals. When CILS began, the OEO-funded lawyers expected the package of legal problems that normally accompany poverty. California Indians were reported to be at the bottom of the economic barrel with annual income, life expectancy, educational level—all the normal indicators of mainstream participation—suggesting abysmal poverty and despair. But there were immediately sharp distinguishing characteristics. At least the leadership of the California Indians shared in the dream that a way out would still be found; that under more or less free enterprise, they would be able to develop their resources in a way that would make them independent of Government interference. They began to conceive of a lawyer in an entirely different way.

For the urban poor, the function of the lawyer is to force the establishment to invent quasi-entitlements to resources that the middle class now controls. The pool of jobs has to be shared; the universities built for the middle class must be made accessible to the poor; and there are those who argue bravely that, beyond all else there must be a sharing of income, regardless of the distribution of work. It is exceedingly difficult to construct the necessary legal, as opposed to political argument to compel such sharing. The lawyer for the Indian poor may often find these themes of "sharing" inapposite. The California Indians living on reservations, for example, have resources and are often entitled to additional resources under traditional legal doctrines. For them, the problem is somewhat different. To be sure, the Indians of California are plagued with problems concerning education, welfare payments, landlord-tenant, and so forth. But in an interesting process of interaction between lawyer and client, the attention of the lawyers has been directed to far more developmental issues. For example, the leaders of the Morongo Reservation, between Palm Springs and Riverside, became concerned over the fact that the slippage of land out of trust status and into non-Indian ownership gives the reservation a pock-marked quality that impeded optimal use and the most satisfactory planning of resources; more important, the land slippage was eroding the base of young members of the band who, deprived of land, moved to nearby cities. The preparation of a more sensible tenure pattern might permit the preservation of zones free of the indirect fallout from development. Tribal leaders sought advice on the possibility of devising some sophisticated scheme that would help in preserving the integrity of the remaining Indian land. [45]

It is hard for lawyers for the poor to take on such assignment for several reasons. First, as has already been indicated, the fierceness of the Protestant ethic influences greatly the strategies that are usually considered. The Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Congress, the Economic Development Administration, the prevailing mood, all seek progress in terms of jobs. The Bureau will not show California reservation lands to prospective industrial users as part of its promotional task largely because there is not an ample Indian labor supply for development. Even though the lands are often in excellent industrial-potential zones, and even though the chief industrial development office of the Bureau is in Los Angeles, the Bureau encourages Fairchild, General Dynamics, and others to locate in the Southwest, the Dakotas, and other areas, such as the Navajo Reservation, where Indian unemployment is found in large numbers. Since the Los Angeles office is largely ineffective, the point is not exceedingly important, but the underlying philosophy is indicative. There is no public interest in making the California reservations financially comfortable without work. It is viewed as peculiar and bizarre that the Palm Springs Indians should now be "rich" without having worked their way up some well-accepted ladder.

Debate concerning economic development, then, is plagued by ambivalence—ambivalence about the relationship between work and income that pervades discussion in other contexts of welfare payments and the preferability of a job. This ambivalence toward substantial wealth for poor reservation Indians is reflected in the process of adjudicating Indian claims against the Federal Government. Because this problem is basic to development, it is worth dwelling a moment on the claims process. California Indians, for example, have claimed considerable land within the State for the last century; to the factory worker in Downey, the claim—that the Indians are entitled to large chunks of metropolitan and rural California—appears extravagant. In the 20th century, afflicted with some sense of guilt, the Nation provided for limited opportunities for the assertion of these Indian claims. [47] If there had been full compensation, the Indians would have gathered enormous wealth, either in land or money. Economic development—in the sense of providing immediate financial security of the highest sort—would have been assured. The solution, embodying a compromise in the form of limited compensation, reflects the reluctance to see development in such grand nonlabor terms. On the one hand, the response allowed continuation of the idea that we are a fair and square country that believes in law and certainly in property rights—for that reason alone, some recognition had to be given to the Indian claims. On the other hand, it was preposterous to recognize fully such extraordinary claims of a handful of poor people, even to the extent that these were based on legitimate entitlement. [48]

Pervading the entire process is the particular kind of phoniness and condescension that pervades many economic development efforts. There was the knowledge from the beginning that the claims, even if they went through trial, could not produce what they would have been worth if they had been the claims of non-Indian property owners claiming, in the 20th century, a taking without compensation in violation of the 14th amendment. Even the pooling of claimants and the per capita distribution process have a certain cynical and simplifying aspect. It would have been too tedious and burdensome to process each claim separately—there must have been over 100 separate California claimants; yet pooling and per capita distributions ignore handsome differences among the groups and individuals in terms of what happened and what their rights are. And for some litigants, lower claims were made simply because of the incredible size of the claims if normal rules were applied.

Just as the claims process was manipulated to provide some compromise between the obligation of conscience and the extraordinary change in living conditions that might occur if full compensation were made, economic development efforts represent a compromise as well. There must be enough industry, enough effort directed to encouraging industry to move to reservations, that our consciences will be collectively healed, but only that sort of industry should be encouraged that permits the proper kind of healing. And that has meant, traditionally, the sort of development that provides the slow entrance into the "mainstream" of American society through work and saving.

Indeed, the impetus towards mainstream is so great that encouragement of industry has an added complexity. Development must be sufficient to make life on the reservation adequate, but not so adequate that persons will be discouraged from leaving the reservation and assimilating into American society. As conceived and as pushed by the Federal Government, and as has been impressed upon the tribes, economic development means traditionally this kind of shifty compromise. The legal services attorney should not be satisfied with such a compromise, at least to the extent that it is Bureau-imposed. It presents the greatest likelihood of disintegrating and emasculating the reservation even further, for the trade of work for income diminishes rather than expands the opportunity for the cultural growth of the reservation. [49]

B. EXPANDING RESOURCES

It is quite natural for a lawyer to expand the resources available for development once the primary goal is clarified. This function includes more than conquest as a means of adding to the tribal domain; it means, also, extricating existing resources from legal and political snarls that render them virtually useless. The claims of the Alaskan natives provide one example. In the act giving statehood to Alaska, [50] the Congress authorized the State to select about 100 million acres of federally owned land. It was generally agreed that the State selection process was crucial to Alaska's economic development. When the government in Juneau began the long process of picking and choosing from the massive Federal reserves, it almost immediately was faced with objections from natives to every selection. It was the natives' contention that when the United States bought Alaska from Russia in 1867, the United States assured continuing rights of use and occupancy to the natives. [51] The purchase agreement has never been fully and adequately interpreted. But the claims that the natives are now making are far from unreasonable; moreover, they have been packaged in a manner that makes them extremely appealing. [52] As a consequence, the Secretary of Interior has frozen all State selections until there is a settlement of the claims. [53] The function of the Alaskan claims is to provide a permanent base of financial security and a guarantee that the Eskimos and Indians will have a continuing stake in the economic future use of the State. The security provides the opportunity to fashion the cultural future of the group in a way that makes it less dependent on migration to urban areas and marginal employment for subsistence.

There are probably similar, well-based claims in numerous States. In South Dakota, the Oglala Sioux of Pine Ridge Reservation are pressing for the return of valuable Black Hills land "temporarily" borrowed by the United States for an artillery range during World War II. In Maine, a venturesome lawyer, on behalf of the few remnants of the Passamaquoddy, has sued the State for $150 million for improper trusteeship of timberland held for the benefit of the tribe. Several years ago in Utah, a group of Navajos successfully attacked the decisions of a State Indian commission that was using trust funds to benefit individuals other than the true beneficiaries. [54] As a categorical matter, residual rights under treaties that still have force have never been adequately explored. Certain areas, including Montana, Oklahoma, and the checkerboard area of the Navajo reservation, are pregnant with uncertainties that flow from the overlapping settlements, and where there is uncertainty, the chances are good that non-Indians have acted affirmatively, leaving it to the Indians to raise later objections. Throughout the West, the rights of Indians to precious water should almost certainly be the subject of more extensive litigation.

Closely tied to these areas for legal ingenuity are the problems linked to the fallowness of present resources held in Indian hands. In southern California, a drive from Indio to El Centro along the Salton Sea is dramatic demonstration of the special problems of Indian land. Alternate sections are Indian-held; those sections owned by non-Indians flourish with date palms, other agricultural uses, and some industrial and residential improvements, while the Indian-held land languishes in the grip of restrictive leasing policy, the ensnarlment of distrust, the heavy hand of cautious bureaucracy, and the crippling uncertainty of informal and formally conflicting claims. A small piece of land is subject not only to statutory restrictions on long-term leasing [55], but its ownership may be fragmented among numerous heirs who cannot be brought together for the purpose of reaching a common business decision. In other places, there may be historic assignments of land, so that on an informal or customary basis, the tribe may not be able to control land that is nominally "tribal." The prospect of working with large chunks of land—a first impression—is quickly corrected by experience. Here there is an important and difficult task for lawyers. Some way must be found to improve the power to make decisions that can rationalize land assignments and land use on the reservation. Some technique must be devised to allow at least the possibility of reassignment of existing rights within the reservation so that the people feel a sense of participation in the planning, a knowledge that their interests are protected, and some sense that through cooperation and rearrangement of entitlement there is some likelihood that not only the group but the individuals within the group will prosper. On most reservations, such a task will require a complete examination of tenure patterns and a wholesale reassessment of the way land is held.

C. LAWYERS AND MANAGERIAL GUIDANCE

In addition to clarification of development goals and improvement of resources, there is a third important function OEO lawyers should fulfill: the providing of managerial guidance. One failure of Federal policy, only partly remedied in the onrush of programs in the 1960's, has been the failure to provide adequate technical assistance so that resources, once exploited and realized, would have a good chance at sensible management. The counsel for Indians must help to close the gap. Two examples will provide background: the Palm Springs Indians and the claims award process.

In Palm Springs, it had been clear since the late 1940's that at some time in the future there would be a partition of tribal assets (mainly land) that had soared in value, and that members of the Agua Caliente Band would face new and intense responsibilities. [56] Indeed, by the time the partition actually took place, the per capita share was in excess of $300,000. The United States, in the exercise of its trust capacity, was quite careful in making sure—under direction from Congress—that the distribution of land was meticulous and fair; men were employed fulltime for several years to supervise the real estate affairs of the Agua Caliente Band. Yet no attention was given to providing the Indians with any skill, education, or training concerning the management of the resource once the trust status was severed. At the time of the distribution, no member of the Band was a college graduate; juvenile delinquency was beginning to be a serious matter. The void in management skills was quickly filled by a group of lawyers under the supervision of a State judge. [57] The group, or at least most of its members, was later charged by the Federal Government with bilking the Indians by extracting from them exorbitant fees for management and legal services. [58] The dependency relationship had been transferred from one group (the Federal Bureau) to another (the local lawyers and bankers). The major consequence of the Federal investigation in 1967 and 1968 into the practice of the Palm Springs bar was castigation and a resumption of the Federal trust relationship. There has yet to be an important effort to prepare the Agua Caliente Band for its new responsibilities. There has been no effort to provide experience or exposure to various investment opportunities or development strategies.

The same thing is true under the practice of the Indian Claims Commission. By and large, its processes consist of long discussions among Washington lawyers for the Indians, Washington lawyers for the Justice Department, anthropologists, and Commission members. At the end of the discussion—which may take over 20 years—checks are sent out to the Indians. On the occasion of the distribution, it is the practice of journalists for some clever press service bureau to go out to the Indian community to see how quickly the paltry sum is spent; it always makes an amusing story. What no one has reported is the shameful fact that the Indian Claims Commission has now distributed $251 million [59], and neither it nor the Congress has given any consideration to the consequences of distribution.

Although Congress does review the plan for distribution before appropriating money, it has generally treated the claims process as if it were an ordinary judgment; and ordinarily neither the judge nor the defendant cares what the plaintiff does with the money he has secured. Yet, in a sense, the Indian Claims Commission Act can be looked upon a precursor of the Economic Opportunity Act. Problems of obligation aside, there was a perceived need to use a greater amount of Federal funds to correct the vast discrepancy between the living standards of Indians and the living standards of other Americans. [60] Perhaps it is wise to look at the Indian Claims Commission Act as a technique for justifying needed expenditures based on entitlements rather than on charity; the claims justification, in this sense, aided only in obtaining passage for the act. If the Commission was a prototype OEO, then it and Congress have failed miserably. The most important goal of such a mission would be to see that the money expended contributed to independence, self-sufficiency, and development. Yet that aspect of the job was totally and completely neglected until the development of the poverty program. The Congress assumed that the awards would mean that there was little need for continued Federal help through the Bureau of Indian Affairs; indeed, the Indian

Claims Commission was often a threshold for termination of the Federal trust status.[61] But the assumption was wholly erroneous. The award of a large sum of money, by itself, almost nowhere provided the ability to survive independently of Federal trusteeship. As a consequence, the money awarded by the Claims Commission was virtually thrown to the winds. It was a salve to our collective conscience, but little else. It did not do what it could have done—provide the basis, the start for meaningful development.

What should be done about this lack of training in development? It is virtually impossible for the Bureau of Indian Affairs, as presently constituted, to correct this problem. Its local agents, by and large, are capable of distributing only misinformation, particularly on issues of economic development. They have no experience and certainly no outstanding expertise in matters like banking, land finance, and land planning. At times the Bureau attempts to progress through changes in nomenclature. At one agency on the Navajo Reservation, for example, the supervisor received word that there must be a town planning officer, but no budget was provided; to satisfy the order, the local realty agent whose job was to file and keep track of allotments and assignments was appointed director of urban and town planning. In many instances, the Indians view the Bureau as attempting to secure a solution that will mean the end to any land-related integrity of the Indian organization, and the businessmen considering enterprises together with Indian communities look at the Bureau as the symbol of redtape and oversupervision. Furthermore, the Bureau is trapped within its own conflicts. It is impossible to service one reservation well as a development advocate when there is a mandate to provide assistance to "all Indians." The Bureau may have different goals in mind from those of the reservation itself—for example, it may be concerned with terminating the Federal trust relationship, curtailing Federal expenditures, creating jobs rather than income, providing incentives for Indians to leave the reservation. It is responsible not to the reservation, but to the Congress and more particularly to the Committees on Interior and Insular Affairs and to the Appropriations Committees. Its policies are designed to produce results and statistics that the committees will find satisfying—but that may conflict with the needs of the reservation. Infrastructure investments, for transportation and water for example, require large Federal expenditures with sometimes remote likelihood of return. Within the Department of Interior, the Bureau must compete for attention, prestige, and funds with agencies that have more muscle and economic power behind them. Within the Department, Indians must fight livestock owners, conservationists, water planners, advocates of every interest other than that of the particular reservation.

D. APPLYING THE LAWYER'S SKILLS

By default, development advocacy falls in part to the lawyer not only in assisting the tribe in obtaining and securing resources, but also in assisting in the management of the resources. If the presence of natural resources constitutes an important distinguishing characteristic between reservations and other poverty contexts, it is fair to ask whether the reservation counsel, OEO-financed or not, is capable of fulfilling this role. What skills, in other words, are necessary for the task?

First, the architectural skills of the lawyer are much in demand. He should constantly consider the sorts of innovative legal constructs that will provide for exploitation of resources in a way that is compatible with the cultural needs of his clients. Here, as in other respects, the lawyer for the Indian poor must be as resourceful as the lawyer for the wealthy. Lawyers for the rich have devised schemes to allow a culture to continue: the spendthrift trust; the personal holding company; the foundation; the Philadelphia nun; the generation-skipping trust—all designed to allow a group of people to live in the style to which it has grown accustomed, hindered as little as possible by the incursions of change in the society at large. Moreover, the rich have often taken the perspective that their way of life should be available not only for them, but for generations to come as well. They ask not only that their assets be preserved, but that they grow, and they ask as well that those assets produce a sufficiently ample income to give the owners freedom to pursue activities of their own choice.

The Indians ask no less of their lawyers. They seek economic development that is consistent with their style of life, but only seldom is it provided. The Palm Springs Agua Caliente Bank may serve, again, as an example. The land of the Bank and of its members is rapidly being "developed." Lavish new houses, new hotels, new golf courses have appeared where not long ago barren vacant lands existed. But none of the houses are inhabited by Indians and the comfortable country clubs have no Indian members. There is money, but it is obtained at the expense of the continuing existence of the Band as a political and cultural entity. Similar difficulties are encountered in the pellmell effort to induce industry—any industry—to locate on reservations. The fact that the jobs created may be rendered obsolete in 5 or 10 years is often overlooked, even though technological change may leave in its wake the same kind of brutalization and haphazard urbanization that has occurred in many instances in small towns and cities throughout the country. And some reservations, without wise counsel, expose themselves to the sort of raping of their natural resources that has saddened the lives and future of Appalachia. [62]

There are more hopeful examples. In Alaska, the legal services program was asked to provide a legal entity that would develop Nelson Island, located in the western part of the State. The Indians [illegible] the village sought a vehicle for development that would not defeat traditional concepts of property and life. The legal services program devised a new kind of entity tailored to the traditional forms of organization and political decisionmaking in the area. Most important, all property except personal property will eventually be held in trust on behalf of all the members of the Nelson Island Corp. [63] The corporate form provides the atmosphere for development while honoring customary ways in which the members of the village consider the property of the commune. Together with Z. Simpson Cox, a Phoenix attorney, the Gila River Reservation has formed a complex 5-year plan for development, including careful decisions concerning what reservation land should be used for homesites, where industrial development would be most desirable, and how transportation, water, and income changes relate to education, tribal organization, and housing. Largely as a consequence of the basic planning, Gila River was selected for inclusion in the Federal model cities program.

In California, there are special circumstances for economic development that limit the capacity of the Indians of the State to employ the substantial funds that have been gained through the claims process. The prime limitation has been the understandable desire of the Indians with an interest in the fund to obtain a per capita distribution. Deprived for 100 years of both land and money, they now have little tolerance for an intangible right to a fund. On the other hand, it is clear that the potential for development is almost wholly dissipated when the $29 million is spread at the rate of about $800 per claimant. Still, some leaders, particularly in the southern part of the State, are interested in seeking ways to achieve both goals. The OEO-funded program in California, California Indian Legal Services, is presently exploring the possibility of creating a special savings bank, in the nature of a California Indian Development Fund, that would allow withdrawals by individual Indians, but would also permit accumulations for investment purposes.

III. Conclusion

The process of shifting from a service orientation to a development orientation is not easy for the lawyer. First of all, there are service needs that, because they result from immediate pains, often must be met. Furthermore, the lawyers themselves may not be trained to take a developmental view of their skills. A corporate lawyer, in the company of titans, may plot with his client the conquest of certain worlds, but the lawyer for the poor normally views his role more humbly. To argue, on behalf of a group of poor people that they, rather than a major city, are entitled to the flow from a major river is a luxury that is local to those representing Indians. Yet in some California valleys where substantial diversions have taken place, such an argument undoubtedly has great merit.

It would be excellent if the charge to lawyers could rest with the mandate to maximize resource use consistent with the cultural needs of the reservation client. Unfortunately, there are complications. Quite clearly, many reservations, smitten by the same ambivalencies that have diseased the non-Indian administrators, may not be able to present the profile of a lifestyle that they wish to nourish and preserve. In some cases, such as the Colville Reservation in Washington, the membership is riven. A large sector has already accomplished the acculturation process and is loathe to stand by while a significant proportion of tribal assets is dedicated to the development of the reservation, but there are others, usually those still on the reservation, who see the need to use common resources in ways that assist the tribal members who are living , as treaties used to say, "in the Indian manner." Again, the use of land becomes central. If the land is not to be sold, the wholly assimilated members of the band may wish to have it exploited in a way that maximizes income, whether the land use is consistent with traditional needs or not. Before long-term action can be taken, before the lawyer-as-architect has any idea of the direction he should take, there must be some approximate resolution among the vying forces concerning the uses of reservation resources.

The resolution is not necessarily in terms of a blueprint and full plan for development; that will rarely occur. It may occur through the political process with the leadership selected largely because of its capacity to mediate between the two sides. But there is almost certainly a prior role for the lawyer to play in some settings—assisting in the articulation process. For example, the dissention in some reservation contexts may be attributable to the fact that no one is aware of all the alternatives; presented with a meager set of choices, the opportunity for polarization is increased. Furthermore, the continuing uncertainty about Federal policy contributes to a false sense of urgency when it appears that policy may change quite drastically. If the lawyer seeks to be guided by the reservation concerning the use of his architectural skills, he must increase the richness of the choices available to the tribe. He has to encourage the tribe to look at issues from a development perspective, he must enhance the ability to criticize the proposals of the Government, of consultants, of lawyers, and of private developers.

Partly, this is a problem of Indian perception of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. In the past, the Bureau was the exclusive provender of Federal Government largess. The superintendent of the agency was the man from whom all money had to be coaxed, and who approved all decisions. The political consequences of this colonial relationship were disastrous. In the recent past, there has been an effort to fragment the notion of dependence by encouraging Indian tribes to go elsewhere with proposals for a change. The Economic Development Administration, the Department of Labor, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, as well as the Office of Economic Opportunity, have become principal sources for tribal funding. As a consequence, the economic importance of the Bureau personnel on the reservation has diminished. But the legacy of subservience and overobedience still remains. It will be impossible for economic development to occur, and it will be impossible for the lawyer to obtain a useful picture of tribal goals, so long as the singleness of the relationship exists. [64] As part of his function of demonstrating the richness of alternatives, the lawyer must indicate the richness of institutional choices that the reservation can make—that it is not necessary to be so dependent on the Bureau of Indian Affairs. [65]

The task, breaking the psychological stranglehold of the Bureau, the legacy of dependence even after the fact of dependence has disappeared, will be most difficult. To a large xtent, it will be the function of the lawyer to demonstrate that the Bureau is vulnerable not invincible, and that its decisions concerning development are often faulty and overly conservative. Such a strategy can be implemented in several ways. First, the lawyer can encourage the establishment of model projects that proceed wholly independent of Bureau involvement, hoping to demonstrate the effect of the Bureau's dead hand. Second, there is the exposition of the truth, making known to the tribal leadership aspects of the Bureau-tribal relationship that have probably never come to light. [66] There are few developmental aspects of the Bureau's stewardship that would not bear serious scrutiny. [67]

The task, however, is not only changing the reservations' view of the Bureau, but also the Bureau's attitude toward the reservations. An Indian reservation, Judge Deady said in *United States* v. *Clapox* [68], is in the nature of a school, and the Indians are gathered there, under the charge of an agent, for the purpose of acquiring the habits, ideas, and aspirations that distinguish the civilized from the uncivilized man. That has been the view of the Bureau, virtually since its inception. It has looked at the reservation as a campus—to be terminated when the graduates all attain sufficient degree of civilization. In terms of economic development, however, there are special perils because of the Bureau's definition of civilization. It must be a definition that flows from the collective ideas and attitudes of the personnel. It is a view of civilization and development that is humble and modest, an attitude toward the pupils that one might expect from a third-grade teacher toward her class. It is an attitude based on Horatio Alger and hard work, professional ambitions for the few, but virtually no ambition for the many. Development of the land, like development of the political institutions, is desirable only to the extent that it increases the freedom of the reservation clients—freedom from hunger and privation, but also freedom to pursue a culture or style of life considered worth while. It is no feat to fill the reservation with another suburb, or to line the reservations with industrial buildings assembling electronic components, just as it is no feat to superimpose American-style courts and educational institutions upon the political structure of the tribe. What is needed, rather, is a subtle understanding on behalf of the reservation, its lawyers, and the Government agencies, of the capacity to manipulate progress so as to provide a greater degree of meaningful self-determination.

NOTES

1. *See generally* Commission on the Rights, Liberties, & Responsibilities of the American Indian, Report: The Indian: America's Unfinished Business, 67–72, 138–41, 159–70 (W. Brophy & S. Aberle eds. 1966).

2. The best justification of United States policy towards Indians as consistent with a rule of law is contained in Felix Cohen's collection of essays, The Legal Conscience (1953). While Cohen's views will always remain a landmark contribution to the understanding of American Indian legal history, it is time for an attempt at revisionism. As a crusader for increased justice, Felix Cohen sought to build on what he perceived to be a consistent strain of fair dealings (with unfortunate aberrations) beginning with the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, Ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50. It is possible, however, that the unfortunate aberrations were the rule and the fair dealings the exception.

3. Menominee Termination Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 250, *as amended*, 25 U.S.C. §§ 891–902 (1964).

4. *See, e.g.*, the Rancheria Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85–671, 72 Stat. 619, which governed the mechanism for dissolving certain Indian land collectives in California. The most expansive legislation governing internal tribal organization is the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461–79 (1964).

5. *See, e.g.*, 25 C.F.R. pt. 52.

6. Reported authority on the spirit of negativism is sparse, but examples abound. Local agents tell the Indian governments what laws they cannot pass, what rights they do not have, what trust moneys they cannot reach. The most tangible evidence of negativism is the recurring theme in presidential and secretarial statements declaring a "new way," allowing Indians to control their own destinies. Candidate Nixon, in a speech given October 9, 1968, for example, said "I will see to it that local programs and Federal budgets are operated with minimum bureaucratic restraint and in full consultation with the Indian people who should achieve increasing authority and responsibility over programs affecting them."

7. *See, e.g.*, R. BRANDT, HOPI ETHICS: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 200–01 (1954); Van Valkenburgh, *Navajo Common Law*, III MUSEUM NOTES (Museum of N. Ariz.) 39 (1938).

8. *See United States* v. *Clapox*, 35 F. 575 (D. Ore. 1888).

9. A California reservation that sought a license to sell beer on fiesta days asked secretarial approval of an ordinance that would limit the sale to specified parts of the reservation. The Bureau official claimed that only a wholesale lifting of prohibition would be approved, and as a consequence, he refused to pass the ordinance to the next highest office. In defense of his position, he invoked his superior knowledge of departmental regulations. A challenge by an attorney produced no better results; only by an appeal directly to the Secretary of Interior could the application be dislodged from the local official's desk.

The maddening slowness of the process is even present in criminal prosecutions. In a recent case on the Choctaw reservation, the body of a Choctaw woman was found near the house at an RCA Training Center. Soon thereafter, her husband, also a Choctaw, was arrested by Sheriff's deputies of Neshoba County, Mississippi, where the reservation is located. It is fairly clear that the State did not have jurisdiction to prosecute if the murder took place on the reservation, and it was clear to all that the murder did in fact take place near the reservation. Yet the Federal Government—in this case the United States Attorney—sought a survey of the land before he would accept jurisdiction, and the State took the position that they would not drop prosecution until the Federal Government moved in. For two months, the Federal Government moved the case back and forth between the Department of Interior and the Department of Justice while the defendant sat in the Neshoba County Jail. Finally, the OEO-funded lawyer filed an action under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964), to obtain his client's release.

10. There are a number of sources for the difficulty in constitution-making, and not the least of them has been the conflicting directions for Indian development proffered by the United States. Division of the land into small individual holdings has created attitudes that conflict with attitudes of those who would rather see the preservation of the land as an entity. The policy of lumping various distinct Indian groups on a single reservation—as on the Colorado River Reservation in Arizona and California and on the Rocky Boy Reservation in Montana—also contributes to the difficulty. Disputes about enrollment of members, as on the San Pasquale Reservation in Southern California, produce sharp and intense conflict that lasts over many decades. And the demand for a constitutional structure, which means the binding quality of a majority vote, often yields an embittered minority.

11. The National Congress of American Indians disassociated itself from the Poor People's March on Washington partly because of a commitment to change through the normal processes of appeal; on the other hand, groups such as the National Indian Youth Council and the fish-in protesters in the State of Washington have been more sympathetic toward demonstration methods.

12. Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Resolution 67-3. Grazing land is a major resource of the reservation, an expanse of land about 5,000 square miles in southwest South Dakota. The decision concerning the terms and conditions of leases of the land have been a consistent issue in elections for the tribal council that has the principal authority. *See* Note, *The Indian: The Forgotten American*, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1818, 1827 (1968).

13. The Assistant Secretary of the Interior wrote the tribal attorney that "the relation a blood factor bears to the qualifications of members of the tribe is not apparent; and no showing has been made that blood degree classification relates to qualifications for a grazing allocation. . . ." The Department sloughed off the argument that the Federal Government establishes blood quantum tests for determining entitlement to Federal benefits such as attendance at Bureau of Indian Affairs schools. The Assistant Secretary relied on Colliflower v. Garland. 342 F. 2d 369 (9th Cir. 1965), to support his argument. *See* M. PRICE, AMERICAN INDIAN LEGAL PROBLEMS: CASES AND MATERIALS ch. I, at 79–82 (tent. mimeo. ed, 1968).

14. It was pressure from off-reservation groups that persuaded the Secretary of Interior to include in the ill-fated Omnibus Bill of 1967 a section that would authorize tribes to vote to distribute shares of commonly-held assets to individuals who wished to withdraw their interest in the reservation. The section would have been divisive and destructive because of its incentive for increased fragmentation, but the bill did not prosper in Congress.

15. The tribal council may be selected with one representative from each particular culture group or historical band on the reservation, regardless of numerical representation. It would be interesting to see if the reservations are a haven from the ferocity of the one-man one-vote rule. The question, of course, has not yet arisen; but the passage of the Rights of Indians title to the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301–03 (1968), suggests that the equal protection standard of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), could be made applicable.

16. The Navajo tribe is currently engaged in a serious dispute on this issue, primarily involving the impact of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 on a tribal rule that prohibited lawyers from practicing in tribal courts. *See* p. xxx, *infra.*

17. The Navajo Tribe has approved a plan for hiring a professional attorney as a tribal prosecutor. DNA stands for Dinebeiina Nahiilna be Agaditahe, which means "Program for the Economic Revitalization of the People." The name was suggested by a Navajo member of the Board of Directors.

18. 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301–03 (1968).

19. Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., Report 1 (1964).

20. Of course, there are serious questions as to the scope of the right to counsel generally, particularly in the area where a misdemeanor might involve a serious punishment. At the present time, the tribal courts do not take criminal jurisdiction over serious offenses, which are prosecuted by the Federal Government under the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1964). But some feel that the criminal jurisdiction over serious crimes may be concurrent. *See* Davis, *Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Country in Arizona*, 1 Ariz. L. Rev. 62, 89 (1959), an excellent article. If the jurisdiction is concurrent, and if the Indian tribes were

to exercise their power, then there would certainly be problems in that aspect of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 that promises an attorney only at the Indian defendant's "own expense." Assuming that the Federal Government has sole jurisdiction over serious offenses, the statute can be read as giving Indian defendants merely the opportunity to hire counsel in any criminal case including misdemeanors. Needless to say, the fundamental question, both before and after the passage of the Rights of Indians sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, is whether the *real* Bill of Rights applies to the acts of tribal governments either as instrumentalities of the Federal Government or through the fourteenth amendment. *See, e.g., Colliflower* v. *Garland*, 342 F. 2d 369 (9th Cir. 1965); Fretz, *The Bill of Rights and American Indian Tribal Governments*, 6 Nat. Res. J. 581 (1966); Note, *The Indian Bill of Rights and the Constitutional Status of Tribal Governments*, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1343 (1969).

21. The best expositions of the judicial systems of the reservations are to be found in various cases that deal with the powers of the courts. *See, e.g.,* Colliflower v. Garland, *supra* note 22; Iron Crow v. Ogallala Sioux Tribe, 129 F. Supp. 15 (D.S.D. 1955); Application of Jimerson, 4 Misc. 2d 1028, 255 N.Y.S. 2d 627 (Sup. Ct. 1963), *aff'd*, 22 App. Div. 2d 417, 255 N.Y.S. 2d 959 (1965). *See also* Lednicer, *The Peacemaker Court in New York State*, 14 N.Y.U. Intra. L. Rev. 189 (1959).

22. Shepardson, *Problems of the Navajo Tribal Courts in Transition*, Human Organization 250 (1950).

23. *See, e.g.,* President's Comm'n on Law Enforcement & the Administration of Justice, Task Force Report on the Courts 97 (1967).

24. The Taos Pueblo may serve as an example. The Pueblo has resisted the imposition of the tribal court structure, and the Governor of the Pueblo settles cases as they are brought before him. It is doubtful that the Governor divides the cases into criminal or non-criminal, for that distinction has only limited utility in a small, closely-knit society where all infractions have antisocial consequences—where, in fact, law and religion are closely intertwined. Similarly, the non-Indian judicial system is beginning to understand the disutility of classifying the problems of chronic alcoholics and the vagrant poor as "criminal" ones.

25. In Sanders v. Russell, 401 F. 2d 241 (5th Cir. 1968), the court struck down extraordinarily restrictive rules announced by the Federal judge in Mississippi that would have made it difficult for regular representation of civil rights litigants, the rules were designed principally, of course, to prevent disruption of patterns of culture, much the same purpose as reservation rules excluding professional attorneys. *Cf.* Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 364 F. 2d 161 (2d Cir. 1966).

26. Because they may be of assistance in the preparation of rules for other reservations, significant portions of the new Rules of Admission to the Practice of Law on the Navajo Reservation are reprinted in Appendix A. These rules are not now in effect.

27. The power to file an application for a writ of habeas corpus has been strengthened by section 203 of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C.A. §1303 (1968): "The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be available to any person, in a court of the United States, to test the legality of his detention by order of an Indian tribe." For an indication of the scope of the writ prior to the Civil Rights Act, see Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F. 2d 369 (9th Cir. 1965).

28. A famous example of a refusal to understand Indian justice is *Ex parte* Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883), where a great rivalry between two leaders of the Brule Sioux resulted in the killing of Spotted Tail by Crow Dog. There was a customary form of retribution, including the surrender of horses and other property by the family of Crow Dog, but this was not sufficient punishment for the Federal Government. A Federal murder indictment was brought.

29. Some reservations are planning to make application for funds for prosecutorial services under the Safe Streets and Crime Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90–351, 82 Stat. 197. The Navajo Tribe has approved a plan for hiring a professional attorney as a tribal prosecutor.

30. See note 26, *supra*, and Appendix A.

31. Indeed, the OEO legal services program, from the outset, has considered itself a combination of professional Anglo attorneys and talented lay advocates recruited from the reservation. As part of the DNA program, these lay counsel are given additional training by the professional attorneys.

32. The Advisory Committee of the tribe, invoking the tribe's inherent power to exclude any non-Indian from the reservation, passed a rule forbidding Mitchell from coming on Navajo land. The very circumstances of the expulsion underscore the otherworldly quality of practice on the reservation. At a meeting in the Navajo Council Chamber shortly before his expulsion, Mrs. Annie Wauneka, an elderly and important member of the tribe's central Advisory Committee, was questioning certain Washington officials about the power of the tribe to exclude non-Indians. In the process of the conversation, Mitchell, who was sitting at the back of the room, laughed. He laughed, he said later, out of embarrassment; Mrs. Wauneka said it was "the silliest, dirtiest laugh I have ever heard." At any rate, after brooding about the matter, Mrs. Wauneka walked up to Mitchell at another session and began pounding him about the head. The next day, August 7, 1968, the Committee passed a resolution that Mitchell's

> ridicule of the Advisory Committe and other selected officers of the Navajo Tribe has increased tensions among the Navajo people to the point where there has even been a breach of the peace and violent disturbances during a meeting of the Advisory Committee.
>
> such defiance, ridicule, tensions and violence seem destined to continue and grow worse, thus threatening the peace and well-being of the Navajo people and manifestly leading to grave danger to the life and health of members of the Navajo Tribe.

The resolution was a prelude to an order for "forcible removal" pursuant to section 1786 of the Tribal Code, which permits the Chairman, with the concurrence of the Bureau, "in extreme cases involving grave danger to the life, health, morals or property of the Tribe," to order exclusion from the reservation. The formal charge, then, leading to banishment was ridicule, a not infrequently used tool of lawyers. Mitchell moved his office to a trailer outside the reservation, and OEO has hired a lawyer to defend him. In Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 17 (D. Ariz. 1969), the Federal court held that the tribe's action had violated the Civil Rights Act, and directed that Mitchell be readmitted to the reservation. The decision is now on appeal.

33. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461–79 (1964).

34. The Indian Desk was an early creation of Sargent Shriver, then Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, designed to ensure that there was some coordinated philosophy behind OEO grants for the benefit of Indian reservations. The Desk had its greatest influence on the design and funding of applications establishing community action agencies, such as the Office of Navajo Economic Opportunity. Head Start programs were also approved through the Indian Desk. Legal Services programs were treated slightly differently. The predominant planning and funding function rested with the Legal Services Branch of OEO in Washington; the Indian Desk had the right to renew and complain, but not the power to veto. The director of the Indian Desk during the formative years was Dr. Jim Wilson, an Oglala Sioux.

35. Various areas of friction developed; among them was the pace of recognition of the Native American Church and its use of peyote; DNA seemed to encourage greater haste toward legalization than did the tribe's general counsel.

36. The Navajo tribe is divided into 98 chapters with roughly 1,000 members each. DNA sought to reach the people with an effective community legal education program through the chapters. Furthermore the chapters elected Navajo members to the Board of Directors of DNA. Because of the service, the close contact, and the appointment of effective young Navajos to leadership positions in DNA, the bonds to the people were strong.

37. Thus, the Legal Services Bureau in Washington made it a fairly strict rule that the OEO-funded lawyers were not to provide legal advice to CAP officials. Furthermore, the CAP normally had, at the most, only token representation on the legal services board. Ethical problems, such as the interposition of a nonlawyer decision-maker between the lawyer and his client, were thereby blunted. But the Washington office made it clear that there was supposed to be some relationship with the CAP. In metaphorical terms, the legal services program was one weapon in the war on poverty; if the CAP director was the General, then surely he must have some influence on what his divisions do.

38. It is true, however, that the CAP executives rarely knew how to use a legal services program in an integrated way with other programs even if the lawyers would have been willing.

39. The theme of this section has been to develop examples that indicate the differences between OEO experience on Indian reservations and in other legal services contexts. A final contrast relating to conflict may be useful. A major question for OEO has been the acceptability of a condition in grants to legal services programs prohibiting suits against State officials. This issue was epitomized in the struggle between Governor Ronald Reagan and California Rural Legal Assistance. At the heart of the fight, at least in its last incarnation, was the demand by the Governor that the CRLA lawyers promise that they would not sue government agencies. At one level, the Governor was protesting the use of government funds to finance attacks on government programs, but the basis of the attack was some sentiment about the right of the State to develop, for example, the Medicaid program free of substantial interference from another official agency. It was easy at the time for those fighting poverty to point out the folly of the Governor's position since transactions between the government and the poor were often the root of a felt injustice or oppression, to exclude that area of litigation from the activities of lawyers for the poor would be to gut the effort and to substitute a patina of assistance for the real thing. Advocates of CRLA summoned forth numerous examples of State subvention of legal attacks, primarily in the area of criminal defense. Since the 1920's there has not been much fashion in the position that the government is entitled to some special protection or some preferred position in the defense of law suits. The CRLA struggle, was not an occasion where reasonable men could differ; if anything, the CRLA experience, the challenges to the State and to the Federal Department of Labor, emphasized the need for an adequately financed group of lawyers whose prime function was to attack the government.

Yet there is a haunting difference between CRLA's experience with Governor Reagan and suits against the tribal government on Indian reservations. For example, the Office of Economic Opportunity, through promotional and training programs established at Arizona State University, approached eight pueblos in northern New Mexico to determine whether they would be interested in a legal services program as a delegate agency of the community action effort. The pueblos, including the Taos Pueblo, contain strong traditional leadership that has measured carefully the introduction of each modern development. The pueblos listened carefully to the OEO proposals and then indicated acceptance with a limitation that sounded strangely Reaganesque: the OEO-funded lawyers in the pueblos must agree not to bring any action against the tribal organizations. The pueblos argued that they could not trust lawyers from an alien culture, taking internal issues into foreign courts, upsetting delicate balances, providing the image that the tribal government is not only fallible, but can easily be brought to task before non-Indian decisionmakers. What at first seems like a similar condition—that the federally-funded lawyer forbear from challenging a governmental decision—may thus turn out to have different roots and to be defensible here.

40. The land is held, as will be indicated below, under serious disability. All in all, there are about 50 million acres of Indian land (outside Alaska) that fall under trust status with the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Commission on the Rights, Liberties, & Responsibilities of the American Indian, Report: The Indian: America's Unfinished Business 72 (W. Brophy & S. Aberle eds. 1966). Some of the land is owned in common by the reservation; some is allotted into units and owned, subject to the Federal trust relationship, by individual Indians; some land is assigned to Indian families, formally or informally, but with the impact that assigned land is not open to reassignment at the tribe's whim. See Gilbert & Taylor, Indian Land Questions, 8 Ariz. L. Rev. 101 (1966).

41. "Development" is a magic word that rarely receives interpretation. It is incanted to persuade electronic assembly plants to remove to reservations where nimble fingers can be placed at the disposal of transistor radios. "Development" as a concept is swallowed uncritically, not rubbed and examined to determine what kind of development is good for what kinds of reasons. Indeed, there is the possibility that economic development—as widely understood—is itself chimerical, as remote, romantic, and false a goal as "civilization" was in the nineteenth century. It wraps up inapplicable values in a dignified cloak, obscuring the basic crudity of our understanding. In the nineteenth century, private property was the *summum bonum*, the doorway to civilization and progress, the prerequisite to education, thrift, and enterprise. Since private property in land was so elevated, it was forced upon the Indians, primarily through the Dawes Act, 24 Stat. 388 (1887), with disastrous consequences. Today, it is thought, sophistication is rampant, and our planners would not repeat the simplistic mistakes of the past.

Yet the Bureau planners now have the solution wrapped up in development with the formation of "corporations" being the successful technique. The attitude toward development fluctuated with the predominant feeling about the good life in the United States. In its 1904 regulations, for example, the Department of Interior claimed that the act passed in 1887 was designed to "give the Indian a tract of land that he could call his own; in which he would feel a personal interest and from the cultivation of which, by the labor of his own hands, he might gain a subsistence and at the same time acquire the arts of civilization." U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Regulations of the Indian Office § 599 (1904). The regulations continued: "To permit the indiscriminate leasing of these allotments would defeat the purpose for which they were made." This virtual prohibition on leasing is far different from the 99-year leases now being indulged on various reservations designed to encourage economic development, 1960's style.

42. The current style in economic development is for the location of industries that will provide jobs on the reservation. In important ways, this is not a departure from the nineteenth century approach outlined in the prior footnote. Instead that will provide jobs on the reservation. In important ways, this is not a departure from the nineteenth century approach outlined in the prior footnote. Instead of a farmer, the Indian becomes a worker; either way, he finds his way to civilization.

43. The location of various industries in the area near Shiprock on the Navajo reservation has meant important changes in population distribution and, often, an increase in the number of single women who are employed in a quasi-urban area. While there is certainly nothing "wrong" with the trend towards urbanization on the Navajo reservation, and towards the creation of a new supply of jobs, for women, the tribe does not ask a great deal about the social implications before it encourages General Dynamics or Fairchild to establish a plant.

44. It is possible that all that is implied is that the development chore is for private rather than OEO-financed attorneys. But it has been clear on almost all reservations (except for those that have ever-present private attorneys) that the OEO lawyer can do a great deal to establish the basis for development, draft some of the early papers, and introduce some important choices for organization among other things, leaving to the private lawyer the remaining functions when the enterprise begins to be profitable.

45. At Soboba to the southeast, the problem was just as encompassing. Reservation population had decreased and income per capita had fallen precipitously since the early twentieth century when a water-carrying tunnel destined for Los Angeles, driven through the mountains above Soboba, dried up the springs that fed the land immediately below it. From a plush orchard, the land became dry and rocky. Now, 50 years later, negotiations are still in process to restore an adequate water supply and to obtain compensation.

46. In fact, the California claims have an unusual and fairly clear historical validity. Shortly after the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, in an effort to quiet title, the Federal Government dispatched a group of treaty commissioners to California to persuade the Indians to surrender their claims to immense areas for the guarantee of peace and tranquility in more modest zones. By and large, the Indians agreed, questions of the adequacy of consideration aside, in 18 treaties. But in the spirit of the Gold Rush, there was opposition to assuring Indian hegemony even over the limited parcels guaranteed in the treaties; as a consequence the treaties were never ratified by the Senate. Because the treaties were rejected, the former rights of the Indians were theoretically preserved.

47. 60 Stat. 1049 (1946), *as amended*, 25 U.S.C. § 70–70v (1964).

48. The California claims cases are typical of the compromise inherent in the response. In the first suit, under a special jurisdictional act, a portion of the California Indians obtained a judgment of $17 million against the United States, based on a valuation of land at the time of taking of $1.25 per acre; the figure of $1.25 was justified by peculiarly legalistic notions such as the price that could have been commanded if all the land had been sold at one time and the sorts of buyers that were available in 1851. There was never any question of receiving land back, of course, nor was there interest on the judgment. And to add legalistic insult to injury, the Congress "set off" against the judgment $12 million for items such as education, blankets, and support for BIA bureaucrats. The result was a "victory" for the litigating California Indians of $5 million. Through such contortions was the American legal conscience satisfied, while preventing a particular group of poor people from asserting fully and adequately an entitlement against the Government.

A "compromise" is now coming to fruition in the remaining California claims cases. Under a law establishing an Indian Claims Commission in 1946, ch. 959, 60 Stat. 1049, all claims not included in the 1944 judgment could be filed for recovery. The claims were pooled, and lengthy research proceedings began. By 1963, the lawyers for the California Indians (there were over 70 lawyers involved in one capacity or another) agreed with the Department of Justice that a settlement offer of $0.47 per acre should be presented to the Indians. While some estimates of the entitlement ran to half a billion dollars, the settlement offer was finally accepted although a plebiscite among the plaintiffs revealed a significant dissent. In the fall of 1968, Congress passed the necessary legislation ordering that a roll of California Indians be brought up to date and that the $29 million be distributed on a per capita basis. It is expected that there will be about $800 distributed per person by 1970 and that that will be the end of the land settlement.

49. At the Choctaw Reservation near Philadelphia, Mississippi, development takes the form of taking six new families each month into a year-long skill development program with an eye to eventual jobs in New Orleans and Cleveland. There are only 300 Choctaw families left. Six families each month is a steady sort of cultural attrition.

50. The Alaska Statehood Act, 72 Stat. 339 (1958).

51. The Alaska Organization Act of 1884, 23 Stat. 24, 26, declared that "the Indians . . . shall not be disturbed in the possession of lands actually in their use or occupation or now claimed by them but the terms under which such persons may acquire title to such lands is reserved for future legislation by Congress. . . ." The Statehood Act, in addition to providing that the State could select about 100 million acres from the public domain, provided that the State must disclaim right and title to lands or other property if the right or title is held by Natives or by the United States in trust for them. Since it was unclear which land was public and which was Native-owned, there was a stalemate.

52. The Alaska Federation of Natives, together with then Governor Walter J. Hickel, now the Secretary of the Interior, established a Land Claims Task Force to develop a legislative proposal in cooperation with the States. The report of the Task Force was far-reaching and imaginative. It would provide land security by withdrawing lands in extensive measure surrounding Eskimo and Indian villages. In addition, there would be the receipt of a percentage of revenues from the exploitation of offshore oil wells with the money administered through a development corporation run by the native people. Finally, there would be some per capita cash distribution.

53. *See generally* Henninger, *Alaska: Share the Oil*, THE NEW REPUBLIC, June 28, 1969, at 15.

54. Sakezzie v. Utah State Indian Affairs Comm'n, 215 F. Supp. 12 (D. Utah 1963).

55. *See* 25 U.S.C. § 415 (1964).

56. *See* Arenas v. United States, 322 U.S. 419 (1944).

57. The process of turning the Indian estates from Federal trust status to local guardianships and conservatorships under the control of the Palm Springs bench and bar was outlined in a series of Pulitzer Prize winning stories by George Ringwald of the Riverside Enterprise. *See also* N.Y. Times, May 20, 1967, at 16, col. 4.

58. *See* Report to the Solicitor of the United States Department of the Interior, from the Special Palm Springs Task Force, September 26, 1967. The Task Force reviewed the following complaints about the conservatorship and guardianship program: (1) high fees assessed against the estates; (2) lack of knowledge by the wards about their estate affairs; (3) confusion and misunderstanding of Indian rights under the program; (4) failure of the program to train and educate Indians to handle their own affairs; (5) frustration at not being able to foresee an end to the program.

59. 1968 INDIAN CLAIMS COMM'N ANN. REP.

60. There was also an effort to improve the world public view of the United States. Karl Mundt, then a Congressman and now a Senator, urged that "if any Indian tribe can prove it has been unfairly and dishonorably dealt with by the United States, it is entitled to recover. This ought to be an example for all the world to follow in its treatment of minorities." 92 CONG. REC. A492 (1946).

61. *See* Pawnee Tribe v. United States, 124 F. Supp. 860 (Ct. Cl. 1953).

62. On the Muckleshoot reservation in Washington, beautiful land with historical significance is being cleared for trailer parks. Another example is the Big River project of the Colorado River Reservation, straddling the Arizona and California border. The most valuable sector of the reservation, along a scenic bend in the river, has been turned over to developers for the building of yet another suburban-type leisure city, with some opportunity, some time in the future, for the Indians to be paid. In the meantime, the developers have given the tribe a new gymnasium, the 1969 equivalent of glass beads. There was not even the attempt, indulged frequently by underdeveloped countries elsewhere in the world, to require that the developer employ and train the indigenous population at all levels of his enterprise.

63. Summary of achievements, Alaska Legal Services Program (undated memorandum). Similar problems arose in American Samoa. The Samoan Constitution, approved by the United States Secretary of Interior, proclaims that no law shall be passed that is inconsistent with Samoan customs and land ownership. Specifically, Samoan land cannot be owned by anyone with less than 50% Samoan blood. The constitutionality of this provision under the United States Constitution has not been tested.

64. Indeed, the idea that in 1968 a Government functionary can bear the title "superintendent" of a reservation (as if it were a huge prison farm) approximates the absurd.

65. For example, a reservation in the Northwest has a substantial timber business with a potential income of $10 million per year. The management of the resources is now conducted by the Bureau of Indian Affairs; for the past 25 years, the tribe has eschewed obtaining expert private management assistance because it thought it was obtaining aid from the Bureau free of charge. Recently the tribe learned that the Bureau is deducting 10% of income to cover administrative expenses. Furthermore, the Bureau, in providing management assistance, often has unusual ideas about the limits on development strategies; it has, for example, discouraged vertical integration of the tribe's lumber business because of the possibility of distressing the white community near the reservation. It is possible and likely that the Bureau will change its views, but the monopoly aspect of the situation stifles the atmosphere in which the highest, most creative thought concerning development can take place.

66. Often this will center about the administration of trust land or trust money by the Bureau. California Indian Legal Services, for example, has filed suit against the government for paying only 4% interest on Indian funds on deposit in the United States Treasury while no other creditor is paid at so low a rate.

67. The lawyer might encourage more critical appraisals of Bureau proposals. In California, the Bureau of Indian Affairs found $15,000 remaining at the end of a fiscal year that would have to be returned to the Treasury if it were not used or obligated. Rather than turn back the funds, the Bureau spent the money to hire a retired land planner to do an economic development profile of five reservations in the Pauma Valley. It was a hopeless task from the outset—the contract was signed before the Indians were consulted; there was not enough money to do a decent study; the contract plan was pregnant with the possibility that the planner would devise land uses incompatible with Indian wishes. With little at risk, it would have been possible to recommend to the over-studied California bands that they reject the contract, that they state why it was inadequate and inefficient, and that they ask for an accounting from the General Accounting Office of the procedures under which the contract was let.

68. 35 F. 575 (D. Ore. 1888).

APPENDIX I

RULES OF ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW ON THE NAVAJO RESERVATION

I. Definitions

A. "Attorney" shall mean any person who has been licensed to practice law by any State.

B. "Advocate" shall mean any person who is not a licensed attorney in at least one of the states of the United States, who appears for another and practices law upon lands subject to the jurisdiction of the Navajo Tribe by arguing causes, presenting motions or otherwise appearing before the Navajo Tribal Courts, whether such arguments, motions or other appearances is made orally or by written documents.

C. "Practice of Law" shall mean giving legal advise or counsel; or appearing in a representative capacity in proceedings before any court; board, body or commission; or acting professionally in legal formalities, negotiations or proceedings for a client; or preparing or drafting legal instruments or contracts by which legal rights are secured; or taking any action for another in matters connected with the law.

II. Self Representation

Any person may appear before the courts of the Navajo Tribe without the assistance of a regularly licensed attorney or advocate and present or defend any action wherein he is plaintiff or defendent. One who acts only for himself in legal matters is not practicing law contrary to these rules. An owner representing a business entity other than a sole proprietorship, or a person prosecuting a claim procured by assignment or a claim not originally his own is engaged in the practice of law, and must be licensed according to these provisions.

III. License To Practice

A. Only persons licensed to practice by the Board of Legal Examiners shall practice law upon lands subject to the jurisdiction of the Navajo Tribe. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed upon qualified persons for the benefit of the Navajo Tribe in accordance with its duty to assure that a high standard of justice and order is maintained.

B. An attorney shall be licensed to practice upon lands subject to the jurisdiction of the Navajo Tribe who furnishes satisfactory proof to the Board of Legal Examiners that:

1. He has a professional knowledge of the laws, court rules and procedures of the Navajo Tribe, and is a licensed member in good standing of at least one state bar, or, he is a licensed member in good standing of at least one state bar and has engaged in the practice of law for 5 years continuously prior to his applications;
2. He is of good moral character, and
3. (a) He has maintained his continuous domicile upon the Navajo Reservation for a period of four months immediately prior to his application, or (b) He has been permanently and continuously employed on the Navajo Reservation on a full time basis under the supervision of an attorney who is duly licensed to practice pursuant to these rules for a period of four months immediately prior to his application.

C. An advocate shall be licensed to practice upon lands subject to the jurisdiction of the Navajo Tribe who furnishes satisfactory proof that:

1. He has a professional knowledge of the laws, customs, and court rules and procedures of the Navajo Tribe, and
2. He has a fluent command of the Navajo and English languages, and
3. He has maintained his continuous domicile upon the Navajo Reservation for a period of six months immediately prior to his application, and
4. He is of good moral character.

D. Advocates and attorneys currently practicing law upon the lands subject to the jurisdiction of the Navajo Tribe may be licensed notwithstanding any other licensing requirements set forth in these rules upon:

1. Payment of the application filing too, and
2. Furnishing satisfactory proof that: (a) If the application is for license as an advocate, the applicant has been regularly practicing before the courts of the Navajo Tribe since (insert date 6 months prior to effective date of these rules), or (b) If the application is for license as an attorney, the applicant has been regularly practicing law on the Navajo reservation, other than by appearing in tribal courts, on a full-time basis since (insert date 3 months prior to effective date of these rules).

E. Upon motion to the court hearing the case a duly licensed member of a state bar who is sponsored by an attorney or an advocate who is licensed to practice on lands subject to the jurisdiction of the Navajo Tribe may be permitted to appear as an associate to a duly licensed advocate.

The motion to appear must be accompanied by a statement showing that the applying attorney is sponsored by an attorney or advocate duly licensed pursuant to these rules to practice upon lands subject to the jurisdiction of the Navajo Tribe. The statement of sponsorship shall state that the sponsoring attorney vouches for the good character and professional good standing of the applicant, and that the sponsoring attorney will be personally responsible for the professional conduct of the applicant.

The motion must specify the advocate with whom the applicant is associating, and the applicant may not associate with a different advocate except upon motion to the court. The association shall be only for the purposes of the trial or hearing of the cause then before the court, and the attorney who has been granted permission to associate shall at all times be under the direct personal supervision of the advocate with whom he is associated, pursuant to the provisions of Section IV of these rules. Time spent on the lands subject to the jurisdiction of the Navajo Tribe while associated shall not be included in computing time requirements for domicile or practice periods under Section III B of these rules. Nor shall permission to associate confirm any rights to practice law on the lands subject to the jurisdiction of the Navajo Tribe other than those given to participate as an associate in the cause in which permission to associate has been given. Any person upon lands subject to the jurisdiction of the Navajo Tribe pursuant to a permission to associate shall be subject to the provisions of Section X of these rules.

IV. Motions and Arguments

All motions and arguments before courts of the Navajo Tribe, whether oral or written, shall be presented only by the following persons:

A. In criminal or juvenile cases by an advocate, or by an attorney under the direct personal supervision of the advocate.

B. In civil cases by an advocate, or pursuant to a motion if the court specifically grants permission for the purposes of the case before it, by an attorney under the direct personal supervision of an advocate.

C. This section shall not be construed as limiting the scope of Section I.

A PLAN FOR NAVAJO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

By DAVID F. ABERLE*

FOREWORD

For many years, Navajo economic development has been hampered by rapid population growth and an eroding agricultural resource base. Although in recent years the tribe has derived substantially increased revenues from oil leases, the economy remains essentially that of an underdeveloped region. David Aberle argues that the Navajos are in what is essentially a colonial situation, with the chief benefits of natural resource exploitation going to outsiders. Aberle outlines a development approach which would involve the Navajos in planning for their own economic development and would allow the tribe to exploit their own mineral resources and control their own industrial development. Other development needs he identifies include rapid expansion of transportation facilities and public utilities and improvements in health services and the educational system. Aberle stresses that no major development effort can succeed without a commitment by Congress—not only a sustained commitment of funds, but a commitment to let the Navajos manage their own affairs.

CONTENTS

Page
Preface 225
- I. Introduction 228
- II. Environment 228
- III. History of the Navajo Economic Scene 230
- IV. The Reservation as an Underdeveloped Area 236
  - A. The technological base 237
    - 1. Livestock 237
    - 2. Roads 237
    - 3. Water 237
    - 4. Fuel, light, and heat 238
    - 5. Miscellaneous 239
  - B. The course of mineral exploitation 239
  - C. Education 240
  - D. Employment 242
  - E. The region 242
  - F. Summary 243
- V. The Local Economy 243
  - A. The style of life 243
  - B. The role of the trader 245
  - C. Summary 249
- VI. Possibilities for Development 250
  - A. Who should plan development? 250
  - B. The population context of development 251
  - C. Mineral exploitation 252
  - D. Industry 254
  - E. The technological base 258
  - F. Commerce 259
  - G. Livestock industry 260
  - H. Farming 264
  - I. Some land problems 265
    - 1. Off-reservation groups 265
    - 2. The executive order territory 265
  - J. Population movement and labor migration 266

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VI. Possibilities for Development—Continued

Page
K. Education 266
L. Health 269
M. Welfare 270
N. Miscellaneous 271
  1. Housing 271
  2. Experts and the training of experts 271
O. Summary of the purpose, nature, and advantages of the plan outlined 271
P. Summary of disadvantages 272
Q. Requirements for implementing this plan 273
R. The alternative 274
S. The price tag 275
References 275

PREFACE

This report was prepared at the request of the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress. I was asked to prepare a plan for economic development for the Navajo Tribe to aid the committee in its deliberations. As I understood the request, it was that an anthropologist undertake to say what kinds of things needed to be done for a satisfactory development of the reservation: that is, one that would contribute to a more satisfying life for Navajos. I did not think that I was to prepare budget estimates, and I have not done so. The report was prepared without staff or funds. Work began in October 1968, a first draft was circulated to a large number of people in December of 1968, and the final draft was completed in March of 1969.

My qualifications for preparing it are nearly 30 years of intermittent contact with hundreds of Navajos, including past and present members of the Tribal Council and past and present Chapter officers, with officials of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and especially of the Navajo Area Office, and with traders, missionaries, and border-town Anglos. The report is based on recollections of the Navajo scene in 1940 and 1941, and on eight summers' field work at the community level (1949–53, 1965, 1966, and 1968), the last three explicitly concerned with the effects of the contemporary economy on Navajo family and kinship organization. It is also based on several years' research on the history of the Navajo economy (Aberle, 1966, esp. pp. 23–106), and on a good deal of reflection on the condition of underdeveloped economies in the world today.

The first draft has been extensively revised in the light of comments from BIA officials, officials of the Navajo Tribe, and social scientists, and in the light of documents submitted by the Navajo Area Office of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, asterisked in the bibliography at the end of this report.

The report has been prepared under time pressure and without access to a great many important facts—indeed without a knowledge whether some of those facts are available without further firsthand research. It has, however, benefited by the new information received since December.

I should like specifically to acknowledge the assistance of the following individuals, none of whom would agree with everything in this report, and some of whom would disagree with most of it. None can be held accountable for the opinions I have expressed, nor for errors of fact or interpretation that may follow. They are: Graham Holmes, Russell E. Kilgore, and Val McBroom, of the Navajo Area Office, BIA; Paul W. Hand, Chinle Agency, BIA; Wayne Holm, Rock Point School, BIA; Walter O. Olson, Robert W. Young, and F. D. Shannon; Albuquerque Area Office, BIA; Ed Darby, Navajo Tribal Office, Edward B. Danson, Museum of Northern Arizona; Jerrold Levy, Museum of Northern Arizona and Portland State University; Mary Shepardson, San Francisco State University; Elizabeth Colson, University of California at Berkeley; Louise Lamphere, Brown University; William Willmott, Cyril S. Belshaw, Braxton Alfred, and Terry Reynolds, University of British Columbia; my wife, Kathleen Gough, Simon Fraser University; Stephen Kunitz, Yale University, Robert Bergman, U.S. Public Health Service; and Tom T. Sasaki; the Johns Hopkins University. Allan McMillan assisted greatly in collating the comments received from all of these sources.

It is a matter of concern to me that this report inevitably criticizes some of the very people who have helped me: Bureau officials, traders, and members of the Tribal Council in particular—not by name but by category. In spite of the criticism, however, I see the Bureau, the traders, and the Tribal Council as locked into a situation that they can change less than it needs to be changed. The tragedy of the Bureau is that so much intelligence and humane concern should have been channeled into an organization that has largely lacked the power to take necessary steps and has often failed to take steps that might have made a modest, favorable difference, because of political pressures engendered by local interests. The traders' tragedy is that although many have a decent attitude toward the Navajos, they themselves are the next to bottom rung in a chain of exploitation that they cannot break. The tragedy of the Council is that, with resources now to control, they have become so preoccupied with the mechanics of this operation that they have lost sight of their own constituencies—or so the constituents tell me. In addition, they have been exposed to only one approach to development—that through external, private business exploitation of Navajo resources—and they have accepted this outlook with too little question.

Having dealt with the deficiencies of planning and action of all of these parties to present Navajo problems throughout this report, I should like to say at this point that the primary responsibility finally falls on that arm of the Government that provides funds; that is, the Congress of the United States. It is possible to add up appropriations for the benefit of American Indians over the years and to claim that a great deal has been done—but not if one is forced to contemplate the results. In terms of political muscle, the BIA is one of the weakest arms of the executive branch. Only Congress could strengthen it, but it has been sensitive to the demands of national and local business and to local politicians, far more than to the needs of Indians.

This report suggests some ways of breaking out of the present frame of reference. As I write it, however, I am aware that the preparation of plans too often has been a substitute for action, rather than a basis for action, in the case of American Indians. A plan was recently developed by Abt Associates (see Radov 1968 in the bibliography of this report); the tribe has recently hired consultants to assist in its planning; now Congress has this report. Similar multiple efforts could be found for the 1930's, 1940's, and 1950's. The question is, When will resources be made available so that some plan can go forward?

It is barely possible that some Navajo readers will regard this document as lacking respect for their way of life: as an outsider's view that they must be "uplifted." This is not the case. I like Navajo life styles. I find living with Navajo families a blessed relief from some of the pressures of an academic existence. But Navajos complain to me about their diet, as to its quantity, quality, and variety, about their deficient housing, medical care, and education, about their lack of control over their own affairs, and about their difficulties in earning a living. This report is dedicated to showing the roots of these miseries and suggesting some remedies.

It is, however, a report by an American anthropologist, not by a Navajo. If my definition of Navajos' needs disagrees with their own, my views must yield. Finally, although this report was prepared at the request of the Joint Economic Committee, it is prepared *for* the Navajos—for the Tribal Council and for any Navajo who wants to read it and use it.

This last point must be underscored for the benefit of Navajo readers. I view this report as one man's view of what is needed for Navajo development, not as a plan to be imposed on Navajos. The Joint Economic Committee is, of course, not a committee with a responsibility for detailed planning of Navajo development. The aim of the report is to stimulate the committee's thinking, and, far more, to provide suggestions to Navajos interested in planning their own future. The remainder of this report will, I trust, make it fully clear that I think that the right and the responsibility for planning (but not for fundraising) rests with Navajos.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Navajo Reservation has rich resources; the Navajo Tribal Council receives sizable revenues from a portion of these; there are more to be utilized in the future; but the per capita income of reservation Navajos is perhaps a third of that of Anglos in the Southwest (see U.S. Census for 1960). To understand this apparent paradox we must first examine their natural environment, their history, and their current pattern of relations with the larger society. It will then be possible to discuss their needs, to speak of the kind of technological development that would meet those needs, and to explore some ways of arriving at the desired end state.

Economically speaking, the Navajo constitute an underdeveloped group. They are an underdeveloped, internal U.S. colony. They show the marks of it. Their poverty and their undereducation are not causes of their underdevelopment but results of it. The underdevelopment results from their relations with the larger society, which limit the economic options open to them, drain off their resources, and fail to provide them with the education, the technological base, and the organizational forms necessary for satisfactory development.

Because I view the Navajo Reservation as an underdeveloped economy, I have put stress on programs related to mineral exploitation, industry, and commerce, above all. Farming and livestock improvements are important and urgent, but less so than these matters. Educational changes are vital, but are seen here primarily as an instrument for local economic development, rather than treated primarily as a means to remove Navajos from the reservation as a part of the labor force. The option of migration under satisfactory conditions should, of course, be open to Navajos. Tourism is not stressed, although it is in much tribal planning, because Navajos have much more significant assets than the excess cash brought by tourists, and more important and humanly significant tasks open to them than acting as living examples of their culture for the benefit of Anglo visitors. Health and welfare programs are seen as sustaining economic development, rather than viewing the Navajo future as one of major dependency on individual doles. In sum, the program recommended, which is summarized near the end of this report, is one that would put Navajos in control of their own economic destinies and create a developed economy in the area. Before detailed recommendations can be supplied, however, a good deal of background information must be supplied. That is the purpose of sections II–V.

II. ENVIRONMENT

The Navajo probably number in excess of 120,000 people, most of whom reside for at least part of the year on a reservation in northern Arizona and New Mexico and southern Utah, and in off-reservation checkerboarded allotted areas to the east and south of the reservation.

A handful live off reservation in southwestern Colorado. Many work off reservation for a part of the year, and some have relocated, permanently or temporarily, in border towns and in such major American urban centers as Los Angeles, San Francisco, Denver, Dallas, and Chicago.

The entire Navajo-Hopi Reservation area includes about 23,600 square miles, of which about 19,400 square miles is clearly Navajo-owned and about 1,500 square miles is clearly Hopi-owned. The remainder has been allocated by court decision (Jones vs. Healing) to the two tribes to work out their way of allocating surface and subsurface rights. They have not succeeded in doing so. Hence a definitive area for the Navajo Reservation cannot be supplied. The Hopi Reservation, however defined, exists entirely surrounded by Navajo lands. An additional 3,000 square miles of allotted land occupied by Navajos is in New Mexico, adjoining the reservation. There are additional Navajo groups at Ramah (230 square miles), Canoncito (120 square miles), and Puertocito or Alamo (100 square miles), the last two remote geographically from the main body of the Navajo.

Altitude ranges from 4,500 feet above sea level to 10,000 feet on the mountain peaks, with the bulk of the area between 5,000 and 7,000 feet. Rainfall varies from averages of 7 inches per annum (lows down to 1.5) up to averages of 27 inches, a figure reached only at the highest elevations. A tabular presentation will clarify conditions.

TABLE 1.—CLIMATE, SOIL, AND VEGETATION

		Temperature				
Type	Percent of area	Annual average	Average summer maximum	Average winter minimum	Vegetation	Uses
Semidesert	55	50-60	95-105	11-30	Chamise, greasewood, weeds, barren.	Herding.
Steppe	37	45-50	80-88	10-25	Grassland, weed, sagebrush, chamise, greasewood.	Farming and herding.
Humid	8	43-50	70-80	4-15	Timber, meadow, woodland, aspen.	Farming, herding, forest products.

Note: The presence of irrigated or irrigable land makes farming possible in any zone except at altitudes too high for a reliable growing season. About 2,600 square miles of the Navajo and Hopi Reservations are barren or inaccessible or both.

Source: The Navajo Yearbook, 1961: 358-366.

The land can be divided into the following kinds of use areas from the point of view of food production: over half is suitable for livestock (principally sheep) but minimally satisfactory for subsistence agriculture; over one-third is suitable for livestock with better agricultural potential than the first; some is suitable for relatively productive agriculture on irrigated farmland, with livestock subsidiary. In addition, two other types of production should be mentioned: a few good forests of timber, principally Yellow Pine (*pinus ponderosa*) stand on the reservation, notably in the Chuskas and Lukachukais, and mineral resources are found in various areas: the reservation presently produces oil, natural gas, helium, uranium, and coal. Other minerals are known.

The scanty and fluctuating rainfall that characterizes most of the reservation makes for uncertain production and occasional catastrophe in both farming and livestock management.

III. HISTORY OF THE NAVAJO ECONOMIC SCENE

The original homeland of the Navajo is far to the north, where most of the Athapaskan languages are found today, in Canada and Alaska. (Navajo is one of the languages of Apachean; Apachean is a subgroup of the Athapaskan language family.) Ancestral to present-day Navajo culture is a hunting and gathering technology. The Navajos acquired agriculture either en route to the Southwest or when they arrived here, adding cultivation to their hunting and gathering pattern. Probably about 1600 A.D. the Navajos acquired Spanish techniques of riding and herding horses, using them for hunting and warfare, and shortly afterward, Spanish techniques of managing sheep, cattle, burros, and so forth.

When the Navajos arrived in the Southwest, they found that the best watered sites (those capable of supporting farming villages like those of the modern Pueblo Indians) were already mainly occupied by the Pueblos. The Navajo therefore settled in an inter-Pueblo niche. They had to live on relatively small, scattered spots where they could use floodwater runoff for farming, while they continued to hunt and raid. The scattered residence pattern created by this pressure from their natural and cultural environment was reinforced when they began to build up their herds (sizable by 1750), since a concentration of several hundred people around a compact village would require each herdsman to take his animals out far from the village and remain in an isolated and dangerous situation for the sake of pasture. Otherwise the forage area around the village would be denuded. Consequently, from the beginning of their recorded history until today, they have lived scattered about over the countryside in large family units, some as small as two members, but many with 20 or more men, women, and children. Seasonal moves to new pasture were also required—two, three, or more per year.

This pattern of exploitation of the natural environment remains the basic one for the majority of the onreservation population. It means that, although the reservation grows constantly more crowded, the population remains spread out, in separate clusters of kin, dispersed by its own livelihood pursuits, rather than concentrated in villages. The partial exceptions occur where a different kind of resource is involved: the closer clustering of individual homesteads on the irrigated land of Shiprock, Fruitland, and Many Farms; and the town pattern of various agency headquarters, where Navajos depend on steady wagework, predominantly for the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the U.S. Public Health Service, and the Navajo Tribe.

Competition between Mexicans and Navajos must have begun fairly early. It was certainly a chronic feature of the scene by the time of the American occupation of the area in 1846 and following. Although Mexicans and Navajos raided each other for stock and slaves, the U.S. Government patently considered the Navajo raids the primary issue, not the Mexican. Kit Carson, who was the planner of the American conquest of the Navajos in 1863, viewed this as unjust; yet under his leadership in 1863, American troops burned off Navajo crops, drove off Navajo stock, and invited Navajos to come to Fort Sumner if they did not wish to starve in the winter. Some eight thousand made the trek to eastern New Mexico. A number—variously estimated from a handful to five thousand—stayed out in the hills. Called a resettlement project at the time, Fort Sumner could in no wise accommodate the Navajos and other Indians incarcerated in what can better be called a nonlethal concentration camp, nor could it protect them from the raids of still other Indians, such as the Comanches. In 1868 a U.S. Army commission, headed by General Sherman, finally decided that they should be released. A peace treaty was signed, and the Navajos were returned to a portion of their former homeland, with an agency headquarters at Fort Defiance. Livestock were issued to them, and they commenced to rebuild their lives. They lost large amounts of their best eastern territory, but over the years they spilled out over the reservation borders, to be repeatedly confirmed in the possession of new territories, until expanding white settlers and Navajos reached an approximate territorial equilibrium in the early 20th century. The last major addition occurred in 1907, the eastern off-reservation area was restored to the public domain in 1908–11, and thereafter there were only minor additions up to 1934, when Government additions ended.

Warfare disappeared from the Navajo techniques of livelihood after 1868; there were no further serious breaches of the peace. Involvement with the American market began in the 1870's with Navajos selling increasing amounts of wool blankets and later silver, to procure various trade goods on which they came increasingly to depend. Still later pinon nuts became a significant item of sale as well. The agents connecting Navajos with the American economy were the traders, who sold a wide range of goods to Navajos and bought their goods from them. The traders sold coffee, fat, flour, potatoes, cooking utensils, water barrels, wagons, farm implements, horse gear, clothing, cloth, etc. The prime medium of exchange was credit and trader script: that is, the trader extended credit until time for wool sales or until rugs were brought in, or he purchased these items from the Navajo with "tin" or "paper money" good only at his trading post—a practice finally halted only in the late 1930's. In addition, Navajos pawned their turquoise and hand-crafted jewelery to the trader. Navajos in the late 19th Century, then, combined subsistence farming and herding with commercial herding and crafts and entered the American economy.

As far back as the 1850's and presumably far earlier, some Navajos had many sheep and others had few. It was presumably those with least who were willing, from the turn of the century on, to enter the job market, seeking part-time employment initially on the railroad as it was extended west through the Navajo country. The absolute number and the percentage of Navajos involved in the off-reservation job market has increased steadily, with a big jump during World War II; indeed among able-bodied Navajo men 60 and younger at present, it would be hard to find one, English-speaking or not, who has not worked at least part time, off reservation for several years—on the railroad, in the beet, bean, or carrot fields, or elsewhere. I have known Navajos with no command of English who have worked for the railroad as far afield as Chicago and The Dalles, in Oregon. The traders act as labor recruiters.

In this way, Navajos have developed a dependency not only on their reservation subsistence resources and on the sale of native products, but also on the larger job market. In the process, one mode of livelihood has not replaced another, but outside sources have supplemented the exploitation of on-reservation resources. This theme will be discussed further below.

Beginning in the 1930's, the Navajos suffered a major economic dislocation, in their own view second only to Fort Sumner as a hardship. This was the livestock reduction program of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. To understand this program we must go back some decades. From the modest beginnings of Navajo herds in the issue of livestock by the Government to the Indians immediately following the return from Fort Sumner in 1868, the herd had grown rapidly. By the 1880's agents had begun to comment about the overgrazing of the range. Although the reservation grew, the herds grew faster. By the late 1920's, when there was a total of perhaps 1,300,000 head of sheep and goats, including immature animals, plus 60,000 to 75,000 cattle and horses, the Bureau regarded the situation as critical. The depression following 1929 resulted in a lower level of sales and herd buildup, and drought or bad winters caused major livestock losses on the overcrowded reservation land—and, for that matter, in the equally crowded off-reservation allotted areas.

By the 1930's, then, the range showed marked effects of overgrazing. The quality of the forage had deteriotated. Areas that once produced hay now produced Russian thistle. What had once been runoff flood plains in wet weather had turned to deep arroyos. Loss of plant cover was causing wind erosion of topsoil, as well as dissection of the country by water. This was also the period of the dustbowl in American farming. A conservation-minded administration turned to livestock reduction and control for the Navajos, 50 years after the problem had first been noted.

The Bureau asked for, and got Navajo Tribal Council consent for reduction—but what consent meant in this case is problematic: the Councilmen received an explanation of the value and importance of a reduction program, were told that if they were genuinely interested in the welfare of their people they would accept reduction, but were also told that even if they did not accept it, the herds would be reduced. They also understood that the people would be able to secure Government jobs to compensate for their livestock losses. Work for the Civilian Conservation Corps and Emergency Conservation Works did provide them with new income, but did not supply the amount or duration of employment that the Navajos had expected. The Council accepted. Between the mid 1930's and the mid 1940's, Navajo herds were reduced from nearly 940,000 mature sheep units to below 450,000 mature sheep units. (A sheep or a goat is one sheep unit. Cattle are rated at four units, horses at five.) The quality of the sheep was improved by Bureau efforts, so that the total amount of meat and wool on the hoof on the reservation actually increased—even if there were fewer hooves—but since Navajo population was growing rapidly, the net effect was a per capita decrease of some magnitude, and one that has, by and large, continued ever since: herds have varied somewhat, rising slightly in the past few years, but population has risen constantly. (In 1967 there were 585,000 mature sheep units on reservation and 131,000 on Navajo lands in districts bordering the reservation. The reservation was 18 percent over estimated carrying capacity.)

Along with reduction went New Deal on-reservation government-supported employment: Emergency Conservation Work, expanded

Bureau payroll, and so on. But, as some Navajos said, it was not necessarily those who lost the stock who got the jobs. As the United States began to prepare for World War II, Government job supplements to the reservation economy decreased. There might have been a crisis, but the war itself averted it. Many Navajos were drafted or volunteered, and in the labor shortage situation of the wartime economy, many more Navajos left the reservation to work in industrial plants. This is a phenomenon to be stressed: when the economic situation was advantageous, when jobs with good pay were abundant, Navajos who were, on average, of lower educational attainment than is the present Navajo population, could be induced to do wagework off reservation and could perform successfully. No relocation program since has operated under these economically advantageous conditions.

The effects of peace in 1945 and after, created a near disaster. Veterans and wartime industrial workers returned to a still more overpopulated reservation, with no local reservoir of jobs, with sharp limitations on the livestock economy in the form of livestock regulation, and with a level of local technological development well behind the non-Indian parts of Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah, and even farther behind the more developed sectors of the United States: to a roadless country with little water development and no electricity other than that suppled by local generator systems, for traders and the Bureau.

The Navajo-Hopi 10-year rehabilitation program was instituted in 1950 to attempt to cope with the crisis. Over a period of 11 fiscal years it supplied a total of just short of $90,000,000 (of the $108,570,000 authorized in 1951 and 1958, not all allocated by Congress). It is doubtful that this level of expenditure would have had much effect, had it not been that tribal income increased rapidly during the same period. There was a small jump with the discovery of uranium ores on the reservation (visible in 1952 and after), and a much larger jump, especially in 1953 and after, when rich oil fields were discovered—not the first in Navajoland, but incomparably more productive than earlier finds. The tribe deployed some of these funds for various forms of relief and part-time employment and expanded its organizations. In addition, through Federal payment to the Southwestern States of unusually large proportions of welfare funds, beginning in 1950, Navajos and other Indians became eligible for State relief funds (old age, aid to dependent children, aid to the needy blind) even if resident on reservation. They were also eligible for social security, old age and survivor's benefits, etc., if they could qualify on the basis of employment or as selfemployed. In 1961, however, an estimated 30 percent of qualified Navajos did not receive social security or old age and survivors' benefits because they did not know about their eligibility. Since then the tribe has employed some Navajos to explain the system and to deal with complex cases. Whereas between 1951 and 1960 the number of payments to the aged and the blind remained more or less level, there was a striking increase in aid to dependent children. No more recent figures are available to me, but the trend doubtless continues.

More recently a major school building program in the 1960's has afforded new jobs for construction workers and instructional aids, and the OEO program (Office of *Navajo* Opportunity, or ONEO, in the Navajo country) has created a large number of part-time jobs.

Tribal public works programs are a significant source of short-term employment.

Mineral resources have been exploited almost entirely by private, nontribal capital. Income from minerals comes to the tribe in the form of rents, royalties, and bonuses. Betewen 1935 and 1956, some $19 million accrued. Between 1957 and 1968, the total was $217 million. The upturn is obvious. The first period shows an average of less than $100,000 per annum, the second, an average of about $18 million per annum, with a range from less than $9 million to nearly $35 million.

It would be a mistake to believe that these royalties could substantially benefit individual Navajos if they were divided on a *per capita* basis. The principal reason for this lies in the present economic condition and economic opportunities of Navajos (described below). Per capita divisions would be dissipated at once to meet such consumer needs as trucks, furniture, and clothing, leaving each family with precisely its present inadequate economic base. The principal beneficiaries would be border town merchants. The average benefit would vary around $200 per person, or $1,000 per family, per annum. As will be shown later the tribe has not divided these funds but instead has used them for a variety of useful purposes.

There is some tribal industry. And there is now some private industrial development on the reservation.

The result of income from uranium, oil, gas, and coal is recent years has been to transform the role of the Tribal Council and to make some progress toward breaking down the barriers to development engendered by the lack of the necessary technological base (infrastructure) on the reservation.

The tribe has used its funds in imaginative ways: For emergency relief, for housing grants to those unable to afford materials (limited to $600), for relief of impoverished families whose homes are destroyed by fire, for prostheses, which the Public Health Service will not supply, for baby layettes and clothing for schoolchildren whose parents cannot afford them—for a range of social services. It has set aside a large principal sum the income of which provides scholarships and loans for college students. It has enacted enabling legislation to permit it to cooperate in industrial development on reservation and in border towns where this development would result in Navajo employment. It has set up a revolving credit fund. It pays the Navajo law and order (police) staff and the tribal judges. It supports the construction and improvement of chapter houses (for community organization headquarters and community functions). It has put money into Tribal enterprises, of which a Forest Products Industry, a Tribal Utility Authority, an Arts and Crafts Board, some motels, and a housing project are successful examples, and a cement products, clay products, leather products, wood products, and wool textile industry are unsuccessful examples, together with four trading posts once owned by the Tribe. It is engaged in water development. The Tribal public works program supports activities that improve a variety of local conditions, including work on dirt roads whose maintenance is vital for community travel. And more projects could be named.

Furthermore, it has negotiated successfully for access to gas pipelines running from reservation gas sources to the west coast. Electrical power is generated on the reservation by coal, by Utah Construction

Co., and the Arizona Public Service Co., and a portion of this is reserved for tribal use in the future. Electricity has been run in from Farmington as well, and the Navajo Tribal Utility Authority deals with electrification, natural gas systems, and water and sewage facilities.

Indeed development projects undertaken by the Tribe since the 1950's would require a volume for description and evaluation.

There is ONEO money, as has been said, furnishing part-time employment to many Navajos.

The result of this period of expansion is the existence of a number of new foci of power on the reservation. Prior to 1920 the foci were the BIA, the traders, the missions, the border town financial interests, and influential Navajo leaders. In the 1920's the tribal council and the local chapters began to be slight forces, and in the 1930's larger ones. At the same time, with the first oil leases, large corporate business began to be a force on the reservation, with interests in council decisions. Today, in addition to traders, missions, and border town financial interests, there is still the BIA, there is a well-organized Tribal Council, there are local chapters, there are a variety of major corporate financial interests, there is ONEO (Office of Navajo Economic Opportunity), which is not under BIA control and becomes a new power element, there is DNA, a legal aid organization funded by ONEO but with its own board of directors. Needless to say the powers clash, and the results of the clash are visible in conflicts within the Tribal Council, since each non-Navajo force seeks support within the Council.

To read the preface to the Navajo Tribal Code (published in 1962) written by the former attorney to the Navajo Tribe, is to feel that tremendous progress has been made. Yet the per capita income figures are discouraging, both as to relative amounts and as to source.

Perhaps the most important point to be made is that Navajo income is probably in the neighborhood of one-third to one-quarter of various white comparison groups. The second important point is that nearly three-quarters of that income comes from wagework and another sixth comes from welfare, social security, railroad retirement, etc. This is, then, a low-income group, one of the very lowest in the country, and one that spends a great deal of its time in maintaining herds and farms but gets most of its income from elsewhere.

Young, for example, estimated Navajo per capita income in 1960 at $521 net and at $645 if the value of "free" Government services and surplus commodities was included. This includes the value of livestock and farm products consumed by the producers. The State of New Mexico (including Navajos) had a per capita of $1,812; McKinley Country (including Navajos) had a per capita of $1,709, and the United States as a whole had a per capita of $2,116 (TNY 1961: 229). U.S. Census figures for 1960 are not computed separately for Navajos, but are for rural Indians in Arizona and elsewhere. They show higher per capita figures, but these are based on all individuals 14 or over and are not directly comparable with Young's. Indian figures run at one-third to one-quarter of white figures in Arizona. Adams' figures for Shonto in 1955 (Adams 1963: 137–148) run lower than Young's but are for an isolated area with relatively little wagework income. Belaboring the point will not change it; Navajo figures are probably low among American Indian groups, but not at the absolute bottom; their incomes are below Negro and Spanish-American incomes and far below Anglo incomes. No figures for more recent years are available.

Young has estimates for percentages of income from various sources for Navajos in 1958 (TNY 1961: 100–109), regrouped in Aberle (1966: 81). Only 10 percent of income came from livestock and agriculture; only 1 percent from arts and crafts; 68 percent from wages; 5 percent from mineral leases; but 16 percent from railroad retirement, social security, welfare, etc. Over 60 percent of wages were derived from off-reservation work, and two-thirds of off-reservation wages were then from railroad work. Furthermore nearly two-thirds of on-reservation wages were derived from Federal and tribal employment: 40 percent from Federal and 23 percent from tribal sources. (In 1967–68, the BIA employed 3,300 Indians, most of them Navajos, out of an estimated labor force of 32,000, over 10 percent of employables. Apparently 50 percent of that force was seeking employment. Navajo Area Office 1968a: 12, 14.)

The figures for 1958 on farming and livestock include estimates for the value of products consumed and do not reflect sales only. Thus in 1958 the two dominant sources of income were wages and welfare, which made up 84 percent of all income in goods and cash. This is no subsistence economy. I have no comparable figures for the present period. They would show a rise in terms of on-reservation wagework, because of ONEO funds (about $11,500,000 in 1968), Tribal public works programs, Federal building programs, and increase in the number of school employees. Welfare would also rise. The percentage derived from farming and herding would fall. Yet under present circumstances, for reasons to be set forth, many Navajos will not give up and dare not give up their farming and herding, although on a dollar accounting basis it is relatively trivial. Instead, the characteristic pattern for Navajo families is the necessity to depend on a multiplicity of income sources, no one of which yields a stable and predictable income.

IV. THE RESERVATION AS AN UNDERDEVELOPED AREA

What are the equities of the Navajo situation? There are several ways of looking at this. In earlier decades, a plea for improvement of Indian conditions was often based on the fact that since Western European settlers took the continent from the Indians, we owed a special debt to them. A later plea was based on the argument that we have a moral obligation to "lift the Indian to our level." To each of these the counter argument has been made that the Indians could have done for themselves what various immigrant groups did for themselves. This ignores the fact that Indians were not immigrants, but on the contrary fighting a losing battle against immigrants backed initially by various colonial forces and later by the Federal Government.

The argument set forth here is that the Navajo country is an underdeveloped area, and that the cause of its underdevelopment is its historical and current relations with the larger polity, economy, and society. If this is so, the issue becomes relatively clear: either these relationships must be changed, or we must openly decide that the dispossession and deprivation of the Navojo sector (and many other submerged sectors of our society) is something the consequences of which the rest of the society is prepared to accept.

The basic reason for this hundred-year period of underdevelopment is that the Navajos did not have the capital or the know-how to achieve development, Congress would not provide the Bureau with the funds necessary for development, nor would the States, and until the 1950's private industry had little interest in exploiting reservation resources. Various features of the reservation will be examined in turn.

A. THE TECHNOLOGICAL BASE

The Government did not, and for many decades the Navajos could not create the technological base that would make it possible for the area to be developed by Navajos, rather than by outside forces.

1. *Livestock.*—Virtually no effort was made to avert the eventual catastrophe that overtook the Navajo livestock industry in the 1930's. Many steps could have been taken. First, although there were sporadic efforts to bring larger and more productive sheep on the reservation in earlier days, these failed because the sheep could not cope with Navajo environmental conditions. In a crisis it was possible to develop a sheep that provided a much increased meat and wool yield and could cope with the reservation environment, and when it was developed, the Navajos accepted it: the barriers to improved livestock, then, were not just Navajo conservatism, but American. Earlier development of this breed could have made it possible to reduce the livestock painlessly if certain other steps had been taken as well. Incentive payments for culling, incentive payments for raising improved breeds, parity payments for livestock—all these, combined with livestock regulation, could have created improved livestock practices and economic yields. Government subsidies to farmers in other areas have proved to benefit large, rather than small owners. It is, therefore, no particular surprise that a tribe of small holders was not the beneficiary of such a program as has been outlined.

2. *Roads.*—The road system has always been inadequate. There were no paved roads on the reservation except for Highway 666, which was needed to connect nonreservation communities, until the 1950's. Today the reservation has about 30 percent as many miles of surfaced road per 1,000 square miles as the surrounding rural areas. The States receive Federal supplements to their highway programs, nominally to build reservation roads; the Indians pay State gasoline tax, which goes toward road building; but the State does little to build reservation roads, which are primarily built by the Federal Government. The inadequacy of the system of paved roads handicaps every phase of Navajo life: job seeking, transportation of children to schools, trips to medical facilities, livestock marketing, and so on. As one indication, when a single black-top road was built in one community, half the boarders in the local school became day pupils.

3. *Water.*—The water system remains totally inadequate, whether in terms of domestic water or stock water. As respects domestic water, in 1960, a survey of over 1,400 homes indicates that less than 12 percent had a water source ¼ mile or less from the home; another 36 percent had a source between ¼ mile and 2 miles, so that less than half of the houses had a water source closer than 2 miles. The remaining

52 percent were drawing on water sources more than 2 miles distant, and indeed over 17 percent traveled more than 4 miles (TNY 1961: 306). We are speaking here of water for drinking, cooking, dishwashing, laundry, and for washing hands, face, hair, feet, et cetera. (Most bathing is done in sweat baths or by using a chapter or schoolhouse bath facility—or the trailer of a friend working in the school.) At one time this perhaps made not too much difference. Today, hauling water requires the use of male labor and at times ties men down who might otherwise take off-reservation jobs (see below under *Fuel, light, and heat*).

It is unlikely that much can be done about running water in homes while Navajos live scattered as they do. Where sizable concentrations of population are found—as at agency headquarters—there is running water in the homes. Expansion of water systems beyond agency headquarters proper is a function of the Navajo Tribal Utility Authority, founded in 1966. It had about 1,000 customers in 1967, or perhaps a maximum of four families out of 100. Only increase in the number and percentage of people living in concentrated clusters of residences will make it possible to reduce the number of people who must carry their water. There has been a considerable improvement in recent years in the number of Government wells from which people can draw domestic water, but they are not inspected frequently enough. As a corollary of the lack of running water, there is a serious sewage problem. Population densities have tripled since 1930, but Navajos outside agency headquarters use outhouses for the most part (they once followed a more salubrious practice of burying wastes), which promises serious health problems in the future. NTUA is developing sewage systems, but these are, of course, for concentrated populations.

The failure to develop adquate stock water resources contributes to the erosion of the reservation and makes rational use of pasture quite impossible. Undeveloped water is a resource that Navajos do not regard as the exclusive property of anyone. If they did, one man's flocks could die when his source was dry, and his neighbor's on a similar occasion. Hence people have traditional rights to move across another man's customary pasture to get to water in that pasture, treading out and consuming fodder in the process. I have known men who had to move their own stock to a winter pasture area in the summer because, during a dry spell, their neighbor's sheep were going to and fro so often. Government-developed wells are protected for common use by current grazing regulations. The results are conflict, treading out of pasture, and inability to plan the use of pasture. The topics of water for industry and irrigation are discussed elsewhere.

4. *Fuel, light, and heat.*—The Federal failure to develop local electrification in a largely electrified Nation is conspicuous. There is an increasing amount of electrification on the reservation today—as a result of Tribal Council, not Federal action. The NTUA had 7,000 electric customers in 1967, or about 30 out of 100 families.

In the absence of highways, the gathering of wood is unduly difficult, which again ties men at home who might find positions in the extra-reservation labor force. Today some Navajos begin to use propane, for heat, light, and cooking in their homes, but the delivery of large gas supplies remains a problem—this for a tribe that is at one end of a gas pipeline that reaches to the west coast and was constructed at a cost of $140 million (TNY 1965: 266). Some of the natural gas leases make provision for Navajo tapping of the pipeline, but relatively little has yet been done to pipe gas to homes. NTUA had about 1,300 customers in 1967, or about five families out of 100. This situation is again partly a problem of scattered population.

The cost of this pipeline is sometimes used as a figure to justify the fact that Navajos receive royalties on their minerals rather than exploiting them themselves. If one considers, on the contrary, that private capital can pay for the lease, the exploitation, the processing, the royalties, and the pipeline and still realize a profit, the picture alters somewhat. And when the $140 million used by private capital for this one pipeline is put alongside the $90 million allocated to rehabilitate the Navajo and Hopi combined from 1951 to 1961, serious questions arise as to how to spend rehabilitation funds, and as to how much money is required.

5. *Miscellaneous.*—The list of underdevelopment could go on and on; it is worth mentioning housing and communications, in order to say that both are sadly underdeveloped. Some progress in housing has been made recently.

Under these circumstances, commercial, industrial, and agricultural and livestock development on the reservation necessarily lags: it has nothing to "hook up to" and, because of the educational deficit (see below), until recently it could rely on almost no supply of adequately trained local labor.

B. THE COURSE OF MINERAL EXPLOITATION

It is only by luck that the Navajos have mineral wealth. In the 1870's Agent Arny tried to release a strip across the northern end of the reservation of those days, because he thought there were minerals there. Alerted by traders married into the tribe, the Navajos succeeded in having him removed. From 1889 to 1891 there were efforts to find minerals in the northern reservation, illegally and legally, and the agent foresaw a fate for the Navajos like the dispossession of the Sioux when gold was found in the Black Hills. A cession of part of the reservation in 1892 occurred because it was thought that there were minerals there.

The Navajos were fortunate, however. No significant mineral finds on the reservation were made until the 1920's, when the Federal Government created a Tribal Council for the specific purpose of having a legal body to sign mineral leases. (The Council was not always willing to do so, however; see Kelly, 1968.) They were also fortunate that a protracted series of battles in Congress raised the allowable percentage of oil royalties going to Indians living on reservation land created by Executive order (see Kelly, 1968). Until recently, royalty rates ran at a normal rate of 12.5 percent by Federal law, except in individually negotiated instances. In 1961 the rate was raised to 16⅔ percent, with the possibility of higher rates in some instances (TNY 1961: 265). In addition, the tribe receives bonuses. On unproven land these sometimes run up to $5,500 per acre. On proven lands they run at a fixed rate of $500, but royalties are negotiable, and under certain conditions some of them reportedly brought high royalty bids, averaging as much as 50 percent (Navajo Tribal Code, I (1962): xiii).

The dollar costs of these leases have been low. For example, in 1960 about $114,000 was spent for the salaries of Federal and Tribal employees who expedited leasing. This, of course, does not include such concealed costs as the per diem figures for Councilmen meeting to consider the acceptance of bids nor the salary of the Tribe's legal staff insofar as that staff spent time in providing general advice to the tribe in these matters. Even so, additional concealed costs would still represent a relatively small figure compared with the $12 million of income from leases, bonuses, and royalties received in 1960. The costs of exploitation of the oil fields, on the contrary, is high: $100,000 to $300,000 per completed well in the Aneth area, and $140 million for a gas pipeline to the west coast. It has become an accepted dictum, to be challenged here, that leasing is the appropriate, sound, and economical way to exploit Navajo mineral resources (see, for example, Hough, 1967).

The point to be made, however, is that the entire operation has been run with primary concern for non-Navajo needs. Had minerals been discovered earlier on Navajo land, the land would not have remained Navajo. The rate of exploitation is determined by the needs of private industry and Government, without consideration of any controlled rate of exploitation for the sake of Navajo budgetary planning. And the producer receives a tax benefit, a depletion allowance, although it is Navajo resources that are being depleted. In sum, through tax loopholes the American public underwrites a not inconsiderable part of the expenses, the Navajos get the royalties, and the oil companies get the profits.

The answer to all this might well be that since the Navajos have little, they cannot afford the experts, equipment, roads, gaslines, and so forth, necessary to exploit the fields. This would be a reasonable argument, were it not that the U.S. Government subsidizes many well-endowed enterprises. It runs an agricultural subsidy program that has been repeatedly shown to benefit large producers more than small. It pays the research and development expenses of large corporations manufacturing novel military equipment and then pays a profit to these same corporations when they sell to the Government (see Nieburg, 1966) and so on. Under these circumstances, it would seem reasonable to redress the equities somewhat, to consider a subsidy sufficient to permit Navajos to develop their own mineral industry.

Instead, although a joint development program with a private firm was considered and rejected by the Bureau and the Tribe a few years ago, so far as I know Navajo management has never been proposed to the Tribe by the Government, and there is reason to believe that Federal officials emphasize the advantages of leasing and the difficulties of native development, so that by now everyone is convinced of the efficiency, economy, and equity of the present arrangements.

C. EDUCATION

1. Early in this report it was said that undereducation was a result, not a cause of underdevelopment. That is true in the sense that the Federal Government has not supplied Navajos with an adequate school system, and that this failure is a part of a general undernourishment of the reservation's economy and society. It is also true that an undereducated population is one of the factors that slows development.

In sum, the Navajos were provided with insufficient schools for their children from 1868 until the 1950's, when, for the first time, there were enough seats in schools for almost all the children. About 90 percent of Navajo children of school age are now in school, the remainder being largely the physically or mentally handicapped and the children of parents who avoid sending them to school.

There was early Navajo resistance to schooling, partly because the labor of children was an asset for the livestock economy, but also because the early schools were often brutally run, fed the children miserably, and created conditions that resulted in many deaths from infectious deseases. From 1946 on, as children became an economic liability and as wartime exposure of a part of the population to the outside world showed them the disadvantages of undereducation, Navajos began to plead for schools. Now they demand an adequate educational system. The long-term lack of education has meant a lack of opportunity to compete successfully in the larger society.

2. Only in the last few years has there been the beginnings of a broadscale effort to introduce special methods for the teaching of English (English as a second language), although the vast majority of entering pupils speak only Navajo. Early, promising efforts by Willard Beatty in the 1930's and early 1940's did not take hold. As a result, there is often little relationship between the language competence of a pupil and his nominal grade level. I know seventh-graders who can barely understand simple English in a face-to-face situation with a familiar person. Clearly they cannot cope with seventh-grade instruction in mathematics, history, and science.

3. In the 1930's and early 1940's, under Willard Beatty's aegis, there was an effort to introduce curricular material that would encourage a feeling of pride in being a Navajo and an Indian. Again, this effort did not take hold. There is now some revival of such efforts, which find slightly more acceptance among teachers today as America's general ethnic problems multiply. Meantime, however, most Navajos passed through school under conditions that led them to believe that they and their culture were regarded as inferior. Some people pass through such an experience hardened and tempered in their opposition to the larger society, but a commoner result is a feeling of defeat early instilled.

4. The pattern of schooling makes unusual demands on both parents and children. The early approach in the Navajo country was on-reservation boarding schools, later supplemented by off-reservation boarding schools. These early schools (from the 1870's to the early 1930's) had unfavorable characteristics mentioned above. In addition, they demanded the separation of parents and children. Yet few families in the larger society would accept a similar separation from their young children by Government edict.

Later, a day school program in the 1930's foundered for lack of a technological base: the roads were so poor that pupils could not be bussed to school, nor, given weather conditions on the reservation, could they walk in winter, nor did their parents have adequate ways to bring them. Today in some areas a child is in boarding school near his home until eighth grade and may then be in boarding school some distance from his home. In other areas, he must leave his home region after third grade. A notable exception is found in major administrative centers where many agency and tribal personnel live. There, public high schools are to be found, so that this group of parents does not have to part with its children. Some 50 to 60 percent of Navajo children attend boarding schools.

It is true that boarding schools permit parents, all of whose children are in school, to seek winter off-reservation employment, but this marginal employment pattern, further discussed below, is not a desirable one.

5. The first community college was opened in 1969, although as yet it has no building of its own: it now occupies part of a large high school that has not yet been filled. It is good to note that it is directed by a Navajo board of regents.

6. There has never been an adequate Bureau-operated college for Indians off reservation.

7. There has never been a proper college preparatory program on reservation.

8. Only in recent years has there been a Federal scholarship program for Indian students. In recent years BIA scholarship support has increased. On some agencies it is able to support all students admitted to college or university. In the case of the Navajo, the tribe's mineral wealth has been used in part for a scholarship fund, which supports about 500 students. The BIA, in the Navajo case, uses its scholarship funds to support those students to whom the tribe is unable to make grants, which is a reasonable approach, and one that has provided funds for a number of successful students. It is the lateness of Federal entry into this field, however, that I wish to stress.

D. EMPLOYMENT

Navajos are subject to the racial discrimination so common in American society when they seek jobs in the off-reservation world. They are thereby reduced in their capacity to secure income through employment. They are discriminated against in hiring, in wage levels, and in working conditions. Furthermore, this discrimination is most marked in the border towns, precisely in the areas that would be most convenient for Navajos seeking work—and also in the very communities most dependent on Indian customers for income. The *Navajo Times*, the tribe's own newspaper, characteristically carries ads for consumer goods from border towns and help wanted ads from remote communities. Although the Bureau is the largest single employer of Navajo workers, charges of discrimination have been made even there.

E. THE REGION

Section VI of this report deals with proposals for the development of the reservation. A proper perspective on development, however, requires attention to the towns bordering the reservation, since the reservation is not an isolated enclave. These towns are themselves relatively underdeveloped, with a heavy reliance on tourism and on an impoverished Indian clientele and an emphasis on retail and wholesale facilities. (Farmington relies as well on the newly developed oil and gas industry.) They have contributed to reservation underdevelopment, since they have been jealous of competing on-reservation facilities. In the long run, a prosperous Indian population will, however, benefit them. As things now stand, the reservation is an underdeveloped vacuum standing inside a larger partial vacuum: the border towns.

F. SUMMARY

The Federal Government is responsible for the situation on the reservation. It has been in charge of the land and the people for a hundred years. At the end of this time we find an undereducated, unhealthy, overcrowded population with a primitive livestock and farming pattern, with no technological substratum for development, and with almost no development save for the exploitation of mineral resources by outside private capital. Furthermore, Navajos have not been protected from the relatively monopolistic situation created by trading posts, for pressures to enter the job market on unequal terms, or from an unplanned draining off of their resources. They are, then, a population that is exploited and underdeveloped.

It should be noted that I have referred here, and in many, but not all other places in this report, to the Federal Government, rather than to the BIA. The BIA is what local and national popular pressures and Congress have made it: an understaffed, underbudgeted operation with no control over many of the salient factors that would make a difference in Indian economic development. It is not encouraged to set up tribal businesses of any scale, it is not in a position to exert much pressure on border town populations, and so on. In the Navajo case, what water, roads, police, schools, agricultural extension work, livestock extension work, and planning were to be found in the area until the 1950's, when tribal income increased, were the product of the Bureau and its resources. I have tried to show that what it was able to do was totally inadequate, in spite of the labors of many men of good conscience and intelligence.

The inability of the BIA to proceed with development with its own resources is amply evident from the most recent budget available to me, that for fiscal year 1968. The total is $54,715,490. Nearly 70 percent of that budget is for "education and welfare services," almost all of the 70 percent for education. Another 12 percent is for resources management and repair and maintenance. Only a little over 18 percent is allocated to construction (buildings and utilities—a little over 1 percent) and road construction (the remainder). It is notable that development funds came from the Economic Development Administration ($8.5 million, with plans to apply for another $21 million). The point is not necessarily that the Bureau's budget should include development funds (although I will later argue that in the past it certainly should have), but that unless generous funds on a preferential basis can be made available to the Navajos and other Indian tribes, development must lag hopelessly.

We turn from the overall picture to a closer examination of the local economy.

V. THE LOCAL ECONOMY

A. THE STYLE OF LIFE

The effects of all these factors promoting underdevelopment in the Navajo country are, at the local level, a particular style of economic and social life—one often criticized by Anglos as evidence of backwardness, or praised by some as "the Navajo way." It has some roots in custom, but it has its present causes in current economic conditions and represents an adjustment to them.

It is a curiosity that so much energy has been expended by agents of American society—Bureau officials (particularly in the past), missionaries, sometimes traders, and others—to push Navajos to give up "Navajo ways" like long hair, ceremonials, and even mother-in-law avoidance, and so little has been expended in giving them an opportunity to take on those parts of American life that they so evidently want: Roads, plumbing, electric lights, sewing machines, and so on. The aim has been too often to rob them of cultural identity while depriving them of material benefits, where it should so clearly be a matter of providing them with the opportunities for materially improved conditions while allowing them cultural identity and pride in being Navajo.

The key items that promote the Navajo style are—

(1) shortages of material equipment, stemming from a shortage of cash;

(2) simple logistic problems in running the household and the subsistence economy, resulting from a need for some wage labor and from the difficulties involved in herding, getting water, and hauling fuel; and

(3) fluctuating income.

By shortages of equipment I refer to a number of things. Navajo families have difficulty managing without access to a pickup truck, which is often needed for such mutually contradictory purposes as hauling wood and water, getting to and from a job, and procuring supplies from the trading post or the town. Yet by no means every unit of husband, wife, and immature children can afford a pickup. Hence a cluster of such families (an extended family) is advantageous, since it can share the pickup and often can pool sporadic contributions to maintain the payments on a pickup. (In effect, Navajos today are involved in the lifetime rental of a pickup truck, at about $200 per month. It takes about 3 years to pay for a pickup, and by the end of that time, road conditions being what they are, it is uneconomical to keep it. It is traded, and payments on a new one begin.) But not only pickups are involved. I have seen gas irons, gas lamps, tarpaulins, water barrels, sewing machines, automobile tools, etc., borrowed from family to family to meet temporary exigencies.

The absence of running water, of adequate stock water, and of fuel except in the form of firewood, all require the labor of some men in the family for at least a day or two a week. Again the extended family is useful as labor pool. There are, however, families where, for one reason or another, there are no resident adult males: Where there are a set of related women all of whom are divorced or widowed, whose younger male relatives have married out or taken jobs far away. In one such case, as an example, a woman's married son is the major source of labor for firewood and water hauling, for her and several female descendants with small children. He lives an hour's drive away and has a major commitment to his own children and his wife's family as well. Meantime he certainly cannot seek employment.

Along the same lines, many Navajos do not believe that they dare to give up their livestock. But someone must herd it. Within limits this work can be done by women, although it is seldom done exclusively by women. Particularly in winter, and when sheep are lost, herding is arduous in the extreme. To have only *one* possibly herder in a family is to tie the herder permanently to the home, without opportunity even to go to the trading post, and to invite disaster if that one should fall ill. Again the labor pool afforded by the extended family is valuable.

As for fluctuating income there is, for most Navajos, no stable and predictable single source of income. Weather, disease, and fluctuating prices for wool, mohair, and sheep and cattle cause wide variations in both the food supply and the income from livestock. In an arid environment, crops often fail as well. The wagework market is variable. Even Government jobs (BIA and Office of Navajo Economic Opportunity) fluctuate in accordance with budgetary variation. Furthermore a man receiving disability pay may experience no change in his physical condition yet be cut off the welfare lists, through the occasional "re-evaluations" of conditions like bad backs that occur.

Not only is there continual gift giving and borrowing within the extended family to cope with these variations, but there is a wide circle of kin who depend on each other, who ask for help when they need it and give help when they can. This style of economic life we may call reciprocity—the Navajos call it "helping out" when they speak of it in English—and the ethic that accompanies it is generosity. No more than among other peoples does every Navajo do what is expected of him, but this ethic dominates the Navajo values at present. The behavior that accompanies it is often seen by whites as foolishly improvident. It is not: it is the best way for people thus circumstanced to survive.

Thus in a typical extended family—parents, some of their children (usually daughters) and their mates, and their children's children—multiple economic dependencies are the rule: Livestock, farming, weaving, part-time off-reservation work, and welfare are frequently found as income and subsistence sources in the same unit. No one of these can be relinquished—that is, efficient specialization is impossible—because none is certain and none is sufficient.

Three hundred years of history leave the Navajo in one sense exactly where they started: In the 1660's they depended on multiple, fluctuating resources—the farm, the herd, the hunt, the raid, and in the 1960's the sources have only partly changed—the farm, the herd, the hunt to a small extent, the job, the wood, rug, silver, and pinon nut market, and the welfare check.

B. THE ROLE OF THE TRADER

Any institution may be a force for progress in one era and a conservative force in another, without changing its basic form. That is what has happened to the traders. Once they were the primary channel for introducing Navajos to the elements of Western technology, food, clothing, utensils, and so forth, that they could use; assisted Navajos in their land struggles—some still do; and explained the ways of white men and Government to them. Today, as the center of each community's credit system, they are forced into being conservative forces by their quest for market security. Each attitude was tied to opportunities for profit—the first to gain, the second to retain a market. And their situation is becoming increasingly difficult.

Traders aim at keeping a certain volume of Navajo business, which they manage by judicious use of credit. There is no long-term debt peonage in the Navajo country: Navajos are allowed credit only in amounts that they can repay in the relatively near future. The trader supplies his customers with credit sufficient to absorb their short-run (6 months to a year) future income, extending credit for expectable income that is likely to pass through the trader's own hands. This income includes wool sales, rug sales, sheep sales, and to some degree cattle sales (when these go through the trader), welfare and railroad retirement checks, and Federal and tribal paychecks in areas where he is the only easily available agent for cashing checks. Although tribal law requires a trader to give the Navajo payee the full amount of a check he cashes for him, this law is certainly widely violated. (Traders could have been more tightly regulated by the BIA. Regulations permit this, but U.S. attorneys have not pushed enforcement.) The trader allows credit on future wools, rugs, sheep, and cattle, and on future checks, and balances off the credit when the Navajo sells to him or when the checks come in. He serves as a pawnbroker for Navajo jewelry.

The trader is in a position to put pressure on Navajos to take off-reservation jobs so that they can pay off debts to him, and he can apply pressure on men working off reservation to remit money by informing the man's family that credit will be cut off if no money comes in. This is riskier than the livestock and wool sales and local checks (often mailed care of the trading post), but traders learn eventually who are good and who are poor credit risks in these situations.

As every trader is well aware, he is the community's bank, and apparently the Tribe, the Government, and the local financial interests in the towns are willing for this arrangement to continue, since they have developed no feasible alternatives, such as a fully adequate Tribal or Federal loan program. The Tribal revolving credit program had outstanding loans of $1,123,000 at the end of fiscal year 1967–68, according to the Navajo area office. It is not clear whether this included loans to Tribal businesses or not. Even if we assume that these are all loans to individuals, it should be noted that in 1961 Young (TNY 1961: 245) estimated a need of $2,500,000 to $3 million to support an adequate loan program. The Area Office also mentions that in 1967 "outside sources" provided financing in excess of $47 million, but without further particulars one does not know what to make of this figure, which includes loans to the tribe.

The trader maintains his position, insofar as he can, by credit saturation, as Adams (1963) calls it. (Most of my information on trading comes from this source; some comes from observation of a number of posts from 1949 on.) Credit saturation is the practice of soaking up a man's future earnings by judicious extension of credit, since this tends to result in a monopoly over that man's purchasing power. His interest in credit saturation is demonstrated by the willingness to give a man a higher dollar value for his livestock in credit than in cash.

He compensates for his role as banker—for the costs of his credit to him—in a variety of ways. One way is *high markup*. Prices on reservation are high in comparison with the border towns. At one post, where prices averaged 10–15 percent above town prices, markups ranged from 35 percent for groceries to 75 percent for dry goods, 100 percent for hardware, and 100–200 percent for remedies (Adams, 1963). Traders justify their high markup on two bases, transportation costs and credit risks. Both are certainly elements in traders' costs. So, of course, are the traders' own interest rates. What a reasonable markup would be, of course, has not been established. Some traders add to their markup a credit charge, sometimes a flat 10 percent of the purchase. Some give to regular Anglo customers, cash or credit, discounts as high as 20 percent. Some also give discounts to Navajos who regularly pay cash or who pay cash often, but these are smaller—about 10 percent. There is no evident reason why Anglos should get a higher discount than Navajos, except as a way for the trader to separate "us" from "them".

What it does in addition, of course, is to make costs lower for Anglos, who have higher incomes, than for Navajos, who have lower ones. Perhaps it preserves more business for the trader, inducing Anglos to postpone fewer purchases until their next trip to town. But if there is still a profit after a 20 percent discount, one is curious about the entire operation. Both Navajos and Anglos who have been given discounts are discouraged by the trader from discussing the practice with others. Since they do not wish to lose the discount, they are likely to talk about it only to a limited extent.

At present the reservation situation is highly variable from one place to another. In many areas, Navajos are served by local retailing facilities with the characteristics of a general store in a rural community in the 1930's. Still others are served by facilities like small supermarkets. At Window Rock a new Fed-Mart store, opened in fall of 1968, provides a combined discount house and supermarket facility for Navajos from that area on a day-to-day basis and from a much larger area for occasional shopping trips. (Tribal funds were used to attract this business, which has undertaken to hire Navajo staff for middle managerial, as well as lower positions.)

In the hinterlands, there is an increasing number of cafes attached to trading posts; closer to town are restaurants or drive-ins not so attached. In larger centers there are tourist courts. Some trading posts run garages.

In the hinterlands, only trading posts serve to cash checks. In Shiprock and Window Rock there are banks, in the founding of which the Tribe has played an economic role.

Nevertheless, much of the population must travel distances of 20 to 150 miles for boot and shoe repairs, radio repairs, complex automotive repairs, haircuts (except for the amateur jobs, often quite good, that Navajos supply to each other), beauty parlors, even duplicate keys. For all these trivial items, as well as for major items like furniture, men's suits, women's dresses (except for the simpler ones), they must travel, for the most part, to border towns or, with the new Fed-Mart, to Window Rock. This means gross inefficiency for Navajos in their daily living (since they must run hither and yon for quite minor items), a high cost of living (since they must pay transportation costs), and finally the siphoning off of cash to the border towns, so that Navajo income has no "multiplier" effect for Navajos: the range of customer services that could be provided by Navajos on reservation are supplied by non-Navajos, primarily in border towns. There are many reasons for this lack of facilities. One is the trader's fear of overexpansion; another the poverty of the population; a third the potential

Navajo entrepreneur's lack of capital; a fourth is the relative scarcity of trained Navajos to run local businesses. For a visitor to Shiprock or Window Rock, or even a smaller center like Chinle, the situation has changed enormously in the last 20 years. At points farther from the reservation borders the change is far too slow.

To summarize thus far, the trader is the center of the credit system of many communities. He serves the purpose of extending credit to compensate for the fact that Navajo income comes in irregular amounts. He therefore controls a good deal in the community: pressures for off-reservation employment, for example, may emanate from him, and his attitude toward extending credit controls a family's ability to undertake a large ceremony. He has changed from a "fashion leader" to a reluctant fashion follower, whose customers seek more kinds of goods than he wishes to stock. The reservation lacks many important consumer facilities, which are located in border towns.

The trader's situation, however, is complicated today by three factors: (1) There is more ready cash available to Navajos. Although they must often cash Federal and Tribal paychecks with the trader, they do not always do so. (2) Transportation is easier with better roads, and more pickups and larger trucks, making it possible for Navajos to do quantity buying in town or at more distant posts, and even to sell cattle and sheep in small quantities in town. (3) His own credit costs are rising, so that his credit business is probably more costly to him today (no figures available).

Nowadays some relatively well-to-do Navajos use the trading posts as they would the corner grocery—for the occasional loaf of bread or bottle of milk—doing their major shopping in supermarkets, sometimes a hundred miles or more away. They do so because it saves money. Others, ordinarily not at all well off, use the credit arrangement to insure larger amounts of disposable cash at particular times. Thus a woman may get credit on a rug at one post but sell it at another, or in town. Eventually she must pay off the debt with another rug, but temporarily she has the credit and the cash as well. If this can be done at a time when she has to clothe her children for school or meet some other emergency, the delay may be worth while. The restriction of inventory also leads to shopping in town, and such shopping clearly is not likely to be for the odd item but for a large order. (Among the goods one might not find in some out-of-the-way posts are dental floss, ashtrays, and mailing labels, all of which are nevertheless used by some Navajos and some non-Navajos in the community.)

In the early 1950's the Tribal Council talked as if it might fail to renew a number of trading post leases or renew them only on a short-term basis. In the end, however, it set up provisions for 25-year leases, with no option for renewal except where a case was made that capital could not be recovered in 25 years. It also set up some anti-monopoly provisions. Leases can be canceled for cause (see Navajo Tribal Code). These leases will expire, for the most part, in 1978–79.

The trader is at the bottom of a business hierarchy in the Southwest. Above him are wholesalers and banks. In the power hierarchy of the Southwestern States, few actual traders are to be found, although many significant figures come from what were once trading families.

Traders are kings only on the reservation, and their position is certainly undermined today. Adams argues that many traders could survive in no other setting because they are not sufficiently up to date as businessmen. This may be true for some; it does not seem to be true for most of those I have known. Furthermore, Tribal regulations would appear to make it difficult for a reservationwide or regional monopoly to be set up, but many traders are united by kinship and marriage. Shared interests and personal ties do now, and will increasingly in the future, create a tendency towary,anp ooillgo d toward a "monopoly" by a few people united among themselves and able to compete successfully with new outsiders and with potential Navajo traders, but perhaps not with an expansion in the number of stores like Fed-Mart.

It must be noted that traders do many things not in the repertory of the corner grocer or supermarket manager. They advise Navajos who receive bafflling documents from the Government, notify people about meetings, drive them to the hospital in emergencies, turn out to rescue them from snow and flooded arroyos, provide their own telephone at cost per call to members of the community, deliver individual messages, give wedding presents, sometimes bury the dead, and bear with some patience the trials of daily life.

Nevertheless, Navajos are served by a relatively expensive, inventory-constricted set of retailers. These retailers control the credit network and operate with high interest charges that are neither regulated not clearly visible to the customer. (A 10-percent credit charge on any credit purchase—not a universal practice by any means—is not a clear charge, since it might in different cases amount to 10 percent per day, per month, or per year.) Consumer facilities situation on the reservation are underdeveloped. The trader's position is being weakened, but traders form a relatively well-consolidated interest bloc on the reservation. Traders of Navaio origin, it should be made clear, are few and far between.

C. SUMMARY

Let us suppose that we could cut a cross section through the reservation territory extending about 8,000 feet below ground, and that we could make a rapid-motion picture of the flow of population, money, and resources from about 1900 on. What would we see? First, we would see a population doubled thrice between 1870 and 1958: hogans and houses would multiply before our eyes. Plant cover would disappear; huge washes would appear and increase in size; topsoil would disappear. An ebb and flow of the population off the reservation to employment sites could be observed. But money would flow predominantly to the trader and from the trader to the larger economy, balanced only by a flow necessary to sustain life and (in recent years) somewhat to enhance the standard of living. Sheep would increase rapidly—and then decrease suddenly in the 1930's, to remain more or less steady in quantity. Horses would increase until the 1930's and dwindle rapidly thereafter, while pickup trucks would partly replace them. Wagons would increase to the 1930's and almost disappear by the 1960's. Timber for firewood and house construction would dwindle fairly rapidly, commercial timber less so. Meantime, below ground, we would see oil, helium, coal, uranium, and vanadium draining off into the surrounding economy; we would see rents and royalties flowing into the tribal treasury, but, of course, major profits accruing to the corporations exploiting the reservation. We would see the slow development of roads, water for stock and drinking, government facilities, and so forth, and a flow of welfare funds coming in, to go out again via the trader. The net flow of many physical resources would be outward; the flow of profits would be outward; and the only major increase to be seen would be population, with a minor increment in physical facilities and consumer goods.

This is the picture of a colony. It can be duplicated time after time, place after place, in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean (for not all colonies are formally the political property of the country that dominates them), and, of course for other American Indian groups. Where do we go from here?

VI. Possibilities for Development

A. WHO SHOULD PLAN DEVELOPMENT?

Planning with Navajos has been a major aim for the Navajo Area Office for several decades. *Navajo Progress* (see bibliography) and other Area Office documents make it evident that efforts at joint planning with Navajos are to be found at every level from reservation-wide planning to the local community, and in every area, from industrial development to schools and roads. How much actual devolution of power there has been, however, is another question.

It is not satisfactory, however, to grant Navajos a share in the planning process. The solution is for Navajos to plan for themselves, drawing on such advice as they wish, whether from the Bureau and other Federal agencies, Congressmen, universities, management consultants, private industry, and whatever experts they need. The reason for this is that whereas Navajos may make mistakes, only Navajos are primarily concerned for Navajos. Congressmen are primarily concerned with their constituents, only a minority of whom are Indians. Bureau officials are constrained in many ways: they wish to be primarily concerned for Navajos, but they must be concerned lest they violate their role as trustees for Indian property, and lest they upset local interests, who in turn will put pressure on Congress, which will put pressure on them. Furthermore, neither Congress nor Federal officials have to live with mistakes in dealing with Navajo resources as closely as Navajos do.

To say that Navajos must plan does not mean that all planning should reside in the Tribal Council. There are now two levels at which planning occurs and a third seems to be emerging and should be encouraged. There is the Council and there are the Chapters, or, approximately speaking, a tribewide and a communitywide level. Regional groups are beginning to appear: Agency councils, presently made up of chapter officers and local tribal delegates. (There are five agencies in the Navajo Area Office: Fort Defiance, Crownpoint, Shiprock, Chinle, and Tuba City, and five agency councils.) Under present circumstances these councils are not elective, nor are they strong. A variety of possibilities exist for altering this situation, but it would be premature to discuss them here.

A responsive, responsible, and flexible system for Navajo planning would involve all three levels, since some issues are purely local, far more are regional, and some are tribal. The advantages of the regional (agency) council would be that it would permit new leadership to emerge, that it would be attuned to local issues, and that it would be a counterforce for grassroots level Navajos to the Tribal Council, whose concern with development in recent years has put it somewhat out of touch with local Navajos—or so they tell me. The Council is also unduly sensitive to the opinions of the Bureau and of private industry, and new regional councils might break that mold. Such a step, however, should be undertaken by Navajos, and not be external pressure.

The Bureau's reaction to this sort of recommendation is that it is "bringing Navajos along" as fast as it can. Nevertheless, it is true that I have found a great deal of frustration among Navajos who have definite ideas about what needs to be done and no way of influencing events: there are signs, then, of a great deal of frustrated energy on the reservation, where the Bureau seems to find apathy and hesitancy. It is also said that the Council tend to distrust Anglo employees of the Tribe and that they therefore show a high rate of turnover. But surely it is better for the Tribe to draw on experts whose sole responsibility is to the Tribe than to depend on those whom it did not hire and cannot fire.

The plan submitted below, then, is one man's version of what needs to be done. But it is assumed that the final plan, if there is to be a sound one, will be made by Navajos.

A necessary adjunct to Tribal planning is a Tribally operated unit capable of undertaking sample surveys to determine relevant characteristics of the Navajo population and Navajo reactions to possible plans. The recently completed Navajo manpower survey is an excellent start. It was begun in spring of 1967 and should soon be available. The tribe, the Bureau, ONEO, USPHS, and the Arizona State Employment Service joined forces to carry out this work.

It is evident from the work that Navajos have done as interpreters, census takers for the U.S. Government and for the chapters and the BIA schools, ONEO and social security investigators, and so on, that literate Navajos, some with only a sixth-grade education, are capable after brief training of working as interviewers. A sample of 1,000 to 2,000 Navajos should be adequate for quite complex surveys. What is needed are funds and a few experts—initially from outside, perhaps, but later Navajos—who can plan the sampling technique to be used and cope with the problem of wording interview schedules and of translating them into Navajo. The Tribe should not have to depend on the interests of outside investigators for data of this sort.

The Tribe also badly needs resource surveys. It seems that the USGS will not conduct surveys of Navajo mineral assets. Neither will the BIA. The Tribe should have its own experts, responsible to it, rather than depending on surveys by private businesses for their own purposes.

It should be noted that the Tribe is already carrying out its own planning activities and hiring its own experts. This should continue at an accelerated rate.

B. THE POPULATION CONTEXT OF DEVELOPMENT

Navajo population doubled between 1870 and 1898 (28 years); between 1898 and 1932 (34 years—slowed down by the terrible influenza epidemic after World War I); and between 1932 and 1958 (26 years). Its present rate of growth is probably on the order of 2¾ to 3¼ percent per annum (doubling in 22–26 years). No forces are evident that would slow the rate of growth; on the contrary with 55 percent of the population below 19 and 79 percent below 34, growth should accelerate in the future. Since the present population, on and off reservation, is in the neighborhood of 120,000, about 90 percent of whom spend some part of each year on reservation, any plans developed should be on the assumption that by 1990 (only a little more than 20 years away) there will be about 240,000, and that unless the external economy and the educational system alike have been enormously improved, 80 to 90 percent of these will wish to have a place on the reservation. Over 3,000 should enter the potential labor force this year, and about 4,500 in 1979. Any planning must be done on the basis of a maximum estimate of population and population growth and a minimum assumption respecting emigration from the reservation. These assumptions are necessary for humane, rational planning. Too many plans for the enhancement of standards of living in underdeveloped areas have foundered through a failure to allow for population growth. To develop a plan for extensive migration is easy but inhumane. It is also to a considerable extent unnecessary. With no planning at all, emigration will be forced. Navajos, however, are living in their homeland. They have significant resources. A rational and humane plan will be one that makes migration a matter of choice and provides maximum opportunity for them to gain an adequate livelihood from their own resources.

This report has not discussed organized planning for emigration because it deals with reservation development. It is, nevertheless, true that Navajos will wish to migrate, and that the educational system should be one that gives sufficient opportunity to prepare for this option. There should also be efforts to assist Navajos desiring to migrate to find jobs, housing, and so forth, job training opportunities such as now go on (see below), and perhaps planned efforts to locate Navajo migrants in groups in cities, instead of scattered about, as is typical now. Such enclaves seem to have made for a good urban adjustment for some Pueblo Indians, for example the Laguna colony in Barstow.

C. MINERAL EXPLOITATION

Since only a fraction of the projected population can achieve a decent standard of living based on farming or herding, we will begin with mineral exploitation, industry, and commerce.

In my opinion, the present pattern of leasing mineral rights drains both resources and wealth from the reservation, in spite of the residue that remains in the Tribal treasury. The mineral wealth of the Navajo country is not unlimited, and the yield will decline. All the more reason why it should be managed by Navajos and its profits devoted to them. At present the tempo of exploitation is set by oil and coal companies, and the product used largely for fuel. Yet the oil and coal have potential use for the manufacture of synthetic products. By the time the reservation is ready to take advantage of the potential for more complex use of these minerals, they may well be largely gone or entirely under the control of enterprises whose interests lie many miles from Navajo country.

Although the initial outlay would be considerable, and would require Government support, and although trained personnel would initially have to come from outside, the rational procedure for a planned program of economic development would be for the Navajo Tribe, as a corporate body, to own and operate its own petroleum, gas, coal, vanadium, and so forth, industries, to set its own pace for extraction, to process the products in as large part as possible, to sell them, and to utilize the profits for the benefit of members of the tribe.

At present, Navajo assets are used to enrich non-Navajo enterprises. Tax funds enter the reservation in relatively "soft" forms like ONEO part-time employment funds. The use of Federal funds, whether as subsidy or as low-interest rate loans, for Tribal enterprises of this sort could reverse the present impoverishment of the Navajos and their dependence on welfare and "soft" Government money, like ONEO.

The Tribe operates the Navajo Forest Products Industries and the Navajo Tribal Utilities Authority. Thus it is not Tribal enterprise as such that constitutes a block to Tribal exploitation of minearl resources. The obstacles lie elsewhere. First, the Federal Government's trustee obligations to the tribe are such that legislation would be needed for approval of enterprises involving higher risk than the present ones. Second, shortage of capital would have to be remedied by Federal action. Third, managerial staff would be needed.

There are, however, still other obstacles. Most Federal employees and most Council members are at present persuaded that the low risk and infinitesimal investment involved in present leasing arrangements are preferable to the higher risk and large investment otherwise needed. Both of these attitudes are supported by the reactions of private industry, which undoubtedly would like to use the mineral wealth of the reservation for their highly profitable operations. This last point, I believe, is very important. By and large, private industry and local interests alike resist the development of competitive economic activities by Indian tribes. Thus a sawmill is acceptable because it is a small operation with relatively small profits and hence has little opposition from the lumber industry. The present mineral operation is a very large one with very large profits, and it can be anticipated that there would be great pressure against development of Tribal mineral enterprises. Hence it would be necessary to insure a sales outlet for Navajo oil, gas, and coal. Since the U.S. Government is one of the larger users of all three commodities, it would be in a position to guarantee the purchase of Navajo supplies at fair market prices.

To anticipate somewhat, on the Navajo Reservation at present are various industrial plants in defense-related industries. So far as I know, a considerable part of the product of the companies involved is produced on a cost-plus basis for the Federal Government. This is a tax-subsidized business operation. If this can be done for defense purposes, it would seem that tax money could be used to develop Navajo resources, particularly since in the end the reservation would be far less dependent on Federal funds than it is at present. The fact that Tribal enterprises are not presently subject to Federal tax would also provide a badly needed advantage in establishing tribal industries.

As things now stand, even the manner of exploitation of Navajo resources lies outside the control of the people. There is strip mining of coal near Window Rock, and there will be strip mining by Peabody Coal at the north end of Black Mesa. When I was there the local population did not know anything about strip mining plans, but only about mining, in some general way, nor did they have information (nor do I) as to arrangements, if any, for disposition of toxic wastes, backfilling, contouring, or reforestation. Yet Navajos have been using this area for their own purposes. The entire subject needs wider discussion among Navajos. (I am informed that future strip mining contracts will contain restoration clauses, but how enforceable these will be I do not know.)

Conceivably Navajos would be more prudent in their rates of consumption of these rare and limited resources and more careful in considering the effects of the manner of exploitation than is private industry. Possibly they would prove less prudent and careful. In either case, however, decisions would be based on local considerations and not on the needs of particular corporations. This seems vital for the Navajo future.

I have earlier mentioned processing. What we are seeking here is the well-known multiplier effect: that the extraction itself should employ as many Navajos as possible, that the refined rather than the crude product should, insofar as possible, be produced on the reservation, so that more jobs for Navajos are created on all levels, labor and managerial, that centers of production of this kind become population centers demanding various service industries (stores, garages, and so forth), which in turn would be Navajo-run, and so on.

For this processing to come off, of course, further capital is needed, and the technological substratum of roads, power, et cetera, previously mentioned in virtually every section of this report, is required.

No proposal in this report has encountered more objections from BIA officials than that for Tribal exploitation of minerals. Alternative suggestions made to me are that the Tribe might operate processing plants but not the basic extractive industries, or that management of the entire operation might be Tribal but the capital be external. The objections to these plans, each of which has advantages compared with the present situation, are twofold: neither curbs the outflow of profits from Navajo resources to non-Navajo recipients, and neither places control of the pattern of exploitation in Navajo hands.

There are a number of oil leases on the reservation. Peabody Coal, Pittsburgh and Midway Coal, Utah Mining and Construction Co., and El Paso Natural Gas Co., are all involved in coal exploitation. Other mining interests are represented by Kerr-McGee, Climax Uranium, and Vanadium Corp. of America.

El Paso Natural Gas Co. owns pipeline booster stations, and Shell Oil operates a refinery at Aneth, Utah.

D. INDUSTRY

As much processing of minerals as possible should occur on the reservation, for the sake of multiplier effects. In addition, there should be development of the manufacture of various kinds of finished goods and components.

The past few years have seen a rapid but somewhat special growth of industry in the Navajo country.

The Tribe itself operates Navajo Forest Products Industries, at Navajo, N. Mex. It runs the Navajo Tribal Utilities Authority (NTUA), providing electricity, gas, water, and sewage to an increasing number of customers. It runs the Arts and Crafts Guild, one of the best outlets for high quality Navajo silver, rugs, and other crafts products in the Southwest. And it runs motels and restaurants at Window Rock and Shiprock.

The size of the NTUA operation has been described. In line with what has been said before about Navajo control of Navajo resources, NTUA has one interesting feature. It buys power from the Arizona Public Service Co., which runs a powerplant near Fruitland, N. Mex., with a present capacity of about 570,000 kilowatts, soon to be increased to 2,080,000 kilowatts. Arizona Public Service is headquartered in Phoenix. Ownership of the expanded facility will include APS and Southern California Edison Co., Salt River project, Tucson Gas & Electric Co., Public Service Co. of New Mexico, and El Paso Electric Co. Coal for the plant is supplied by Utah Construction & Mining Co. from Navajo mineral leases. Current will be transmitted to southern California. By about 1970, it is said, the payroll will include 800 persons involved in plant construction, and thereafter the present payroll for the plant proper will double. "The combination of the new power units and the mine will mean an additional $1,041,600 annually in rents and royalties to the Navajo Tribe. The coal reserves will last through the economic life of the powerplant" (Anonymous, 1966a; Destination: the Twentieth Century, p. 3).

This means that Navajos lease mines to Utah Construction & Mining Co., that they receive the royalties on these leases, whereas Utah Construction & Mining Co. receives the profits, and that they then buy back the coal in the form of electric current, which they sell at a profit locally. NTUA is indeed an important achievement for the Tribe. But is there not some less roundabout way for the Tribe to use its own coal and to hold a larger margin of the profits from it? Furthermore, should Navajos relinquish so much of their coal for the sake of power users in California, so that at a later date they can pay for the import of power to the reservation when their own needs expand?

Navajo Forest Products Industries employs about 500 people, over 90 percent of them Navajo; I do not have figures on NTUA employees, save that 93 percent are Navajo. It will probably expand to make particle board, door and window frames, and other products. It should.

There are a number of private industries in the Navajo country. One is a utility, already discussed; Arizona Public Service Co.'s Four Corners Powerplant at Fruitland, presently employing about 120 people, less than 20 percent of whom are Navajos. One is Navajo Furniture Industries, Inc., which manufactures juvenile furniture in Gallup, with about 25 employees, almost all of them Navajo.

There is, as has been said, an oil refinery at Aneth, Utah.

Finally, there are three manufacturing plants, all of them in defense-oriented industries. Fairchild Semiconductor Division, Fairchild Instrument and Camera Corp. manufactures semiconductors in a plant at Shiprock, employing 850 people, 800 of them Navajos. It expects to expand to 1,200 employees. General Dynamics Corp., Pomona Division, has an electronic assembly plant at Fort Defiance, Ariz., employing 150 people, 125 of them Navajos. And Vostron Electronic Packaging Industries carries on electronics assembly at Page, Ariz. It employs 36 people, all but the manager being Navajo. (Data on industries from Navajo Area Office, BIA.)

In the past the Tribe began industrial operations that were later canceled, all of them involving substantially less complex processes than the private plants just mentioned: Cement, clay, leather, and wood products, and wool textiles. I have been told that these enterprises were terminated because they were losing money—through lack of local markets for products, because of high transportation costs for finished products, etc. I have also been told that in the 1950's, when they were stopped, the Bureau was less than wholehearted in its support for Tribal enterprises.

At present, then, Tribal enterprises employ well over 500 Navajos (no figures for NTUA), and private industry on reservation in the neighborhood of 1,000. This is an enormous change from a few years ago, but it represents only a tiny fraction of the potential labor force, or even of the total of Navajos now employed part and full time.

However pleased one may be about this rise in employment opportunities and about the Tribal and Bureau enterprise that helped to bring about these results, there are some significant features of industrial developments to date that deserve considerable thought. First, the electronics plants, the major industrial employers, hire almost entirely women. Thus, opportunities for steady employment for men on reservation are not improved by these industries. There is nothing about the employment of women that is undesirable, either from the point of view of development or from a Navajo point of view. But unless parallel opportunities arise for men, demoralization of the male labor force will continue.

Second, once again private industry rather than Tribal industry has been let in on the ground floor, so that payroll comes on the reservation but profits go off. Furthermore, to the degree that water is a limiting factor for industrial development in the Navajo country, these firms inhibit any later possibilities for Tribal industries to arise.

Third, concentration of Tribal industrial employment in defense-oriented industries would seem unwise unless the United States is to maintain present levels of military spending indefinitely—in itself an unhappy prospect.

Fourth, since there is reason to believe that tax money has been used to finance the development of defense-oriented private enterprise on the reservation, the question arises why it could not be used to finance Tribal enterprise. In brief, Federal funds paid for on the job training; the firms in question carry on a considerable portion of their activities on a cost-plus basis; their location on the reservation seems to have been a product of Kennedy administration policy to spread the locations of defense-oriented industry to hardship areas. The net result appears to be that the Navajos have secured a payroll for about 1,000 employees (at fairly low wages), that in order to do so they have deployed reservation land and water, that the Federal Government has footed the bill for the employment training and, in one way or another, underwritten the profits of the firms in question—profits that do not accrue to the Tribe. (See H. L. Nieburg, "In the Name of Science" (1966), for substantiation of the general position taken here.)

It would appear, then, that a more frontal approach to industrial development on the reservation might be attempted through the creation of Tribal industries—one that would (as at present) use Federal funds to assist in employee training, perhaps one that would provide cost-plus contracts initially, but certainly far better one that would provide low-interest loans initially. Furthermore, the development program should be less one-sided than the present defense orientation. Tribal industry would be highly advantageous in retaining profits in the area. Finally there should be employment for men, as well as for women.

There are many possible ways, instead of, or in addition to the above, for the Tribe to acquire more control over its own industrial development. It could begin as a minority or majority shareholder, instead of an owner. In that case there could be built-in opportunities for the Tribe to purchase increasing quantities of stock on an option basis at a fixed price until it became majority shareholder or owner, as might be deemed desirable. Since options are granted to corporation officials for their services, they could equally well be granted to the Tribe in exchange for its site, roads, and relatively cheap, non-unionized labor (unions are forbidden by Tribal law). There is Tribal enabling legislation for partnerships with private concerns now on the books.

It might be said that trained Navajo manpower would constitute a relatively stable labor supply, since Navajos are strongly desirous in so many cases of finding work on the reservation.

It is evident that in the early phases of Navajo-owned complex manufacturing, non-Navajo know-how would be needed. It can be hired, as it has been for the Forest Products operation. The greatest obstacle, of course, would be the difficulties of marketing products in the face of a distaste for competition on the part of large corporations, and the simplicity that arises for private and governmental purchasing agents in going to large corporations to satisfy their needs. But if this problem cannot be met, the Navajo country cannot be developed except in the present highly exploitative fashion.

It should be noted that each of the private plants is located on the periphery of the reservation, and the same is true of the Tribal ones. Tribally planned development could be based on a system of plant locations that took account of the Navajos' own needs. The present pattern benefits only selected portions of the reservation, except for those Navajos who relocate to take advantage of employment. Light industry has a wider potential range of placement than it has yet achieved in the Navajo country.

If there is to be well-developed cash-crop farming in the land made available by the Navajo Indian irrigation project (see below), and if the livestock industry is to be improved (see below), food processing plants and meat-packing plants would be highly desirable.

The Navajo Forest Products Industries, the Tribe's most successful enterprise to date, now has Navajo employees capable of assuming major responsibilities. One, at least, has been offered an excellent job in an outside wood products company but has refused and is staying on the reservation for lower wages than he could make elsewhere. He was trained on the job. There is, however, no particular reason to assume that local loyalty will operate to keep well-trained Navajos in the Navajo country: It is likely that some are as vulnerable to "brain drain" salary offers as are Englishmen and Canadians, now that the United States pays top dollar. Hence salaries must be competively high. But more important, on-the-job training opportunities must exist in all industries, so that, as rapidly as possible, Navajos may assume responsible jobs. Responsibility is not learned except in responsible positions. Preparation for jobs should also occur in schools. (See education, below.)

D. THE TECHNOLOGICAL BASE

Further mineral exploitation and industrial development, as well as topics discussed below, such as commerce, education, and health programs, demand rapid movement to create an adequate technological base, in terms of roads, electrical service, gas service, and a variety of other features. Mineral exploitation, industrial development, and improvement of the livestock industry and of farming all demand water development.

The 20-year road plan jointly developed by the Tribe and the Bureau will cost $300 million and provide an expansion from the present 430 miles of paved road to about 4,000 miles. This would seem urgent, and 20 years too long a time. A bus service is needed. The basis for expanded electrical and gas service now exists. The water situation is more complicated.

Since 1961, water development has been largely in the hands of the Tribe, with cooperation from the U.S. Public Health Service, which provides technical guidance in developing and protecting shallow water sources. A report by Heinrich J. Thiele & Associates (Thiele, 1966) supplies a detailed picture of the situation in 1966 and of future prospects. It recommends the establishing of a Navajo Tribal Water Authority, and the removal of water development and service from the Navajo Tribal Utilities Authority and all other programs now dealing with water. I can only concur. The Thiele report indicates clearly that planning for water use is a prerequisite for the development of urban centers, industry, commerce, irrigated farming and pasture, and tourism on the reservation. The picture as respects quality and abundance of water is far too complex to present here. Suffice it to say that relatively abundant, potable water can be found on only about 39 percent of the reservation's area, that portion in which about 66 percent of the population was living in 1966. Thirty-two percent of the area brings in brackish water, and 29 percent has almost no water potential. Under these circumstances, planned locations for denser aggregates of the population, for schools, and for industry are an urgent need. Furthermore, there is potential competition for water as respects the demands for livestock, farming, mineral exploitation, industry, and domestic use.

The Thiele report makes mention of future industrial needs but contains few projections on this score. It indicates that since wells were first dug on the reservation, neither selection of sites, construction methods, materials, nor maintenance has been adequate. It is expected that use of water in rural area on the reservation will increase from 6,000 acre-feet in 1966 to 30,000 or more in the year 2000. No figure for industrial and urban use is supplied by the report.

The Navajo Indian irrigation project is supposed to supply about 508,000 acre-feet of water for 110,000 acres of land when it is completed (according to BIA projections, in 1981; according to some newspaper accounts, in the 1990's a date discouraging to Navajos). Originally 23,000 acre-feet in addition was set aside for municipal and industrial use, a figure that did not allow for the domestic water needs of people making use of the irrigated land. This was later increased to 100,000 acre-feet. Of this amount, 51,500 acre-feet has already been allocated to Public Service Co. of New Mexico, Southern Union Gas Co., and Utah Construction & Mining Co., for thermal electric uses, leaving not very much for future domestic and industrial use. (See Public Law 90-272, 90th Cong., S.J. Res. 123 of Mar 22, 1968).

Meantime, Peabody Coal's operation, to slurry coal to Nevada, draws on deep wells in the Black Mesa territory. Full details are not available to me, but there are apparently at least four wells, to depths of 2,500 feet, providing 2,000 gallons per minute each, and costing $250,000 each. Thus scarce water resources are being used to shunt Navajo resources to Nevada, without, so far as can be determined, any overall water plan having been adopted by the Tribe.

To sum up: There is far more water in the Navajo country than might be supposed; much of it is at a considerable depth; it is not evenly distributed; and a water plan and a water authority are urgent needs underlying every phase of development.

F. COMMERCE

At present on the Navajo Reservation there are a large number of trading posts, some with cafes and garages, some private motels (at Tuba City, Monument Valley, and Chinle at least), two Tribal motel-restaurant combinations at Window Rock and Shiprock, two banks, at Window Rock and Crownpoint, brought there through the efforts of the Tribal Council, assorted small businesses like laundromats, and the new Fed-Mart store in Window Rock. There is also the Navajo Arts and Crafts Guild, run by the Tribe.

The perspective for development is a 25-year period, at the end of which time there will be an estimated 240,000 Navajos, most of whom will spend at least a portion of the year on the reservation.

About 10 years from now, a major decision point will arise. The traders' 25-year leases were mainly negotiated in 1953-54 and will expire in 1978-79.

If development occurs on other fronts, principally industrial and livestock, there will be an increasingly prosperous and an increasingly large population to be served by retail facilities of one sort and another. Furthermore, if there is industrial development, there will be (as there already are) population shifts on reservation creating a number of more densely populated centers. Finally, if livestock management were carried out on a suprafamilial level, even in relatively out-of-the-way communities there could be a less scattered pattern of residence, all of which would make retail activities more inviting.

There are dilemmas in the various plans that come to mind for future commercial development. The Fed-Mart store is a new factor that will condition the next few years to a marked extent. If, as appears likely, it is a success, it seems probable that Fed-Mart will build additional outlets in such population centers as Shiprock and Tuba City. And if these succeed, other agency headquarters afford additional possibilities. Each such move will create a small increment of jobs (60 in the Window Rock facility at present) and will draw Navajo business that might otherwise have gone to traders or to the border towns. This is likely to make the traders' position less attractive.

One can envisage the possibility, then, that as the traders' situation, already undermined to some degree, becomes less viable, and as leases expire, the new occupants will be either Anglos content with quite small-scale operations or Navajos willing to operate on a low margin of profit. The advantage of the Fed-Mart development is that it provides consumer goods to Navajos at far lower prices than they have paid to traders and border-town merchants in the past. The disadvantage is that again an outside interest will achieve a position of dominance on the reservation. While this may well make more commercial establishments available to Navajos, it will preempt large-scale commerce, since Navajos will not be able to compete with Fed-Mart in terms of range of goods. The likelihood is, however, that Fed-Mart will have secured its advantage well before any alternative possibility could be realized.

This being the case, there seem to be three areas of planning available. The first is the possibility of Tribal or individual Navajo control of trading posts as their leases expire. The second is an effort to reserve for Navajos the wide range of small business opportunities that ought to open up at an accelerating rate: Such facilities as laundromats, barber shops, beauty parlors, clothing stores, appliance repair shops, etcetera—some needed already, some not feasible for some years. This requires tribal control of licensing (which it has), an education program that will provide appropriate training in skills and particularly in business management, and a loan program on a considerable scale. The third is to modify the trader's role in the credit system, either by regularizing his interest charges or by displacing him as the community "bank" by providing a far more extensive tribal loan system, which would require underwriting by the Government. Navajos ought to have other resources to turn to for futures in meat and wool, for example. This would make it possible for Navajos to have more control over their own economic lives and would free the trader from a credit squeeze that begins to create problems for him. If, however, the credit now supplied by traders were to disappear without a substitute (and it has been argued here that *more* credit is needed than is now available, not the same amount by different means), Navajo families would suffer terrible hardships. At present trader and Navajo are "locked into" the system.

G. LIVESTOCK INDUSTRY

Most Navajos today are not in the livestock business in the sense in which a commercial farmer is in the wheat business. Their production is for a combination of use and sale. The sale is not, in any simple sense, for the sake of making a profit, but to buy the necessities of life at the trading post and the store. Neither mentally nor by means of bookkeeping is there a separation of the herd as a cash-and-credit enterprise, the herd as a source of food, and the herd as a form of insurance—to be used for an emergency, or to fall back on when a man loses his job. This can be seen in the arrangements in some extended families with respect to the yield from livestock. The sheep are earmarked for various members of the family, and each such member would claim that the sheep so marked were his. They may be used in any of the following ways: They may be eaten by family members, contributed for the ceremonies of relatives outside the family, or used for ceremonies within the family. The wool may be sheared and sold. The sheep may be sold. As for cattle, they are produced mainly for sale. Sometimes they are used for ceremonies. They are seldom killed for ordinary family consumption, because they are too large to be used before spoiling occurs. A given family member ordinarily allows decisions about killing sheep for meat or giving them for ceremonies to be vested in the senior member of the extended family. He also makes claims of his own for food and gifts. He may or may not shear his own sheep separately and sell the wool separately. If his parents' needs are great and he has a steady job, he may well allow the wool profits to remain with the parents. He may even allow the money from the sale of lambs to accrue to the parents. He will ordinarily claim the right to sell his own cattle and utilize the proceeds: cattle are seen in more of a business context. In sum, considerations of equity, far more than of profit, dominate the procedures of the family livestock industry.

Nevertheless, more and more people wish to be in the livestock business properly speaking. This often means conversion from sheep to cattle. There are several factors pushing people in this direction. First, so many Navajos are engaged in at least part-time wagework that a shortage of herders is on the way. Cattle require less daily management; they can be run with only occasional mass mobilization of manpower, to count, brand, castrate, dehorn, et cetera. Furthermore, it is often asserted that if the family unit cannot manage livestock operation of high quality, it can make more money from a herd of cattle than from a herd of sheep. (It is also asserted that under optimal conditions for the sheep, they would be more profitable than cattle.) In addition—why I do not know—cattle are viewed differently from sheep: it seems to be considered normal for a person to realize his own money from sales of his own cattle, rather than turning over the proceeds to a parent.

Cattle, however, have one major disadvantage compared to sheep: they cannot be casually killed for a few days' meat. The older people are keenly aware of this; the thought of having only cattle, or very few sheep alarms them. They survive on the sheep. (It is also true that most Navajos like mutton better than beef. Many non-Navajos who have eaten range mutton and range beef would agree with them.)

For adequate economic development of the livestock base, there must be more water development in order for any rational use of pasturage to take place. Fencing is impossible without water development. This need not always mean deep wells, or even shallow ones. Plastic catchment basins draining into stock tanks can in fact provide adequate stock water in many areas. Under these circumstances it would be possible to fence and to plan the use of the range, regulating by season and responding to weather conditions, without the present problems created by few watering spots.

This, however, is not sufficient. At present the Navajo range can support an amount of livestock that was less than adequate for 40,000 people. There are now about 120,000 Navajos, with doubling in prospect in 22 to 26 years.

There are, however, possibilities of increasing the forage yield twofold to fortyfold. At present in some 25 locations on the Navajo Reservation this is being done. It involves chaining off pinon and juniper trees or uprooting sage and reseeding with hardy grasses. But for the grasses to survive, controlled grazing must be achieved, by making water available in each pasture and by fencing. Further work along these lines is certainly desirable.

One difficulty already evident in some areas where fencing, chaining, and seeding have gone on involves the disposition of the dead pinons resulting from chaining. Ideally these should be left initially as obstacles to prevent excessive runoff, and ultimately to decay and enrich the soil. Unfortunately, the shortage of firewood results in the speedy clearance of these trees for fuel.

There are, however, special social and economic consequences that follow from these practices that have not, in my opinion, been thought through. At present, each reseeded area is an extended or nuclear family pasture, that is, a customary use-right area of such a family, fenced only by permission of the neighbors. The reservation is not allotted in severalty at present. Nevertheless, the effects of fencing are to confirm a specific use right for a specific family with a clarity that is not found in other areas. Such families take the position that trespass is involved if other herds move on to the area. Without any doubt they will come to think that these use rights are subject to hereditary transmission. And in time the typical problems of fractionation of heirship will arise. Furthermore, it is probable that if the fencing continues, some individuals will find themselves without grazing areas in the not too distant future. It is by no means clear (*a*) that systematic family allotment on a *de facto* basis is a sound practice, or (*b*) that the alternatives to such allotment have been discussed, or (*c*) that the consequences of family allotments have been made clear to the Navajos. Instead, the BIA seems to prefer to let the system grow on the assumption, no doubt, that it will make Navajo property patterns conform more closely to those of the dominant society.

Rational use of the range, with water development and seeding, could be based on the *community* as a unit, or on the *set of contiguous related families* and their pasture as the unit, or (as at present) the *single extended or nuclear family* as a unit. The present program of range improvement should continue, but not without a thorough airing of the consequences. The technical possibilities of this program *and* the issue of the proper management unit should be raised in discussions between the BIA, Tribal officials, and local Navajos, so that the consequences of the alternative management patterns are fully explored. Decisions about range management should be reached only after this step. The issue is always a sensitive one for Navajos, but that is one reason it needs to be discussed. At present, the Bureau is sliding into a policy the ramifications of which are not clear to Navajos, whether or not they are to the Bureau.

One significant and favorable feature of present policy should be mentioned. The tribe has permitted the issuing of "conservation use permits" to people who chain, fence, and seed—permits based on a survey of the range in the fenced area. These permits are renewable at 3-year intervals: At each review they may be increased, reduced, or eliminated, depending on range conditions and the conservation efforts of the users. It appears that these permits make it possible for more livestock to be raised in a given area and serve as an important incentive for conservation practices. Not every part of the reservation is ecologically suited to chaining and seeding. The practice is not a cure-all, but it seems to have value.

There is no reason why range management, adult education in range management, education in livestock care, and so forth, could not be turned over to the tribe more rapidly than is being done. The Federal Government has recently turned over many of these activities to the States. It would be better in the long run to supply the funds it provides to the States, or additional funds, to employ experts selected and paid by the Tribe. The experts should be answerable to the Tribe. Well-trained interpreters should be developed by the educational program (a step never undertaken), to serve as an effective communications link between experts, governmental or other, and the people. The educational system should be oriented to producing young Navajos trained as range management and livestock specialists to take over the positions now occupied by others.

The Tribe will also have to become sensitive to the future potentialities of the livestock market in planning along these lines. It would be possible to undertake an unwise expansion of the livestock industry: One that does not take into account its inelasticities or the significance of foreign and local competition. The balance of sheep, mohair goats, and cattle must be considered in this context.

The Navajo Indian Irrigation Project, scheduled for completion in 1981, will provide irrigation water for about 110,630 acres of land. It is apparently planned to use some of this land for irrigated pasture, which would make it possible for Navajos to raise grain-fed beef locally.

At present the tribe sponsors cattle auctions through the Cattlemen's Association. Considerably more could be done in the way of organized marketing activities by the tribe (for example, as respects wool and mohair), or in terms of cattle and sheep marketing cooperatives or management cooperatives at the local level. It is important that there be vigorous local organizations; as the tribal council takes on more functions, it is likely to become excessively dominant, unless the mission of chapters is expanded or other local, suprakin organizations emerge, or regional organizations appear—or all of these.

In the past, local cooperatives have not been successful. There are, however, special reasons for local opposition and apathy in most cases. Several cooperatives began by removing part of the pastureland of a given area from the control of families that had used it for many years and putting it under cooperative control. This step guaranteed undying opposition on the part of a segment of the community. The issue, however, should be reopened without this obstacle, so that Navajos may consider whether they wish a local economic unit larger than the family (whether for marketing or management or both), to give them leverage in dealing with traders, border-town businessmen, and tribal and BIA officials.

Finally, as respects both herding and farming (see below for farming), planning cannot be based on the assumption that Navajos need only a subsistence economy. Whereas they may derive food from farming and herding, these activities must be planned to yield a living, and not merely foodstuffs. Evidently there will come a time when family herds will not be the most economical or efficient way to use the range: When, by one means or another, aggregations of herds and of pastures will become desirable. All the more reason that this should be considered now, and from now on.

H. FARMING

There are two distinct issues connected with farming. The first is the likely fate of subsistence farming; the second is the question of the use of scarce and valuable irrigated farmland.

As to subsistence farming, there is some decrease in the number of farms per capita in many areas, and indeed probably an absolute decrease in the number of farms. One factor that probably contributes to this phenomenon wherever it is found is labor shortage. Many younger people are working on and off reservation at wage labor jobs or are in school during such critical periods as those for the preparation of fields, for cultivating, and for harvesting. This leaves a shortage of labor for herding. Older people prefer to concentrate on the livestock industry in many parts of the reservation and hence decide not to try to prepare fields. There are additional local factors, such as the short growing season on the slopes of Black Mesa, which makes farming marginal there, irregular and unpredictable water supply, and lowering of the water table, which has destroyed the utility of some fields good a generation ago.

In other areas, farming is probably holding its own. In a few, where irrigated farming is to be found, principally at Shiprock, Fruitland, and Many Farms, it is supplemented by cash crop farming, and new kinds of crops are being introduced. These areas are, however, inefficiently planned. The farms are small enough to require the family to produce partly for use and partly for sale and in addition to supplement their farming with wagework labor (cf. Sasaki, 1960). The result is an inefficient farmer, an inefficient wageworker, and an inefficient irrigation system.

If the livestock industry were to improve, would subsistence farming in nonirrigated areas increase or decline? Possibly, with more income from livestock, families would rely more on purchasing food and less on subsistence farming. On the other hand, if families had more income, there might be less part-time summer employment and more labor available to farm. These two possibilities should be considered.

Irrigated farming, however, is another matter—not so much for Fruitland, Shiprock, and Many Farms, unless there is to be a great deal of reorganization there—in the case of the Navajo Indian irrigation project.

There are today about 35,000 acres of irrigable land on the reservation, of which perhaps a third is utilized. Low utilization results from such factors as farm units too small for effective commercial farming (as at Fruitland) and uneven and unpredictable water supply (as in the Chinle Wash area). The Navajo Indian irrigation project (based on the San Juan-Chama diversion) is planned to increase irrigable land greatly. It is to supply 110,630 acres of land with 580,000 acre-feet of water by 1981. The work on this project has lagged by comparison with other portions of the San Juan-Chama development. An additional 13,000 irrigated acres could be supplied in other ways. Thus, there is a potential 158,000 acres of irrigable land, by comparison with today's 35,000.

The Navajo Indian Irrigation Project raises a number of planning issues. First, as BIA officials readily recognize, the area must be used for commercial, not subsistence farming. This, however, raises the question whether it should be cut up into small holder plots of reasonable size with, say, farm machinery and marketing cooperatives, or worked in very large plots as corporate enterprises, or what. There is also the question, mentioned before, of using a part of it for irrigated pasture. If, in fact, it is to be used efficiently, it will have to have a far better technological base than Navajo farming heretofore.

Even before the land has become available, there is some talk of using a portion of the 508,000 acre-feet for domestic or industrial purposes, which disturbs Navajos who wish to farm there considerably. But the balance between potential use of that water for farming, herding, industry, and domestic purposes must soon be settled.

In irrigated farmland areas, adult education for farmers is desirable. Responsibility for agricultural extension work was transferred from the BIA to the State extension services July 1, 1968, with Federal funding continuing. It would seem desirable that it should soon pass into Navajo hands, and that the education system should produce Navajo stock experts and agricultural extension workers—still with Federal funding.

I. SOME LAND PROBLEMS

1. *Off-reservation groups.*—The existence of off-reservation groups (other than urban migrants) creates special problems for any development plan. These groups include (*a*) Navajos in Grazing Districts 16, 19, and 20, east and south of the reservation on allotted land, and (*b*) Navajos in the separate enclaves at Ramah, Puertocito, and Canoncito.

For purposes of development, it would be valuable to be able to work in terms of a contiguous area. The enclaves make this impossible, but the borders of the reservation could be extended to create a continuous reservation that would include the groups enumerated in (*a*) above. This, however, would not lead to any simple solution, because these lands are allotted. The kind of mineral, industrial, and commercial development described in this report requires the ability to deal with fairly large tracts of land, and allotment would hence constitute a problem. (Allotment of the entire reservation is no solution at all, although the fencing now being carried out in some areas seems to be moving Navajos toward a *de facto* allotment system without prior discussion of its probable effects. Allotment in the areas mentioned above was necessary to preserve Indian claims to this land, but in the *general* history of American Indians under the U.S. Government, allotment has not led to the solution of Indian problems, but to a transfer of Federal headaches to Indian heads, and to loss of Indian lands to non-Indians.) The Tribe seems inclined to extend such benefits as Tribal police and public works programs to at least some of these enclaves, but there would be problems of extending the general benefits of a reservation development program to them. All that can be done here is to point to the existence of a problem.

2. *The Executive order territory* (*Executive order of December 16, 1882*).—This area is a large rectangle surrounding the territory presently occupied by the Hopi Indians (District 6). It was established by the Executive order of December 16, 1882, at which time it bordered the Navajo Reservation as enlarged in 1878 and 1880. It was established for the Hopi Indians and other Indians dwelling in the area (not a quotation). As a result of a suit, *Jones* v. *Healing*, the area now presents a difficult problem for the planning of development. The court threw

on the Hopi and the Navajo Tribes the burden of arriving at a joint decision respecting the exploitation of surface and subsurface resources. To date they have been unable to do so. It is unlikely that they will be able to reach a solution without long congressional legislation clarifying the situation. Thus at present rational overall planning by either Tribe seems difficult. The building of roads, gaslines, powerlines, and so on, should be planned to benefit this entire area, either, and, indeed, for this reason the Executive order area is the most inaccessible and underdeveloped sector of the entire reservation with respect to roads, electricity, schools, medical facilities, commercial establishments, etc. The issue must be resolved. Some Navajos and Hopis say they could solve it were it not for white lawyers. The ideal solution would be joint planning by the two Tribes.

J. POPULATION MOVEMENT AND LABOR MIGRATION

Everything proposed previously should result in a more concentrated pattern for the population. It is evident that on-reservation mineral, industrial, and commercial development will result in internal migration and denser aggregations of the population. A combination of adequate roads and patterns of management of livestock and farming in larger units would make it possible for families to live in more of a town or village pattern, with farming and herding territories around the towns. This in turn would make a day school program feasible as well as great expansion of the electric, gas, water, and sewage systems to family dwellings, now so scattered that even under more favorable circumstances few could be served. This concentration is another advantage of the proposal for cooperative livestock ventures and corporate or cooperative farming on irrigated lands. The educational program should train people for the many new kinds of expertise that this living pattern would require.

Whereas the thrust of this report is to make the reservation more liveable for more Navajos, many will wish to migrate not within the reservation but outside its boundaries. The educational system (see below) should provide not only the adult vocational training programs that now exist, but the guidance in career planning and the training that would enable Navajos who desire to do so to relocate. They should, however, be given as much psychological armament as possible against the prejudice they will encounter in the larger society.

K. EDUCATION

Most of the foregoing material relates directly to economic development. Education, health, and welfare are necessary for development but do not constitute development in any direct sense. Education in particular, is too often viewed as a substitute for development: it is too often reasoned that if Navajos are given sufficient education so that (in theory) they can leave the reservation, there need be no development of the reservation. In the present report, education is treated primarily as a means to development, not as an alternative for it.

There is evident need for an expanded, updated, and experimental program of education in the Navajo country. It should be said that the BIA is making some efforts to achieve many of the goals listed below. Nevertheless, while the BIA is understandably optimistic in comparing its present efforts with its past performance, people not directly involved in education but with an opportunity to observe the system and its fruits are quite discouraged. The recommendations below reflect the latter state of mind, but should not be understood to ignore what is being done.

1. There seems no reason why the entire school system should not come under the managerial control of the Tribe and of local Navajo school boards. The Bureau has said for decades that it is trying to put Indians in a position where they can manage their own affairs and it can go out of business. Nevertheless, a program of actual withdrawal is not feasible, because it removes essential protection from Indians. There is, however, no reason why there should not be a vastly increased role for the Tribe and for the local community, and a vastly decreased direct role for the Government in the immediate future.

There are nominal school boards attached to most reservation schools, but there has been relatively little devolution of authority to date. Local school boards will not be workable unless they have fiscal control and sizable funds.

In education, modest results have been achieved by creating corporations that administer Federal funds and use them to operate Navajo school facilities on an experimental basis. The first Navajo-run school has already been created at Rough Rock, with a school board some of whose members do not speak English but who seem quite competent to deal with the issues. Experimental programs can be found at other schools—for example, English as a second language is particularly strongly developed at Rock Point. Turning over the school system to the Tribe seems a reasonable prospect for the immediate future. Training of Navajo teachers and administrators in greatly increased numbers is therefore a must. Upgrading of Navajo employees is also needed. The Bureau recognizes this, but much more needs to be done.

2. Closely associated with the first, the education program should be one that attunes Navajo Indians to pride in their own language and culture and gives them a realistic understanding of their situation. An announced goal of the BIA, this is scarcely realizable when so many teachers are in fact firmly ethnocentric, when social life of Navajo and non-Navajo employees remains de facto largely separate, and when few teachers have any experience of the actual daily life of Navajos. Nor is it realizable when there are penalties for children who speak Navajo in school, to name but one of the many points where policy and practice are at variance.

3. Experimentation in the teaching of English is a must. Different schools could well utilize different approaches, which could then be evaluated. One school might experiment with a full development of teaching English as a second language, another with teaching young children in Navajo and making them literate in Navajo, with a subsequent transition to English (as has been done for Spanish-Americans) and so on. While it is true that some experimentation now goes on at Rough Rock and Rock Point, there is room for more. There is a need for better teaching materials and better teachers for the English as a second language program, which remains more of a slogan than an actuality.

4. The salary levels for teachers should be raised so as to attract a higher caliber of teachers and other conditions changed to make it possible to hold them. The school system is fortunate in the number of dedicated people it does draw, but there are a number of inhibitory factors: salary levels, a smothering bureaucratic atmosphere that discourages initiative and experimental variation, and a censorious concern with the personal lives of employees that drives some new teachers away in short order.

5. Several junior colleges on reservation seem desirable in the immediate future. (There is one, now, at Many Farms with a Navajo Board of Regents.) They could and should recruit *part* of their staff on short contracts from the better universities around the country, as visitors. These universities should be encouraged to pay the salaries of such visitors.

6. There should be a concentrated effort at better preparation of students for a variety of vocational and career opportunities and a much enlarged program of vocational guidance. A variety of trained Navajos will be needed in the near future: stockmen and extension workers, teachers and counselors, managers and forestry workers, computer specialists, statisticians, draftsmen, interpreters, and so on. Furthermore, some Navajos will wish to find their place in the larger society. As things now stand the school system is not geared to potential Navajo careers, vocational guidance personnel are few and undertrained, and Navajos are often discouraged from such careers as law and medicine. This is not wise.

7. The amount and quality of personal counseling available in the schools should be raised.

8. Occupational training for those who have left school should continue and be expanded. The Federal Government at present runs a program that prepares Navajos for over 150 occupations, under the aegis of the Branch of Employment Assistance.

9. Adult education classes now in existence should be continued and enlarged.

10. The combination of Tribal and Federal funds (which now provides college scholarships for about 650 students per annum 500 of them supported by tribal funds) should be continued and expanded. But the tribe should be encouraged to set its sights higher. It tends to select the poorer quality local universities as optimal places for its scholarship students. In some cases this may be wise, but able students should be encouraged to go to first-class institutions in any part of the country. It should also encourage some high school students to go to off-reservation private schools that welcome them, as is true at certain Quaker schools (George School and Westtown) and Verde Valley. The tribe should also encourage academic, as well as vocational programs as choices for college students, and should provide support for graduate work, even if this means a more selective approach to college scholarships. Tribal scholarships and vocational guidance work should be integrated.

11. Various universities in the Southwest should be encouraged to do far more than has been done to meet the special problems of Indian students. The document, Indian Education Research Projects and Action Programs, compiled by the Southwestern Cooperative Education Laboratory, includes information from only five colleges and

universities, and may not be representative. There is evidence of efforts to provide special training for some people and in a few instances of language programs for Indian college students. It is evident, however, from what is happening in several American universities, that the curriculum and atmosphere they provide is not acceptable to ethnic minorities. It would be pleasant to hear of Southwestern universities' taking steps to remedy the situation before student strikes or sit-ins force their hands. Indians are already involved in various "third world" curriculum demands on the west coast. The time for action is now.

12. It should be assumed that Navajo children are variable in ability, outlook, and personality: that different programs, different modes of teaching, and different approaches to educating an American minority group will appeal to different children. A pluralistic, not a monolithic approach seems indicated, with an effort to match the child and the program, or the child and the teacher. Since American education as a whole does not seem to be able to manage this, perhaps it is too much to expect of the reservation program, but such an approach should be the target.

A school program for Navajos should be designed on the assumption that will be far more expensive per capita, not less expensive, than the program in the "best" (i.e., wealthiest) sections of urban centers. This will necessarily be the case in any bilingual situation.

L. HEALTH

The reservation program has the following major needs.

(1) Many more doctors.

(2) Many more nurses, nurses' aides, and health education personnel.

(3) An increase from almost none to many medical interpreters The work of Prof. Oswald Werner of Northwestern University Prof. Jerrold Levy of Portland State University, and Dr. Stephen Kunitz of Yale University is relevant here. They have shown that, given a competent, trained interpreter and a doctor who listens, an adequate medical history and explication of symptoms can be obtained from Navajos. With present interpreting facilities, however, this is not often possible. Prof. John Adair of San Francisco State University and Dr. Kurt Deuschle of Mount Sinai Medical School, New York City, have shown that with sufficient staff to inform Navajos and undertake casefinding, Navajos can be induced to use public health facilities wisely and frequently enough to merit great expansion of present resources.

(4) If possible, some reduction in the likelihood that a Navajo who is ill will see Doctor X on one visit and Doctor Y on the next, something that Navajos, like others, find disheartening. And a change in attitude on the part of some doctors and nurses. Many are superb, but some make Navajos feel that they are the subjects of veterinary medicine practiced on not too worthwhile animals.

(5) A vast expansion of preventive medicine and health education. More public health nurses concerned with preventive medicine and health education are needed, more Navajo personnel capable of instructing in Navajo are badly needed, better

inspection of drinking water is needed, and a whole series of fields of instruction need development. These include prenatal and maternal care, sex, contraceptive, and venereal disease education for adults and adolescents, accident prevention, etc. Adequate visual aids, including film strips and movies with Navajo oral text, are vital for health education programs.

(6) An improvement of dental care. Whereas children are seen routinely in school, most adults are not adequately informed about dental care and go to the dentist only when their teeth are so bad as to require extraction.

(7) A program of free prostheses: eyeglasses, dentures, hearing aids, and false limbs. At present medical care and drugs are free, but these are not, yet they are reasonable features of any public health program and any approach to habilitation and rehabilitation. Eyeglasses are sometimes provided to school-children, but often too late in the year to be much help. At present this gap in the PHS program is filled to some degree by Tribal funds, but not adequately.

(8) A considerable rise in the availability of ambulance and air ambulance service.

(9) More psychiatrists—there are two at present, the first ever to be attached to the PHS on the Navajo Reservation.

(50) A systematic program of recruitment, integrated with the vocational guidance program, and the scholarship program, to secure more Navajo doctors, nurses, nurses' aides, health education personnel, and medical interpreters.

It should be emphasized that there has been a tremendous improvement in medical care beginning in 1947, when physicians subject to the draft began to be assigned to work with Indians. The improvement continued after 1954, when the PHS took over from the Indian Bureau PHS. What was once an unqualified disaster has become merely inadequate in all respects mentioned. The quality of the physicians themselves, however, has improved strikingly. This will not continue to be the case if physicians are not subject to the draft unless PHS stipends are raised—since PHS service is presently an alternative to military service for physicians.

M. WELFARE

It is assumed that in terms of eligibility and amounts the welfare program for Navajos will be that of the State and Federal programs, and that some emergency welfare will be available from tribal sources. Far less emphasis has been put on welfare in this presentation than would be made if the stress were not on the development of the reservation economy. Were the steps described to be taken, the welfare load would be considerably lightened over a 25-year period. If they are not, it will increase. If numerous Navajos are to remain permanent welfare clientele, as seems likely under present conditions, then a vastly expanded welfare program would be necessary. Present amounts are totally inadequate, Navajos are removed unpredictably from the rolls, and many do not know their rights.

N. MISCELLANEOUS

1. *Housing.*—The traditional Navajo house was the hogan, a circular, single-room, dirt-floored dwelling made of wood or stone and used both for living and for ceremonial practices. Today most Navajos and most of their ceremonial practitioners insist on the use of a hogan for ceremonial purposes, so that many Navajo clusters of kin maintain at least one hogan. Shortage of the timbers necessary for a good hogan, desire for larger structures, and need for floors as more and more families have furniture and stoves, have led to the building of increasing numbers of dwellings built of machine-processed frame materials. In this building program people have been aided by tribal funds for those with minimum income and by ONEO funds and labor force. Furthermore, the ONEO program has provided training in house-building skills for many Navajo men (Home Improvement Training Program).

The present houses, however, have serious deficiencies. These include cordless, badly fitted windows, that are difficult to open or keep open, concrete floors, which are cold, and uninsulated houses both hotter in summer and colder in winter than the mud-chinked timbered houses of the past. An experimental program in housing is needed for the reservation (and for the United States at large, which lags in this respect). The BIA and ONEO are now developing model homes, which is a beginning.

The industrial and commercial development suggested in this document will require housing projects in the centers where this development occurs; so will an expanding population elsewhere. An improved housing program would be beneficial in terms of employment and for those housed, and would be essential for families working in newly developed centers. Such a program should develop under Tribal aegis. A fair amount of housing has been built in various centers by the Bureau and the Tribe.

2. *Experts and the training of experts.*—Mention has been made of hiring experts for various purposes. In some cases these would be consultants; in others they would occupy managerial roles. In either case, the Tribe would be well-advised to consider experts whose experiences are particularly relevant to their situation: Livestock and farming experts with experience in arid lands, whether in the United States or in the Near East, for example. By the same token, the Tribe might wish to send some of its scholarship students to areas where parallel geographical conditions must be met (for example, Israel), or where industrialization with slender means has made progress. The tendency to use consultants and managers whose prior experience is that of operating with maximal resources and under optimal conditions should be avoided.

O. SUMMARY OF THE PURPOSE, NATURE, AND ADVANTAGES OF THE PLAN OUTLINED

The purposes of this plan are (1) to allow Navajos to utilize their own resources to improve their own livelihood; (2) to give Navajos control over the utilization of their own resources; (3) to increase the level of income by increasing the number of jobs on the reservation and by improving the range; (4) to permit individuals to specialize occupationally in the interests of greater efficiency.

1. First, and foremost, it is proposed that any planning, along lines proposed here or other lines, should involve the Tribal Council, regional organizations, and chapters or other community-level organizations as primary planners. This is not a call for joint planning with the Bureau but for primary rights and responsibilities to be vested in Navajos.
2. It is proposed that the Navajo Tribe undertake future exploitation of its own minerals, process them, market them, and enjoy the profits from them.
3. It is proposed that future industrial development be Tribal in character, whether at once or on a phased basis.
4. It is proposed that there be a rapid development of roads, bus lines, and utilities as a basis for all other developments, and that the issue of water allocation be carefully considered.
5. It is proposed that commercial development of a more specialized type than is found today is necessary and feasible for the reservation population, and that such development might place major emphasis on individual Navajos, Navajo partnerships and corporations, or the Tribe itself; for development and control.
6. Range improvement is proposed. This must be combined with stock water development, transition from sheep to cattle for many people, enhancement of the quality of the stock, and fencing. It is urgent to discuss and decide whether the management units should be nuclear families, extended families, larger kin groups, cooperatives, or community corporations. In all events except the last, heirship problems will arise with respect to improved, fenced range.
7. The irrigated farmland already in prospect raises questions respecting the efficient unit of management. Again the question of family units, larger kinship units, cooperatives, or large corporate farms arises.
8. It is proposed that an expanded and experimental educational program be carried out, that health facilities be expanded and improved, and that welfare operate at the level characteristic for non-Indians.

The advantages of the plan proposed are, first and foremost, to make Navajos responsible for their own economic affairs by giving them control thereof. Let us be clear: Responsibility is not doing what some one else wants one to do; it is being able to think about the consequences of one's acts, calculating the effects of those acts on others and on oneself, and being willing to live with the consequences. There is no such thing as preparing a *people* for responsibility. The capacity to deal with the group's affairs grows only by performance, not by rehearsal. The other advantages are a heightened standard of living, a more variegated series of occupational niches on reservation, and a decrease of dependency on welfare and disguised welfare programs.

P. SUMMARY OF DISADVANTAGES

There are two major disadvantages to the proposal. The first is that given some economic freedom, there will be individual Navajos who will prove as foolish, as corrupt, and as greedy as some people in the larger society. Some plans will go awry, and some Navajos will be guilty of breach of trust. This is a necessary risk. The second is that if planning is to be vested in Navajo hands, at present the principal agent of planning would be the Tribal Council. The Council is, however, out of touch with many sentiments at the grass roots level, or so I am told by many noncouncil Navajos. In addition, in a number of cases, members of the Council have come to believe that the interests of the Tribe and those of corporations interested in the Tribe's assets are identical. Remedies lie in the use of regional and local planning units where possible.

Q. REQUIREMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTING THIS PLAN

Since this is by no means the first plan for Navajo economic development, we must ask what must be dealt with so that this (or any other likely plan of any scale) can be implemented.

1. Congressional behavior will have to change. It will have to expend funds for Indians on a scale much greater than in the past, particularly to back the Tribe in the development of its own mineral exploitation and industry. Furthermore, funds will have to be predictable from year to year, which is not a congressional habit.

2. Considerable opposition will have to be met—from U.S. Senators and Representatives, national business interests, local business and livestock interests, State political figures, some members of the Navajo Tribal Council, and some other Navajos. The kinds of attitudes that must be overcome include at least the following.

(*a*) It is too expensive. (It is expensive for some years to come, but not in the long run.)

(*b*) It allows Navajos certain advantages or protections at the taxpayer's expense in competing with national and local business and local livestock interests. (It should. A close examination of a hundred years of history—the so-called long walk to progress celebrated by the Navajo Tribe in 1968, the anniversary of their release from Fort Sumner, indicates clearly that the U.S. Government has failed to give Navajos the material and educational tools to cope with the larger society and has responded to pressures from powerful national and local interests to make that competition more difficult. After 100 years, the Navajos are undereducated, unhealthy, living in a downgraded environment, living in part on unconsolidated checkerboard fee patent lands in unequal competition with surrounding ranchers, and passive participants in the exploitation of their own lands for mineral resources, a passivity encouraged by the Federal Government. This plan attempts to redress the balance. At least 25 years will be required to do so.)

(*c*) It will undermine native life. (This objection is not too likely from Navajos. Poverty, overgrazing, and overpopulation with the attendant need for more and more of the population to move off the reservation part time will, in time, not so much erode as corrode native life. Navajo life is bound to change in significant respects during the next 25 years. The question is not whether it should change, but in what respects it will change under different conditions.)

(*d*) It interferes with the natural processes of a market economy. (That is why we are where we are today: these very forces have, with relatively little Government interference, created the urban mess, pollution, a stagnant rural economy in many places, and a widening wealth differentiation that, while it accompanies a general rise in the standard of living, leaves the underprivileged increasingly badly off by comparison with the rest of the society.)

(*e*) It is not aimed at integration but at segregation; it is racist. (This objection is particularly likely from liberals. The plan is in fact consonant with a decided tendency toward ethnic solidarity on the part of the Navajo. It is also consonant with the fact that it is easier to gain acceptance in the larger society and to feel secure there if one has an adequate base to operate from. It is consonant with the obvious general increase in ethnic movements in the United States. And it makes sense when one realizes that at present Navajos are not being integrated as a tribe into the larger society, but being squeezed dry by it, and that they are being neither integrated nor assimilated into the larger society as individuals, but pushed into its lower echelons on most unfavorable terms.

(*f*) Perhaps the most insidious argument, one that has already been raised by some BIA officials, is that everything suggested is already being done. Clearly anything that is being done along these lines is to the good; it is unfortunate to criticize the Bureau for not doing what it is doing—but without a tremendous boost, it is too little and too late. Communications from the area office make it evident that priorities established there include the same broad elements as are brought out here: education, roads, industries and commerce, community facilities, and agriculture (in that order for the area office, but not in my mind). It is not so much lack of understanding that impedes the Bureau, but lack of instrumentalities.

3. A well-coordinated development program will require that funding be more centralized—vested in fewer Federal agencies than is presently the case. To read the roster of agencies to which the BIA and the tribe must appeal to get support for each piecemeal program in housing, education, or health is to be amazed by the endurance of officials who, in the end, get even a part of what they need.

R. THE ALTERNATIVE

Under present circumstances and without a major development thrust, the Navajo economic situation will continue to develop much as at present, but with continually increasing pressure on its surface resources. That is, there will be some development of irrigation, which will absorb a few people into cash crop farming. There will be a gradually increasing amount of land fenced, chained, seeded, and developed for water in some areas but in no planned fashion, so that there will have been no thought given as to optimal units of management, consequences in terms of transition from use ownership to effective ownership, and consequences in terms of heirship. Inefficiency will characterize many such operations because of the need of many men to seek part-time employment off-reservation. Mineral exploitation will continue along present lines, but at a pace that is not Navajo-determined, and in a manner that produces a minimum of multiplier effect. Outside forces will gain a stranglehold on somewhat expanded Navajo retail economy. And support of Navajos by part-time works projects based on "soft" money, uncertain from year to year, and by welfare, will involve an increased amount of money, without development of the reservation. It is not to be expected that for some time to come Navajos will be absorbed into the external economic scene on favorable terms. Unemployment rates tend to be relatively high in the economy except through war booms, and Navajos, because of educational handicaps and prejudice, are unfavorably placed for job competition. The attendant political consequences, which will to some degree occur in any case, will involve an increasing conjunction of Navajos in a Navajo power movement, of Indians in a red power movement, and of Indians, Mexicans, and Blacks in a generalized movement of oppressed ethnic groups.

8. THE PRICE TAG

It was understood that this report was to deal with the manner of economic development rather than with the budget for development. Some idea of the order of magnitude can be gained from the fact that the combined Navajo Area Office-Tribal 20-year plan for road improvement would cost over $300 million in 1968 dollars. Evidently a 25-year plan to encompass roads, schools, industry, commerce, credit, utilities, range improvement, and so forth, would cost a great deal more. There would be short run range compensations in reduction of soft money programs, like ONEO. If ONEO remained at its present level, it would expend over $250 million in 1968 dollars over 25 years, in ways that would sustain families and improve morale but that would contribute only modestly to development. In the long run, of course, the development plan would be less expensive than the present modes of sustaining the Navajo population at a minimum level

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THE LUMBEE INDIANS: PATTERNS OF ADJUSTMENT

By MOHAMMOD AMANULLAH*

FOREWORD

The Lumbee Indians of Baltimore represent an Indian group which has attempted to assimilate into an urban environment. Although these Lumbees came to Baltimore from rural North Carolina in search of better jobs and a higher standard of living, they find themselves at the bottom of urban society. Mohammod Amanullah's study, based on extensive interviews with Lumbee families, reveals that they live in extreme poverty and have few contacts with persons outside their own ethnic group. In many cases, they are unaware of available employment opportunities and social services. Their greatest needs would appear to be the development of leadership within the group and concentrated assistance in obtaining available social, educational, and employment assistance.

CONTENTS

Page
Problem 277
Purpose 278
Objectives 278
Sample 278
Methods and data collection 278
Why choose Lumbees? 279
Data handling and objectivity 279
Some limitations in the study 279
Background of the Lumbees 280
The Lumbees in Baltimore 280
The Lumbee family 282
The Lumbees and education 284
Economic status of the Lumbees 287
Marriage 288
Intergroup relations 291
Recommendations 294
Summary 296

PROBLEM

The Lumbee Indians of Baltimore came from North Carolina some 18 years ago, congregating in the slum sections around Baltimore Street off Broadway. The Lumbees are but one of the many minority groups in this neighborhood, which is composed of families of Negro, Polish, Greek, and German descent, and their population is estimated at 1,500. The Lumbees, coming from an essentially rural agricultural background, have had to make an adjustment to urban society. The fact that they are Indians means that they are not accepted by the dominant urban group—the whites in general and the various neighborhood ethnic groups in particular—and the fact that they are anti-Negro means that the Negroes do not look upon them with favor.

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The Lumbees, by and large, are unskilled, therefore, their earnings do not enable them to meet the urban standard of living. Still, their standard of living is perhaps a much higher standard as compared with the Southern rural standard of North Carolina. Economically, they are poor and a portion of the group continually live on welfare. Their educational aspirations are far too limited. Lack of education, a lack of skills and concomitant poor wages combined with poor housing conditions and early marriages create situations which produce constant anxiety and hardships.

PURPOSE

It is the purpose of this study to examine the kinds of opportunities that prevail for intergroup relations between the Lumbees and the minority and majority groups of Baltimore and primarily to determine the actual intergroup relations between the Lumbees and their urban neighbors as a process of social adjustment.*

OBJECTIVES

As the first exploratory study of this group, the study will set guidelines for future research. It is hoped the investigation will discover those situations which aggravate ingroup-outgroup tension and those relations which bridge the gap between the groups. It is believed that certain patterns of behavior will emerge which will provide clues for the improvement of intergroup relations.

SAMPLE

The sample consists of Lumbees who live within the confines of Broadway on the east, Madeira Street and Patterson Park on the west, Madison Street on the north, and Eastern Avenue on the south. The sample is composed of 60 cases (37 males and 23 females). Subjects were chosen on a random sampling basis after a sampling frame was made. Alternates were selected when an attempt to interview first-choice subjects failed. There are common factors in the sample in that 90 percent of the subjects belong to the lower-lower class of Baltimore society; 12 percent belong to the upper-lower class because the heads of the household are skilled. The age range in this sample was 18–56 for men and 18–62 for women,** with an average of 32.6 years for men; 57 of the respondents are married and three are unmarried.

METHODS AND DATA COLLECTION

Methods used in the study are participant observation and the use of a schedule. Each interview lasted from 1 hour and 15 minutes to 2 hours (an average of 1 hour and 40 minutes) and each interview was conducted in the home of the subject. For relevant information, social agencies such as the church, the school, the police department, and the social welfare administration were approached. In order to determine patterns of adjustment among the Lumbees of Baltimore, it was felt that a visit to North Carolina, the Lumbees' original home, would throw some light on the subject. The author visited North Carolina and interviewed several prominent Lumbees in the area. He also secured information in the Pembroke State College Library and in the North Carolina University Library at Raleigh. This information helped him to understand native Lumbee culture as it exists in Robeson County.

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*The city is seen as a system of interaction and a web of social relationships. Adjustment is seen in the process of social interaction. The individual acts in consideration of others, that is, he modifies his behavior to the extent that is presentable and acceptable to the rest.

**At the time of the initial interviews, two respondents were 15 years old, married, and the parents of one child. They were seen often during the period of the study because they lived in an extended family and at the time this is being written they are approximately 18 years old. A set of 15-year-old twins were also interviewed, but for sample purposes, only the parents are considered.

WHY CHOOSE LUMBEES?

The Lumbees are an Indian group who have very few Indian traditions. They have, in large measure, adopted white ways. They are moving beyond acculturation in the direction of assimilation with the dominant society. They now live in several large cities such as Baltimore, Detroit, and New York. Therefore, the findings on Lumbee intergroup behavior in one city may provide clues to their behavior in other cities. Further, the author's own interest in the Indians of the United States and the accessibility of the Lumbees as one of Baltimore's minority groups made them a particularly favorable choice for study.

DATA HANDLING AND OBJECTIVITY

The data consist of responses which came from those who were interviewed. In the interviews the interviewer maintained a friendly but uncommitted attitude. Respondents were asked questions from a schedule. The interviewer also recorded his observations of the subject's home such as household effects, tidiness (or otherwise), children, telephone calls, or any visitors at the time of the interview. Interpretation of the survey is based on actual data through the use of cross tabulation. However, the analysis is also influenced by the author's observation and participation.

Part of the data refer to the same respondent at two or more points in time. Data of this nature help ascertain changes in attitude or interaction of the person. By and large, the discussion focuses on the information gathered at a single point in time.

SOME LIMITATIONS IN THE STUDY

Some of the responses do not always reveal the truth nor do they throw light on the subject in which the investigator is directly interested. It is also true that sometimes answers are given to questions which are socially approved and desirable. For instance, one parent who outwardly displays a high regard for education yet did not help any of his six children to finish high school actually discouraged each of them from continuing his education. Second, the respondents are quite frequently vague when answering any question which requires some conjecture on their part. Additional difficulty resulted from the Lumbees' suspicion of "outsiders"; as in any other group, there is an outgroup hostility among Lumbees.

Lack of cooperation from social agencies such as the police department, school authorities, and social welfare agencies placed limitations in the study in some areas.

BACKGROUND OF THE LUMBEES

Of all the groups that mingle in Baltimore's melting pot, perhaps none have such an intriguing history as the Lumbees who claim descent from Sir Walter Raleigh's Lost Colony. "The universal tradition among the Indians," writes Hamilton McMillan, "found in Robeson County and counties adjoining, is that they are the descendants of English people and the Cherokees."[1]

"The language of these people is old English and similar to that used in the time of Chaucer."[2]

The result of this intermingling is evidenced by the presence of a number of blue-eyed, blonde people among the Lumbees.

The people now known as Lumbees have only recently been recognized as a separate group of Indians by an act of the North Carolina Legislature in 1954. Previously, they had been referred to as Cherokee, Croatan, and "Indians of the Robeson County".[3] The Cherokees, however, do not recognize them as Cherokees—perhaps because of the latter's racial mixture. They were designated as "colored" under North Carolina law and thus were supposed to go to Negro schools. The Lumbees refused to associate with Negroes in any way and so they were an isolated group, claimed by none. The name "Lumbee" derives either from the Lumber River or from the town of Lumberton, N.C. The Lumbees were officially named and recognized by the State in 1954.[4]

It is believed that the Lumbees began to migrate to larger cities, such as Baltimore, apparently to find a better livelihood. The life of the Lumbees in the Pembroke area is even now far below the American standard of living. The bulk of the Lumbee population is engaged in farm work. Socially, there are three classes: (1) the very poor, even poverty stricken, class which is the majority; (2) the lower middle class; and (3) the extremely small elite class. The elites are those Lumbees who have become teachers, authors, doctors, or ministers and the power structure in Pembroke, N.C., is in their hands.

THE LUMBEES IN BALTIMORE

It is estimated that there are 1,500 Lumbees in Baltimore, concentrated in a radius of 5 miles around Broadway and Baltimore Street. Generally, they are a hospitable people. They welcome guests and readily offer a drink and something to eat. The investigator soon discovered that it was wise to avoid interviewing around mealtimes for one family would insist that he join them for "early" supper and the next would equally insist that he join them for a "late" supper. Unaccustomed to drinking, he felt safer on the drive home if he confined himself to only two or three interviews a day. The best in the house is laid before the guest—the husband is jovial, expansive, and full of talk while the wife, in a little flurry of excitement, hurries in and out of the room, anxious that her cooking should please. Children are sent to borrow supplies from the neighbors. Borrowing was carried on in the belief that if someone had what was needed he would share, secure that if he was ever in need, the favor would be returned in kind. At one home, there was no food and the busband borrowed $5 from the investigator for the evening meal. One family with a baby called the investigator to borrow money for medicine for the child. Once, a young man offered the investigator some tea but there was no sugar in the house and no one nearby had any. They do not apologize if their offering seems meager. One teabag will be carried between three or more cups and used again for seconds and no embarrassment will be displayed. Usually, the host does most of the talking and he is a good conversationalist. The only time that the wife talked was during the "ladies' section" of the questionnaire or when she was interviewed during her husband's absence. Otherwise, the man dominated the conversation and relished it.

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[1] *Sir Walter Raleigh's Lost Colony*, Edwards and Broughton Printing Company, Raleigh (1894), p. 42.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 44.

[3] McLean, A. W., "Historical Sketch of the Indians of Robeson County," in: McPherson, O. M., *Indians of North Carolina*, Washington (1915).

[4] *Ibid.*

Most of the respondents live in rented apartments. The appearance of the homes could be characterized as "lacking." Every family had a television set and some had color television. The majority of the families interviewed did not have telephones. During the winter, interviews were conducted in the kitchens because of the inadequate heating and the gas stove would be burning to supplement the heat. Whether the walls were wallpapered or painted, they were cracked and peeling. One family mentioned that the landlord would not furnish paint even when requested. Most of the homes were clean and neat, even though the furnishings were worn. In one home, the back door was hanging off its hinges with the cold air coming in and the gas jets burning. The sink, stove, floor, and counters were greasy. Few dishes and less food was displayed in the open cabinets. There was no door at all between the kitchen and bathroom. The stool had no seat, the window did not close completely, there were holes in the wall. This family had no tub or shower. There were two rooms upstairs, used as bedrooms, and three rooms downstairs: the kitchen, living room, and a dining room converted into a bedroom. The living room was sparsely furnished and contained a well-worn couch and one chair. One or two pictures and a calendar hung lopsidedly on the walls. The floors were bare, unvarnished wood and faded linoleum was on the kitchen floor. Twelve people live in this apartment, including the parents and their children, two married children and their spouses, and a girl who lived with the family. During the time of the investigation, a married son with his wife and child moved in as well. There were no facilities for washing clothes. The family used a nearby laundromat. Utilities were paid for separately from the rent which was $25 a week. During the period of the investigation, two families are known to have been evicted for being a week late with the rent.

There were over a hundred cases on welfare among Lumbees at the time of the investigation. This is estimated to be one-third of the total families. Many of the employed men are seasonal workers and they go on welfare or collect unemployment during part of the year. Thus, the caseload varies from season to season.

Approximately one-third of the sample had automobiles. Their jobs are located nearby or as faraway as 15 miles from where they live. They shop locally at small neighborhood stores and frequent local bars, movies, restaurants, and churches. The Lumbees have two churches of their own, one Baptist and one Church of God. Children in the sample families attend public neighborhood schools No. 23 and No. 27 At the time of the study, 65 children were in school (28 were in grades 1 through 3) and there were seven dropouts in the case families.

THE LUMBEE FAMILY

Sociologists classify the family as either nuclear or joint. The pattern of the American middle-class family falls in the category called nuclear family where the parents and their unmarried children live together.

Lumbees do not fit these nuclear or extended family types. Twenty percent of the sample families are extended families. In one such extended family, the mother and two of her married daughters lived together in a three-story apartment. The two daughters together had 14 children. Only one of the three women was working at the time of the interview—she was a waitress. The daughter with 11 children had not lived with her husband for a considerable length of time, yet she had quite small children. A white man was seen in the apartment, but he was not the husband of any of the women. A number of the children were blond and blue-eyed. It was not clear how they managed economically with only one person employed in the family. There are some Lumbees who belong to nuclear families as well. The difficulty of placing them in one or another cateogry lies in the fact that if and when the Lumbees are not members of extended families, they live in close proximity to other family members. Parents and their married children live (1) in an apartment in the same building, (2) on the same street, or (3) within a distance of a few blocks. Of the 1,500 Lumbees, approximately 900 of them live within six blocks of Baltimore Street alone and the rest within an area of 10 to 15 blocks around Baltimore Street.

It is quite common for family members to visit each other every day and they frequently eat at one another's homes. A daughter may visit her mother in the morning and spend the rest of the day with her until her husband comes. Together they may eat supper and then they return to their own home, which is perhaps in the same block. It does not appear that the mother influences the daughter in any vital decisionmaking; rather, a mother is available whenever any assistance in the form of advice is needed. The mother-in-law and son-in-law relationship is, therefore, not usually one of unresolved conflict, nor is there a sore feeling between them. The son-in-law realizes that the mother-in-law acts in good faith and that she is a well-meaning person. She is not Young and Willmott's "Mum" of the East London family. Father-in-law and son-in-law relation is, on the surface, a friendly relation. They may be seen together in a restaurant or going to the doctor's or lawyer's together. However, this surface appearance is deceiving, especially if they are living in a joint family. The father is the head of his household and that includes his daughters' husbands. He advises them on the jobs they should take, collects "rent" from their paychecks, and either delights in or complains about pregnancy of the daughter. The son-in-law commonly gives so much of his paycheck to the father that he is unable to move out on his own. In those few instances where relations were strained between the husband and his wife's family, the husband attributed it to the "old man's interference." He blamed this "interference" as the reason they were living separately from the wife's family. One son-in-law repeatedly stated that he hated his father-in-law, but in economic stress, he matter-of-factly moved in with his wife's family. He complained that the father-in-law did not work and just collected from the daughters' husbands. He also felt that his father-in-law unfairly made his wife do most of the housework and was angry enough to air his dispute with the entire family.

Husband-Wife Relationship.—The relationship between a husband and wife is based on a clear division of labor—clearer than that which exists in the middle-class American family. A middle-class husband at home generally helps his wife in a variety of ways such as cleaning the house, drying dishes, ironing, changing diapers, etc. This, however, is not the case with the Lumbees. Most household jobs are strictly the wife's. In the study, a very small percentage (15 percent) of the husbands mentioned helping their wives in drying the dishes or doing the laundry. The general pattern then seems to be a segregation of the sphere of duties and responsibilities. A Lumbee father is a relatively free man. He is the head of the house in every sense, the one who makes decisions, and his wife obeys. Of the 60 families (cases) studied, only one wife displayed antagonism and disobedience to her husband. She seemed sulky and seldom spoke except to criticize or correct her husband. Most wives, in front of the interviewer, deferred to their husbands in conversation, never openly disagreed with their statements, and seemed generally to be quiet and unassuming. During the "ladies' only" portion of the interview a wife might mention some incident in disciplining the children or about community relations but if the husband later told a different version, she always agreed with his viewpoint. This one wife took her family's side against her husband and when he defended her right not to be overworked by her father, she took her father's side.

Few of the men in the sample had full-time, year-round jobs. They were occupationally unskilled and educationally deficient. Approximately one-third of the total Lumbee population is estimated to be on welfare. At the time of the study, eight families were on welfare and two of these were long-term cases. In one family the father had not worked in 10 years. In another family the husband was a young man in his twenties who had not held a job in 2 years. Both men are "medically unfit" for work and have the medical evidence to support their claims. (However, the investigator learned that for a price anyone can receive such medical evidence. There are stories told about other Lumbees who "work" 1 or 2 days, become "injured," and then collect compensation. Only one respondent would admit that he was guilty of such a charge, in fact he was proud of it and thought that he ought not to work. A lawyer is available to assist Lumbees in claiming damages or compensation and one such case was underway at the time of the study.) Both these men do not want their wives to work. The welfare check is not sufficient to cover all the expenses connected with a home and children. Yet, the young husband, unable to pay the week's rent or to buy groceries, insists that his wife go to work. She works anywhere from 1 day to 2 weeks, depending on how much the family needs to see them through the latest crisis. If she complains that the work is too hard or the job too far away, he insists that she stop working, but she cannot stop if she has not earned enough for the week's rent. When the wife was sick, this man called upon the investigator for help. Advised about agencies which offer short-term relief, he sent his wife to three charitable organizations for money and food. She was gone nearly the entire day while he complained about her slowness and stupidity. He was positive that she was unable to tell a story convincing enough to secure food and when she did return with staples and money he berated her for not bringing enough. The wife calmly accepted his accusations and never once suggested that he get a job so that such incidents would not occur.

Parent-Child Relationship.—Lumbee parents are generally permissive and yet they use harsh punishment on children. Physical punishment such as spanking and whipping with a belt is not uncommon. Parents are heard to threaten the children by saying, "You want me to get the belt?" Even very young children of a year and a half or 2 are so threatened. Some parents use punishment such as no television, no candy or other treats, or sending the child to his room. They allow the children to stay out late, to play or chat on street corners as they please, to come and go without direct supervision. Yet, a child cannot overtly disobey the parents, particularly in front of visitors, without experiencing immediate retribution. Crimes include sassing, crying when told to stop, or refusing to do chores. Chores are given to all the children in the family, even the youngest. They are expected to clean their rooms, sweep the floors, run errands, mind the younger siblings, and do the dishes. There is a definite difference between boys' chores and girls' chores: boys run errands for cigarettes or Coke, girls make coffee or clean and dress the baby. In only one or two cases were the children given an allowance, none received "pay" for work done around the house. Punishment is swift for bad behavior, but little reward or incentive for good behavior is offered.

It was difficult to gauge the effect of child-rearing practices on the children. Most children were shy, spoke seldom, preferred to leave the room rather than stay and visit. Boys of thirteen sat on the fringes of the men's group, absorbing the talk, but not contributing even if directly questioned.

Parents outwardly place a high value on education. However, their lack of interest or supervision regarding homework or school attendance more adequately reveals their true feelings. They tell the children to do their school work but make no effort to check it for neatness, etc. In the entire sample, hardly ten percent of the parents of school-attending children knew what their children were doing at school. Parents say they want an education for their children higher than what they themselves had. But they do not have a clear set of educational goals and when they do have such goals they do not know how to go about obtaining their realizations. Eighty-five percent of the parents wanted their children to get a high school education and fifteen percent wanted them to have a college education. Those parents who want a college education for their children are the ones who themselves had some college.

THE LUMBEES AND EDUCATION

Educationally, the Lumbees of Baltimore are one of the backward groups in the nation. In the sample, only 8.33 percent attended college for a year or two. No one in the sample has finished college, nor does anyone in the entire area under our definition have a college degree.[5] Interestingly enough, the same percentage (8.33 percent) in the sample had had no formal education, that is, they were illiterate. Women attending college at one time or another numbered 5 percent and the total for men was 3.33 percent. The reverse was true for the illiterates, there were more male than female illiterates. The highest percentage of the population (36.66 percent) comprised those who had completed a sixth-grade education.

Several reasons were given for not continuing with education. Most of the men said they were needed to work on the farm. Their parents had insisted on their working in the fields and for some education was a financial burden their families could not afford. A small number of men, however, said they did not like school and nothing at school attracted them. The women also said that they were required to help out at home by cooking, cleaning, or helping with the younger children. Seven of the women (30.43 percent) were married before they could finish school. Two of them admitted being pregnant when they got married at 15. In Baltimore, the young people were still faced with economic pressures and they often quit school to go to work. Girls usually marry rather than go out to work.

The Lumbees realize that education is necessary if they are to obtain good jobs and they know that their children will find life even more difficult if they do not have good educations. They tell the investigator that they want their children to have a better education than they themselves had, yet they do nothing to encourage or assist their children in reaching this goal. Only 21 percent show some seriousness about helping the children get an education—they talk about the value of school, they see education as a worthwhile goal. Yet, only one mother in the survey said that her children had to finish their homework before playing. A very small 10 percent was aware of what their children were doing in school in terms of grades, subjects, teacher's name, etc. The goal was entirely abstract for these concerned parents had no idea of what they could do to reach fulfillment of their goal. All parents with some college education wanted their children to go to college; parents whose hopes for college were never realized still wanted such an education for their children.

Lumbee parents did not participate in school activities such as the PTA and they did not send cakes or cookies for the school bazaar, etc.

Enrollment of Lumbee children (grades 1 through 10)

Grade:	*Number of children*
1	10
2	8
3	10
4	6
5	8
6	7
7	5
8	8
9	3
10	0
Total	65

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[5] There is a Lumbee social worker with an M.S.W. who works for Baltimore City. He, however, does not live in the area which we defined elsewhere in this study. Many Lumbees know his name and they mentioned his name when asked to name three well-known Lumbees.

There are 228 children in 57 families in the sample, with an average of four children per family. The youngest family represented consists of one 18-year-old couple and their two children. Both the parents quit school at 13. They live with the wife's family and are supported by welfare. At the time of the study, there were 65 children attending public schools No. 23 and No. 27. The chart above shows the number of children enrolled in each grade. The majority of the Lumbee children attend school No. 27, which has been called the "worst" school in the Baltimore public school system. Conditions are so deplorable that No. 27 lacks even the bare essentials for education. Teachers are unqualified. There are no library or cafeteria facilities. Further, the building itself is structurally unsafe. Some parents expressed their concern about school No. 27 in particular and about the poor quality of teaching generally. They have no idea what they can do or whom to approach for improvement of the school conditions. They do not have the money to send the children to another school for bus fares and other incidentals. The Lumbees, as well as all the children in the vicinity, are the victims of the poor school system. It was not determined how much of an effect the poor facilities might have had on the children's eagerness to leave school. The lack of a library is especially evident for no adult in the sample has ever gone to the library. Only two of the children have been to a library, but they have not spent their lives in the Baltimore-Broadway area.

School dropouts.—School officials were asked for information regarding the Lumbee children, their number, the number of dropouts, etc., with little success. The school was very uncooperative and said that such information (based on race or color) was no longer being kept.

Thus, information on dropouts was gathered indirectly. At one time during the investigation, there were two boys (ages 13 and 14) who were put in reform school. One of the two has since been released. Neither boy went to school. Another boy (age undetermined) was identified as a dropout. There were four female dropouts. Two 15-year-old twins said that they had dropped out of school because there were Negroes in their class and they refused to go to a school in which there were Negroes. The other two girls said that their families had wanted them to help out at home. It was said, but not confirmed by the girl in question. that one of the 15-year-old girls was pregnant at the time she quit school.

Lack of motivation was the common factor in these seven cases of dropouts. The lack of motivation was reinforced by the inferior school situation and the parents' unconcern. Economic conditions are certainly a factor in these children's dropping out of school where parents are forced to encourage their children to take odd jobs to supplement family income. It is not unusual to see the Lumbee family in economic distress, trying to obtain money from churches, emergency centers, and other charitable organizations.

The following chart briefly summarizes the investigator's findings on the educational background of the Lumbees in the sample.

EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT AMONG LUMBEES

[Number of persons, 60]

Sex, type of education, and number of persons	Percentage in the sample	Percentage in the total population	Percentage for every 100 males and females combined
Male:			
College (1 year or more) (2)	5.4	3.33	------------
High school (6)	16.2	10.00	------------
Junior high (15)	40.5	25.00	------------
Some schooling (11)	29.8	18.33	------------
No schooling (3)	8.1	5.00	------------
Total (37)	100	61.66	------------
Female:			
College (1 year or more) (3)	13.04	5.00	8.33
High school (2)	8.70	3.33	13.33
Junior high (7)	30.43	11.66	36.66
Some schooling (9)	39.13	15.00	33.33
No schooling (2)	8.70	3.33	8.33
Total (23)	100.00	38.32	100.00

ECONOMIC STATUS OF THE LUMBEES

The Lumbees, as a group, are economically poor. Income ranges between $2,000 and $4,000 a year. Only five cases in the sample had an income over $4,000 a year. Two of these five were white men married to Lumbee women. In view of the America standard of living, the bulk of the Lumbee population lives on an income which Congress has termed "poverty level".

Approximately one-third of the Lumbees in Baltimore are on welfare. In the sample eight familes were on welfare. This number, however, varies from season to season since the men work at unskilled seasonal jobs. Among men only 7.3 percent are engaged in skilled jobs and only 4.86 percent of the women work at skilled jobs. More than 80 percent of the Lumbees are unskilled. Sixty percent of the Lumbees in the sample work in three areas: boxmaking, painting, and roofing. Both painting and roofing are seasonal jobs; thus, approximately 57 percent of these men are jobless during the year. During their offseason, the men receive unemployment compensation and welfare. (In the total sample, approximately 35 percent of the men are jobless during the year who work at painting and roofing.)

Social class determinants include occupation, income, dwelling area, house type, education, and style of life. Any or all of these determinants clearly indicate that the Lumbees are a low-income group and that they inhabit the lowest strata of Baltimore's class structure.

Occupationally, only 12.16 percent of the sample hold skilled jobs: IBM keypunch operator, machine operator, clerk, and auto mechanic. Eighty-seven percent can be classified as unskilled. Special efforts were made to determine how many held steady, full-time jobs. Questions were asked such as, "Since painting is a seasonal job, what do you do off-season?" Few of the men make any effort to find another job preferring to collect unemployment compensation or go on welfare. Two of the men in the sample claim medical disability and have not worked anywhere from 2 to 10 years. It is known that medical certificates are available under a "mutual benefit" agreement to help them in securing fraudulent compensation. All of the respondents gave rosy answers and inflated income figures when questioned about annual income. By observation and indirect questioning, the investigator was able to determine the true extent of their earnings.

None of the Lumbees interviewed owned his own home. All lived in old, rundown apartment buildings. No home presented evidence of affluence, color television notwithstanding, for the furniture was uniformily worn and in need of immediate repair or replacement. Not everyone had a telephone and no one owned a washing machine. Car ownership, no longer a reliable determinant of social class in today's "buy today, pay tomorrow" market, still appears to be adequate as far as the subjects of this study are concerned. Only 36.7 per-. cent of the Lumbees owned automobiles, while 63.3 were without a car.

Their style of life is very meager. Children were shabbily dressed. One 2-year-old only child wore her mother's blouses and stockings Her hair was long, dirty, and unkempt. She was sickly and her parents would take her to the free clinic but be unable to buy the medicine prescribed. Her diapers consisted of torn up blankets, sheets, and men's shirts. She is a pretty and affectionate child. In only one family were the two children neatly and stylishly dressed with clothing that fit. They had an advantage in that their mother had had an education and she was especially concerned that the children have a nice appearance. She also required them to study daily and had dreams of their going to college someday. As the children grew older and were able to find jobs their appearance improved. Even so, the prettiest dress was often torn and dirty. The investigator did not observe sewing machines in any of the homes and was unable to determine if there were any.

OCCUPATIONS OF THE BALTIMORE LUMBEES

Jobs	Number of men employed	Percent	Number of women employed	Percent	Total number and percentage
Machine operator	2	6.45	0	0	2-4.87
Painting	7	22.61	0	0	7-17.03
Boxmaking and other factory work	8	25.80	3	30	11-26.76
Maid	0	0	2	20	2-4.87
Clerk	0	0	1	10	1-2.43
Janitorial	3	9.67	0	0	3-7.30
IBM keypunch operator	0	0	1	10	1-2.43
Exotic dancer	0	0	1	10	1-2.43
Waitress	0	0	1	10	1-2.43
Bartender	1	3.22	0	0	1-2.43
Orderly	2	6.45	0	0	2-4.87
Auto mechanic	1	3.22	0	0	1-2.43
Roofers	4	12.90	0	0	4-9.74
Gas station attendant	1	3.22	0	0	1-2.43
Homemaker	0	0	1	10	1-2.43
Minister	2	6.45	0	0	2-4.87
Total	31	100.00	10	100	41-100.0

MARRIAGE

Lumbees marry at an early age; according to the sample, the average age of marriage for women was fifteen and for men seventeen. Girls go steady as soon as they attain puberty. Most frequently, dating takes place with those who live in the neighborhood or with those who are in some way related with the family. Very little time elapses between engagement and marriage. A very large number of girls are already pregnant at the time of marriage. It was not possible to determine the exact number of premarital pregnancies because all of the information came to the investigator secondhand, except for two girls who said that they had deliberately gotten pregnant at fifteen in order to escape parental pressure at home, but it appears that perhaps one-half of the marriages take place because the girl is pregnant. The ceremony of marriage is not elaborate. A wedding gown is not worn and large numbers of guests are not invited. It is very much a family affair and a wedding cake and the minister's blessing are sufficient. The wedding is performed in the minister's home (part of which is used as a church) and the bride and groom go directly home. Their economic conditions seldom allow for such extras as an elaborate wedding or a honeymoon trip.

"I think it is better to marry in one's own race," sums up the feelings expressed by Lumbees with regard to intermarriage. While opposed to mixed-marriage generally, they are specifically and vehemently opposed to any Lumbee-Negro marriage. The investigator has knowledge of two cases of Lumbee-Negro intermarriage* but they are not included in this sample. There are 16 cases of intermarriage in the sample, all between Lumbee and white. The expressed adherence to endogamy is more idealistic than actual since more than one-fourth of all the marriages in the sample are mixed marriages. Lumbee-white marriage is quite common among the upper class Lumbees in North Carolina. The mayor of Pembroke—a Lumbee—informed the investigator that all of his children married whites. Such intermarriages have been taking place since the time of Sir Walter Raleigh and it is difficult to visually distinguish a Lumbee from a white among the upper class Lumbees of Pembroke.

A Lumbee is not disgraced by marrying a white. In fact, he acquires a sense of superiority toward other Lumbees. Intermarried couples do not visit each other. The white spouse is willing to have the nearest relatives and the closest friends of the Lumbee over to the house. On the other hand, the white person's relatives do not invite the couple and they do not visit the couple, although they do invite the white partner alone. One white woman married to a Lumbee said, "My friends deliberately ignore me if they happen to see me in the store or on the street." Only one of the whites mentioned taking his wife to his family's home and he said that she was well received. None of the white spouses had visited the Lumbee partner's home in Pembroke. For the Lumbee, intermarriage with a white raises him in the eyes of other Lumbees, insofar as social status is concerned, but he gains no recognition at all from the dominant white group and finds that his white partner's social status can be considerably diminished.

Divorce and separation.—The Lumbee rate of divorce and separation is not different from the national trend. There were 14 cases of divorce (23.3 percent) and four cases of separation (6.7 percent) in the sample.

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*There are four Negro families whose last name is Locklear. The Lumbees stated to the author that Negroes took the name in order to establish themselves as Indian. One of the Negro Locklears is herself the child of a mixed marriage. She is married to a Negro college graduate, has had 2 years of college, and did not in any way try to impress the author that she was Indian. She related that about 50 years ago her parents and aunt came from Rocky Island, N.C., and that she herself was born and raised in Baltimore. She visited Pembroke only once, when she was four, and considers herself Negro. She lives in a middle class Negro neighborhood. Another Locklear is a male who has completed 4 years of college and is now doing part-time graduate study. His Negro wife is a nurse. He is proud of his Indian ancestry and says that he is Negro-Indian. (His wife, however, emphasizes the point that her husband is a Lumbee.) He lives in a middle class integrated neighborhood and sends his children to private school.

The rate of divorce is higher among mixed marriages. There are 16 Lumbee-white marriages in the sample and the divorce rate is 37.5 percent. For Lumbee-Lumbee marriages, the divorce rate is 18.2 percent.

DIVORCE AND SEPARATION (N-60)

	Divorces	Percent	Separations	Percent
Lumbee-Lumbee	8	13.3	4	6.7
Mixed couples	6	10.0	0	0
Total	14	23.3	4	6.7

DIVORCE RATE BY COUPLE COMPOSITION—N-44 (LUMBEE-LUMBEE); N-16 (MIXED COUPLES)

Lumbee-Lumbee	8	18.2	4	9.1
Mixed couples	6	37.5	0	0

The Lumbees felt that there were several reasons for their rate of divorce. These are listed below in descending order:

1. "Not marrying their own kind."
2. Infidelity.
3. Husband drinks too much.
4. Husband stays away from his job, is not a good provider.
5. Couple does not get along.
6. Husband beats up on wife.

The Lumbees do not approve of divorce but they agree that when "things do not go right" it is perhaps better to get a divorce. Part of the reason for their rate of divorce may be that the role of the woman in the Lumbee family has considerably altered since the Lumbees came to Baltimore. In the rural agricultural environment of North Carolina, mothers do not work; grandmothers, sisters, aunts, nieces, and other female relatives help each other with their work and take care of the children. In an urban setting, however, wives are more dependent on their own resources. All too often the husband is unable to adequately support his family due to his lack of skills and education and the wife is forced to seek work. A woman with no skills can work as a janitoress, maid, waitress, nurses' aide, or factory worker. These are all low-paying jobs but if a woman is fortunate enough to have her mother or another female relative nearby she can avoid paying for child care. In one family, both parents work in a factory and they freely admit that the wife's mother was asked to come from Pembroke in order to care for the children. The wife felt that the children received the best care and the husband agreed. The wife's role as a working partner makes her somewhat financially independent from her husband. If she is the sole money-earner, her voice becomes increasingly more important in terms of how the money is spent and this diminishes the man's importance as the provider and decision-maker.

It may be assumed that there is a loss of role as the result of urban impact. Men find that they cannot go home to rest in the middle of the working day and women cannot bring their husbands' lunches to the job as they did when the men worked in the fields. They find themselves confused in the anonymity of urban life. One woman spoke about the magnitude of "things" in the urban setting, the great profusion of bars, stores, and restaurants, the mass of traffic and people constantly passing by. She made a distinction between the relationship of people in North Carolina and in Baltimore. In North Carolina, she felt, people are friendly because they want to be your friend. In the city people were "out to get you" and no one could be really trusted as a friend. Unsure of how they "fit" into the urban scheme of things, they become overly sensitive to the impersonal and formal urban ways.

INTERGROUP RELATIONS

Acculturation is the imposition of the culture of the dominant group on a subordinate group. In Baltimore the Lumbees definitely find themselves in a subordinant role. Because they live in a city, they are subjected to an inescapable "voluntary" acceptance of urban ways. Therefore, in any intergroup contact, the Lumbees feel a sense of insecurity, anxiety, hostility, and suspicion. In this atmosphere of hostility and insecurity, much of the intergroup relationship is not fruitful. The investigator faced rather strange and unforeseen problems during the period of study. After walking along Baltimore Street for several hours, talking to people who denied that they had ever heard of the Lumbees, the investigator was told by a policeman that the Moonlight Restaurant was a Lumbee gathering place. In the restaurant, he was able to meet and talk to two Lumbees who were rather reticent about themselves but who did give their names and phone numbers. Later, the investigator tried to contact them without success.

After several more fruitless visits to the area, the investigator finally found a church selling secondhand clothes on a Saturday morning and approached the minister. He was introduced to an old gray-haired lady who then invited him to her house. After talking to her for several hours, he learned that there were three churches serving the Lumbees and he decided to attend Sunday church services to make more contacts. Soon it was discovered that all three groups, except for a few individuals, were highly suspicious of him. Repeated attendance at church led to some confidence among a few members of the group, but on the whole there was very little trust by the Lumbees that the investigator was indeed seeking only information.

After about 6 weeks of observation, a schedule was constructed dealing with various aspects of their lives. Some names and addresses were obtained and attempts were made to interview respondents. Many still shied away, giving various excuses, and there were two people who were violently opposed to anyone studying the Lumbees. Unfortunately, these people were group leaders and many contacts were blighted by this resistance. Their opposition stemmed in part from the publication in Ebony of two articles showing Lumbee-Negro interaction, and from a series of Sunpapers' articles which they felt were uncomplimentary. Added to these expressed reasons was the deeply ingrained suspicion and distrust the Lumbees felt toward any "outsider". Wild rumors spread that the investigator was a welfare worker checking on fraudulent claims, that he was a plainsclothesman, a fire inspector, and even an insurance inspector checking on phony broken arms and legs.

It was with patience and perseverance that two informants were hired with the understanding that they would be paid for each interview they arranged. It was only through the intervention of the informants that doors were opened. Together, we would go to the subject's home for coffee and small talk. During the conversation we would try to set up an interview time during the next day or two. The investigator would then return alone to conduct the interview. Once this rapport had been established the interviewing could proceed. Otherwise, the investigator was given the cold shoulder if he attempted to speak to families on his own. Use of the informants was not altogether successful. One in particular was not universally popular and the investigator was told that he would receive no help if he were ———'s friend.

Intergroup relations may be approached in terms of social participation. In the church, in school, in recreational activities, and other community functions some participation is expected. Perhaps the most intensive interaction is between intermarried couples and their friends and relatives. This does not represent the bulk of the population and we will attempt to discuss interaction outside intermarital relations.[6]

Religion is an integral part of Lumbee life. Their religious and social life centers around the church. The initial interviews for this study were arranged through contacts made in church. Presently they have two churches—one Baptist and one Church of God.[7] Both are storefront churches. One is attended exclusively by Lumbees while the other has some white and Negro members as well. Attendance ranges from 30 to 50, including the children. It is reasonable to assume that the church having white, Negro, and Lumbee members does provide opportunities for interaction. Some white parishioners do visit the Lumbee minister, but the investigator was otherwise unable to determine the quality or extent of interaction.

The Lumbee children participate in some form of interaction during their time at school. The school should also provide a forum for interaction on the parents' part. In the entire sample only one mother replied that she went to the school to check on the children's progress and to talk with the teacher. None of the parents attend PTA meetings. There does not appear to be any adult-level interaction between the Lumbees and the school community. The children, of course, play with children at school and in the neighborhood but this interaction is with white children only. None of the children visit the home of his white friends and only two reported that they had a white friend over to visit their home.

Recreation is considered to be another major form of interaction. The interviewees were asked if they participated in activities of the Y, the Little League, scouting, or structured recreation such as bowling or group sports. A response of 100 percent was elicited to the effect that no one participates in such activities. They mentioned spending spare time in the Moonlight Restaurant or the Volcano Bar. They occasionally go to the White Coffee Pot or Gino's, but none said they went to larger restaurants. They mentioned watching baseball on television but when asked if they attend games at the stadium, the response was negative. The women do not belong to any ladies' groups.

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[6] In any process of acculturation, a dominant and subordinate role relationship is involved between the two groups of people. In assimilation, however, the differences between the groups are forgotten for all practical purposes. In Pembroke, N.C., the elite class is assimilated to the extent that intermarriage is a regular and uneventful part of life. Such intermingling has been going on for decades. The elite class has participated in such a high degree of intermarriage that it is hard to distinguish a Lumbee from a white. The elites hold the power in Pembroke and, in comparison, the Baltimore Lumbees appear to have regressed in patterns of interaction.

[7] At the beginning of the study there were three churches serving Lumbees. One of these storefront churches was condemned by the city as deing unsafe.

Social distance between the Lumbees and other groups is believed to be the result of a lack of interaction. Interaction between Lumbees and whites is considerably different from interaction between Lumbees and Negroes.

The Lumbees are aware of discrimination in society. They are also aware that the Negroes are the most discriminated against. Therefore, the Lumbees do not want to associate with the Negroes lest they be labeled as Negroes.[8] The Lumbees make special efforts in Baltimore to be away from areas where Negroes have apartments. No Lumbee family lives in the public housing project in Baltimore because public housing has a heavy Negro concentration. In *The Newcomers*, Oscar Handlin states, "The colored Puerto Rican wished above all to avoid the stigma of identification with the Negro and he could do so only by establishing himself as a Spanish-speaking Puerto Rican."[9]

There is a belief among Lumbees that by disassociating themselves completely from the Negroes that their own identity becomes closer to the whites. They believe that they become more acceptable to the whites the more closely they live near them. It is quite common for a Lumbee to brag, "I am the only Indian in the building, the rest of the people are all white."

There are, however, differences among individual Lumbees in terms of the kind of interaction they have with others. For instance, it was found that Lumbees with steady jobs more frequently interact than those who have no steady jobs. Seventy-five percent of those with a steady job considered a white as a friend. Twenty-five percent expressed friendship with a Negro. It is significant that 25 percent of those with steady jobs considered a Negro a friend, since only 10 percent of the entire sample had the same feeling.

Also, it was observed that educational attainments and social interaction are interrelated; thus, people with a high school education and those with a college education have more interaction with other groups than those whose educations are limited. Everyone in the sample having a college education expressed a high level of interaction with the whites.

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[8] Many whites in the Baltimore Street-Broadway area regard Lumbees, except for those who can pass as white, as "colored". The white minister of a Methodist church in the area was unable to distinguish a Lumbee from a Negro, while in fact the facial features and hair of the two groups are markedly dissimilar. The Lumbees resent the epithet "colored" and do not want to be in any way identified with the Negroes. They say that some Negroes want to capitalize on their heritage by claiming to be Lumbees. They disavow any discriminatory actions against themselves, but two men did say that they had faced discrimination in housing and jobs because they are dark skinned.

[9] *The Newcomers: Negroes and Puerto Ricans in a Changing Metropolis*, Doubleday & Co., Inc., Garden City, N.Y., 1962, p. 60.

LUMBEE INTERACTION WITH WHITES AND NEGROES

[Number of persons, 60]

	Number	Percent
No interaction with negroes	45	75
Some contact with negroes	15	25
Casual relationship	5	33.3
Repeated contact	10	66.7
Not considered friend	4	40
Considered friend	6	[1] 60
No interaction with whites	0	0
Some contact with whites	60	100
Casual relationship	12	20
Repeated contact	48	80
Not considered friend	38	79.2
Considered friend	10	[2] 20.8

[1] Considered friend in the total sample is 10 percent.
[2] Considered friend in the total sample is 16.7 percent.

Note: Friendship does not include any members among relatives, such as resulting from marriage.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Lumbees are not happy with the existing order of things. They are not happy with the job market or with the income they earn. They have very basic needs: food, clothing, housing, and education of their children. But these needs are not being adequately met. In every area, the Lumbee is at the furthest extremity of the social and economic ladder. They feel that they have grievances which need immediate redress.

Because of the lack of proper leadership, the Lumbees are unable to articulate their grievances. They are so engrossed with making a bare living that they are unable to examine their difficulties or to find solutions. It is not that they are indifferent and do not care. Rather, their poor education and lack of ease with regard to the dominant society stifles their abilities to express themselves. Even the educated Lumbees do not know how to apply for a job, do not know who to see for a better paying job, do not know which jobs pay more. They tend to work together—one man works for a contractor and his friend applies at the same company. They do not regard their failure in the job market as "discrimination," only two respondents said that they were discriminated against in housing and jobs, but they do feel that "there's nothing a man can do about it" and so they accept the inevitable.

Clearly, they are in need. Perhaps an agency could be set up strictly for the purpose of helping the Lumbees find a more rewarding and socially productive place in urban life, providing them with opportunities to develop their own solutions, by giving them answers to questions such as "Where do I go to get a job as a housekeeper?" This agency could approach various public and private social organizations for their help.

It is a fact that groups in the lower strata of urban society need help in satisfying their barest needs. The Baltimore Urban Renewal Agency has initiated a specific program in a specific area with a specific purpose in mind—to encourage residents of the urban renewal area (Harlem Park) to see a doctor. Each year the agency sponsors two social gatherings of the community to discuss any disease which members had not discussed with a doctor. These people lack the habit of consulting a doctor for medical advice and diseases such as cancer and TB are cured only by early diagnosis and treatment. The agency feels that the program is successful, particularly in the detection of TB, as it orients community members to seeking medical help when they feel ill. In the same way, the Lumbees could be encouraged to more fully utilize the opportunities available in an urban setting. They do take their children to the clinic of a nearby hospital but, due to the setup of the free clinics (long lines, long waits), they avoid taking the children for routine checkups or in the early stages of illness. Some hospitals are now in the process of revitalizing their clinic programs and it is hoped that the families dependent on the clinics for their health care will find that the "too poor to pay" indignities of clinic care will have been alleviated. In one instance, the investigator found a 63-year-old woman who had a large boil on her leg. She went to a doctor once a month to have it cleaned and bandaged. Unable to pay the $10 fee, she did not come back weekly as the doctor suggested, and so the boil did not heal. The investigator called several agencies to secure help for this woman who did not know anything about medicare. The very next day someone came with the forms and helped her to fill them out. She then received medical attention through medicare. There might be many in similar situations who, with a little help in defining their needs, could secure benefits to ease the problems they face.

The Lumbees need assistance in realizing the importance of education. Lumbee children should be given additional counseling in school and encouraged to finish their high school programs. Efforts should be made to place them in better schools. There is no distinction in attending the worst school in the city. Since parents cannot afford bus fares, busing might be provided. School must be made meaningful and attractive to both children and parents.

Recreation is essential in the inner city. Few of the Lumbees have cars and their limited resources do not permit them to take advantage of the recreational activities available. Through coordination of programs with the Y, the Girl and Boy Scouts, and so forth, activities such as camping, swimming, picnicking, and sports could be made available to the children.

Perhaps an agency such as VISTA would extend its help to Lumbee families. VISTA volunteers could be assigned to these neighborhoods to aid the people and define their needs. After these needs were identified then programs could be designed to meet them.

Both the Community Action Agency and Model Cities receive large sums of money from the Federal Government. Thus far their attention has not been drawn to the Lumbees. The investigator spoke to leaders of these programs and discovered that they had no plans even in the distant future for the Lumbees. Social welfare's help does not go beyond the monthly check as determined in this study. It might be strongly suggested that these agencies, either separately or together, set up an office on a temporary basis to work extensively with the Lumbees. Such an office could institute a door-to-door survey of the Lumbees regarding their needs in jobs, education, housing, and all the related areas of social living.

The Lumbees, as a minority, are nowhere represented. This group is alienated in the sense that they cannot effectively participate in their society due to a (1) lack of education, (2) lack of effective organization,

(3) lack of effective leadership, (4) halfhearted acceptance in society, and because (5) they are a group for whom special provisions should be made since they are Indians—original inhabitants of North America. They also suffer from a latent sense of inferiority and a consequent lack of interaction.

Once they are recognized as a group unrepresented, as a group that badly needs public assistance to better their lives, special efforts can and should be made to find remedies. They are not aware of programs such as the Job Corps and the Manpower Training Act but they could be given information and encouragement to join these programs.

Not all help necessarily should be governmental. Private agencies could easily fill these needs. The New York Archdiocese formulated "a policy to provide all possible assistance to the Puerto Ricans to help them become integrated into established parishes. The archdiocese is not following a policy of setting up separate parishes for the Puerto Ricans, but is making an extraordinary effort to train priests, sisters, and lay workers to work with the Puerto Ricans as they seek to become active members together with older parishioners in existing parishes." [10] Such an experiment in integration has never been tried by Baltimore's religious institutions, yet because of the Lumbees' intense interest in religion, this could be a starting point.

SUMMARY

PROBLEM

The Lumbees of Baltimore migrated from North Carolina some 18 years ago and settled in the slum section around Baltimore Street and Broadway. The Lumbees are but one of the many minority groups in this neighborhood which is composed of families of Negro, Polish, Greek, and German descent. The Lumbee population is estimated at 1,500. Coming from a rural background, with very little skill for urban employment, they have had to make a large measure of adjustment to urban society.

PURPOSE

It is the purpose of this study to examine kinds of opportunities that exist for intergroup relations between Lumbees and the other groups as a process of social adjustment.

OBJECTIVES

As the first exploratory study of this group, the study will set guidelines for future research. It is hoped the investigation will discover those situations which aggravate ingroup-outgroup tension and those relations which bridge the gap between the groups. It is believed that certain patterns of behavior will emerge which will provide clues for the improvement of intergroup relations.

SAMPLE

The sample consists of Lumbees who live within the confines of Broadway on the east, Madeira Street and Patterson Park on the west,

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[10] Milton L. Barron, *Minorities in a Changing World*, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., New York, 1967, p. 284.

Madison Street on the north, and Eastern Avenue on the south. The sample is composed of 60 cases (37 male, 23 female). After a sampling frame was made, subjects were chosen on a random sampling basis. Alternates were selected when an attempt to interview failed. There are common factors in the sample in that 90 percent of the subjects belong to the lower-lower strata of Baltimore society. The remaining 10 percent are white men married to Lumbee women and Lumbee women who belong to the upper-lower class. Three men out of the 37 are skilled and two women out of 23 are skilled. The age range was 18–56 (male) and 18–62 (female). Fifty-seven of the respondents are married and three are unmarried.

METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION

Methods used in the study are participant observation, use of a schedule, and printed materials. Each interview averaged 1 hour and 40 minutes and was conducted in the subject's home. The author visited Pembroke, N.C., for comparison of native Lumbee culture as it exists in Robeson County and the patterns of adjustment found among Lumbees in Baltimore.

FINDINGS

Economically, Lumbees are poor, averaging $2,000 income a year They live in crowded slum housing, paying average rents of $102 monthly. Redfield and Wirth generalized that, as people migrate from a rural to an urban location, the primary group relation generally changes into secondary group behavior; urban characteristics effect a decline in the importance of a primary group. However, Lumbees, even though from many parts of North Carolina, are very informal with each other and 20 percent still live in extended families, a primary group characteristic. About 88 percent of them are engaged in jobs which call for manual labor. The remaining 12 percent is composed of 2 percent clerical, 2 percent homemaking, 2 percent auto mechanics, 4 percent machine operators, and 2 percent keypunch operators. Education among Lumbees is still at a very low level. Only 5 percent female and 3.33 percent male have a year or two of college; 10 percent male and 3.3 percent female are high school graduates; 36.7 percent have a sixth-grade education, and 8.33 percent are illiterate.

The Lumbee father is the head of the patriarchal family in every sense. Women find themselves in a subordinate role—even those who have a job and economically are the family's sole support. About 24 percent of the marriages end in divorce and a further 7 percent were separated. However, in terms of the total marriages, the rate of divorce for mixed marriages is much higher. There is a general permissiveness in the Lumbee families and the children, according to age, are expected to do a number of chores.

If social interactions reduce group tension, this is clearly evidenced with Lumbees and their relations to other groups. Those Lumbees who have a steady job are the ones who are secure and make a better adjustment. The people with steady jobs and a high school (or beyond) education have a much higher degree of contact with other groups. People with higher intergroup contacts show less outgroup hostility and aggressive behavior. Places of interaction are the church, job, restaurants, bars, and grocery stores. The frequency of Lumbee-white contacts: Casual, 20 percent; repeated, 80 percent; and considered friend, 16.7 percent. However, the trend of interaction with Negroes varies from that of the whites. Thus, Lumbee-Negro contacts are: No interaction, 75 percent; some interaction, 25 percent, and considered friend, 10 percent.

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TAX INCENTIVES FOR INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

By HON. E. Y. BERRY*

FOREWORD

Despite large Federal expenditure on Indian programs, poverty and unemployment remain severe on the Indian reservations. In his statement prepared for this compendium, Representative Berry argues that the solution lies in attracting industry to the reservations. Tax incentives, similar to those which have been so successful in encouraging Puerto Rican industrialization, offer a promising means of helping industry overcome the added costs of locating in remote reservation areas. Together with Representative Morris Udall of Arizona, Representative Berry has introduced legislation authorizing a pilot program of 10-year tax exemptions for industries locating on Indian reservations in South Dakota and Arizona.

Introduction

The purpose of this statement is to set before this subcommittee the absolute need for an "Operation Bootstrap—Indian Style" industrial program on the Indian reservations of America. I propose a tax incentive law which will be an inducement for industry to search out reservation areas. It is an inducement for industry to provide employment, salaries and income for the Indian people, permitting them to lift themselves by their own bootstraps from the quagmire of despair and the hopeless welfare existence in which they find themselves today, and from which there is no possibility of improvement through the programs in effect today.

THE INDIAN PROBLEM?

One of the oldest cliches in the American lexicon is "the Indian problem." There is no Indian problem—what is glibly referred to as an "Indian problem" is purely and simply a white man's problem. It has been created by the white man through the bureaucracy of the white man's government.

The difficulty is that when Congress sees a bad situation—whether it be domestic or international—the tendency is to throw money at it and hope the problem will disappear. Millions of dollars have been thrown at the "Indian problem," only to find that the problem has grown worse and worse. This is true primarily because the activities of the Bureau of Indian Affairs have been geared basically toward the use of land rather than toward the improvement of the lives of the Indian people. We found the Indian on the land—we thought that all Indians should be farmers.

Because of this policy by the Bureau, the plight of the individual Indian has worsened year after year because there is nothing for the individual Indian to look forward to. There is probably enough land on each reservation to provide a livelihood for 5 percent of the enrolled Indians on that reservation, and the Bureau has geared their entire program to that 5 percent. The other 95 percent have been kicked from pillar to post. They are much worse off today than they were 40 years ago when I made my home on an Indian reservation and first became interested in trying to help solve their problems.

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*A Representative in the Congress of the United States from the Second Congressional District, South Dakota.

Through recent years such programs as relocation have captured the imagination of the Bureau. The Indian people have been taken to the cities where jobs have been found for them. But because these people have no friends there, and because they soon become homesick for someone with whom to associate, they soon return to the reservation where they can live in the only surroundings they know, and where they can associate with people they know. The reservation is the only homeland they have ever had.

In every instance where industry has gone to these reservations, and provided jobs, salaries and opportunity, we have seen a complete transformation of the Indian people and of the Indian community. Absenteeism is lower in these plants than in any like plant anywhere in America. They have used their money to improve their homes, feed and clothe their children, and instead of spending their meager relief check on liquor, they spend their salaries on improving their own lot and the lot of their families.

The difficulty with human beings—regardless of the color of their skin—is that if they have no future to look forward to they try to drown their failure in liquor, or some method of mental relief.

Now the question is, how do we, as a government, promote the industrial development of these reservation areas? It must be remembered that almost every reservation is located in some remote area where the cost of transportation of the raw material, and the cost of the transportation of the finished product, is very high. Because of this situation, industry is unable to compete with like production in the more accessible areas of the Nation, with the result that industry shies away from reservations in spite of the fact there is a great pool of possible employment.

The only way this cost differential can be compensated for is either through a *direct subsidy* to *industry* coming to the reservation, or else in the use of a *tax benefit* similar to those tax benefits offered to industry by the emerging nations, and by such other areas as Puerto Rico, and so forth.

The Bureau for several years has been working on a program of locating industries on Indian reservations, with some minor success, but the program will never be a success, and will have only scattered results until there is some offset for the added cost of production on these reservation areas.

The only inducement the Bureau has today is an Indian Trades Training and on-the-job training program wherein a portion of the salary of the employee can be paid by the Department during the time such employee is learning the trade. This, of course, is some little inducement for industry, but the inducement is so very small because of the fact that when the employee has learned the job sufficiently well to fill the proper niche, this subsidy is removed, so that actually, while this is very beneficial to the Indian employee, it is of very little permanent benefit to the industry itself.

For several years I have had legislation pending which would provide a tax incentive in the form of a complete Federal tax exemption for a 10-year period. However, the Treasury has always opposed it on the grounds that it has no way of knowing what the cost would be to the Federal Government. As a pilot program to determine what might be expected in the way of cost, Representative Morris Udail of Arizona and I have, for the past 4 years, had legislation pending which would provide a pilot program, giving a 10-year tax exemption to any industry that would come onto Indian reservations in South Dakota and Arizona, employing Indian help for at least 50 percent of their staff. By this pilot method Treasury and the Bureau of Indian Affairs would have a good idea as to what the cost of a national program would be

The advantages of such a program are primarily that it would provide training, industrial education, jobs, and salaries, and do it in the home area of these people where they can stand erect once again, as they did before the white man forced them into concentration camps, later referred to as reservations. It would give them an opportunity to again have pride in themselves and their family, providing education and equal opportunity for their children and give them an opportunity to lift themselves by their own "moccasin straps" from the shame of dole to the pride of production.

Congress and the Bureau have tried everything else and everything else has failed. While Congress has passed dozens of integration laws that apply to the colored man, we have passed twice that many laws *forcing segregation* of the Indian people. We have forced the Indian to attend segregated schools where non-Indians are not permitted. We have forced them to live on segregated reservations where non-Indians are almost entirely excluded, and we have forced them to live on the dole if they want to be among their own people rather than going out into an unknown world without training, without a job, and without friends.

Bringing industry to these reservation areas would also bring non-Indians to these reservations to manage the business ventures. This would mean non-Indian children living and playing with the Indian boys and girls. It would give the Indian youth an opportunity to learn that the non-Indian can be a friend, and it would integrate these reservations. Another thing, as the Indian becomes trained and skilled in the job provided by industry, he would be transferred to other areas off the reservation in managerial capacities. In other words you would eventually have complete integration, complete opportunity, and a race of people with a future, instead of a government forced, segregated, welfare existence.

THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN PRESENT-DAY INDIAN INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT: A DISCUSSION

By Maurice Sonnenberg*

FOREWORD

The apparent inefficiency of many of the Federal Indian programs is disturbing. Among the problems identified by Maurice Sonnenberg are lack of statistics needed for intelligent planning, duplication of effort, excessive time lags in processing project applications, and inadequate accounting of funds expended. Sonnenberg suggests that all Federal programs relating to Indian economic development be brought together under a newly created Indian Economic Development Administration. An Indian development company and an Indian development bank should be part of this agency, and the agency should seek private as well as governmental advice and assistance. Among the programs Sonnenberg would like to see this new agency emphasize are tribal equity in industrial and commercial enterprises on Indian reservations, financing and guarantees, a tax exemption board, and a "data bank." He also suggests that Indian reservations be given the same authority to issue bonds that other local governments enjoy. The new IEDA should work closely with the Indian tribes, giving the Indians full opportunity to manage their own affairs.

It is well known that a large segment of the American Indian population suffers severe economic deprivation.

Approximately 40 to 50 percent of the national Indian labor force, 16 years or older, is unemployed. This compares with a national unemployment average of less than 4 percent. In addition to the serious problem of unemployment, there is extensive underemployment. Indian health conditions are depressing: Life expectancy for the American Indian averages 50–52 years, an excessive infant mortality rate, a high rate of pulmonary disease and an apparently high incidence, on certain reservations, of illnesses that fall into the category of psychological ills (alcoholism, depression, etc.).

Alternatively, the facts show there has been a great deal of improvement in these conditions in recent years. For as bad as conditions in the area of health and education have been they are improving. It is the rate of time which is of concern. This has been the result of a greater awareness and effort on the part of tribal leaders, the increasing role of the Federal Government through its various agencies, in assisting the tribes to achieve greater self-sufficiency, and the efforts of private organizations, such as the National Congress of American Indians and the Association on American Indian Affairs, Inc.

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*An investment consultant primarily engaged in the business of encouraging capital flow of investment into underdeveloped areas of the United States, Latin America and the Caribbean. His consultative work has permitted him to become involved in the field of economic development as it affects American Indian reservations and lands.

Let us reflect on some of the methods used to alleviate this obvious inequity in our present day society. At the outset, however, it should be pointed out, I am not an expert in the field of American Indian problems (as a matter of fact, I am moved to point out the recent appearance of a plethora of quasi-American Indian experts, most of whom are of a non-Indian background!).

Since the Federal Government plays such an enormous role in the lives of the American Indian, I would ask how can the Federal resources be better utilized to eradicate the obvious social injustice and deprivation so long endured by this group of people?

The answer lies in a thorough examination of some of the benefits and defects I have observed in the application of Federal resources to Indian reservations and communities, and then, a perusal of some recommendations for alternative programs.

The most startling observation and point of concern is the fact that the Federal Government is spending well over one-half billion dollars, on an annual basis, through its various agencies, Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), Economic Development Administration (EDA). Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), and others, in Indian lands and reservations. There are approximately 600,000 Indians in America today, of which an estimated 400,000 to 450,000 live on these lands and theoretically receive the benefits of this munificent expenditure. I am moved to ask whether this expenditure, while not necessarily unjustified, is commensurate to the return? The question is even more pertinent when it has been established that there is approximately one Federal employee working on Indian programs for every six Indians, granting the fact that the Federal Government employs many Indians.

To digress a moment, I would like to note that my observations will be confined primarily to the area of industrial and commercial development in the direct sense of the word. Therefore, I would be remiss if I did not also mention the appalling inadequacies that exist in the area of formal and technical education, be it academic, psychological, or cultural. Likewise, that this has a direct bearing on the fact that there are few trained Indian individuals and leaders. This condition, if not dramatically improved, may irreparably slow down the development of tribally developed leadership from which to draw managerial and supervisory skills, let alone advance skills on the production line level. In addition there is abundant evidence of the need in the near future for basic and adequate housing. Especially, if the expenditures to be made in the area of industrial and commercial development are to be fruitful. In short, the community factors of development cannot be isolated from the subject at hand.

As said before, hundreds of millions of dollars have been spent by BIA, OEO, and EDA on Indian communities, a small part of which goes into direct economic development. Before these expenditures are made there is a necessity for adequate planning based on substantive analysis. This is predicated on the availability of adequate statistical information. Mr. Henry W. Hough recently wrote, "If all Indians living on reservations had a total income of $9,248,255 from agriculture in 1939, and the comparable figure for 1944 increased to $22,038,111, the figure for 1966 should be highly interesting and significant; unfortunately, it is impossible to obtain recent figures."[1]

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[1] Hough, Henry W., *Development of Indian Resources*, World Press, Inc., Denver, 1967, p. 72.

Mr. Hough quotes a Bureau official who says that "these statistical series came to a halt after 1944 and our recently instituted surveys have yet to provide current counterparts."[2] Mr. Hough goes on to say, and I concur, "that in much the same way it is impossible to obtain information for the total income of Indian tribes, in various categories of income such as from rentals and royalties, from forest lands, from trust funds and other investments, and from operation of tribally owned enterprises."

Only this past year an attorney for one tribe informed me of the tribe's having entered into a research contract with an institute involved in community and economic planning, and of an official of the company receiving "population figures that were almost 100 percent higher in the tribe's files than in Washington files at the Bureau." The tribe has an adult population of less than 5,500.

Statistics in all phases of social and economic concern are deplorable, at best, inadequate. Certainly, with the present amount and method of funding, there should exist some sort of "data bank." A national registry of this type is indispensable to any sensible planning.

Another area in which I find a need for serious revamping is the inefficient handling of Federal moneys due to duplication of efforts. By way of example, one large tribe has three "industrial development specialists." The benefactors of the "experts" are OEO, EDA and BIA. A visit by a former Indian Council member and myself to these gentlemen provided us with contradictory basic information on the subject of existing factors necessary for someone contemplating an economic venture—for example, one actually told us a small factory was in operation "with about 45 employees," while the other expert claimed no one had been working there for at least 6 weeks. Furthermore, there existed a rivalry that rather than assisting in development here proved counterproductive.

My Indian friend and I found that an estimated $70,000 payroll was being squandered in this manner in view of the serious needs of the community for decent housing and improved education. An absurd situation when one is aware of the fact that less than 1,500 adults are available for employment at this reservation.

While it appears to me that it is the function of the Small Business Administration (SBA) to develop programs to encourage the development of small entrepreneur enterprises, I was puzzled when I discovered EDA and OEO have found this an area of their concern. I would point out that I am not against another agency fulfilling this need should the assumed agency for this kind of activity be remiss in its duties to the community.

Duplication again manifests itself in the unfortunate tendency to claim successful projects as belonging to that agency preparing its list of accomplishments. The 1968 Progress Report of one agency, for example, discusses the agency's role in American Indian work by naming one plant it claims is the "result" of two coastal "EDA and OEO sponsored industrial conferences." The fact is that the plant, (the only one mentioned in this brief account) was in operation before these conferences were held, largely due to the efforts of a third agency. Furthermore, the tribe put up the money for buildings, machinery and equipment.

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[2] *Ibid.*, p. 72.

While on the subject of those conferences, the appearance of almost as many Federal employees as Indians, and a grossly exaggerated figure of the number of industrialists that appeared, only seems to emphasize the need for centralizing and professionalizing the role of these agencies.[3]

Then there is the example of simultaneous studies for the same project, by two agencies having an interest on the same reservation. The studies were completed before either agency knew what the other was doing! Downgrading by one agency's efforts of the other, is the natural consequence of this circumstance.

This leads to another area that needs a thorough examination, that of the "feasibility studies" or a variation thereof.

There exists a mimeographed compilation (no identifiable source), entitled, "Tabulation of Studies and Surveys Conducted on Indian Reservations and in Indian Areas (Including Alaska Native Areas) 1961 to March 1, 1967." Funding agencies are listed, for the more than 200 studies, as the BIA, Area Redevelopment Administration (ARA) and two or three tribal contributions costing hundreds of thousands of dollars. Requests by me for some of these studies revealed that more than half of the 20 I requested were not to be found. I understand that this is not an uncommon experience for others who inquire about such studies. But far more serious is the fact that the Indians will probably not really benefit by most of these studies because of the lack of quality inherent in these productions. It might be of value to examine the firms that received these awards and whether they are actively and seriously engaged in the "consulting business," and what followup occurred, if any.

I would caution the reader to not construe my comments as a call for curtailment of necessary feasibility research in the area of economic development. Quite the contrary, the expenditure in this area should be increased. However, this expenditure should be aimed at a more fruitful return and benefit for the Indian rather than for the contractor.

I am reminded of one Indian who in a rare fit of anger said, "we are tired of being studied to death." These are cries, whether accurate or not, of frustration at the apparent lack of efficacy in some of this monumental planning.

It would be unfair of me to leave this subject without pointing out the fact that there have been numerous projects that have been developed from some of these studies and in all likelihood they would not have come to fruition had it not been for such preparatory activity.

One agency has attempted to activate economic development through grants and loans for public works projects, as well as loans for working capital. Its "Directory of Approved Projects" reveals some interesting aspects in regard to its activities in Indian reservations. It has "selected 15 reservations that have the greatest potential for economic and social development."[4] I am not sure that this is the proper and fair course to follow although, from the agency point of view, the chances of success are more likely!

This directory is interesting in that it allows for examination of another facet of possible abuse, that of the subject of accurate reporting there is no room for misleading accounts of activities that are being engaged in by these agencies. EDA "Directory of Approved Projects," as of September 1969, lists awards made throughout the country under "Public Works," "Grants" and "Loan" and another heading referred to as "Business Development." This report is somewhat misleading in the sense that when one glances at this directory, one would assume, for example, that these approved loans were on their way to the recipient of the project described.

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[3] *1968 Progress Report of the Economic Development Administration*, U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1968, p. 28.

[4] "1968 Progress Report of the Economic Development Administration" U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1968, p. 28.

The fact remains that a number of approved projects on Indian reservations have yet to receive their funds. An explanation given is that "these are conditional and they're holding up the loan by failing to comply." I believe this information should be so stated in the directory. In some cases, the time has extended over more than 1 year. Furthermore, this inordinate amount of time for processing has resulted in time-consuming activities that have discouraged applications and terminated interest in projects. The protracted time for processing of these applications seems to exist in virtually every Indian land in the country.

Since the assumed purpose of this expenditure is job production, there should be a reporting of how many jobs were created, in addition to an accurate accounting of the disposition of this money.

In one area in the Southwest, public works' grants "approved" totaled more than $2.2 million, and loans of well over $400,000. In addition, business development loans of over $2 million were likewise approved during the years of 1967–68. Perhaps this approval becomes more significant when one is informed of the fact that a 1963 population census compiled by the BIA lists this area as a reservation of having a population of less than 7,000: Wouldn't it be worthwhile to see how many *Indian* jobs were created as a result of these approved EDA expenditures in the past 3 years?

I took the time to call the BIA about one large loan (over $800,000) approved in 1967, and was told that the operation so funded has not yet produced a job. I do not propose, nor have the time to run through this complete listing, but I would presume that this Senate subcommittee could recommend a thorough examination of how efficiently these funds are being used.

As said before, the Government should, I believe, share the responsibility of assisting in these enterprises, although in a more discriminating manner. The EDA led project in Bethel, Alaska, to give natives decent housing, is undoubtedly worthwhile and the 1968 approved public works loans and grants of over $500,000 would seem to be warranted in this situation. By way of contrast, to the prior example, the population here is less than 9,000.

A better and more accurate reporting system of what plants or industrial firms are actually on reservations or nearby lands is mandatory. Just to have agencies breast-beating their promotions on a published list of named accomplishments is meaningless unless one knows not just the firm name, but relationship to parent firm, if any, how many are employed (10 or more?), constantly revised so as to indicate how many are actually operating, who funded the project (Indians?), and by exact percentage. (One list I have seen indicates a firm with 200 or more employed that has since gone broke, and needless to say, with it, the various approved agency fundings.)

In short, agencies should stop trying to set phony track records!

Finally, there is the agency that has been repeatedly asked for a breakdown of figures in regard to its expenditures on Indian lands and consistently sends a "Summary of Indian Participation in OEO Programs," with no figures: The other day I was informed of two senatorial requests that have been made in the past 6 months for these figures, with no success.

A BIA official said simply, "they make block grants and that ends that." Where some of these programs are indeed of value, for example, Headstart, CAP, job training, et cetera, how efficient are they if the administrators cannot be called upon to give an account of their activities in terms of the expenditure? Or worse, as was pointed out to me by a reservation Indian official, "what real voice have we got in these Indian programs?" I countered by saying that many Indians were employed in these programs on the reservation, and he said yes, but "must do and say what they're told by that Indian Division."

Other agency practices that bear some investigation are as follows:

> The Bureau of Indian Affairs administers the forests of the Flathead Reservation and takes ten percent of gross receipts as its "contribution" from the Indians toward the total cost. . . .
>
> The imposing total of these "deductions" is seen clearly when an Indian group receives its final settlement after receiving a judgment for a claim won by the Indians. The "costs" levied against the Indians by the Bureau of Indian Affairs frequently use up nearly all of the judgment funds, leaving a relatively small amount of money that actually reaches the Indian beneficiaries.[5]

Then there is the refusal of one agency to give prior credit, financia and feasibility information to an attorney who requested it more than 9 months ago in relation to his clients purchase of this particular agency's sponsored industrial project, previously gone broke.

This is further complicated by the charge of misrepresentation against the agency as regards the value and resources being conveyed.

Meanwhile, the Indians are not working.

Or the case of a tribe where one agency pledged Indian trust funds to another agency, so that the second agency might finance a project that the tribe's attorney claimed, was just a method of financing a continued nonreservation white man's operation. A threat of suit against the first agency brought a restoration of the funds removed without the tribe's authority.

Or the case of the agency recommending use of limited tribe funds in a business run to the ground by its non-Indian "operator." The marginal nature of the business and its operators doomed it from the beginning.

In fairness to the agencies, these are cases I have come across and do not suggest to me a general practice. However, even if isolated, they must be corrected by tightening of agency activities.

The budget of the United States, under the heading of Department of the Interior presents some interesting figures with regard to "commercial and industrial development." The following table appears:

	1968 actual	1969 estimated
New industrial enterprises established	36	29
New Indian jobs created	2,138	1,560

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[5] "Development of Indian Resources," p. 155.

With the need for more than 65,000 jobs in the next 5 years to normalize the unemployment situation among Indians, one can ask how much progress has really been achieved?

So much for the criticism. What can be offered that is constructive?

Without question, the training programs are needed expenses. The BIA, I was informed, spent approximately $24 million on training activities this past year. I have no knowledge as to the amount of funds expended under the Manpower Development Training Act (MDTA) or OEO in this area. In any event, this seems to me to be a form of expenditure where the returns are inherent in the investment.

There is a necessity to enlarge these expenditures outside of **the** area of the traditional on-the-job and apprentice training.

For example, there should be training in areas of job opportunity that are not directly related to immediate income-producing activity. The severe shortage of housing will have to be met and therefore, skills in this area might perhaps be improved to allow the Indians participation in greater numbers in this potential employment activity.

Furthermore, as a basic economy develops, due to the increased return from agriculture, use of mineral and timber resources, and/or industry, there will hopefully arise a commercial middle class. This means more Indian shopkeepers and other entrepreneurs. Training in the skills necessary for these activities should be established now (by one agency). One reservation I visited had 90 percent non-Indian ownership of commercial enterprises on its reservation. Some skills and funding could expedite the needed change in this area.

The subject of future Indian management and supervisory personnel should also be given priorities. There should be more training programs available in the area of advanced management skills. Funds should be also made available to send a number of promising Indians through courses in advanced business and public administration. Likewise, a number of promising Indians should be exposed to actual management situations through association with off-reservation corporate management activities.

The development of trained management offers the future possibility of greater participation, with those tribes so able and inclined, for joint-venture, and the creation of indigenous enterprises and commercial intrepreneurship.

I would like now to consider an area which I feel can increase, immeasurably, the number of job-producing enterprises and at the least cost to the Government. This is the area of more capital availability. I refer specifically to the area of tax incentives and bond financing power.

The experience of "Operation Bootstrap" in Puerto Rico has proved that corporate tax exemption for a limited period of time has been instrumental in turning this largely agrarian populace of 20 years ago into a viable industrial society.

Its problems were not too disimilar to those of the Indian Reservation. A possession territory (vis-a-vis a trust territory), which had a need to find adequate employment opportunities for its out of proportion unemployed population * * * a need for substantial investment in capital resources and educational activity to compensate for the lack of natural resources and usable land, sensitivity to transportation costs due to its comparitive isolation as well as the prior mentioned lack of natural resources and a comparatively small economic size for its local market.

In 1959, the per capita income of this island was only $469 per year, and now it is well over $1,100. The percentage of unemployment had been cut in half.

The success lies primarily in the industrial development program of Puerto Rico. A canvass I personally conducted a few years ago of about 30 manufacturers in the Island, revealed that 25 would not have located their facilities in Puerto Rico were it not for the tax exemption.

This does not mean that I advocate a tax exemption on the same basis as exists in Puerto Rico. However, there appears to be a need for the use of tax incentives (or credits) to stimulate the employment that will become necessary if this deprivation is to come to an end.

Incentives can take the form of tax credits on machinery, equipment or number employed, if the exemption for an across-the-board corporate taxes meets with too much opposition. (Although I personally favor this as the most dramatic and fruitful approach.) In any event, any of these exemptions or credits would have a period of duration for the industrial facility of perhaps 10 years.

There would be a need and ability to attract serious industry, rather than marginal firms that have already caused the Indians added grief. This could be controlled by a criteria of eligibility for tax exemption (or credit). For example, the firm is to be a legitimate subsidiary of an established corporation, not a runaway plant, with an anticipated minimum employment at commencement of operation.

Opponents of this method of subsidized financing, who oppose it on the grounds that good business does not seek "avoidance" of tax, should be informed of the fact that any tax exemption or credit given in this area is, in reality, more of a tax transfer than a giveaway, especially when one considers the expenditures presently coming from the national treasury.[6] The Indians would really be receiving a direct tax benefit.

Next the tribes should have the right of raising their own financing; this would result in increased independence from unwieldly bureacratic purse strings. If municipalities and counties have the right to issue tax exempt bonds, why shouldn't the reservations? These bonds have been a sine qua non to the island of Puerto Rico in its successful departure from the poverty line.

The present Revolving Loan Fund of the BIA does not seem to be adequate to the needs of the Indians. As one official in the BIA pointed out to me, very little money has gone into the industrial and commercial development area from this fund. The $450 million fund (as authorized by section 1 of act of 1963, as amended), is set up to provide a source of financing for Indians [7] who cannot borrow from other credit agencies or commercial lenders. Loans are made to tribes for relending purposes in such areas as economic development, education, preparation and trial of claims pending before the Indian Claims Commission, etc.

While this is indeed a commendable approach, it is not enough.

A bill introduced in the 90th Congress (H.R. 539), would provide for guarantee and insurance of loans to Indians and Indian organizations. This approach, has been very successful in financing industrial enterprises in the States of Connecticut and Rhode Island.

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[6] Contrary to some expressed views, there has been little exodus of successful plant operations due to expiration of tax exemption in Puerto Rico.

[7] "Authorized" does not mean appropriated.

It is apparent that a combination of these methods or one alone could make significant inroads into present existing conditions on these reservations.

I now return to one of the subjects of my initial complaint. The plethora of organizations involved in the development of Indian reservations on the Federal and State level.

I feel almost all of these functions should be placed in one all encompassing Indian Economic Development Administration (IEDA). This administration should be charged with the function of overseeing the use of Federal funds in this area. I believe that an Indian development company and an Indian development bank should be part of this administration. Financing and guarantees, equity ownership, industrial construction, assistance to local development projects in progress should be made through this organization. There should be a tax exemption or credit board that will pass on the merits of the projects requesting such relief, as being in the best interest of the Indians. This board should have as its members some Government officials, some Indians and representatives of industry. Likewise, another board should be created to assess the merits of assisting finanancially any projects which can further advance the economic growth of Indian lands.

A "data bank" should be immediately established within this Indian Economic Development Administration so that sensible feasibility studies can be made and research done in an industry-like manner, that is, research and development unit.

Furthermore, a small crack unit, of industrial location experts should be established. These are to be well-knowledgeable and connected individuals who can approach the very top echelons of industry. They should be hired on a consultive basis, except for a skeleton staff. If necessary, contracts should be attached to their performance; i.e., results.

Any tribe requesting assistance should be able to apply to what I call an "intelligence" unit to get free consulting on project inquiries. These inquiries are to be in the province of the tribe and the IEDA agency, only.

The development of tourism should be placed under the IEDA as a legitimate function of its activities.

Finally, the board (or other IEDA designate) should work closely with tribes during and *after* projects are activated. Since it is presumed the board would not engage in rivalry with another agency, it would be better able to ride through the occasional difficulty of tribal politics.

I note that while the tribe is sometimes to blame for the difficulties arising in development plans, it has not been beyond the scope of an agency to engage in mischievous activity through deliberate or negligent conduct on the part of its agents.

If the IEDA were not empowered to give out training labor funds through its industrial development company, then it must have direct liaison with one agency—for example Departmentof Labor—so that these funds can be made accessible in quick time. In short IEDA is to be a one-stop agency!

All education, health, and welfare matters would presumably remain in other agencies so charged with that responsibility. However, it would not be out of the province of IEDA to exert influence upon other agencies having responsibilities in the area of community development, and this is where the greatest effort must be placed. Closer liaison with housing and education agencies—not rivalry—is essential.

There should exist the possibility of tribes being able to draw on professional management, from the private sector, if they so desire. As previously pointed out, a number of industrial projects have failed and with it the loss sometimes, of limited Indian tribal capital because the so-called Government Indian experts were not up to the job of giving the Indians sound economic advice. Furthermore, projects that should have been considered more seriously were summarily turned aside or procrastinated upon so that the interested investor lost interest. An outside management adviser might also have the effect of lessening detrimental tribal political situations.

In closing, I offer some observations. It has been my experience that one cannot generalize about a monolithic American Indian. The tribes have different cultures and mores. They are trying and should be allowed to develop on their own terms, and in their own way. Their unique attachment to their land is nonexistent with any other ethnic group in this country. It is their security, their religion, their hope. The policy of the Government has for too many years been heavyhanded and when beneficial, at times, clouded by a kind of oppressive paternalism.

Yes, I realize the attitudes of many of the Federal employees is changing and the ward concept of Indian care is diminishing. However, I recall only last month of the refusal of two tribal officials to challenge what was an obviously detrimental policy of Federal officials in the area of economic development of that tribe for fear of retaliation by the local Federal authorities.

The policy in general should, I believe, be to phase the Federal Government off the reservation, except where health and related services are necessary.

The time has come for the Federal Government to be there to assist the Indian rather than lead or push him. It is sometimes a cycle where the massive presence of the Government over the Indian, inhibits the initiative to develop his own economic destinies. I emphasize that this generalization does not apply to all reservations or indicate present government policy.

I want to just touch briefly upon the reorganization plans that have been discussed in this area.

Whether the BIA should remain as an entity, needs close examination. And, likewise, whether these other agencies in the Indian business should continue their present functions, should certainly be the subject of concern.

I realize there are proposals to place the education and welfare functions of BIA in HEW, and these may have merit. My proposal for an IEDA would certainly necessitate a separate agency if it were adopted in full detail.

This would encompass a transfer and dissolution of present functions, in other agencies now charged with these areas of economic development activities.

However, my economic incentive measures could be acted upon under present organizational structure.

It is simple to conclude that what appears to be needed is a more dramatic and efficient use of the funds presently available for Indian development projects. This calls for a thorough examination of the past expenditures by these agencies. The General Accounting Office could aid considerably in evaluating the raison d'etre for their continued involvement in these programs.

Furthermore, there must be a greater effort to bring—with assistance from the Federal government—the currents of American business and industry into more of a partnership with the Indians. The goal in mind is an uprooting of those officials whose practices border on delinquent management of Indian affairs.

Finally, I reiterate, there must be a greater awareness of the individuality of the Indian and his tribe, and a respect for the right of the Indian to choose his own destinies. At best, the assistance he receives should increase his options in arriving at that choice. For surely, as the choice expands so will the pride that is so richly buried within the soul of this group of Americans.

This concomitant independence will inevitably result in the greater well-being and prosperity of this forgotten American, the first American.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND ALASKAN NATIVES*

By Arlon R. Tussing and Douglas N. Jones

FOREWORD

New discoveries of mineral wealth in Alaska create exciting prospects for that State and for its Native groups. In this excerpt from the Report of the Federal Field Committee for Development Planning in Alaska, Arlon Tussing and Douglas Jones describe the Alaskan economy and the economic position of the Natives in the various regions of Alaska. They then discuss the possible economic damage which may be being incurred due to the current freeze on the leasing of mineral rights, and the development possibilities which an eventual settlement will present for the Alaskan Natives.

The meaning of the native protests for economic development in Alaska is necessarily a central issue in their resolution. There is hardly any aspect of the general problem of the protests which is the subject of deeper and more persistent controversy. One source of conflict is the fact that the notion of economic development holds *different meanings* for different groups. To some it means factories, to others the commercial use of land resources, and to still others a self-sufficient homestead. The question in other terms is *whose* economic development is to be fostered.

Another difficulty is that even if the meaning of economic development can be agreed upon there are differing views as to its *proper measurement.* Typically, the measures are changes in employment and income. But the *distribution* of these gains—the labor force and population base against which they are measured—is equally important. Alaska natives cannot be expected to feel a stake in a pattern of economic growth in which the new jobs are almost exclusively filled by white in-migrants. Other less direct, but no less important, quasi-economic tests might be used if other values—say, the political and psychological dimensions—are given emphasis. In this case, a wider distribution of landownership and a greater feeling of participation in one's economic affairs might be the desired change.

A final problem is that of the *time frame* which is chosen for evaluating the economic consequences of development, however defined and however measured. Is it a short term, intermediate term, or long run time horizon that is the backdrop within which we progress? Economic development is, after all, a process; and this implies that longer term gains later on may come at the expense of short term gains now. Conflicts arising from different time horizons are not resolved simply by choosing a single "rate of discount" by which the present and the future can be compared. Such a procedure may be meaningful for the State or for a large corporation which can borrow or lend on the basis of future expectations, but it is meaningless to people without commercial assets or commercial attitudes.

The burden of analysis of the economic implications of the native protest and the attendant claims legislation involves at least four tasks,

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*From *Alaska Natives & the Land*, report of the Federal Field Committee for Development Planning in Alaska, Anchorage, 1968.

and these are the ones around which the subsequent writing centers. These are:

- To summarize the most important features of Alaska's economy and recent economic development;
- To discover whether or not corporate or governmental behavior has been different as a *result* of native protest and whether such different behavior has had an effect on economic development in Alaska; and to indicate whether or not sustained, unresolved controversy on the issue would affect economic development in Alaska;
- To evaluate the implications for Alaska natives of the most likely patterns of regional economic development; and
- To appraise the likely effects on economic development of various possible legislative provisions.

ALASKA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

One of the most important points to understand about the Alaska economy is its *enclave* or insular character. Population and productive activity are mostly concentrated in a very few locations at tidewater and in a narrow belt about 100 miles long, stretching from Palmer to Kenai, and centering in the city of Anchorage.

Economic activity is even more concentrated than population, both spatially and sectorally. The proportion of all employment in the State contributed by all commodity-producing industries is extremely low. A table showing Alaska's gross domestic product for 1965 (Figure VI-1) shows the particularly undeveloped and unbalanced nature of the economy in more striking detail. Less than 1 percent of the product came from agriculture, forestry, and fisheries combined; and mining accounted for less than 4 percent of the total, despite the fact that it is for the latter two industries that Alaska is most noted.

FIGURE VI-1.—ALASKA GROSS PRODUCT, 1960-65

[Millions of current dollars]

	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
Agriculture, forestry, and fishery	4.3	5.7	6.3	5.2	5.8	8.3
	.6	*.8*	*.8*	*.6*	*.6*	*.8*
Mining	28.3	34.4	38.8	37.2	36.2	38.3
	3.8	*4.6*	*4.8*	*4.5*	*3.9*	*3.7*
Contract construction	98.9	64.1	64.8	69.2	105.3	117.5
	13.2	*8.7*	*8.4*	*8.4*	*11.2*	*11.4*
Manufacturing	65.4	58.0	61.0	65.1	68.7	82.3
	8.8	*7.8*	*7.9*	*7.9*	*7.3*	*8.0*
Transportation	45.0	42.7	45.0	47.6	52.6	56.4
	6.0	*5.8*	*5.8*	*5.8*	*5.6*	*5.5*
Communications	34.2	59.8	55.1	55.5	53.0	55.0
	4.6	*8.1*	*7.2*	*6.7*	*5.6*	*5.3*
Electric, gas, and sanitary services	9.4	11.0	13.8	15.7	18.2	21.0
	1.3	*1.5*	*1.8*	*1.9*	*1.9*	*2.0*
Wholesale and retail trade	85.2	96.1	95.3	100.2	109.3	126.1
	11.4	*13.0*	*12.4*	*12.1*	*11.6*	*12.3*
Finance, insurance, and real estate	42.6	44.8	51.1	58.4	66.6	77.4
	5.7	*6.0*	*6.6*	*7.1*	*7.1*	*7.5*
Services	42.6	44.8	50.4	51.4	66.9	74.5
	5.7	*6.0*	*6.5*	*6.2*	*7.1*	*7.2*
Government and government enterprise	290.8	279.8	291.0	321.0	369.9	372.2
	39.9	*37.7*	*37.8*	*38.8*	*38.2*	*36.2*
Total	746.8	741.2	770.7	826.5	942.1	1029.5
	100.0	*100.0*	*100.0*	*100.0*	*100.0*	*100.0*

Source: Bradford H. Tuck, *An Aggregate Income Model of a Semi-Autonomous Alaskan Economy*, prepared for the Federal Field Committee for Development Planning in Alaska, Anchorage, 1967, p. 68.

Note: Italics denote percent.

Manufacturing, including the processing of primary products (fish packing, lumber, and pulp manufacture, etc.), and the so-called support industries (like baking, soft-drink bottling, and printing and publishing), contributed 8 percent of value added. Commodity production in its totality, then, made up only about one-eighth of the total volume of activity in Alaska's economy.

On the other hand, Government employment alone was directly responsible for well over one-third of Alaska gross income and product; and Government activity alone accounts for about two-fifths of all employment and for about half of all wage and salary payments in Alaska. In addition, the activity of the service sectors of the private economy and of construction ultimately depends largely upon the income injected into the State from Government expenditures. Government must ultimately account for substantially more than half of all economic activity in Alaska.

The large role played in Alaska's economy by the Federal Government, and particularly by defense activities and defense construction, together with the relatively small role of the State's resource industries, is *not*, however, representative of the forces for growth in the State. As shown in figure VI-2, the gross value of product in Alaska's extractive industries about doubled between 1960 and 1966.

FIGURE VI-2.—GROWTH IN COMMODITY INDUSTRIES BY VALUE OF PRODUCT

[Millions of dollars]

Industry	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966
Fisheries	$96.5	$128.7	$126.5	$104.7	$125.0	$166.5	$185.0
Forest products	47.3	44.7	49.7	50.1	58.0	57.5	67.8
Minerals	20.6	17.8	18.8	35.2	35.5	[1] 47.6	34.7
Oil and gas	1.3	17.0	28.4	32.7	35.5	35.6	50.2
Agriculture	5.4	5.5	5.8	5.5	5.6	5.2	5.5
Furs	4.8	4.2	4.3	4.4	4.4	5.8	[2] 7.0
Total	175.9	217.9	233.7	232.6	264.0	318.2	350.2

[1] Reflects postearthquake construction.
[2] Largely an increase in unit prices.
Source: Alaska Development Corporation, *Annual Report*.

Figures on *investment* rather than production would show an even more spectacular contrast and lead to the conclusion that it was oil and gas and their derivatives above all—exploration, development, and processing, as well as production—which are now the main engine of economic growth in Alaska. The discovery in 1968 of what appears to be the biggest oil field in North America certainly does not modify this judgment.

There has also been an expansion of Alaska-based fisheries operations, formerly concentrated almost wholly on salmon, into other species such as king crab, shrimp, and scallops.

Logging, pulp manufacture, and the cutting of roughly squared lumber for export to Japan have also expanded substantially so that by the fall of 1968 almost two-thirds of the State's allowable timber cut had been committed to production.

It cannot be too heavily emphasized that the above three resource groups—oil and gas, fish and timber—and their processing are now, together with tourism, the State's *only* basic growth industries and that the benefits from their growth are distributed exceedingly unevenly within the State. The growth of these resource-based activities has, of course, greatly stimulated the growth of supporting manufactures and services and of State and local government; but it is only mildly exaggerating to say that this growth of the "infrastructure and superstructure" has occurred entirely in the Anchorage-Kenai area.

On the whole, this concentration—indeed urbanization—has been beneficial to Alaska's overall development. It has reduced costs through economies of scale and through greater competition and has provided the Anchorage area with virtually all of the amenities of modern urban life. The developments of the last decade have, in addition, reduced the relative amplitude of seasonal fluctuations in income and employment.

This growth has, however, meant little to most Alaska natives. There has been some influx of natives into the urban centers, but most natives still live in small villages apart from the continental land transportation network and almost totally outside the mainstream of the economy.

Even more significant, however, is the *composition* of new employment. A comprehensive manpower and manpower-demand study of Alaska has yet to be done, but there is little doubt that the education and skill requirements for entry into the jobs being created by economic growth in Alaska are, on the average, exceptionally high, and are rising year by year. This circumstance was reflected already in the 1960 census by Alaska's median educational attainment for whites of 12.4 years compared with 10.9 for the United States as a whole.

The leading growth industry—oil and gas—is one of the most capital intensive and technology intensive of all commodity-producing industries and employs almost no unskilled or semiskilled labor.

Alaska's economic growth is expected to continue at a rapid pace along its present lines, and some of the most serious problems of economic backwardness and isolation (for instance, high prices and costs, and violent seasonal fluctuations) may be effectively mitigated in the urban core over the next few years. But it would not be surprising if this development took place without adding at all to the number of jobs which can be filled by persons without at least the equivalent of a high school education.[1]

SUBREGIONAL ASPECTS

The important economic aspects of each of Alaska's five subregions, defined in figure VI–3 (of the report), as they touch the native protests, are considered below.[2]

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[1] This is not to say that there will not be *any* new jobs created at minimum entry levels. The point is that any new positions of this type may well be more than offset by the disappearance of unskilled and semiskilled jobs in declining industries or trades, and resulting from automation, modernization, and upgrading of work in general. Under these circumstances, programs to place additional natives in minimum-entry jobs may succeed only to the extent they *redistribute* unemployment rather than alleviate it.

[2] The regional subdivision of Alaska used here is that prepared for the Federal field committee's "A Subregional Economic Analysis of Alaska," Anchorage, September 1968, which study provides a detailed description, analysis, and projection of the economies of the respective subregions.

Region I—*Southeastern Alaska*

The economy of southeastern Alaska is heavily dependent on government and distributive activities; virtually the State's entire timber industry and a large proportion of fishing activity are also based in the region. Commercial fishing is the most important occupation of the native people, and the subsistence economy is less important here than it is elsewhere in the State.

Because the bulk of the productive land in the region is national forest land, and because at least a partial resolution of the claims of the Haida and Tlingit Indians has already been achieved judicially, the "land freeze" has little effect here.

Region II—*Southcentral Alaska*

Southcentral Alaska comprises the economic heartland of the State. With the State's largest city, about half its population, virtually the entire oil and gas industry, and the bulk of its fishing industry, any action related to Native claims which affects the magnitude and pace of economic activity in this region cannot help but have a significant effect on the total economic and fiscal strength of the State. The effect of the land freeze on the oil and gas industry is treated a few pages hence; we take up here its impact in other fields.

The whole of the Chugach National Forest lies within the bounds of region II. The estimated allowable cut for the Chugach is 67 million board feet. Only a fraction of this has been cut. In the opinion of the U.S. Forest Service, the national forest will be unaffected by native land claims. In large part this view stems from the fact that the present Native claims legislation does not contemplate disturbing the national forests. The Congress could, of course, make a different settlement. The Statehood Act provides that communities may, for purposes of expansion, select "* * * from lands within national forests in Alaska which are vacant and unappropriated at the time of their selection not to exceed four hundred thousand acres of land * * *." So far the State has made requests amounting to fewer than 40,000 acres under this provision.

The State of Alaska has received tentative approval for its selected timberlands on the Kenai Peninsula, Shuyak Island, the Susitna Valley, and the Yakataga area. Major State sales include 96 million board feet on the Kenai and 100 million in the Susitna Valley. A sale in conjunction with a U.S. Forest Service sale was planned to include 100 million board feet of State timber on Shuyak Island, but was not consummated. Within a year the State expected to offer the Yakataga timber for sale. Estimated allowable cut there is about 29 million board feet yer year.

Unless present policy is changed, the State will not receive approval on any further timberland selections that it might make until the land claims have been settled.

The areas mentioned above should provide adequate inventory from the present to at least 2 years hence. When the time period 3 to 6 years is reached, the land claims may well have an effect. By that time, cutting on sales which have already been made may be in full swing.

Some additional demand could be met by further sales on land the State now controls. Should the resource be seriously depleted, however, it is quite possible that potential buyers would look to national forest timber for supply where they might normally have sought out State timber.

The major land selection which would be delayed by the land claims is the Copper River Valley area. The Bureau of Land Management is presently surveying and classifying this land area. It is understood that the State would like to select this land in about 5 years.

As to the Alaska Peninsula and the Aleutian Chain areas, it is concluded that there is no appreciable effect of the pending native land claims legislation. It did not deter investment in plant and equipment during the past 2 years, nor did it have an effect on the recent sale of the Dutch Harbor property by the General Services Administration; although these properties are outside the delineated land claims.

People in the fishing industry do not seem concerned. They are far more concerned about the fisheries resource than they are about lands on which to establish plants. It is anticipated that lands would be made available to the fishing industry, taking into consideration impending land claims, as long as they offered employment.

Other problems such as townsite planning, the use of wildlife refuges, and the relationship and use of military lands appear to play a greater role than do native land claims in this area.

Region III—*Kuskokwim Area*

The population of region III is about 13,000, about nine-tenths of whom are Alaska natives. Bluntly put, the region has no apparent base for economic growth. It has a rapidly growing population without local employment prospects and generally without the cultural, educational, and skill prerequisites for successful out-migration. In the foreseeable future, outside of the conversion of the present subsistence fishery in the Kuskokwim and Yukon Rivers to a more efficient commercial operation, any growth of opportunity either for employment or for enterprise in the region, will result directly from Government action. The only prospect for expansion of the public sector, in turn, can be anticipated as a result of efforts to overcome the cultural and economic handicaps of the region's population.

No instance is known in which the "land freeze" has hindered, delayed, or prevented any economic development project in the region. There can be no assurance, however, that a prolongation of the freeze for several years would not deter programs which depend on acquisition of mineral title or on timber sales. It should be pointed out, however, that there is no immediate prospect for action in either area under any circumstance.

Region IV—*Interior Alaska*

The economy of interior Alaska is concentrated in the Fairbanks area and is dominated by Government and distributive activities. The only conspicuous source of economic growth in recent years has been the University of Alaska and a Government-technical-scientific complex growing up around the University campus. Mining and agriculture have minor and declining roles in the area.

Interior Alaska's native population is approximately 6,500, or 13 percent of the total population. Outside of Fairbanks proper, most natives are still attached to the subsistence economy; and their most conspicuous sources of cash income are occasional construction work and Government employment together with welfare payments.

No instance is known in which the "land freeze" has prevented any commercial development. Its continuation would, of course, be an obstacle to mineral development in this highly mineralized area, assuming, of course, that significant discoveries would otherwise be made and produced.

Region V—*Northwest Alaska*

This area, with a population of about 12,300, of which about nine-tenths are Eskimos, is almost totally undeveloped; but it is the site of the recent spectacular oil discoveries. The potential for economic development rests largely in minerals and tourism. At present no mineral production is being carried out, but the north slope as a whole may turn out to be one of the world's richest petroleum provinces and the general geology of the Brooks Ranges suggests the possibility of major developments in metallic ores. Actual production of either is unlikely within 4 or 5 years, and the future of the mineral industries in the area is still highly speculative. In the present primitive state of mapping, surveys, and exploration, statements about the regions' "vast mineral wealth" are prophesies of the faithful more than assertion of fact. Nevertheless, indications of oil and gas and of other commerce mineral prospects are sufficient to encourage substantial private investment in exploration. Discounting for the uncertainties of discovery and eventual production, the present value in the private market of all petroleum and natural gas rights on north slope land yet to be leased, including Naval Petroleum Reserve No. 4, is probably in the order of hundreds of millions of dollars.

Even in advance of possible production, the exploration investment in region V and the public revenues generated from leases will be enormous in resident *per capita* terms, as will the gross value of product and public royalties and revenues when any production begins. But these flows will not generate a direct demand for the labor of local Eskimos *at their present levels of acculturation, education, and skills*, and in conformity with their present customs of employment and livelihood, so that the constructive impact on the indigenous economy may not be great.

No instance in which the "land freeze" has hindered, delayed, or prevented any economic development project has been found. All present or anticipated programs are being carried out or are planned offshore, on private land, or on existing leases or withdrawals. There can, however, be no assurance that prolongation of the freeze for several years will deter programs which depend on acquisition of new mineral title or lease.

GOVERNMENT AND OIL INDUSTRY PERCEPTIONS

Perhaps as important as whether or how the fact of native protest or the provisions of the attending legislation "should" have implications for the economic development of Alaska is how decisional parties—governmental and corporate—*perceive* implications to the protest and claims. Two quotations are representative of the State's view. The Alaska Division of Lands recent annual report contains the remarks:

> The State's land selection program continues to be restricted by a Federal policy of refusal to take final action on lands which are under recorded native land claims. There are now 40 such claims. They cover most of Alaska's 365 million acres, and because of overlapping, total more than the State's entire acreage.
>
> The Interior Department's policy of "no final action" means that tentative approval is not granted on State selections, and without tentative approval the State has not been able to assume management of the selected land. This, of course, means the State is not able to proceed as rapidly as desired in moving land into the hands of private ownership.[3]

In this last connection it should be pointed out that Interior's policy derives from the Administrative Procedures Act which requires a *finding* on protested government actions and is, therefore, not to be viewed as arbitrary and capricious.

In the same publication, the section on oil and gas leasing activity contains the observation:

> The decision of the Federal Government to suspend issue of leases in cases where the land is under native claim has had a definite adverse effect on rental revenues to the State. Alaska is entitled to 90 percent of oil and gas lease revenues, but the total revenue continues to decline because expiring leases are not renewed and new leases are not issued. The rental income to Alaska from Federal oil and gas leases, topped $4 million in 1966, but dropped to $3,526,398.20 in 1967.[4]

Less conclusive is the University of Alaska's recent analysis of the impact of the freeze. The university publication states:

> Actual effect of the freeze on future oil and gas development is open to conjecture. Presently the freeze is stimulating drilling on some Federal leases, especially the Alaska Peninsula. This increased activity has resulted because the Federal leases in this area will be the first to expire and oil companies want to eliminate these areas from their list of prospects before the expiration dates do so automatically. If production is developed on a Federal leasehold, the lease is automatically renewable and, therefore, not subject to the restrictions of the freeze. Present indications are that the only districts in which oil company activity is actually slowing down are the Copper River Basin and along the Gulf of Alaska shoreline—and activity in these areas may have slowed without the freeze. However, if the freeze continues over a period of years, gaps will occur in potential drilling blocks in these and other areas that could depress future explorations in Alaska.[5]

It is notoriously difficult to get the industry view of any issue on the Alaska petroleum scene. This is not usually a matter of secretiveness on the part of the industry but more frequently a recognition of the fact that individual members—and, indeed, individuals within a single company—have quite divergent views on most questions at issue. In an effort to get some insight into what some members of the oil and gas industry see as the effect of native protest on their activities, a group (35) of landmen responsible for advising their corporations on land availability, leasing and acquiring rights, negotiating land contracts, and the like was contacted. The questions posed each member and the distribution of responses follow:

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[3] *Alaska Division of Lands 1967 Annual Report,* State of Alaska, Department of Natural Resources, Anchorage, Alaska, pp. 9–10.

[4] *Ibid,* p. 4.

[5] Judy Brady, "Native Land Claims," *Alaska Monthly Review of Business and Economic Conditions,* vol. IV, No. 6 (November 1967), University of Alaska, Institute of Social, Economic and Government Research, pp. 8–9.

> *Question.*—What effect, if any, has the native land protest—and the land freeze—had on your company's behavior in Alaska?

Sixty-two percent of the respondents advised that the land freeze had an adverse effect on their company's exploratory activities in Alaska. Thirty-one percent advised that the land freeze had no noticeable effect to date. Seven percent advised the question was not applicable to the company's operations.

> *Question.*—What effect could it have on your company's behavior in Alaska in the future?

Ninety-three percent of the respondents felt that the continuance of the land freeze would seriously limit and possibly halt their company's efforts in Alaska. Seven percent advised the question was not applicable to the company's operations.

> *Question.*—Do you believe the recent California lease activity on the part of the industry in any way involves committing corporate monies there that might have been directed to Alaska in the absence of native protest and land freeze?

Fifty-three percent of the respondents advised that the land freeze did not affect their company's participation in recent California lease activity. Twenty-three percent advised that they felt their company spent more money at the recent California sale than they would have had they been otherwise committed in Alaska. Three respondents advised that they feel the land freeze has released exploration monies not only for use in California but in other areas in the United States as well. Seven percent of the respondents advised that there was little comparison between the recent Santa Barbara sale and oil activities in Alaska. They felt that their companies were purchasing known producing structures as opposed to attempting to delineate such oil fields in Alaska.

Within these generalized conclusions, several particular responses brought out the move to substitute exploration of Outer Continental Shelf lands in Alaska for onshore lands, the difficulty and cost of altering the 5-year budget plans which typify the exploration process—on the point of forecasting corporate activity in foreign or other domestic areas—and the all-pervasive mood of uncertainty and instability they see as surrounding land matters.

Almost all comments from any source on the economic effects of native protest cite the so-called land freeze as the central source of immediate difficulty. It seems fair to say that the freeze is looked upon by business as a much greater obstacle to development than cloudiness of land titles. This, of course, is understandable in that the freeze is explicit and certain and the ultimate resolution of ownership is quite unclear.

The freeze affects all land disposal cases situated in claim areas, including State selection; final action on homesteads, homesites, trade and manufacturing, power and airport sites; road rights-of-way; mining claims; and the like. The freeze does not directly affect Federal lands already under lease nor does it affect State-owned lands, including tidal and submerged lands. Further leasing of federally administered lands and tentative-approval lands was stopped, however.[6]

The prevailing view of the actual and potential results of this paralysis is captured in the testimony of one former senior State official in the land field. He writes:

> * * * The welfare of all Alaskans and the economic stability of the State itself is dependent upon accelerated rather than delayed development of the resources * * *. [The] recent freeze on issuing oil and gas leases on land covered by native claims, has proven costly financially to the Federal and State governments. It promises to be far more costly in delayed resource development.[7]

Further, he concludes:

> Although the Federal Government can tolerate delays resulting from decisions, cumbersome legal proceedings or from lack of appropriations, Alaska cannot permit such delays which often mean lost opportunity for securing commitments of development capital.[8]

On the face of it, one might imagine that the question of ownership of land—or, indeed, even the matter of land in disputed ownership—might not "make any difference" to the interested business party (for example, oil companies) as long as it was leaseable. But even here there are economic implications that turn on the nature and provisions of ownership. Lease payments would be 50 cents per acre per year with State ownership. Similarly, royalty payments would be at a rate of 16½ percent. The terms of leases under possible native association ownership are today simply conjectural. Further, there is the question of the patterns of offerings, their frequency, size, and location, and how these might differ under varying ownership. Finally, the issue of the administrative and managerial skill levels and experiences under different ownership arrangements is probably viewed by most State and industry officials along the lines of the following quotation:

> Once the "freeze is lifted," mineral exploration and development can proceed promptly if established and tested laws and regulations are in effect * * *. If the mineral rights are transferred to Native groups, development will unquestionably be delayed and discouraged simply because of the uncertainties attendant upon drafting and adoption of rules, regulations, and operating procedures. The significance of Alaskan mineral re-

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[6] Writing to this point, the University of Alaska analysis of Native claims includes the comment: "The history of leasing in Alaska has shown that 20 to 25 per cent of the federal leases are dropped or expire each year. These leases have been replaced by enough new leases to keep the level fairly stable. Under the freeze, with virtually no new federal leases being issued to replace those dropped, the acreage under federal lease has dropped from approximately 10 million in May of 1966 to about 7.8 million at the end of May 1967." *Ibid.*, p. 8.

[7] Testimony of Roscoe E. Bell, consultant to the Alaska Land Law Study team of the Public Land Law Review Commission and lecturer in natural resources, University of Wisconsin, on S–2906 in letter to Senator Henry Jackson, chairman of the committee holding hearings on the legislation.

[8] *Ibid.*

> source development justifies retention of the mineral rights by the Federal or State government or at least mineral management by the Government agencies.[9]

It should be explicitly acknowledged, of course, that judgments about the character and quality of native management of land resources that might be granted by legislative settlement are highly speculative. So long as land and mineral title is not so fragmented as to make rational management impossible, there is no reason to expect the quality of business talent engaged by native groups to be inferior to that of the State. On the contrary, the management of native investment corporations might be expected to be more single-mindedly devoted to maximizing the commercial value of their assets than would management agencies of the Federal or State government, which face many more conflicting policy objectives and constraints.

There is another important dimension to the whole "supply side" of the equation that is generally discussed above. This is the behavior of Government—State and local agencies and other Federal agencies—in the face of native protest, the Department of the Interior's "land freeze," and pending claims legislation. Here, too, the effects are several, with varying degrees of impact on the orderly growth and development of the State. One is the conflict between claims legislation and land selection rights granted by the Statehood Act, that is, given the fact that land suitable for selection is not unlimited in quantity, a large acreage grant to native claims could reduce the amount of desirable land available for State selection.

A second and related item is the fact that the extensive existing Federal land withdrawals around the State will be seen as increasingly desirable in the competion for land of value. Earlier withdrawals will very likely come under growing pressure for review and reclassification. This, of course, is quite consonant with the charge of the Public Land Law Review Commission.

A third effect is that agencies may well pursue their normal program in the land-management or related fields with less vigor than they otherwise would or may redirect their efforts away from some areas in favor of others on the basis of native protests. Examples here might be found in airport facilities work, grazing permits, land classification, and wilderness and parks and recreation activities. Any relative retrenchment on the part of agency programs in a State where government is such a dominant phenomenon in the economy cannot have neutral effects.

A "demand analysis" of the issue points up several considerations. There is a danger of viewing corporate (and, perhaps, Government) behavior in too narrow a context. It could well be the case that industry conditions of prices, markets, costs, and internal company concerns of budgets, cash flow, utilization of facilities, and substitute opportunities elsewhere may be more determinative of business behavior than the fact of native protest and legislation—or at least the latter may be only governing at the margin. Then, too, there is the possibility that the native protest may be used as a handy scapegoat—a ready explanation for business to taper off the level of their activities contemplated for other reasons.

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[9] *Ibid.*

Use and Management of Resources

Alaska's wildlife resources which are of national significance are afforded habitat preservation and management by the Federal Government. While Alaska native populations depend in whole or in part upon biotic resources in order to sustain life and while many of Alaska's wildlife resources are of national significance, there is little conflict between the national wildlife objectives and native subsistence requirements, with the possible exception of some migratory bird nesting populations. Increasing conflict between the sport or commercial harvest of wildlife resources and the subsistence harvest of these same resources by the native people is, however, developing.

Legislative jurisdiction for all wildlife resources, except for migratory birds, is vested in the State of Alaska. On the other hand, proprietary jurisdiction of most of Alaska, the habitat of wildlife, is vested, at this point in time, primarily in the Federal Government which has the right to prescribe who, where, and in what manner persons may enter, travel across, and conduct activities upon land within its jurisdiction.

As in the case of wildlife resources, the native "property right" in the fishery resource was "taken" when legislative jurisdiction over fish and wildlife resources passed to the State by virtue of the Statehood Act. Alaska's native people rely heavily upon the fisheries, but they share in these resources only as members of the general public.

The fishery resource is a natural resource which offers immediate direct promise for major economic participation; one in which natives can compete as wage earners with moderate outlays of capital. It is a renewable resource with which natives are familiar.

The general development and allocation of Alaska water resources is essential to economic growth and community welfare in Alaska. Furthermore, Alaska is a region of water surplus and is considered as a future potential continental water source for water-deficient areas in the western United States and Canada. While the largest possible use for Alaska water resources is hydroelectric power development, this, with the exception of a few sites, does not exhibit favorable cost-benefit ratios. The Federal withdrawal of many hydroelectric power sites which have no foreseeable reservoir areas, however, prevents a conflict with potential land ownership to many native groups and villages.

Many Alaska aboriginal groups recognized a "user right" to individuals or families for a net, weir, or other fish catching place on a river or lake; no such exclusive "right" now exists on navigable waters because the Statehood Act extinguished any personal proprietorship and vested general ownership of lands beneath navigable waters in the State.

There is need to provide watershed protection to water source supplies for Alaska's cities, towns, and villages. Depending upon location and physiography, community watersheds may have to be of considerable size in order to provide for safe and adequate supplies in the future. There is need also to provide land for public flood plain zoning in many regions of Alaska as economic and community growth increases.

Alaska possesses 16 percent of all U.S. forest resources. Nearly all forest resources of Alaska are subject to Federal jurisdiction. The important commercial forests of the coastal zone are administered by the U.S. Forest Service within the Chugach and Tongass National Forests. Interior forests on the public domain, comprising 32 percent of the total land area of Alaska, 21 percent of which is commercial timber, are administered by the Bureau of Land Management. These interior forests are subject to State selection and also offer a possible resource to native claimants.

Almost all available cropland in Alaska has been selected by the State or patented to private interests. The undeveloped agricultural resource significant to native claimants and nonnatives alike, however, is grazing land—particularly on the Alaska Peninsula, Kodiak Island, and the Aleutian Islands. With improved transportation and changing economic feasibility, livestock production (cattle and sheep) is a potential expandable use for the grasslands of western Alaska. However, conflict with wildlife use of the same lands is probable; and at the present time, wildlife is the more economically valuable resource. A particularly important grazing land use occurs on lands of the Seward Peninsula, St. Lawrence Island, and Nunivak Island and a few other small areas of western Alaska where native reindeer husbandry is practiced.

Although present areas of intensive recreational use cover less than one-sixth of Alaska—chiefly in areas adjoining the major communities—the recreational resources of the State are one of the most potentially valuable economic assets of the Nation, State, and natives in the years ahead. Estimates are that by 1980 nearly three-quarters of a million tourists will have visited Alaska, adding thereby $225 million to the Alaskan economy in the 15 years following 1964.

The potential wealth of Alaska mineral and oil and gas resources is not known, although it is estimated to be many billions of dollars. So little of the State's geology is understood—many regions of the State being virtually unexplored—that it is impossible to pattern a rational distribution of land based upon mineral wealth. Nevertheless, sufficient knowledge exists to say that geologic distribution of known deposits is extremely unequal and variable.

ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF SETTLEMENT

Any forecast of the pace and pattern of economic development in Alaska is limited by the accuracy of its assumptions and must be accepted with great caution. The same caution is required with respect to forecasts of the economic consequences of any legislative package designed to settle the native claims. The following remarks are intended to set out in what general *direction* will be the probable effect on the economic status of the natives and on Alaska's general economic development of the individual elements of various settlement proposals, including those before the Congress.

PROTECTION OF SUBSISTENCE RESOURCES

None of the legislation introduced so far deals in a definitive way with protection of fish and wildlife stocks used in the indigenous economy, or with protection of native access to these stocks. With the partial exception of migratory wildfowl, fish and game are a matter of

State title and State responsibility. Article VIII, section 3, of the State constitution appears to preclude establishing proprietary rights in fish or wildlife harvests.[12] Under these circumstances, the only provisions of any of the existing bills which might affect *exclusive* native access to fish or wildlife resources would be large grants of land in fee simple, or unrestricted grants of the surface estate. Such measures, while not conveying a property right in fish or wildlife, would enable native proprietors to post the land against entry by others for hunting, fishing, or trapping.

Congress might, however, protect public access, native and non-native, to fish and wildlife by providing that State-selected land and other land withdrawn from the public domain in Alaska for other purposes remain open in perpetuity to (all) the public for hunting, fishing, and trapping. Under either of these provisions, the harvest in fact available to natives would still depend upon State management and regulations.

The general economic impact of legislation in this area would depend upon the amount and location of lands and waters involved. There might conceivably be local effects on recreation and tourist-oriented enterprise, but these effects in the aggregate are not likely to be large.

GRANTS OF HOMESITES, TOWNSITES, AND SPECIAL-PURPOSE LOCATIONS

The absence of title to land occupied by natives in Alaska villages is clearly an obstacle to financing homes, businesses, and community facilities. The grant of title to these lands would just as clearly have a beneficial effect on the village economy. The same is true of grants of land for expansion in the vicinity of each village. One necessary reservation here is that, unless some provision is made for future exchanges of land or otherwise for the occupation of new sites, families and communities may be tied to places which turn out to be poorly located from an economic or some other standpoint.

Grants of land title for homesites, businesses, community facilities, and special-purpose locations such as fish camps and burial grounds should not be expected to have any negative effects on general economic development. Some question might be raised about sites in existing withdrawals such as national forests. The total area of land involved is so small, however, that we can find no instance in which such transfers would subvert the purposes of the original withdrawal.

INDIVIDUAL LAND GRANTS

The aggregate impact of granting individuals fee simple ownership, or title to either the surface estate or the mineral estate, on large tracts of land is extremely difficult to predict. It is obvious, however, that the benefits would be very unevenly distributed, both because of the wide differences in value of land resource, and because of wide differences in individuals' ability to manage and exploit these resources. Some individuals would undoubtedly become very wealthy, while a great number would probably not benefit at all.

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[12] "*Common use.* Wherever occurring in a natural state, fish, wildlife, and waters are reserved to the people for common use." In addition, sec. 15 of the same article reads, "*No exclusive right of fishery.* No exclusive right or special privilege of fisheries shall be created or authorized in the natural waters of the State." *Alaska State Constitution.*

It is not clear whether such a provision would on balance speed up or retard commercial development of Alaska resources. What probably can be said is that the time horizons of individual proprietors would be shorter, and their focus narrower, than would be the case with Government management.

LAND GRANTS TO NATIVE CORPORATIONS OR NATIVE ASSOCIATIONS

There is no reason to expect the quality of management employed by native associations to be on the average inferior to that available to the State. Generalizations about management policy, however, are extremely speculative. On balance, ownership by native corporations, like private ownership in general, would probably result in a more rapid rate of development and a greater concern for maximizing the economic returns from the land resources than would management by Government agencies. For instance, native corporations would probably not require primary processing of extractive products or "sustained-yield" timber management except where they were clearly justified in dollar terms. Native corporations in attempting to maximize their net incomes from the land would pursue a multiple-use policy, and in doing so would probably be able to resolve conflicts among competing *commercial* land uses more economically and more satisfactorily than would Government. On the other hand, to the extent their policies reflected a single-minded concern with the commercial revenues of the land, they might be less concerned than would Government with such nonmonetary and collective values as those of wilderness and scenery.

The previous treatment assumes that native corporations would manage their land grants for their income rather than distributing them to individuals or selling out in order to distribute the proceeds. The impact of either of these policies on native welfare would approximate that of individual land grants and individual cash settlements, respectively. Grants of commercially valuable land managed for its income by native corporations could be expected to provide an income flow to individual families and to provide a source of capital which native enterprise could invest in other lines of business and capital for community improvements. It would also provide openings for the development of native managerial talent.

INDIVIDUAL LUMP-SUM SETTLEMENTS

It is again difficult to generalize about the impact of lump-sum individual payments on native welfare except to say that the effects would vary immensely among individuals. Some natives undoubtedly would invest their money very effectively; but because of poverty, lack of education and of commercial attitudes, a great number of recipients would undoubtedly soon be no better off than they were before receiving the grant.

For the same reason (i.e., the natives' high propensity to consume), the lump-sum settlement to individuals would probably be a sharp stimulus to the general Alaska economy, but this stimulus would be of a "once-and-for-all" nature and would leave little lasting impact on Alaska income or employment.

INDIVIDUAL CASH ANNUITIES

Substantial cash grants to individuals, distributed regularly over a long period of time, might be expected to make a contribution to native living standards proportionate to the size of the grant, and to be a corresponding stimulus to the regional economy. It is not clear, however, that such payments would be any different in principle or in effect from increased, universal, public-assistance distributions.[13]

CASH SETTLEMENTS TO NATIVE ASSOCIATIONS OR CORPORATIONS

A large cash settlement distributed to a native corporation or corporations, if treated as investment capital rather than distributed to individuals, could be expected to provide a continuing stream of income to individuals as well as a source of funds for enterprise and for community development. It would also provide openings for the development of native management talent. Beyond this it is difficult to generalize, because the impact both on welfare of individual natives and on overall economic development would depend on the investment policies pursued, and on the managerial skills provided by, or hired by, the native groups.

SHARE OF REVENUES FROM PUBLIC LANDS (AND/OR OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF)

Distribution to natives of a specified share of revenues from all or from certain kinds of public lands in Alaska would have effects on native welfare similar to that of cash disbursements and would vary similarly depending on whether the payments were to individuals or to a native corporations. In the latter case, they would vary depending on the managerial skills available to, and the policies of, those corporations. Unlike grants of commercially valuable lands to individuals or to native corporations, land and resource management would remain a government responsibility and would probably be pursued with a broader range of policy objectives than would be the case under private ownership. The flow of funds to native individuals or groups would begin sooner than they would in the case of grants of land title, unless the latter included lands presently under mineral lease.

Any increased investment or expenditure in the State resulting from these payments would clearly be an impetus to overall economic development, except to the extent they preempted a share of royalties, lease payments, or timber sales revenues which would otherwise accrue to State or local government. The net effect on economic development in the latter case is not clear.

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[13] This study is not the proper place for a full discussion of the philosophy and economics of welfare. Existing public-assistance programs are under critical examination throughout the United States, and several alternatives are being widely considered. It is appropriate to point out here, however, that some kind of family income maintenance program will be required in rural Alaska for many years. We would hesitate to generalize about the relationship of public-assistance payments to the feelings of self-respect and to the economic motivations of Alaska natives, but it is clear there is a close connnection among them in the thinking on the cultural majority in America. Unearned income is regarded as degrading and disgraceful if the recipient gets it because he is poor and unemployed. But such income is highly respectable if it comes from the ownership of land or of securities. This consideration suggests that, dollar for dollar, public funds distributed to Alaska natives may be more effective in raising ther social and economc status if done wisely as part of a land-claims settlement than if done as public assistance.

TAX EXEMPTION

Tax exemptions *could* have significant fiscal implications for the State and local government. The real estate exemption of S.B. 3586, for instance, keeps all the lands granted off the property tax rolls whether they are "in fee or in trust." This provision applies as well to any minerals associated with the land grant which could otherwise be made subject to *ad valorem* levies where tax bodies existed. Conceivably, these sums might amount to considerable amounts of public receipts foregone. Some caution is appropriate here, however, in that too early and too much land taxation can result in confiscation of the land, which result would clearly be counterproductive to the policy resolution intended.

The problem here seems to be to distinguish among the different purposes for which land might be granted. In the case of homesites, fishing camps, and the like, or of lands granted to protect subsistence activities, maximum insurance is required against confiscation because of the owner's inability to pay taxes. In the case of grants of commercially valuable land for income purposes, however, the point is to get them into a productive, income-earning position and, indeed, to get them *on* the tax rolls. To the extent that these lands are in fact capable of producing income, there is no obvious justification for keeping them off the tax rolls simply because they happen to be owned by natives or native groups.

Any provision, however, that initial cash payments under the Act are not taxable means simply that any monetary settlement is effectively larger in disposable income than its nominal dollar amount.

The provision in S.B. 3586 relating to section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code indicates that another nonprofit enterprise would be created, a corporate status which is currently under serious review by government and public-finance scholars alike. In a State the vast bulk of whose land and a great proportion of whose capital assets are already exempt from taxation, there seems to be no economic justification for this further departure from tax uniformity.

CORPORATE ORGANIZATION, TRUSTEESHIP, AND PROPERTY ALIENATION

To the extent that lump sums, tracts of commercially valuable land, or a share of the revenue from public lands in Alaska are transferred to native corporations, a major purpose is to assist the natives as a group to get a firm footing within the money economy and the capitalistic organization of the United States. Other aspects of the claims settlement may be designed to protect those natives and native communities which wish to maintain intact their nonmarket economy and their distinctive ways of life. But legislation providing a special role for native development corporations is directed toward economic equality for natives with other Americans, and toward their economic integration into the life of the Nation. For this reason, provisions establishing any trusteeship over the capital assets of the natives, including land, or establishing a special status for native development corporations, should be carefully examined and the time span of these provisions carefully considered.

The desire to protect a vulnerable people from exploitation or expropriation must be balanced against the desirability of giving them early control over their own livelihood and their own assets, and against the community's interest in avoiding franchise to private monopolies and special privilege. While restrictions on land transfer or stock sales to nonnative provide some protection to the improvident and the gullible, these restrictions will sharply reduce the *value* of the assets involved. Land which cannot be alienated cannot be mortgaged. If the land is the owner's only capital assets, he is tied to it economically as securely as if he were a serf. Stock in a native corporation which can be sold only to eligible natives is *ceteris paribus* worth less than stock which can be sold to anyone; stock which cannot be sold at all is, of course, worth even less. To the extent that the property of individual natives or of native corporations is encumbered either by law or by covenant, the value of that property will be reduced, the economic freedom of the natives impaired, and the most productive use of land and capital discouraged.

The bills so far presented to Congress for settlement of the land claims include two distinct approaches to protecting both native assets and the public interest during a prolonged transition to full equality. One approach would hold much of the natives' assets in trust and would rely heavily on the discretion of the Secretary of the Interior. The second approach, together with or separate from the first, provides a multitude of special provisions for native development corporations, including tax exemptions and restrictions on the disposal of their assets and on stock ownership. Congress may wish to consider whether either apparatus is really necessary, if the native development corporations commence with sufficient economic scale in terms of cash, land title, revenue shares, or some combination thereof, to reduce uncertainty about future income to acceptable levels, to distribute its benefits widely among the native communities of Alaska, and to engage first-rate professional management. In this case, the public interest, native and nonnative alike, might best be served by the early transformation of the native development corporation into one with all the rights and responsibilities of other businesses in our economy.

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